Collective Punishment for a Non-Collective

Today the Bahraini government begins its holy grail of court cases. Twenty-one of the country's top political opposition leaders (7 in absentia) stand collectively in a "Lower National Safety Court" (although the state of "national safety" itself has now been revoked). The Bahrain News Agency cites 12 different charges, most of them falling under the country's vague anti-terrorism law of 2006, among which are included:

7. Insult[ing] the army. ...
9. Broadcasting false news and rumours that caused the threatening of public security and inflecting damage to public interest. ...
10. Inciting the hatred of a certain sect of people. ...

One might go on about the conditions of the case itself: most of the detainees have been held incommunicado since arrest; many were beaten at the time of arrest; some have reported being tortured; and defense attorneys were given less than 24 hours notice before the beginning of the trial. And, most ironically, many of these individuals were PARDONED on almost IDENTICAL "terrorism" charges soon after protests began in February, which seems like a strange thing to do if you really believe them to be part of a terrorist conspiracy.

Yet the most striking thing is that this incredibly diverse group of individuals is being tried collectively as members of a coherent terrorist organization. During my time in Bahrain I had the opportunity to interview 4 of those now on trial as part of my dissertation research, and to say that they represent a coherent group of any sort, much less a coherent "terrorist organization," is difficult to square with the patent ideological and political differences that distinguish them.

Those on trial represent five main opposition groups: al-Haqq (e.g., al-Mushaimi', al-Singace, al-Sumaikh), al-Wafa' ('Abd al-Wahhab Hussain, al-Miqdad, al-Nuri), the BCHR (al-Khawajah), Islamic Action (Salah al-Khawajah), and Wa'ad (Sharif). Two of these (Wa'ad and Islamic Action) were perfectly legal organizations until just weeks ago when they were dissolved, while the rest have been "illegal" for some time.

Now, the most obvious odd-man out is Ebrahim Sharif, a secular Sunni whose only connection with the others is that he is an opposition leader and rallied against the government in February and March. His organization, more properly the National Democratic Action Society, is a leftist group that has fielded candidates in each of the last two parliamentary elections (it boycotted in 2002), but since Bahrain's electoral districts are gerrymandered around ethnic lines, Wa'ad (as other secular societies) has not succeeded in winning a single seat despite capturing a relatively large proportion of the popular votes in both 2006 and 2010. (In fact, according to the my 2009 survey, about 10% of Bahraini Shi'a identify with Wa'ad.) Thus among Sharif's biggest gripes is that Bahrain's political system institutionalizes religious-based affiliations to the detriment of secularists such as himself (and he would, say, to the detriment to the country more generally). Sounds like a real terrorist, right?

The other groups are all Shi'a-dominated organizations and, far from cooperating in the service of some larger "terrorist" agenda, tend in fact not to get along so well. Sure, al-Haqq and al-Wafa' (and the London-based Bahrain Freedom Movement) combined to form the "Coalition for a Republic," but historically the relationship between the two has not been so cooperative. That is because al-Wafa' exists precisely as a counterpoint to al-Haqq, which critics (especially al-Wifaq supporters) accuse of lacking religious legitimacy.

The leaders of al-Wafa', then, decided in early 2009 to create a new movement (indeed "the New Movement" was its name for a while) that would rectify this limitation of al-Haqq. By combining political clout ('Abd al-Wahhab Hussain) with religious authority (Sh. al-Miqdad), the idea was to offer a new protest movement that detractors could not dismiss as acting without religious legitimacy. Understandably, however, this move did not sit well with everyone in al-Haqq, especially since 'Abd al-Wahhab Hussain was some years ago among its top leadership.

The al-Khawajahs (representing the BCHR and al-Amal), finally, form yet another category of Shi'a opposition with no connection to al-Haqq or al-Wafa'. These groups, long associated with the "Shirazi" supporters of Ayatallah Hadi al-Mudarrisi, are ideologically at odds not only with the majority of Bahrain's Shi'a (who follow the more mainstream principle of waliyat al-faqih) but with the Iranian regime itself. Indeed, during the 'Ashura' ceremony one finds much evidence of this additional intra-Shi'a split, with separate mosques/ma'tams for Shirazi and non-Shirazi worshipers, and even signs and banners hung by one side to criticize the other.

In sum, Bahrain's collective trial of its opposition figures gives (and presumably is meant to give) the impression of a massive conspiracy among many like-minded individuals. Yet those facing trial share little but an anti-government orientation, and constitute no more of a collective "terrorist" threat than Marxists and evangelical Christians do to the U.S. As Sh. 'Ali Salman once said of the similar trial in September 2010 of many of these same individuals,

"The group accused of attempting to overthrow the government cannot overthrow the board of a charity society if they wanted to by the means they were using, let alone a regime."

Mahdi Army Meets Peninsula Shield

Fresh off the rumors out of Israel last week that the Hamas political leadership may relocate to Qatar, we hear today of another interesting visit to Doha with wide geopolitical implications: that of S. Muqtada al-Sadr, who is said to be there as a guest of the Emir to discuss the American withdrawal from Iraq, bilateral and regional relations, and, more interestingly, "the situation in Bahrain." Al-Sadr's aides have denied reports that he will travel to Bahrain after the visit, which is probably better for everybody. (Incidentally, the Economist only two days ago ran a now-timely article titled "Muqtada al-Sadr, back in business.")

Qatar and Saudi Arabia have long championed either side of the intra-Palestinian conflict, with Al-Jazeera known to project a pro-Hamas line and Al-Arabiyyah a pro-Fatah one. And Qatar's desire to play conference-holder and peacemaker -- in Yemen, in Libya, et al. -- is no secret. Yet even so the visit of Al-Sadr, who apart from Al-Sistani is the face of Iraqi Shi'ism even while lacking the status of marja', must be rustling some feathers this morning in Riyadh and of course in al-Riffa'.

Indeed, while there is nary a peep about the visit on Bahrain's main Shi'a opposition forums, the story and resulting discussion thread is already atop the list on the main pro-government site, with commentators mostly asking rhetorically how fellow GCC pal Qatar could do such a thing.

The first comment, for example: "A smart plan from Iran to provoke a conflict between the Gulf countries. / Unfortunately the Emir is the ass that allows it to happen. / The Qatari people and tribes unfortunately don't get involved in politics."

The second: "A slap in the face to the [Muslim] brothers in Qatar. How can they bring in some slob like this rafidi and talk with him about Bahrain??? This is strange and mysterious from Qatar??? And it begs the question what is the policy of Qatar?????

The third: "Honestly, Qatar's policy is with Iran and Iraq."

And so on. In fact, there are already 4 pages of some 50+ comments in less than 2 hours.

We have already seen Kuwait pushed back into line by the other GCC states (i.e., by Bahrain and Saudi Arabia) for its initial refusal to contribute to the Peninsula Shield force. Is Qatar next on the chopping block? or has its clout increased enough now to resist even the combined pressure of Bahraini Arabia?

Update: according to Bloomberg, al-Sadr's website is now reporting that the Qatari emir "has promised to mediate a solution to the crisis in Bahrain and that he would personally meet with Arab presidents and kings to resolve this crisis." That will be an interesting conversation with King 'Abdallah.

False Dichotomies

The Western position on Bahrain is predicated on a presumed "trade-off" between an autocratic but friendly ally (today's Bahrain) and a nominally democratic but pro-Iranian regime (what we would have had the "revolution" succeeded). This either/or is reiterated once again in an editorial today in the Wall Street Journal. The operative sentences read:

The danger, here and elsewhere in today's Middle East, is that promoting Western values too forcefully along one dimension risks destabilizing them along others. The West has no interest in seeing an autocratic but friendly Bahrain replaced by a pro-Iranian, Islamist "democracy."

This "trade-off" thus implies two related but separate dichotomies--both of which are problematic.

The first is an issue we have discussed at length before: Bahrain's political status quo or a pro-Iranian theocracy. This is the argument that if Bahrain's anti-government protesters got their wish, the outcome would be an Iranian-inspired Islamic Republic. Of course, we have seen already that in fact there was as of 2009 little appetite among Bahraini Sunnis OR Shi'is for a regime based on Islam--and that, if there is today when there was not 2 years ago, then it is of the government's own making. But since there is an entire post dedicated to this point, I won't restate it here.

The second is that Bahrain's protest movement was ever going to lead to wholesale regime change. Sure, opposition groups managed to get many people on the streets (especially so after al-Wifaq put its weight behind the rallies), and, yes, they managed to occupy part of the financial district. Yet in the end revolutions require weapons, something would-be revolutionaries in Bahrain simply do not have. (I once brought a Yemeni tribal dagger to Bahrain in my checked baggage as a gift to an American friend, and it was not only detected by some baggage scanning system but was confiscated by the Ministry of Interior.)

Indeed, why but for precisely this are Bahraini Shi'a excluded from the police and military? Doing so guarantees the government a monopoly on arms. Equally telling is that to counter criticism of this exclusion, the state created a new, Shi'a-inclusive police force--the "community police"--with the proviso that it is unarmed. And of course this is to say nothing of political naturalization, whose explicit purpose is the constitution of a foreign-born military force with loyalties with no one but the state.

More generally, scholars of civil war and insurgency have long recognized that Bahrain is unfit for a revolution or insurgency despite its simmering government-Shi'a tensions. In fact, Fearon and Laitin (2005) go so far as to offer Bahrain as an instructive counterargument to the "grievance" explanation of civil war. They write, "Bahrain’s contemporary history reads like a litany of grievances; yet these do not easily translate into sustained violence." They explain, "A combination of 'metro-community' scale and political will to be brutal partly accounts for Bahrain’s avoidance of insurgency"; and conclude: "[E]veryday protest in society met with brutality by the state does not make for a civil war."

Thus is the second false dichotomy unpinning Western thinking on Bahrain: crackdown or revolution.

Finally, one remaining dichotomy implied in the WSJ editorial is that seemingly adopted by Western governments themselves: silence or full abandonment of the Al Khalifa. That is, the U.S. and other governments apparently see no middle ground in their treatment of the Bahrain crisis: either they turn their backs entirely on the ruling family, or they stand silent while the Al Khalifa carry out their methodical dismembering of the Bahrain opposition.

Trade Arabia reports today that 1,123 Bahraini workers have now been fired for suspicion of taking part in protests or strikes, representing almost 1 in every 500 Bahrainis. Nearly 50 doctors and nurses will be tried in military court for "participating in attempts to topple the ... monarchy and taking part in illegal rallies." And just a week ago 4 protesters were sentenced to death in a closed military trial and verdict that lasted all of one day, with 3 others given life in prison. Still myriad others under arrest could face trial in military court at any time.

And so continues the self-fulfilling prophesy of Bahrain. As summarized by the editorial, "unless democratic nations make clear to the Khalifas that reform is necessary and that brutal repression only guarantees more resentment and instability, the U.S. and Europe will run a growing risk of getting precisely what they fear."

Death of Bin Ladin Somehow Fails to Solve Crisis in Bahrain

I'm now back in Washington; hence the lack of updates. From the way people have been reacting here, though, I would have thought that bin Ladin having been killed, in addition to incapacitating global terrorism and bringing gas back down to $50/barrel, would have somehow worked to solve the political crisis in Bahrain as well. Or it may just be that people are exaggerating the substantive impact of his death.

Anyway, after having been away from the news for a few days, three things seem to stand out.

First, the government strategy in dealing with "problem groups"--i.e., those that it would like to be rid of but cannot do so directly because it would garner too much (international) backlash--is now quite clear. And it seems to be a very effective one. This it has followed in at least three cases recently (bloggers, Al-Wasat, al-Wifaq) and another (the Bahrain Society for Human Rights) some time ago in September 2010. It goes something like this:

Step 1. Make a dramatic move guaranteed to earn criticism. (Example: arrest the most prominent of Bahraini bloggers, Mahmood al-Yousif; declare that Al-Wasat will be shut down; move to outlaw al-Wifaq).

Step 2. Once backlash has sprung, clarify that the earlier move was simply a misunderstanding! (Example: Mahmood just came in for a chat; Al-Wasat is not being shut down, just being reorganized; al-Wifaq is not being "dissolved," just being referred to the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs for "investigation.")

But at the same time, while attention is focused on the primary action, continue to enforce the substance of the move elsewhere. (I.e., arrest other, lesser-known bloggers in addition to Mahmood al-Yousif; arrest Mansur al-Jamri, deport anti-government columnists, and install a pro-government editor at Al-Wasat; move to arrest al-Wifaq members.)

Step 3. Wait for international media interest to wane after moderation of the original move while reaping the benefits of the less noticed actions/arrests.

Step 4. ???

Step 5. Profit!

The reason I bring this up now, of course, is that two members of al-Wifaq, Jawad Fayruz and Matar Matar, were arrested Monday. Among other things, I guess this explains why certain al-Wifaq resignations were accepted and others not. Probably not coincidentally, the resignations of MPs who speak the best English and on the best terms with foreign media and missions were those accepted, conveniently stripping them of their parliamentary immunity. And now authorities are taking advantage.

The immediate cause of the arrests is unknown (or indeed whether they are even under arrest; no one seems to know where the two are). Perhaps the government was not happy with al-Wifaq's response (via Sh. 'Ali Salman and Sh. 'Isa Qasim) to the announcement of the death sentence of the four protesters. The arrest of the two MPs, then, may be a message to al-Wifaq's clerical leadership, which if not untouchable is much more difficult to prosecute directly.

At the same time, moreover, we hear today the inevitable: that Al-Wasat is finally to close altogether, barely a month after the administrative coup that toppled its main editors and, equally, its credibility among readers. The last edition will appear on May 9, according to Reuters, whose source says that the closure comes "for economic reasons[;] the commercial viability was gone." This may be true strictly-speaking, but its commercial viability is only gone because its former subscriber base has fully abandoned it after the government takeover.

So on all accounts the government got what it wanted from its strategy above: Al-Wasat will close without being "shut down" officially; al-Wifaq members have been rather quietly arrested, setting a precedent for future crackdowns on the group; and of course the "predation" of foreign media and Internet users continues unabated.

The second thing that stands out from the past few days is the continued pressure by U.S. interest groups for a change in policy toward Bahrain. A few weeks ago, the group Physicians for Human Rights protested the detention and persecution of medical workers treating protesters at Salmaniyyah Hospital. (Incidentally, the government just announced that 23 doctors and 24 nurses will be tried on this account.)

Now, the AFL-CIO is getting into the mix, demanding the suspension of the U.S.'s free trade agreement with Bahrain in order to "send a strong message to Bahrain's leaders that 'their actions are moving in a very dire direction,'" according to the deputy director of the groups's international department.

How sad, then, that ordinary American citizens are more concerned about the political crisis in Bahrain than the U.S. State Department?

Finally, and relatedly (in that it illustrates why the latter should be more worried), the festering stalemate in Bahrain continues to shape regional Gulf politics in troubling ways. Amid rumors of the possibility of a permanent GCC military base in Bahrain (why not turn Bahrain into one big military base, really?), there is a timely article in Foreign Policy titled "Ahistorical Kuwaiti sectarianism" by a former Gulf Fulbright colleague, Lindsey Stephenson. The conclusion of the piece is that:

Kuwait will not become Bahrain in terms of outright violence, but if media in Kuwait continues to draw lines in the sand between the sects, these lines could very well become perforations over time, and perhaps more quickly if tensions in Bahrain continue to escalate. For a country located between the poles of Sunni and Shia Islam, a weakening of Kuwaiti national unity could translate into unwanted meddling and a loss of autonomy for the whole.

So, if Bahrain is shaping up to be the new Iraq, wouldn't it make sense to try to avoid another Bahrain?

The More Things Change...

As noted in this article in TIME magazine, today marks the first time in history that Bahrain will try civilians before a military court. The seven are accused of running over two police officers, killing them, and of unspecified "different charges." (A video of this event has made its way around television and YouTube. In fact, a search of "Bahrain run over" in YouTube gets you 465 results.) The defendants deny the accusations, and, as always seems to happen, many opposition supporters claim that the whole thing was orchestrated by the government. (Here is a forum post outlining the "lies" involved.)

The seven join rights activist 'Abd al-Hadi al-Khawajah, who also will be tried in military court, having had his first hearing a week ago. The specific charges against him have not been made clear.

What is known, though, is that the seven accused of killing the police officer are being tried under Bahrain's vague and controversial "counter-terrorism" law, which employs the contemporary definition of "terrorism"--whatever we don't like--rather than one limited to actual attacks aimed at causing mass terror--you know, actual terrorism.

From an BCHR English translation of the law:

terrorism means any threat or use of force or violence, whatever the motives or the purposes, resorted to by the criminal in carrying out either an individual or collective criminal project, in order to disable the provisions of the constitution or the laws or the rules, to disrupt the public order; to expose to danger the safety and security of the kingdom; or to harm the national unity or the security of the international community, if the act harms individuals or disseminates among them horror or panic or puts in danger their lives, freedoms or security; or damages the environment; the public health; the national economy; the public or private facilities, buildings and properties; or their occupation or obstructing their work, or obstructing the public authorities or religious buildings or educational faculties from doing their work.

Thus "terrorism" may include "damag[ing] the environment," "the public health," the economy, "harm[ing] national unity," or stopping people from going to work.

Yet more than just underlining the totality of Bahrain's "legal black hole where no one knows what their rights are, what their access is" (in the words of Shadi Hamid, director of research at Brookings Doha Institute), the military trials of the seven accused of murder and of 'Abd al-Hadi of Khawajah highlight the extent to which Bahraini politics have a way of staying the same despite seeming forward progress.

In 1996, for example, Bahrain had more than twenty years earlier dissolved its parliament; had no legal political societies; was locked in a years-long Shi'a uprising, and operated under perpetual martial law in the form of a "state security" decree. And still we find this article from the New York Times that reminds us how little things have really changed:

Execution Stirs Protests In Bahrain
AP
Published: March 27, 1996

New fighting erupted today between protesters and the police after the execution of a dissident who was convicted of killing a police officer.

The execution was the first in Bahrain in 20 years, and it underlined the Government's determination to stamp out protests. Bahrain is a major financial center in the Persian Gulf and home to a major United States Navy base.

Amnesty International, a London-based human rights group, said the execution followed "a trial which ignored internationally accepted human rights standards." ...

As word spread today of the execution by firing squad of Isa Qambar, 29, angry villagers among the Shiite Muslims who have been at the center of protests took to the streets, burning tires and throwing stones at police officers.

Security forces responded with tear gas and rubber bullets, and made an unknown number of arrests.

Shiite opposition groups have been pressing the Sunni-led Government for political reforms and improved social conditions, including restoration of a Parliament dissolved in 1975, and better job opportunities.

Shiites make up a slight majority of Bahrain's 500,000 citizens, and many have a standard of living much lower than that of Sunnis, the ruling sect in Bahrain and other Gulf Arab countries.

The civil strife is the worst in a Gulf country in 20 years, and Bahrain has been under pressure from its neighbors to act forcefully to end it.

Saudi Arabia's eastern province, across a 15-mile causeway from Bahrain, is home to a large Shiite population. Across the Persian Gulf, Shiite-dominated Iran has posed a threat to the Gulf Arab states since Islamic fundamentalists overthrew the monarchy in 1979 and established an Islamic republic. ...

Any of this sound familiar?

Update: the verdict is already in. Four of the seven defendants have been sentenced to death, the other three to life in prison. I guess the useful thing about trying people behind closed doors is that "justice" can be executed swiftly if not transparently. The government has posted videos (video #2)--on YouTube no less; very official and governmental--of what are purported to be "confessions" of the accused as part of a Bahrain TV "documentary."

The only question now is how many similar "trials" we are likely to see in the coming weeks and months. The government has clearly signaled that this is not the end.

I have already heard Sh. 'Ali Salman call into Al-Jazeera to criticize the decision, so presumably al-Wifaq is taking a rather strong stand against it. (Some industrious forum-goer has already uploaded the full text of his call, which is here.)

And there are already demonstrations planned in Shi'a areas for today, tomorrow, and Saturday.

Update 2: Citing "British sources close to the Al Khalifa," forum rumors are spreading suggesting that the execution of the death sentence is likely to be postponed amid conflict within the ruling family, specifically between the Crown Prince and the "hawk" lobby of the PM and friends.

Neither Wedding-Bound Nor Politically-Relevant: the Crown Prince and the New "Extremist Elements" in Bahrain

Fresh off the news that Crown Prince Salman has "declined" his much-criticized invitation to the celebrity love-fest that is the UK royal wedding, newspapers everywhere seem to have discovered what we've been arguing here since March 20 ("A Different Sort of Coup"): he is now all but irrelevant within the Al Khalifa. This Telegraph piece, for example, reports not only this but acknowledges another of our long-made claims, saying,

Since then, the prime minister, along with the military chief, Sheikh Khalifa bin Ahmed, another royal relative whose brother is the minister for the royal court, Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed, have been leading the crackdown, in which 30 people have died and hundreds detained.

It has been reported Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah gave King Hamad no choice but to crack down and said he was sending in troops anyway.

Now, I won't say any more here about this, which is essentially a belated recognition of something that happened a long while ago. For those interested in the details of the Crown Prince's sidelining, including some Royal Court intrigue and rumor, I suggest you read the article linked above, "A Different Sort of Coup."

Instead, the more important upshot now is that we are left in Bahrain with a lack of political moderates--and not foremost on the side of the opposition. If King Hamad writes in his op-ed last week that "the legitimate demands of the opposition were hijacked by extremist elements with ties to foreign governments in the region," we might easily make the same argument about Bahrain's rulers: that "the legitimate political dialogue initiative of the Crown Prince was hijacked by extremist elements with ties to foreign governments in the region," only the "extremists" here are not Shi'a revolutionaries but the Prime Minister and his clique, the "foreign governments in the region" not Iran but Saudi Arabia. This now-familiar thesis cuts both ways.

This fact is put in even more stark relief when compared to the quite deferential statement (Ar.) released by al-Wifaq on Sunday regarding "recent political developments." I have not seen an English translation yet nor indeed any coverage of it at all (perhaps precisely because it says little new), but it begins by praising the King and Crown Prince, including the King's disingenuous op-ed in the Washington Times. It goes on to reject "the various forms of foreign interference" in internal Bahraini affairs (point 1); to tell citizens to stop spreading "disinformation" via "official" and "semi-official" (read: Internet) media (point 2); and more generally to call for a political rather than military solution to the ongoing crisis. It does eventually make references to private and public sector employees (including medical personnel) detained and fired, as well as a more veiled reference to the Shi'a mosques that have been destroyed, but overall its weak tone seems to have disappointed many ordinary Shi'is.

As if we needed more evidence of this lack of moderates within the Bahraini political leadership, then, especially as viewed next to the supposedly "extremist" opposition, here are a few headlines just from today:

• Bahrain Seeks Death Sentence for Protesters on Trial
• Bahrain Football Players Held, Shi'a Clubs Suspended
• More terrorist plots! (Not to be confused with More terrorist plots)

And a final one, which cannot be contained within a mere bullet point, is the latest stop on the Prime Minister's nationwide allegiance drive: a personal visit to the medical staff of some unnamed hospital (more likely the BDF Hospital than Salmaniyyah). In typically over-the-top fashion, he is said to have told them,

"You answered the call of duty when your country needed you most, while others [who could these be?], misled by the self-destructive mantra, let Bahrain down and hijacked the medical profession from its noble mission."

He paid the heart-felt tribute as he received a group of doctors, who submitted an allegiance pledge.

So in the previous two weeks only: 1) the Prime Minister has received businessmen at his palace in a "day of reckoning" in which they were chastised for not having been more outspoken against demonstrations; 2) the King's son Nasr became the royal patron of a national "loyalty pledge" campaign in which citizens are encouraged to sign their names to pledge books at stations around the country (Update: this program is now taking online signatures! Register TODAY, and make sure to have your Bahrain National ID card ready!); and 3) the Prime Minister is seeking pledges of allegiance from medical staff after the debacle at Salmaniyyah Hospital.

I wonder if there is a book you can sign to request that your home or local mosque not be demolished. It seems that asking in person is not the way to go.

Finally, not to be outdone by other U.S. allies in the Arab Gulf are the Emiratis, who today detained five of those who sent a petition to the ruler of Abu Dhabi some weeks ago requesting political reforms. They are accused of "crimes of instigation, breaking laws and perpetrating acts that pose threat to state security, undermining the public order, opposing the government system, and insulting the President, the Vice President and the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi."

Admittedly, though, they do sound like some dangerous individuals:

"Dr Nasser bin Ghaith [is] an economics professor at Abu Dhabi's Sorbonne University."

"Mr al Shehhi is the head of the Al Shahouh Folklore Society, one of the four civil society associations that signed a second petition calling for universal suffrage in upcoming Federal National Council elections."

No word yet whether the five arrested were trained by Hizballah or by Iran directly through its Social Science Warfare division.

In any case, I think we can expect a sharply-worded rebuke from President Obama any day now.

Middle East Politics Quiz

American Middle East Diplomacy 101
Midterm Quiz


Instructions:

Please read the following April 2011 statement from President Barack Obama and circle the answers that best complete the sentences.

Statement:

The United States condemns in the strongest possible terms the use of force by the [Syrian | Bahraini] government against demonstrators. This outrageous use of violence to quell protests must come to an end now. We regret the loss of life and our thoughts are with the families and loved ones of the victims, and with the [Syrian | Bahraini] people in this challenging time.

The [Syrian | Bahraini] Government's moves [yesterday | two months ago] to [repeal Syria’s decades-old Emergency Law and allow for peaceful demonstrations | offer political dialogue leading to meaningful reform] were not serious given the continued violent repression against protesters [today | before and since]. Over the course of two months since protests in [Syria | Bahrain] began, the United States has [repeatedly | ambivalently] encouraged [President Assad | Bahrain's rulers] and the [Syrian | Bahraini] Government to implement meaningful reforms, but they refuse to respect the rights of the [Syrian | Bahraini] people or be responsive to their aspirations. The [Syrian | Bahraini] people have called for the freedoms that all individuals around the world should enjoy: freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and the ability to freely choose their leaders. [President Assad | the Al Khalifa] and the [Syrian | Bahraini] authorities have repeatedly rejected their calls and chosen the path of repression. They have placed their personal interests ahead of the interests of the [Syrian | Bahraini] people, resorting to the use of force and outrageous human rights abuses to compound the already oppressive security measures in place before these demonstrations erupted. Instead of listening to their own people, [President Assad | the Bahraini government] is blaming outsiders while seeking [Iranian | Saudi] assistance in repressing [Syria's | Bahrain's] citizens through the same brutal tactics that have been used by [his Iranian | its GCC] allies. We call on [President Assad | the Bahraini ruling family] to change course now, and heed the calls of [his | their] own people.

We strongly oppose the [Syrian | Bahraini] government’s treatment of its citizens and we continue to oppose its continued destabilizing behavior more generally. ... The United States will [continue to | depending on the situation] stand up for democracy and the universal rights that all human beings deserve, [in Syria and | save for in Bahrain and other allied countries] around the world.

Any questions?