Fighting Dialogue with More Dialogue

In the past week more news has been trickling in about Bahrain's al-Dhaharani-led National Dialogue, not least via the new Twitter account setup by the government to disseminate propaganda--er, I mean news--about the initiative set to begin on July 1.


As indicated by such tweets as these, then, the most notable new development seems to be that the authorities have altogether disregarded al-Wifaq's argument (via Khalil al-Marzuq) that "[t]he dialogue that needs to happen is between the King, the Crown Prince, and the opposition."

Instead, it appears to be taking the exact opposite route, designing the national dialogue to include as many people as humanly possible in order, one assumes, to preclude any chance of agreement on substantive reforms. Sh. Fawaz has already indicated that the dialogue "will include 60 societies." No word whether the BSPCA in Saar has been invited. In fact, I myself am thinking of registering the Justin Gengler Society for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice so that I can finally visit al-Safriyyah Palace. More likely, though, given the lack of enthusiasm on the part of Bahrain's authorities, the national dialogue meetings will be held at Nando's in 'Adliyah.

Al-Wifaq, at least, is not bothering to waste time finding out. As reported today everywhere, another Friday sermon has brought more tough talk from Sh. 'Isa Qasim, who "denounced the Gulf kingdom's rulers for 'damaging the country' and warned Friday that tension-easing dialogue cannot take place until authorities halt crackdowns used to crush protests demanding greater political rights." The Washington Post quotes him as saying,

We demand meaningful and real reforms that guarantee the rights of people. ... There is no reform when our people are in jail, dismissed from jobs, religious ceremonies attacked and media sponsored by the state are spreading lies and misinformation. ...

We have offered so many sacrifices and cannot back down and end up empty handed.

As always, we will post the video of the sermon once it's been posted to YouTube, which shouldn't be long.

Al-Wifaq is not, however, just sitting on its hands. Today marks the second week in a row that it has organized a well-attended "dialogue" of its own. Last week was in Saar; today's "festival for the nation" starts at 5:00pm in the village of Kharajiyyah in Sitra. The announcement:


Curiously, this seems to overlap with another, less "official" gathering by the February 14 Revolution folks that had been scheduled for 4:30pm in all the villages of Sitra. Its announcement below tells that "the people of Sitra will keep their promise until the fall of the Al Khalifa regime":


So apparently either al-Wifaq co-opted these more "radical" protests or they are happening simultaneously. I would guess the former. Either way, turn-out seems to have been decent:


(Update: al-Wifaq has now posted a video of the event to its YouTube site:)



The real question, of course, is how far al-Wifaq is willing to go in its boycott of the National Dialogue, and what happens if it eventually relents. Right now considerable pressure remains on the Bahraini government, including from the United States, which just mentioned it in the same breath as Iran and Syria as a human rights violator (see Bahrain's response); but if it seems to the U.S. as though the opposition is not willing to meet the government half way, no doubt al-Wifaq will find itself the U.S.'s next target. (The Coalition for a Republic is already upset that the U.S. has rejected it as a partner in the national dialogue.)

This is all the more so given the concerted media campaign lately designed to highlight American favoritism toward the Bahraini opposition. Indeed, the pro-government Twitter camp is quick these days to report any sightings of U.S. Embassy officials meeting with the opposition. This guy, for example, says: "I always see [former al-Wifaq MP] Jasim Hussein with Americans... everywhere he is meeting with them in coffee shops. Coffee is the biggest ... link between foreigners and al-Wifaq." And another asks provocatively: "I wonder why Munira Fakhro from Wa'ad is meeting with the chargé d'affaires from the American Embassy in Lulu's [coffee shop] a little bit ago?"

So, again: what happens when July 1 comes around and al-Wifaq is not at Nando's with the other 731 societies talking dialogue? And equally interesting is the opposite scenario: what happens if al-Wifaq is somehow convinced to take part? When one visits Bahrain's main opposition forum one is greeted with the following banner, declaring, alternatively, "No Dialogue with Murderers"; "Fall, Hamad! Fall, Hamad!"; and "Self-Defense is a Sacred Right."



Certainly, not everyone in the opposition will agree with such sentiments, and not all of the forum-goers are al-Wifaq supporters to begin with, but, as Toby Jones has observed recently, "Events seem to have gone too far and too fast for some kind of quick fix through talks." Time will tell.

Finally, we may mention a notable event that does not fit neatly in the preceding: the news that King Hamad's son Nasr (of "Bahrain is an island with no escape passage; everybody who interfered in these issues will be punished and everybody who took a stand [supporting the regime] will be awarded" fame) has been promoted to Head of the Royal Guard, a decision he announced himself via Twitter. At the same time that Crown Prince Salman's stock is falling, then, Sh. Nasr's seems to be rising. As if Al Khalifa court politics needs any more complications.

Updates: some highlights of 'Ali Salman's address today in Sitra have already been posted. I'm sure the video is not too far off.

And there are Twitter reports of a march tomorrow on the Prime Minister's Palace.

Update 2: an astute reader points out this al-'Arabiyyah article reporting that non-Bahraini ex-pats will also be invited to the national dialogue! Hell, why not? The chances of the Justin Gengler Society for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice are looking up!

Indeed, it would seem that the only group not welcome to al-Dhaharani's dialogue are, based on remarks he made just last year in May 2010, Bahraini women. Al-Dhaharani said then, "We have to look at our society in a realistic way and I don't believe that it is ready for women in politics." But ex-pats in politics? No problem.

Update 3: The video of Sh. 'Isa Qasim's Friday sermon has finally been posted:



Update 4: 'Isa 'Abd al-Rahman, introduced as an official spokesman for the Bahrain national dialogue, has given an interview with al-'Arabiyyah, available here:



Update 5: The President of al-Wifaq's Local Council for the Northern Governorate, 'Ali al-Jabal, has released a series of questions/concerns regarding the national dialogue, titled "Dialogue of the Deaf." You might guess what his position is.

Meanwhile, in a development the likes of which we've seen a few times before, the leftist political society Wa'ad has been unbanned and will participate in the national dialogue after releasing a statement (full text here) distancing itself from the opposition as well as an impending change in administration. Yet another organizational coup (a la Al-Wasat) for the Bahraini government.

Media Jihad: If Ya Can't Beat 'Em, Sue 'Em!

As if entirely oblivious to the irony, Bahrain announced on Tuesday that its Information Affairs Authority will take legal action against the UK-based newspaper The Independent "for repeatedly publishing wrong and defamatory information to tarnish its image." The logic seems to be that if you can't convince the world using your own media propaganda machine (most notably BTV) that Bahrain is back to its jolly self, why not try to convince the world that the international media is biased against you? At which point ipso facto Bahrain is back to its old self. See how that works?

The BNA press release quotes an IAA official as saying, "The Independent has deliberately published a series of unrealistic and provocative articles targeting Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." Aww.. isn't that cute to see a little brother defending his big brother?

It continues:

He accused the British daily of orchestrating a defamatory and premeditated media campaign against both countries, failing to abide by professional impartiality and credibility in its one-sided news-coverage and reports. In this regard, he cited particularly leading Independent Middle-East based reporter Robert Fisk.

Mr. Al-Maawda called upon all media to observe accuracy and objectivity and project the true image, adding that all doors remain open to visit Bahrain and gauge the real situation on the ground as the Kingdom is steadily regaining normality and stability.

Indeed, and isn't that what the Bahraini government is all about these days? Respecting "accuracy and objectivity?"

Coinciding with this official complaint against The Independent, moreover, is a less directly state-sponsored attack on international media coverage of Bahrain via such English-language outlets as, for example, the pro-government Bahrain Independent blog/e-zine (coincidental name, that), whose entire coverage these days seems to be dedicated to repudiating foreign newspapers and journalists. As I look right now, there must be a dozen stories of this nature:

1. "A Response to @NickKristof"
   
2. "The Kristof Crusade"
3. "Kristof! You Let Go!" (Can you tell that the pro-government folks don't like Nick Kristof?)
4. "Robert Fisk on Bahrain: Integrity for Sale" (Update: This has now reappeared as an "op-ed" by "Scout Finch" in the GDN. I always knew Harper Lee was a Bahraini government supporter.)
   
5. "Nick Robertson CNN: Report What's Right"
6. "AlJazeera, CNN, BBC: 'Angels of Mercy?'"
7. "Mr. Fisk, Were We Truly 'Invaded' as You Say? Let's See.." (Or Robert Fisk?)
8. "Martin Samuel Stalls Out On His Moral Superiority Lap: UK Daily Mail"
9. "Al Wasat and Its Readers"
10. "Ayat Al Ghermezi – Freedom of speech does not allow freedom of Insult!"

And let's not forget the article we linked last week called "The False Friend: Qatar, Al-Jazeera, and Terrorism."

Apart from the Bahrain Independent, several other English-language sites (to say nothing of Twitter and Facebook) have taken it upon themselves to attempt to refute the "lies" of various Western newspapers, in particular the New York Times. The Brave Bahrain blog outlines the "False Accusations of [the] New York Times." The similar Peace Bahrain blog/e-zine has an entire section dedicated to stories about "Media Lies." And so on.

In fact, as you are likely to have noticed while browsing online coverage of Bahrain (or even this blog) since February, there is an entire cadre of Bahrainis whose job it is to post pro-government comments on articles critical of their government. They even have a name: the Al-Fatih Group for Electronic Jihad. And a logo to match:


And, if you're looking for something to do, they're even looking for volunteers. As their slogan says, "Your Soil is Rich, O Nation"--apparently rich in bored young men who are decent with computers.

Of course, all this is not to say that it is only the pro-government faction in Bahrain that is engaged in the country's ongoing media jihad. A quick Twitter search with the #Bahrain hashtag is enough to dispel that idea. The point, rather, is that in its lawsuit against The Independent the Bahraini government has conveniently forgotten about its own biased media coverage of events since February and indeed well before, a tactic that seems to follow its losing Formula 1 strategy of saying to international observers, "Hey, look over here at this thing. No, wait, but don't look over there at that other thing."

When one does look over there, though, it usually isn't pretty.

Just yesterday, for instance, the Gulf Daily News ran this supposed "letter to the editor" titled "Loyalties 100% with the King," in which a supposed Bahraini Shi'i takes aim at his own community, concluding that those who attended anti-government demonstrations "are worse than the Jews." It begins:

Enraged is how I felt when I read about the WikiLeaks report in the [Gulf Daily News] on Al Wefaq leaders' "secret dealings" [i.e., with the U.S. Embassy].

What else are we going to find out about you? What you have done is more than one can bear! The opposition leaders have made the lives of the respectable Shi'ites miserable with their hidden agendas.

When will America and Britain get it through their thick skulls that the majority of the Shi'ites don't want regime change and their loyalties are 100 per cent with His Majesty King Hamad.

The minority of the Shi'ites that protested were either brainwashed, threatened or, most probably, promised monetary gain by Ali Salman, Mushaima, Nabeel Rajab and the rest of their degrading group.

They talk of Israel, well, let me tell you I never thought I would say this, but you are worse than the Jews. At least they don't betray their government and their people, because they are united. You, Mr Ali, and your clan should watch, observe and learn from their attributes.

After continuing in this vein a bit longer, it concludes: "I urge the people of Bahrain to speak out against these malicious lies that have given Bahrain a bad name abroad. Use whatever means possible and spread the truth until you wipe out the lies."

It seems the Bahraini government at least is taking his advice. Perhaps that leaked document purporting to direct the Information Affairs Authority to pursue a more aggressive foreign media campaign was not a forgery after all.

Update: speaking of media manipulations, this piece in The National discusses the court testimony of Mansur al-Jamri that the false Al-Wasat articles that led to his and the newspaper's demise were submitted by plotters in Saudi Arabia.

Update 2: a friend passed along these funny 4chan-style cartoons that actually relate nicely to the topic here.

The first is in Bahraani (Shi'i) dialect:


- "So did you see the CNN exposé on Bahrain?"
- "Yeah I saw it but the government says CNN is bankrolled by Iran."

The second is in Sunni dialect:


- "Master, we've carried out the plan and took pictures of the weapons inside the ma'tam."
- "Ok, but this time don't humiliate and expose us!"
- "No no, don't worry; this time's we'll say we saw tanks inside the ma'tam too."

National Dialogue or Just Another Session of Parliament?

The Bahrain News Agency is reporting (English here) new details about King Hamad's "National Dialogue, Take 2" initiative, which is scheduled for the beginning of July and will be presided over by... Crown Prince Salman--oh wait, no it won't. Actually the king has tapped current two-term Speaker of the Parliament (actually the only speaker of the parliament since the body was reinstated in 2002) Khalifah al-Dhaharani. So much for the recent New York Times report that the White House is "cultivating" Crown Prince Salman to be the moderate future leader of Bahrain, and that he "has been assigned to lead whatever dialogue there is with the opposition." Oops. That was February; this is June. The BNA video press release is below:



Apart from the obvious slap in the face of Crown Prince Salman, and further confirmation of what everybody already knew--that despite meetings with Obama he is still essentially irrelevant within the Al Khalifa--the selection of al-Dhaharani also raises serious questions about the nature and ultimate viability of the National Dialogue Initiative.

Firstly, and relatedly, al-Dhaharani's selection over against that of the crown prince offers a precious window into internal royal family politics. The crown prince, King Hamad's son and chosen successor, has been passed over for an initiative that he himself sponsored (creating what one Bahraini friend described euphemistically as "an awkward situation") in favor of the prime minister's right-hand man in parliament. Though the latter is simply the agent, the two Khalifahs (bin Salman and al-Dhaharani) seem thus to have won a conspicuous battle against the faction led by the king and crown prince.

The second and equally notable upshot of a National Dialogue headed by al-Dhaharni is that it threatens to become, as the title of this post suggests, a mere session of parliament. Indeed, if its attendees include only the pro-government parties now in parliament along with former MPs from al-Wifaq (since al-Haqq and al-Wafa' were never going to participate, and Wa'ad and al-'Amal are now banned), and the whole thing is going to be presided over by the speaker of the parliament, then how exactly will it differ from a glorified legislative session?

For all his lost political capital, at least the crown prince would be a direct representative of the ruling family who, even if he cannot negotiate entirely on its behalf, occupies an immediate place next to the country's decisionmakers. Al-Dhaharani, on the other hand, if perhaps a loyal follower and close confidant of the prime minister, can serve at best as political messenger to the royal family.

Moreover, he seems not to be particularly liked, not simply by the opposition but even by his own pro-government colleagues in parliament. Back on February 24, for example, Al-Wasat ran this article where it was reported that fellow pro-government 'Adal al-'Asumi announced his refusal to attend sessions of parliament in protest over al-Dhaharani's "manner of administration," which he said included "repeated violations" in parliamentary procedure. Al-'Asumi complains further that al-Dhaharani treats MPs like "primary school students" and reminds al-Dhaharani that "this council is a council for the people whose representatives are elected, not post office clerks working in his private organization." He concludes by accusing al-Dhaharani of aggravating Bahrain's February crisis: "I announced loud and clear out of my faith in my country and allegiance to its leadership, headed by His Majesty the King, that the method of the presidency in the management of differences [within parliament] is one of the causes of aggravation that brought us to the present bottleneck."

The following video shows another pro-government MP, 'Abd al-Halim Murad, threatening to resign from the parliament on account of al-Dhaharani, whose managerial and conflict resolution skills are here on display!



So what does everyone else think? Well, obviously the prime minister is pleased, as announced already in Al-Ayyam in an article appropriately titled "the Prime Minister welcomes the King's selection of al-Dhaharani to the presidency of the Dialogue of National Consensus."

The Crown Prince has officially "congratulated" al-Dhaharani. Yea, I bet.

Al-Wifaq, however, is reiterating via 'Ali Salman its position that it "will not participate in an unconditional dialogue." And Khalil al-Marzuq elaborates upon al-Wifaq's rejection: "The dialogue that needs to happen is between the King, the Crown Prince, and the opposition."

And the less-mainstream opposition has a stronger stance still: that "dialogue is suicide," which is less catchy in English as it doesn't rhyme. The opposition forums are full of graphics proclaiming this message:


or:


Which leaves open the possibility that King Hamad's "Dialogue of National Consensus" in fact will be a "Dialogue of Those Already in Consensus." I can almost see it now...


More seriously, the main difficulty with the al-Dhaharani plan for political reconciliation is made obvious when we compare it to the previous model of 2001, which resulted in Bahrain's National Action Charter and, eventually, the Constitution of 2002. This process, if ultimately disappointing for the opposition due both to the content of the constitution and its unilateral promulgation by King Hamad, at least employed a process of political negotiation that was much more viable than the current attempt.

In 2001, negotiations were held behind closed doors, were held directly with the King and other members of the Al Khalifa, and involved senior religious and political leaders on the side of the opposition. King Hamad even made a celebrated (or infamous, depending on your view: see the video below) stop to the home of influential cleric 'Abdallah al-Ghurayfi as a gesture to Bahraini Shi'a. Although, again, the end result fell far short of the expectations of many Bahrainis, still the process of negotiation itself enabled a debate (if not a transparent debate) about fundamental political restructuring that involved those senior-level figures that must of necessity be involved in such discussions.



Compared to this more serious initiative, which saw no less than the King of Bahrain making a personal visit to the home of an ordinary citizen in order to engage the opposition, a "national dialogue" under the sponsorship of Khalifah al-Dhaharani is just another session of a powerless and ineffective parliament.

Update: the Bahraini government has apparently decided that if al-Wifaq is not happy to play ball with the al-Dhaharani-led dialogue, it may as well just prosecute its members. Matar Matar and Jawad Fayruz, arrested some weeks ago under mysterious circumstances, were today abruptly taken to military court (English). The cases against them, now adjourned for around two weeks, revolve around the charges of "public incitement for regime change and deliberately spreading biased rumours, in addition to taking part in public gatherings." (Separately, sentences were handed down for half a dozen other individuals tied to February/March protests, including the now-famous poet Ayat Hassan Muhammad.)

If it didn't before, I'm sure al-Wifaq will really want to participate in the national dialogue now.

Update 2: CNN has a bit more on the court proceedings against the ex-al-Wifaq MPs.

And, for Arabic readers, the Bahrain Mirror has an interesting piece by one of the founders of Al-Wasat and former deputy editor-in-chief of Al-Ayyam, 'Abbas BuSufwan, titled "Who Ran the Crown Prince Out of the National Dialogue?" The article also bears this nice graphic related to its main point:


"National Dialogue: Between the Cars of the Crown Prince and the Horses of al-Safriyyah [Palace; i.e., his rivals within the Al Khalifa]"

Update 3: more good stuff from the Bahrain Mirror, both on the crown prince (though both in Arabic).

1. The mother of Crown Prince Salman lashes out at her son's detractors.
2. A piece on "the war of the palaces" highlights the crown prince's economic policy and achievements. Can you tell that the opposition really would like to have him back in the picture?

Ramping up the Pressure

No time to write today or perhaps this weekend, but since today seems to have brought many interesting Bahrain stories, I thought I could quickly post a few:

• Toby Jones in The Atlantic joins a growing if still probably non-influential group of people calling for the removal of the Bahrain-based U.S. Fifth Fleet. He actually goes a step further, though, to call for its wholesale dissolution.
  
  
• Al-Jazeera English (not to be confused with the real Al-Jazeera) continues coverage of the Ludo Hood affair, with some details that seem to be new.
  
  Speaking of Al-Jazeera, the pro-governments seem to be getting increasingly annoyed with its coverage of Bahrain--which while I was in Doha a month ago was non-existent, so it's difficult to see what their problem is. This article in the pro-government "Bahrain Independent" (the same folks who "broke" the Ludo Hood conspiracy) discusses "The False Friend: Qatar, Al-Jazeera, and Terrorism."
  
  
• The New York Times has a piece on the Obama Administration's attempt to revive the dead political career of Crown Prince Salman, whom it says is being "cultivated" as a moderate leader of political reform in Bahrain. Sadly, I think the article is much too sanguine about the chances of this happening given the forces stacked against him within the Al Khalifa, but it's a good read anyway.
  
  
• Finally, and of most direct interest, is this partial summary in the Washington Post of another provocative Friday sermon of Sh. 'Isa Qasim, who seems to be losing his patience with the government. Earlier there were statements to the effect that worshipers would be bussed to al-Diraz from other parts of Bahrain to hear the sermon (not that they would make it past the checkpoints), a way of saying to the government, "What? you think we can't get people back into the streets?" The Arabic transcript of the sermon, titled "Refusing Shi'i Existence/Presence," is now available on opposition forums. Audio is here. The video is finally here as well:
  
  
  
  Part of the frustration--you know, apart from the security crackdown, mass arrests, attacks on religious processions, dismissals from work, etc.--comes as a result of the government's decision this week to ban a long-standing seminar series held by al-Wifaq that is open to the public and discusses various political and social issues.
  
  In response, al-Wifaq has joined Sh. 'Isa Qasim in taking it up a notch, organizing not just a seminar but an entire "festival of sermons" titled "Everyone's Homeland" for 5:00pm tomorrow, Saturday, at the Grand Saar Ma'tam, headlined by Sh. 'Ali Salman. The Twitter announcement from al-Wifaq links to the following advertisement:
  
  
  (Update: the event was allowed to go ahead and seems to have had a decent turnout.)
  

Update: the Washington Post also has this longish interview with Bahraini Foreign Minister Sh. Khalid, apparently in town with the crown prince.

More: Salon Magazine has an article about the D.C. law firm hired by the Al Khalifa to refute the unlawful firing complaint brought against them by the AFL-CIO.

And we can't forget our friend Yusif Al Bin Khalil, whose column today in Al-Watan makes the bold prediction that "we expect increased pressure on Bahrain by Western governments and international organizations in the coming months." Ya think?

Winning the Battle, Losing the (Media) War: Formula 1 Edition

It seems that Bahrain's authorities have spent a bit too much time recently attacking the U.S. and Embassy Manama (in the press) and Shi'a religious processions (in real life) and not enough time convincing the international community that "Business-friendly Bahrain" is indeed back in business. Just days after apparently reinstating the Bahrain Grand Prix, Formula One boss Bernie Ecclestone now says the race is "not on." And, as the BBC aptly summarizes,

If, as Bernie Ecclestone accepts, the Bahrain Grand Prix will not go ahead in October, it will be a huge and humiliating blow to the tiny Arabian island.

Indeed. It will also mark the utter failure of what Simon Henderson in a great piece in Foreign Policy today describes as "Bahrain's diplomatic charm offensive," an effort doomed by the apparent assumption that somehow the world would pay attention only to government press releases and not to actual events in Bahrain.

For, as Henderson outlines in systematic fashion, the days following the end of martial law on June 1 and King Hamad's coinciding "National Dialogue Initiative, Part Deux" have witnessed a Bahrain that has hoped to win over international observers at the same time that it "declares war on protesters back home."

Obviously, there is no need to cover the same territory as does Henderson, who touches on the military trial of 47 medical staff charged with aiding protesters back in March; the now-infamous BTV interview with U.S. Embassy Chargé d'affaires Stephanie Williams a few days ago (which you can find here); the Ludo Hood affair (which we first covered here); and the crown prince's meeting today with the Obamaman.

Still, we may offer a few additional details and links.

1. First, for all your anti-U.S. propaganda needs, see this nice summary by Roy Gutman at McClacthy, which covers the latest vitriol from Al-Wasat (how's that new editor working out?), Akhbar al-Khaleej, and Al-Ayyam.

And if you really need to make your hatred of the U.S. known, you can sign this more-or-less-comprehensible Twitter petition:



2. Second, as alluded to in the introduction, the end of the June 1 martial has kept Bahrain's security forces busy. First, they crushed the attempted return to the Pearl Roundabout on June 1, then they crushed the second attempt at demonstrations two days later on Friday.
   
   Unhappy with just two crushings per week, though, the government forcefully prevented Shi'a 'azzah processions on June 5 marking the death of the tenth Shi'i imam. Reuters has the details, but even more illustrative is this Google Map depicting the locations of all the reported clashes, involving at least 14 villages in all.
   
   More illustrative still, however, is this YouTube video showing the riot police in action. As one would expect, they spare no tear gas canister in their fight with these Shi'a terrorists, who are clearly attempting to call upon the disembodied spirit of the Tenth Imam in order to overthrow the Al Khalifa.
   
   


After seeing the video, is it really that difficult to believe that Bahraini Shi'a (and other anti-government protesters) might be pissed off with the regime independently of any outside prodding? Which is the more obvious source of "radicalization": instructions from Iran? or being shot in the face with a tear gas canister while attending a religious ceremony?


3. Finally, a scandal is brewing in Bahraini cyberspace following the leak of a document allegedly detailing instructions of Shura Council member Dr. Salah 'Ali to Sh. Fawaz bin Muhammad Al Khalifa, President of the Information Affairs Directorate, in which the latter is instructed to highlight in- and outside Bahrain (e.g., on official visits to European countries) the foreign Iranian agenda behind al-Wifaq and BCHR activist Nabil Rajab.
   
   While I am in no position to verify the authenticity of such a document (Dr. Salah has already denied writing it in an Al-Ayyam editorial), in true Internet fashion we should probably just post it here anyway:
   
   

Among those not impressed by such developments are evidently the heads of major banks. An appropriately-titled article in the Financial Times, "Banks ponder Bahrain exodus," reports:

Robecco, the asset management arm of Dutch lender Rabobank, which has $5bn of regional assets under management, has decided to move its regional headquarters and 12 staff from Bahrain to Dubai by the end of the year. ...

Other institutions which chose Bahrain as their regional hub because of its proximity to Saudi Arabia and large pool of educated local talent have been mulling their options.

But rumours that BNP Paribas is moving its headquarters and 450-strong staff to Dubai are denied by one person close to the company. ...

Nonetheless, senior bankers say that even large lenders are considering their options as Bahrain’s liberal image dissipates.

Some are quietly shifting staff to other offices in Dubai, which is more competitive than ever because of its real estate crash. Officials in Dubai say that inquiries from Bahrain are building up.

While some executives welcome a return to stability, others see no future in a divided society where a state-ordained purge of pro-protester sympathisers is sweeping the private sector.

The million-dinar question, then, is the fate of King Hamad's new national dialogue initiative in the wake of all these setbacks. Just as the crown prince was embarrassed into political oblivion by the failure of the reconciliation plan he patronized, now the Bahraini king must attempt to maintain support from within the Al Khalifa for a renewed effort that seems to have come too late to achieve its most obvious goal--securing a rescheduled Bahrain Grand Prix--and to convince Bahrain's international critics (and investors) that the situation there is improving.

If there is no obvious immediate benefit now to a reinvigorated attempt at dialogue, one that will doubtless earn the ire of many pro-government Sunnis--to say nothing of the prime minister, his Saudi allies, and the Khawalid (followers of hawkish Royal Court Minister Khalid bin Ahmad)--will the King still be prepared to risk for it his already-dwindling political capital? Once the crown prince returns to Bahrain with his message from Obama, we are likely soon to find out.

Update: for those interested in the circumstances regarding the (brief) reinstatement of the Formula One last week, see this leaked report by an F1 fact-finding mission to Bahrain, which was naively swept off its feet by government officials and state-appointed human rights organizations. The New York Times has a lengthier analysis.

The Council on Foreign Relations website also has this illuminating interview on Bahrain with McClatchy reporter Roy Gutman. We've linked to McClatchy and Gutman several times in the past weeks (and we do so above) for their coverage of the Ludo Hood affair.

Finally, Nick Kristof has an open letter to King Hamad today in the Times in which he demands the release of one of his Bahraini friends. I bet the other thousand people in jail wish they were friends with Nick Kristof too. (The Bahrain "Independent" blog now has an open letter to Nick Kristof in response.)

Update 2: the BNA reports that the king has tapped lower house speaker Al-Dhahrani to preside over a yet-undefined "dialogue of national consensus" commission whose work will begin on July 1. The video press release is here:

The Most Dangerous Men in Bahrain

Writing more than three decades ago in 1980, Fuad Khuri offers in his classic Tribe and State in Bahrain the following remarks, coming near the conclusion of the section on "Organized Protests and Rebellions" (p. 217):

To prevent the rise of large-scale formal political organizations, the [Bahraini] government opposes the foundation of political parties, societies, labor unions, or clubs that cut across regional, ethnic, or religious groupings. This policy of “organizational fragmentation” has likewise been extended to the employment of foreign labor and to the parliamentary elections of 1972 and 1973. Foreign labor is recruited from various provinces and districts of India, Pakistan, or other places in the Far East; small as it is, Bahrain was cut into twenty different constituencies for the parliamentary elections.”

(For the post-2001 parliament, make that 40 electoral districts.)

This observation of Khuri, that in the history of modern Bahrain the Al Khalifa feel never more threatened than when Sunnis and Shi'is bridge their typical cooperation gap to unite for (or more usually) against one and the same policy, is a lesson that appears several times throughout his still-unrivaled work. And it is also one that will preface well the discussion here of "the most dangerous men in Bahrain."

For, from the perspective of the regime, the most dangerous men in Bahrain today are not those one might immediately think of: say, Hasan al-Mushaimi', 'Abd al-Wahhab Hussain, and the other high-level Shi'a opposition figures currently standing trial before military court. No, as far as the ruling family is concerned, the most dangerous sort of person in Bahrain is the one who breaks ranks with the government's Sunni ethnic constituency to join those calling for reform; the one willing to cross the usual Sunni-Shi'i divide for the purposes of political coordination.

Hence the authorities' strong reaction to the "No Sunni, No Shi'i--Just Bahraini" campaign, wearers of which paraphernalia were especially targeted for harassment at security checkpoints beginning early on in the unrest.

And, even more obviously, hence the speedy arrest and public ostracism of those Sunnis who did play a prominent role in the March demonstrations, particularly in addressing the crowds at the Pearl Roundabout. These include most notably the (now former) Wa'ad leader Ebrahim Sharif, who many saw as the "odd man out" among the political leaders arrested, not only for his being Sunni but also for his leftist political views, which are difficult to square with the portrayal of protesters as Shi'a revolutionaries bent on the installation of an Iranian-style theocratic regime in Bahrain.

Sharif especially has been singled out for lambaste by the pro-government camp, which has all but excommunicated him from Sunnism altogether. This graphic from a popular Sunni forum, for example, includes him among a large group of Shi'a activists--among them Mansur al-Jamri, Sh. 'Isa Qasim, Nabil Rajab, and 'Abd al-Jalil al-Singace--being shipped "to Iran."


Sharif's likeness also figured prominently in last month's "No mercy for the demonstrators" billboard campaign, which we examined before:











Yet, as the LA Times reports, Sharif is not the only Sunni facing repercussions for his prominent anti-government stance at the outset of protests. Muhammed Al Bu Flasa, an ex-military Salafi, remains missing after being detained in February following an address at the Pearl Roundabout meant to "promote unity among the country's Shiite Muslim majority and Sunnis." His brother told the LA Times back in February,

Mohamed's speech was meant to reduce the fire going on where people create differences between Shiites and Sunnis. He was there to show there is no difference between them. We are all Bahraini. ... He is not against the royal family and government.

Unfortunately, however, such a stance puts him precisely "against the royal family and government," which, as Khuri observed three decades ago, is especially intolerant of social and political groupings that cut across Sunni-Shi'i lines.

Arrested on the day of his speech, February 15, Al Bu Flasa had been sentenced to two months imprisonment for "engaging in authorized political activity," "participating in an unauthorized demonstration," and "incitement against the regime." Yet as April 14 neared, his detention was extended another 45 days by the military prosecutor. Al Bu Flasa is now on a hunger strike.

The LA Times reports,

Albuflasa called his wife a few days ago and told her he would no longer be allowed to make phone calls from jail and was starting a hunger strike in response. ...

Albuflasa's family believes he is being punished because the government wants to reprimand Sunnis who had supported the pro-democracy demonstrations in Manama that were led by the island's Shiite majority. “When Mohamed came to the roundabout, it was like a surprise and a big attack for the government. They thought, ‘How could one of our guys go to the roundabout?’ Now they are making him pay the consequences,” his brother Rashed said.

Ebrahim Sharif and Muhammad Al Bu Flasa: two of the most dangerous men in Bahrain.

Update: for Arabic readers, a friend points out that the Bahrain Mirror (which is now blocked inside Bahrain) has a very related piece titled "They Are Not Shi'a."

Update 2: I just noticed that al-Wifaq has posted the following video slash music video to its YouTube page that opens with about 30 seconds of Ebrahim Sharif's speech at the Pearl Roundabout. I haven't been able to find the entire thing, so this might suffice for those interested.



Update 3: I've now been directed to a video of the full speech:

How Much Does "Business As Usual" Cost?: About $40 Million

$40 million. That's the amount the London-based owners of Formula One, CVC Capital Partners Ltd., would have been out had they decided to cancel the Bahrain Grand Prix. Bloomberg, citing a Telegraph report, quotes this figure as the fee Formula One charges the Al Khalifa for holding the race. So, then: any guess as to their decision?

The NYT quotes a statement by the International Automobile Federation:

"After considering all the factors and taking into consideration all stakeholders' concerns, the WMSC (world motor sport council) unanimously agreed to reinstate the Bahrain Grand Prix in the 2011 FIA Formula One World Championship. ... The WMSC feels that reinstating the Grand Prix is a means of helping to unite people as the country looks to move forward."

Wow, who woulda thunk it? Money and politics trumps humanitarian concerns. News at 11. (See this longer Times piece for a lengthier analysis.)

Human rights watchers are busy criticizing the decision. Max Fisher writes in The Atlantic, for example, "Green Light for Bahrain's Formula One Is Setback for Democracy Activists." Former FIA president Max Mosley offers an even stronger opinion:

“If I was president today, F1 would go to Bahrain over my dead body. ...

The grand prix will be used to paint a picture of Bahrain that will be false. They will be attempting to use the grand prix to support what they are doing, almost using F1 as an instrument of repression. ...

There is only one reason Formula One is in Bahrain and that is a political reason. To go will be a public relations disaster, and sponsors will want their liveries removed.”

Yet Bahrain's opposition is more forward-looking. As put by Muhammad al-Maskati,

"On the one hand, Formula One isn’t respecting human rights, but on the other, it’s a good chance for the people to express how they feel on television worldwide."

Which is to say, "Go ahead and hold the Formula One, because we're going to be protesting the hell out of it--from the airport, down the highway, all the way to the track."

Al-Wifaq leaders have also officially supported the rescheduling of the race, presumably for the same reason.

Paradoxically, then, the rescheduling of the event may prove to be a boon to the anti-government camp, particularly in the wake of the failed attempt to restart mass protests this week following the lifting of martial law on June 1. Though small groups of demonstrators did make it past the labyrinth of checkpoints to the streets both on Wednesday and Friday (braving rubber bullets and teargas), they failed to reach their target of the now-sacred ground about the erstwhile Pearl Roundabout and, more generally, failed to garner the sort of numbers they had aimed for.

Certainly, the rescheduled Grand Prix will be marked prominently on the calendars of Bahrain's opposition, and look for the King to expedite his just-announced "National Dialogue, Take 2" initiative in order to help ensure some progress toward a political resolution in time for the race.

Speaking of which, the Bahraini government might want to get started with that. It seems the only people invited to talks so far have been the pro-government folks. Al-Wasat reports the first meeting of the National Dialogue 2 was held on June 1. Who did it involve, do you ask? The crown prince and Sh. 'Ali Salman? The king and the heads of all the main political societies? Not exactly. Actually, the initial phase of the national dialogue consultation involved... the prime minister and pro-government independents in parliament, namely the speaker of the lower house, Khalifah al-Dhaharani, and president of the Shura Council, 'Ali Salih al-Salih. I'm sure they had some really deep disagreements to sort out.

Update: the Wall Street Journal is now reporting that the White House will host Crown Prince Salman next week in an effort to jump start the new national dialogue initiative. Evidently they've failed to notice that he is no longer in a political position to make that happen.

Update 2: Al-Jazeera English has a 30-minute video segment up on its website about the reinstatement of the Formula 1 in Bahrain. It's called "Putting Money Before Morality?"