tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-83919582878089595712024-03-06T07:00:24.359+03:00Religion and Politics in Bahrain"The Battle of Karbala' still rages between the two sides in the present and in the future. It is being held within the soul, at home and in all areas of life and society. People will remain divided and they are either in the Hussain camp or in the Yazid camp. So choose your camp." — 'Ashura' banner in Manama, 2006Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.comBlogger238125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-27650406648203877692019-11-04T06:13:00.000+03:002019-11-04T11:19:47.111+03:00New Projects on Bahrain and Beyond<a href="https://www.gulfpolicy.com" imageanchor="1" target="_blank"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjxhRobPPkgE1jYKAV2ChxYD1QmsNKSrAG1XWpYKkItavQWtvS8-IL79m7OORPigozk9XbOlKPu8vlQG_srliyPK9VN6T6l88dDCJ2NfYOci-4Zky9WqH_Y3xgvDelYjGj4FMYaJtfHh10/s1600/weight-rand.jpg" width="500" height="339" data-original-width="935" data-original-height="635" /></a><br>
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It's an understatement to say that it's been a long time since I've updated <i>Religion and Politics in Bahrain</i>. This is mostly due to the necessities of academia, where blog posting is not viewed as a good use of one's time. Actually, it's worse than that: blog posting is viewed as a quite <i>bad</i> use of one's time. And perhaps it is. I also sometimes comfort myself with the observation that the lack of activity here at least reflects the lack of real change in Bahraini politics over the past few years, but that is probably just a mental excuse. Indeed, some <a href="https://agsiw.org/bahrains-royal-family-adjusts-for-the-future/">interesting developments</a> continue.<br>
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However the case, since it's very unlikely that I'll find the time to revive this blog anytime soon, I wanted to alert those visitors who still trickle in to a new <a href="https://www.gulfpolicy.com/">personal academic website</a> I've created to track my ongoing research and publications. Not so many are related to Bahrain any longer, at least directly, but some are.<br>
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One recent project that is focused on Bahrain is a chapter in a 2019 <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2799.html">RAND volume</a> examining communal resilience to sectarianism. The chapter examines the effect of sectarian-based geographical segregation on government service provision and economic welfare in Bahrain. It relies on original survey data collected in the country in early 2017. The data demonstrate that Bahrainis' likelihood of benefiting from public goods is strongly influenced by the sectarian demographic character of their neighborhood. Shi'a living in Shi'a-dominated districts are far less likely than Shi'a elsewhere to be employed by the government, and also have lower average household income compared to Shi'a in mixed or Sunni-majority districts. The reverse is true for Sunnis: living in a homogeneous (co-sectarian) neighborhood vastly increases the chance of having a public sector job and being well-off economically. The results give strong support to the idea that the Bahraini state uses the sectarian character of a neighborhood as an important basis for distributional decisions.<br>
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<a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2799.html" imageanchor="1" ><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjnUcnnTaAPgbc7Yp3RN_xEoe3LvST3dfkGUGuOj3LXQLKMTEYdXargzGcoSQLNNQqQqNmQjzy6axeuZ15mueQp-bCvcxAm2EonXGaYTu95sytnNau673B4k5F2QkKtkUhruR9WuZ8az8s/s1600/publicsector-0-100-final.jpg" width="500" height="336" data-original-width="1600" data-original-height="1075" /></a><br><br>
Such geographical-cum-sectarian disparities in goods provision are perhaps well-known to citizens and scholars of Bahrain. But the paper is unique in being able to use public opinion data to demonstrate this fact empirically.<br>
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Also, the data offer an updated estimate of Bahrain's sectarian balance compared to the 2009 data from my doctoral thesis. In fact, the ratio remains statistically unchanged from 2009, with Shi'a respondents accounting for 56.6% of the 2017 random sample. This gives a 95% confidence interval of between 52.1% and 61.2% for the country's Shi'a population in early 2017, compared to <a href="http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.com/2011/04/facts-on-ground-reliable-estimate-of.html">52.9%-62.3% in 2009</a>. These two very similar estimates should give added confidence in their accuracy. Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-65595888402534040032016-02-14T06:42:00.000+03:002016-02-14T08:48:45.961+03:00Bahrain Five Years after the February 14 Uprising<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/13/how-bahrains-crushed-uprising-spawned-the-middle-easts-sectarianism/" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" height="375" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh80iVdaXTmqcKpbp6LHio5khG9AyuwGUdyD6KTu3ARCsKjAfDbdUa34RZvlBjjTA3ZZmbh5jRVKrgoe7soadowIWKoz81EfP3z4LxWJEtgUlF1qU8rerJS3rlG13E1QcsFSGId31qd3wQ/s1600/wapo.jpg" width="500" /></a><br />
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The <i>Washington Post</i>'s political science blog Monkey Cage is running a retrospective <a href="http://pomeps.org/2016/01/20/reflections-on-the-arab-uprisings-five-years-on/" target="_blank">series</a> for the five-year anniversary of the Arab uprisings, with an article published on or near each country's respective anniversary of the onset of protests. <br />
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I contributed the Bahrain article, which carries the somewhat overwrought title (not mine), "<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/13/how-bahrains-crushed-uprising-spawned-the-middle-easts-sectarianism/" target="_blank">How Bahrain’s crushed uprising spawned the Middle East’s sectarianism</a>."Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-78655744490380640562015-11-17T19:11:00.003+03:002015-11-17T19:11:29.697+03:00Sectarian Backfire?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/map/sectarian-backfire-assessing-gulf-political-strategy-five-years-after-arab-uprisings" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="326" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjibUXta5MvdLEMca19x9YcrUqQflT1d85Os-wv6jm_K1NLPv-GdCsStxIJoILHHIl5XsD61Jy9tbc69Fu-yBiM03ElR5cgXpDtObZR2bFdX-90wt_6Sfm8I5vkZNeFPx8QORnEgGoGLVw/s1600/Screen+Shot+2015-11-17+at+7.06.16+PM.png" width="500" /></a></div>
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The Middle East Institute has just published a short essay by me titled, "Sectarian Backfire? Assessing Gulf Political Strategy Five Years after the Arab Uprisings." The aim, as the title suggests, is to examine the extent to which the deliberate post-2011 sectarianization of Gulf politics by (mainly) Saudi Arabia and Bahrain has been successful from their perspective. In particular, the piece attempts to counter the prevailing sense that the strategy has "backfired" for these governments, what with the rise of Da'ish, deepening of the Syrian civil war and the spread of war to Yemen, and so on.<br />
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But as I argue in the article, the strategy, insofar as it was implemented in service of the primary goal of regime security, has arguably succeeded beyond rulers' original expectations. Mobilization of co-sectarians doubtless contributed to the immediate goal of fending off domestic oppositions. And, since the rise of the Islamic State, it has also secured GCC governments huge arms deals and essentially a free diplomatic hand to act regionally and domestically in return for their support of the Western anti-IS coalition. Meanwhile, the more onerous physical costs of the sectarian policy have been successfully externalized by Gulf governments.<br />
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Any change in this sectarian policy, I conclude, is far more likely to owe to the Gulf's changing economic circumstances than to a change in <i>political</i> calculation.<br />
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You can read the article <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/map/sectarian-backfire-assessing-gulf-political-strategy-five-years-after-arab-uprisings">here</a>.Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-67345868668414600072015-10-08T06:32:00.000+03:002015-10-08T10:12:27.735+03:00Saudi Arabia Drags Bahrain Back into the International Spotlight<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh86WiGyX1ayrMiVaQT_NkqRPGPw0uifCuTwgFTtu7stgOK2pkiXfytQko4-LSNcA4v5r-dcZ6v4qCDGV02qFVb2LtBkR0mB1Y3-H1OqJOSkIpSZPOZKiGRDsSur4p7EMY-opllPhUsU5c/s1600/iraniraq3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="356" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh86WiGyX1ayrMiVaQT_NkqRPGPw0uifCuTwgFTtu7stgOK2pkiXfytQko4-LSNcA4v5r-dcZ6v4qCDGV02qFVb2LtBkR0mB1Y3-H1OqJOSkIpSZPOZKiGRDsSur4p7EMY-opllPhUsU5c/s1600/iraniraq3.jpg" width="500" /></a></div>
It's been a while, but I've managed to eke out a few minutes to post here just as confirmation that I've not died, joined the CIA and been sworn to silence, etc.<br />
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In fact, I was impelled to post mainly by the reemergence after a long hiatus of another source of Bahrain commentary, namely the "advocacy group" Citizens for Bahrain. This group of pro-government Bahrainis and/or Western PR firm employees, whose e-mail listserv and other publication machinery was in full tilt in the run-up to last fall's parliamentary elections and then in the aftermath, in recent times has been relatively inactive. The group sent over 100 e-mails during 2014, for example, compared to only around 20 in 2015, and most of these were concentrated at the beginning of the year.<br />
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Now, however, I've received three messages in the space of about a week--one attacking the British opposition leader for his criticism of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia ("<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/13/jeremy-corbyn-labour-leadership-victory-vision" target="_blank">the Bahraini dictatorship murdering its democracy movement, armed by us</a>"—ouch) in his keynote address to the Labour Party; a second attacking Iran for its criticism of Saudi Arabia in the wake of the tragic <i>hajj</i> stampede; and a third attacking Marc Owen Jones and coauthors for their criticism of Bahrain in <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Bahrains-Uprising-Alaa-Shehabi/dp/1783604336" target="_blank">a new book</a> edited by Jones and other Bahrain Watch members. Am I detecting a theme here?<br />
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Clearly, Bahrain once again is finds itself in the uncomfortable position of international scrutiny, and is doing what it can to fend off critics. Yet, this case bears an interesting distinction from previous ones: renewed diplomatic pressure is coming not as a result of any development in Bahrain itself, or as a routine consequence of Bahrain's hosting of high-profile annual events such as the Formula 1 race or Manama Dialogue. No, here we can clearly see that the spotlight on Bahrain is a side-effect of the much more massive spotlight being shined on Saudi Arabia owing to its disastrous foray into Yemen, the continued growth of ISIS, the further escalation of the war in Syria following Russia's entrance into the conflict, and general questions about the kingdom's management and leadership after two deadly incidents at the <i>hajj</i>. <br />
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In the past month alone, Saudi Arabia was blasted by the potential future Prime Minister of its strongest political ally, Great Britain; faced accusations by Iranian, Indonesian, and other officials about its handling of the stampede in Mina, including misrepresentation of the death toll; narrowly (and controversially) <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/middleeast/western-nations-drop-push-for-un-inquiry-into-yemen-conflict.html" target="_blank">averted</a> a UN resolution submitted by the Netherlands calling for an international investigation into the war in Yemen; and, according to <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/saudi-war-yemen-senate-arms-sale.html#" target="_blank">this story</a> in yesterday's <i>Al-Monitor</i>, apparently now faces opposition by members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee to an arms deal that would send additional precision-guided munitions (and other high-tech weaponry promised as compensation for the Iranian nuclear deal) to the kingdom. The article reads,<br />
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“What we are concerned about is that there is not a military solution in Yemen,” Sen. Ben Cardin, D-Md., the top Democrat on the panel, told Al-Monitor. “What we want to do is get the parties serious about implementing a political solution. We thought we had a clear track to that, and it's off track right now. So we want to get it back on track.”<br />
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Cardin described the delay as a fairly routine matter of lawmakers and staff pressing the administration for answers and reassurances. He and others made it clear, however, that senators on the panel, particularly Democrats, have a wide array of concerns they want to see addressed.<br />
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“This proposal is receiving a considerable level of congressional scrutiny,” one Senate Democratic aide acknowledged.<br />
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A coalition of human rights and arms control groups has been working behind the scenes for weeks to try to get lawmakers to speak up against the Saudi-led air campaign in Yemen, which has been blamed for the deaths of more than 2,300 civilians over the past six months. Their message emerged in public Oct. 6 during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Yemen that saw several Democrats question the wisdom of re-arming the Saudis.<br />
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“I fear that our failure to strongly advocate diplomacy in Yemen over the past two years, coupled with our failure to urge restraint in the face of the crisis last spring, may put the viability of this critical [US-Saudi] partnership at risk,” said Sen. Ed Markey, D-Mass. “The Leahy Law prohibits US security assistance — and many forms of defense cooperation — with forces that have engaged in gross violations of human rights. If reports are accurate, the Saudi indiscriminate targeting in the air campaign and an overly broad naval blockade could well constitute such violations.”
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And, if this were not cause enough for concern, last week saw the widespread <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/28/saudi-royal-calls-regime-change-letters-leadership-king-salman" target="_blank">publication and reporting</a> of two letters penned by an anonymous Saudi royal and circulated among senior members of the family that revealed significant factionalism within the Al Sa'ud over the leadership of King Salman and his son. An article in yesterday's <i>Foreign Policy</i> blog sums up the near-apocalyptic mood nicely: "<a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/will-the-united-states-help-if-saudi-arabia-starts-to-fall-apart/">It’s Time for the United States to Start Worrying About a Saudi Collapse</a>."<br />
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It is under this backdrop, then, that the traditional diplomatic relationship between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, in which the latter comes to the former's defense, has been turned on its head. In a show of support for the war in Yemen, in early September King Hamad <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/09/07/Gulf-and-Arab-countries-pledge-reinforcements-to-Saudi-led-coalition-forces-in-Yemen.html" target="_blank">announced</a> that his own sons Nasser and Khalid would join the fight. (Some pro-Iranian news outlets have since <a href="http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940708001449" target="_blank">claimed</a> that Khalid was injured or even killed in a Houthi missile attack in Ma'rib.)<br />
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Bahrain also reacted vociferously to suggestions by Iran and other countries to internationalize the <i>hajj </i>pilgrimage (and therefore divest Saudi Arabia of significant religious cache and tourist revenue) by handing stewardship of the Islamic holy cities to a neutral authority. Indeed, one gets the impression that Bahrain's October 1 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/bahrain-expels-iranian-diplomat-alleges-link-to-militants/2015/10/01/014a27e0-6871-11e5-bdb6-6861f4521205_story.html" target="_blank">expulsion</a> of the Iranian ambassador, ostensibly after the discovery of an opposition arms depot linked to Iran, was a response primarily to its role in keeping diplomatic pressure on Saudi Arabia. For instance, this Bahrain News Agency <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/689510" target="_blank">story</a> detailing a Shura Council's debate of "Iranian interference [and] threats" devotes three of six paragraphs to <br />
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the Iranian statements [that] bear threats to the GCC countries, [for instance] the statements of Iranian Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Ali Al-Khamenei on September 30 during a graduation ceremony of cadets in which he targeted Saudi Arabia following the stampede in Mena during pilgrimage.<br />
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The committee voiced its categorical rejection of those defamatory statements which do not show any respect to the major role played by Saudi Arabia in serving the pilgrims and facilitating their rituals. It also added that the Iranian statements represented an explicit threat to sow sedition by disseminating fallacies.<br />
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The committee stressed that Saudi Arabia's security is part of Bahrain's security which is a red line, adding that those attempts will never succeed to shake regional stability and Iran's attempts to impose hegemony on the whole region will be doomed to failure thanks to the great awareness and determination of the GCC people and their belief in the Arab identity of the region and the wisdom its leaders.</blockquote>
It is notable also that another Saudi proxy, Yemen, <a href="http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/yemen-cuts-ties-with-iran-after-bahrain-expels-iran-diplomat-1.371440" target="_blank">cut diplomatic relations with Iran</a> almost simultaneously, once again for Iran's alleged involvement in arming and training the opposition there. Several days later, the nephew of the late Sa'ud al-Faisal, Prince Khalid bin Sultan, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/prince-faisal-saudi-arabia-lead-region-yemen-iran.html" target="_blank">told</a> an audience on Capitol Hill that Saudis fighting in Yemen have confirmed the presence of Iranian and Hizballah fighters, and more generally warned against "increasing Iranian incursion into other states’ affairs." While his comments were not meant to represent the official position of Saudi Arabia, it is difficult to imagine that they will not be taken as such.<br />
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Thus, it would seem that, faced with renewed threats from all sides, Saudi Arabia is doubling down on what it knows: the sectarian strategy in which accusations and resulting fears of Iranian empowerment are meant, first, to justify otherwise unpalatable actions; but, more importantly, to convince allies that there is no other option but continued support of Saudi Arabia in the face of far scarier alternatives. Five years after the onset of the Arab uprisings, one wonders how much longer such a strategy can hold out.<br />
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<b><span style="color: #e06666;">Update</span></b>: I forgot to mention this <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-10-05/no-gulf-country-syrian-refugees" target="_blank">article</a> in <i>Foreign Affairs </i>published this week by myself and Michael Ewers on the topic of the Gulf states' non-acceptance of large numbers of Syrian refugees.Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-79742382383916084932015-06-03T12:39:00.000+03:002015-06-03T12:39:04.316+03:00Rethinking the Rentier State: My Bahrain Book Finally Published<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.amazon.com/Group-Conflict-Political-Mobilization-Bahrain/dp/0253016800" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjYyRba6bJa_2aYBv1_DuTF7xCGKIWHJMW8P5G_KqvaeTlG-fNJeFxeXh77eG6PI3231DTo5vOVj3H0vs5IKz3uSM4SSLFf9OtnWnXnWCD3yLE60RR8YgTzR7Iubu5fdUhU-6GjxCZRusI/s1600/book+covier.jpg" /></a></div>
A friend wrote to say that he received his pre-order copy of my new book on Bahrain (and to a lesser extent the Arab Gulf generally), and it reminded me that I haven't really dedicated a full blog post to it.
Obviously, I'm not going to go on and on about how great it is; mainly I want to inform readers that the 20% pre-order discount on Amazon is still available until the official publication date of June 8, even though (apparently) it is already shipping. Or you could always wait six months or so until people are selling used copies for 99 cents or whatever.<br />
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The book is titled <i><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Group-Conflict-Political-Mobilization-Bahrain/dp/0253016800" target="_blank">Group Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf: Rethinking the Rentier State</a>. </i>Not such a catchy title, right? Despite that, it is being published in the Indiana University Press <a href="http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/index.php?cPath=1037_3130_3183" target="_blank">Series in Middle East Studies</a>, and we've already reached an agreement with another publisher for an Arabic translation. But I don't have a clear sense yet how long the latter will take.<br />
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The book draws upon my doctoral fieldwork in Bahrain, including the results of my mass political survey administered in 2009. But the revision schedule was such as to allow historical analysis up through the 2014 parliamentary elections. So it's actually quite current.<br />
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Analytically, the book attempts to understand the conditions under which the presumed "rentier bargain" -- rent-funded economic benefits for citizens in return for political loyalty or apathy for the state -- fails to operate, or operates among some citizens and not others. In doing so, it examines the political motivations of ordinary Gulf (mostly Bahraini) citizens as well as specific strategies of rule adopted by Gulf states.<br />
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Hopefully people will find it interesting.Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-49340267509312914382015-05-14T06:17:00.000+03:002015-06-01T09:45:51.532+03:00Bahrain Settling in to a New Normal<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/bahrain-king-skips-obama-meeting-horse-show-117899.html" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="331" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjHbdfFYvCn4LoE0iqICWldqWyib1VW_RHwAPcHqXLJt0VD3tKfaOZSRrx0ZnXSYTpsZxrDuhekiQj8nCf3JQzh9QMrPxik2AFX24yn32nepeXQp7LNUwQCMGli-Lu5q9UoybO-yBOsIHY/s1600/horse1_17052014.jpg" width="500" /></a></div>
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<i>"This is way more awesome than meeting with Obama, right?!"</i></center>
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Needless to say, it's been a while since I've posted here, mostly because I've been busy with actual work, but also partly because Bahrain has fallen into a political lull since the latest crackdown on activists that saw the arrest of 'Ali Salman and others. One suspects that there is simply no one left to protest who hasn't already been arrested, been driven into hiding, or fled Bahrain entirely. Indeed, Bahrainis are now <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/27/dispatches-bahrain-don-t-mention-war" target="_blank">threatened with punishment</a> for criticizing even the Saudi-led military operation in Yemen, so one can imagine the situation with regard to local politics.<br />
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Another reason I've taken to writing today is that I've been able to speak recently with some well-connected Bahrainis who've offered some useful insights that I thought might also interest others. So, in no particular order:<br />
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<i>The Overall Situation</i></div>
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Very few protesters continue to take to the streets, and much of the labyrinthine system of checkpoints has even been dismantled. In its place, however, is an even more ubiquitous network of UK-style CCTV cameras, presumably courtesy of the Ministry of Interior's British police advisers.<br />
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No progress has been made in bridging the social and political chasm that continues to separate Sunnis and Shi'is since February 2011. Similarly, almost no space remains for genuine political activity by members of either community. Members of parliament, who are now mostly younger, inexperienced independents with no coherent legislative agenda, appear far more interested in jostling for private benefits -- travel to international events and meetings, press opportunities, and so on -- than working to aid constituents or the country.</div>
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With a closed political arena and social relations that remain utterly frayed, the state is redoubling efforts on the economic front, aided by considerable funding from Kuwait and especially the UAE. My Bahraini contact suggests that the Emirates has far exceeded its contribution to the GCC fund for Bahrain, and is helping the government to fund massive new housing projects spread across the country, including in Hamad Town, Muharraq, and the Northern Governorate.<br />
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Crown Prince Salman is leading and is the public face of this effort, enabled by his close relationship with Muhammad bin Zayid. One almost gets the sense that Bahrain is returning to the days of the EDB and a development-based plan to reduce political tensions, without of course the corresponding political liberalization.</div>
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<i>'Ali Salman and al-Wifaq</i></div>
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On the other hand, the Crown Prince has been instructed by conservatives within the government to stay out of politics, and in particular to stay out of the case currently being prosecuted against al-Wifaq leader 'Ali Salman. Members of the society expect that a verdict could be announced as soon as June, though the state may seek to draw out the case to use as a bargaining chip with the opposition. In all cases, Salman's lawyers expect a sentence of two years at a minimum, and likely much higher. </div>
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The catalyst for the arrest was, obviously, al-Wifaq's decision to boycott last year's parliamentary elections, a move that alienated what few quasi-allies the society had. For several months following the elections, the Crown Prince was so upset that he refused to have any contact at all with al-Wifaq or its representatives. Likewise, the British embassy made clear that the group had in its view dug its own grave, and could not expect to be treated like a legitimate political actor if it continuously eschewed the legitimate institutions of politics.</div>
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The new U.S. ambassador to Bahrain, William Roebuck, who was appointed just a month before the elections, has assumed a very low profile, in stark contrast (one assumes not coincidentally) to his much-maligned predecessor. All high-level cooperation appears to be routed instead through the Pentagon, whose officials remain on close terms with their Bahraini military and civilian colleagues. The State Department, to put it diplomatically, does not enjoy the same esteem among top Bahraini officials.
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<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>Potential Changes at the Top</i><br />
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According to one contact, the prime minister is ill, and visibly so. He still makes his trademark public appearances, but he is in the office only for several hours a day, compared to the usual six or eight. But one should not expect Khalifa bin Salman's successor to enjoy his authority, or for Bahrain to continue the new GCC trend of empowered Crown Princes. </div>
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<br /></div>
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On the other hand, given Sh. Salman's personal and generational connections with his counterparts in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh (i.e., Muhammad bin Nayf), his political future is probably looking brighter than it was two or three years ago. King Hamad's other influential son, Nasr, who enjoys a good reputation (among government supporters) as a tough military man, has made no foray into politics per se, and seems to have his eyes instead on the position of Defense Minister and the title of field marshal.</div>
</div>
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</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>The GCC Camp David Summit</i></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
According to a contact, King Hamad initially was planning to attend the GCC summit at Camp David, with the visas and passports of his entourage already having been arranged. However, after the Saudi king's decision not to attend, Sh. Salman was deputized in King Hamad's place, presumably at the implicit or explicit suggestion of the Saudis. As it is now, King Hamad is <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/bahrain-king-skips-obama-meeting-horse-show-117899.html" target="_blank">scheduled instead</a> to meet with Queen Elizabeth at the Windsor Horse Show, a fitting alternative symbolic of Britain's (and Europe's) newfound diplomatic cache in Bahrain and the Gulf generally since 2011.<br />
<br />
The contact mentioned that in anticipation of Camp David, the government has recently released as many as several hundred political detainees, mostly women and youth. The preemptive step was taken to bolster Bahrain's case for being on the right track politically, while avoiding accusations that the release was in response to a "demand" or pressure by the United States or Obama.<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update</b></span>: I forgot to mention that my Bahrain-focused book, <i>Group Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf: Rethinking the Rentier State</i>, is finally being published on June 8 in the Indiana University Press Series in Arab and Islamic Studies. I mention it because it's <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Group-Conflict-Political-Mobilization-Bahrain/dp/0253016800">available now on Amazon</a> for a 20% discount ($24). Or I guess you could wait to buy a used copy from someone in September for two dollars or whatever. Moreover, we've agreed with another publisher on an Arabic translation, which should be out a few months later. So some may wish to wait for that.<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update 2</b></span>: A reader writes in regarding Sh. Nasr: "my understanding is not that he has plans to become Defense minister, but that he may head in the future a newly-formed Ministry for the National Guard."Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-70424462642798329952015-01-18T06:10:00.000+03:002015-01-18T09:18:15.902+03:00Bahrain's Sectarianism Bites Back―And Not Just Politically<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigdLd87vZYoVs8IoLdUX5CNm4tohSjuxAX4nxLSrCBn6O-WLGeC87LKVozDByQZVr90qTfi6HwpAvBPSqm96qSl6PmhQmhFY7xeNNB15DFkk4fDzEGUgykjOcyXQv_WschmDTPqPj8_ig/s1600/562778_403616599704479_1179132689_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigdLd87vZYoVs8IoLdUX5CNm4tohSjuxAX4nxLSrCBn6O-WLGeC87LKVozDByQZVr90qTfi6HwpAvBPSqm96qSl6PmhQmhFY7xeNNB15DFkk4fDzEGUgykjOcyXQv_WschmDTPqPj8_ig/s1600/562778_403616599704479_1179132689_n.jpg" /></a></div>
<center>
<i>Bahraini Salafis </i><i>boastfully </i><i>engaging with Syrian rebels in August 2012. </i></center>
<center>
<i>What could possibly go wrong?</i></center>
<br />
The inevitable political blow-back of the sectarian agenda employed by Bahrain and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states since 2011 has remained a common theme of this blog. Forestalling change by instilling in citizens not simply a violent opposition to political reform as a specific policy choice, but a visceral hatred of the actual reformists themselves, is a decidedly short-term strategy, and it seems that we're now nearing an inflection point.<br />
<br />
The local political and communal implications of Bahrain's sectarianization of politics have always been clear enough: the deepening of distrust between Sunna and Shi'a, the rise of violent opposition movements, and the marginalization of moderate factions both within the government and society.<br />
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But with the meteoric rise of Da'ish in Syria and Iraq, and the free operation of similarly-oriented groups based in the Yemen, these implications are no longer limited to the political and societal. Rather, Bahrain's deliberate incubation of Sunni radicalism is transforming now into a foremost <i>security</i> problem for the Al Khalifa. As described in an article published on Thursday titled "<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/giorgio-cafiero/bahrains-daesh-dilemma_b_6462998.html" target="_blank">Bahrain's Daesh Dilemma</a>" (and before that in <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/29/why-is-bahrain-outsourcing-extremism/" target="_blank">a piece</a> by Ala'a al-Shehabi in <i>Foreign Policy</i>), it turns out that Bahraini nationals count among several senior members of the so-called Islamic State, including the main theological apologist for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his claim to the Caliphate.<br />
<br />
Not only this, the article tells, but many of these individuals are or appear to be former members of and/or defectors from the Bahraini security forces, which one will recall are composed primarily of non-national Sunnis from Yemen, Syria, Pakistan, and elsewhere due to concerns over what might happen if you allow Shi'a to have weapons. Well, it turns out that Bahrain must also now concern itself with the opposite case, i.e. what happens when you give weapons to radicalized Salafis recruited from countries infiltrated by terrorist organizations. For it is not just heretic Shi'a, but also the ruling family itself, that are the targets of the latter. <br />
<br />
In this context it is instructive to consider another piece published on Thursday, a <a href="http://susris.com/2015/01/15/commentary-a-new-name-for-isis-prince-turki-al-faisal/" target="_blank">commentary</a> by Saudi Prince Turki al-Faysal in which he endeavors to give Da'ish "a new name," namely "Fahesh" (obscenity), to better reflect the reality of the organization. The article is a remarkable feat of cognitive dissonance, with Prince Turki managing to describe chronologically the rise of the Taliban, al-Qa'ida, Da'ish, and other Wahhabi-oriented terrorist groups without once mentioning their origins in the Wahhabi ideology exported for decades -- still being exported -- by the Saudi state, an ideology that features very few doctrinal differences from than being employed in, say, today's IS-controlled Mosul.<br />
<br />
Indeed, in Prince Turki's Bizarro World telling, it is Iran, not Saudi Arabia, that is culpable for the scourge of Salafi jihadism(!). And perhaps Saudi Arabia will then take credit for creating Hizballah and the Mahdi Army.<br />
<br />
Of course, it is no secret that the very existence of Saudi Arabia owes to a pragmatic marriage of politics and religion, and that accordingly it cannot afford to alienate the conservators of the monarchy's legitimacy and stability. It, like Bahrain, continues to bet on its ability to externalize the costs of the Sunni radicalization for which it itself is primarily responsible. One just hopes for its sake that IS militants don't learn how to <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/great-wall-saudi-arabia-163153320.html" target="_blank">climb fences</a>.Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-67693000725459251642015-01-01T06:38:00.000+03:002015-01-06T09:52:00.645+03:00On the Mystery of 'Ali Salman's Arrest<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://manamavoice.com/news-news_read-25968-0.html" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEguu3bUfzGz6rMKTzjXqUZKKjZkLorsfUICBH4ahLAhQnyfTVLNivK6pAyCeV7GhzKImyrgzPXejquv1o8NK1KhSWt0vZp9eqiSSRzNkHyxTk1MDyGkfOnUaeYJWyqdrZJ0DIgtvKNN6ps/s1600/__051062-01-08_109.jpg" height="329" width="495" /></a></div>
Bahrain's arrest on Sunday of al-Wifaq leader Sh. 'Ali Salman, ostensibly in response to recent "escalatory" statements, has, at least according to the <i>New York Times</i>, left many observers "puzzled." Indeed, the newspaper<i></i> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/middleeast/calls-to-free-leading-cleric-in-bahrain.html" target="_blank">quotes</a> no less than Khalil al-Marzuq as saying that "despite the government’s history, he was surprised by the arrest. 'Why should they create more trouble with this move?'," he asked.<br />
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Among this "trouble" is not only the <a href="http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/12/31/392649/bahraini-forces-attack-salman-supporters/" target="_blank">reaction</a> by al-Wifaq supporters, but, more importantly from the Bahriani government's standpoint, that of the international community. The UN high commissioner for human rights, who is hilariously somehow a member of the Jordanian royal family, delivered a pointed rebuke following the announcement of Salman's arrest, while the United States is as usual "<a href="http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/12/20141231312650.html?CP.rss=true" target="_blank">deeply concerned</a>." Yet the State Department statement fell far short of calling for his release, saying only, "We strongly urge the Government of Bahrain to follow due process in this and all cases." So, basically the U.S. government is calling on Bahrain to conduct the fairest and most transparent sham trial possible.<br />
<br />
However, one could perhaps more easily make the opposite argument: that, precisely in light of the state's observed political tactics since the uprising, this move is little surprising if not altogether inevitable. Officially, Bahrain's attorney general <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/647760">accuses</a> Sh. 'Ali of delivering "statements [that] had significantly escalated from incitement and hate
speech ... to threats of military force against the state, including the imminent option to deploy methods currently used by armed groups operating elsewhere in the region." Apparently, then, Sh. 'Ali let slip al-Wifaq's secret plans for a Huthi-style blitzkrieg invasion and takeover of Manama and al-Riffa, the tribal seat and present de facto capital of Bahrain. <br />
<br />
Of course, one doubts whether 'Ali Salman's statements and sermons over the past week or month differ qualitatively from those he's been giving since February 2011, if not before. As always, the occurrence and timing of the arrest stem from deliberate political calculations. In this case, multiple factors would seem to be in play.<br />
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<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>"You Need Us More Than We Need You"</i> </div>
<br />
As Khalil al-Marzuq is eventually made to mention in the <i>New York Times</i> story, Bahrain clearly feels emboldened to defy or annoy its Western allies at a time when it is playing a strategically significant political and military role (as a base of operations) in various conflicts throughout the region, including versus the Taliban in Afghanistan, Da'ish in Syria/Iraq, and to a lesser extent the Iranian regime.<br />
<br />
Just earlier this month Britain formally <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/building-a-british-naval-base-in-bahrain-is-a-symbolic-choice--for-no-clear-reason-9908344.html" target="_blank">announced</a> the signing of a deal to build a £15m permanent naval base at Mina Salman, while the U.S. is presently undergoing a significant <a href="http://www.stripes.com/news/bahrain-expansion-latest-signal-of-continued-us-presence-1.257371" target="_blank">expansion</a> of its own Naval Support Activity Bahrain. At the regional level, Bahrain also will play host to a new joint GCC naval force <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/gcc-to-set-up-regional-police-force-based-in-abu-dhabi" target="_blank">announced</a> at the Doha summit in December, and potentially a new GCC naval war college as well.<br />
<br />
Its regional and international partners thus in need of both its political will to join conflicts against Arab and Muslim enemies (mainly) of the West, as well as physical access to its strategically positioned territory, Bahrain can afford to thumb its nose at the United States and Europe for the sake (professedly) of its own "national security."<br />
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<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>Al-Wifaq in Political Limbo</i></div>
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<br /></div>
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Even before its electoral boycott, 'Ali Salman and al-Wifaq were under intense pressure, including formal legal investigation, by the Justice Ministry and other entities for their continued abstention from formal politics. If the group continues to eschew the parliament and elections and instead operate outside the normal channels of politics, the state argued, then how can it expect to remain a recognized or indeed tolerated political society?</div>
<br />
Now, with the election in November of yet another al-Wifaq-less parliament poised to remain for another four years, the government clearly recognizes the potential danger in having in effect two parallel political processes: one centered nominally around a formal, elected legislative body, and another involving dialogue and/or negotiations with an extra-parliamentary protest movement. Not only would such a dual-track further undermine whatever legitimacy the parliament enjoys, but it could also potentially rekindle the political hopes of those Sunni movements that abstained from or were defeated in the elections.<br />
<br />
Not incidentally, one presumes, just two days before his arrest 'Ali Salman was <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30632127" target="_blank">reelected</a> as al-Wifaq Secretary General, promising for the state another four years of headache. By occupying al-Wifaq with the persecution of its leader, the state can ensure that al-Wifaq will voluntarily reject any notion of continuing the Crown Prince's National Dialogue process, and so also keep sidelined those Sunni groups (not to mention the Crown Prince himself) that have also been involved in the talks.<br />
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<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>Throwing Disgruntled Sunnis a Bone</i></div>
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<br /></div>
However, more central to the state's decision-making here than all of the preceding, in my estimation, is its desire to dissipate or head off widespread Sunni resentment following the humiliation that was the November election. It was humiliating for Bahrain's Sunnis not only for the result -- the almost complete failure of Sunni groups to capture seats, in main part due to electoral engineering -- but also for the larger atmosphere surrounding the election. Sunnis, as characterized to me recently by one Bahraini, were <a href="http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.com/2014/12/electoral-rules-and-threats-cure.html" target="_blank">compelled</a> to vote by the ruling family like dogs made to sit. Many went to the polls in spite of themselves and having not even registered, passports in hand, in fear of the consequences threatened for those who condescended to stay home.<br />
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The portrait drawn by many ordinary Sunnis is of a ruling family holed up in al-Riffa in their palaces and private airport, barely coming (with the exception of ever-busy Sh. Khalifa) to Manama or Muharraq, and watching as outsiders while the country continues to dissolve economically, socially, and politically. Yet, even those who hold this view remain nominal supporters of the state, loath to assist a Shi'a-dominated opposition by outward expressions of dissatisfaction. Thus, Bahraini Sunnis are left to stew in their frustration, caught between what is widely perceived as an uncaring government and an even more hateful opposition.<br />
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Thus, as has happened so many times since 2011, when the state perceives discontent among its Sunni support base, it appeals to those more security-minded (as opposed to strictly reform-minded) among them by arresting or threatening to jail some or another opposition leader -- whether Nabeel Rajab, Khalil al-Marzuq, 'Ali Salman, or Sh. 'Isa Qasim himself. The sure-to-be drawn out legal process; the inevitable accusations of "foreign interference" in Bahrain's internal affairs; the wider crackdown on activists protesting 'Ali Salman's detention and eventual trial -- all offer no shortage of drama and distraction from substantive political issues. And, if all goes well, Bahrainis will forget all about the new parliament and government are or are not accomplishing.<br />
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<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update</b></span>: We now know the specific "escalatory" remarks of 'Ali Salman that the general prosecutor refers to in his statement, and that are the nominal basis for his arrest. As seen in the below video (beginning around 1:38), Sh. 'Ali states that "the Bahraini opposition has been encouraged to become like the Syrian opposition and transform the country into a military battleground, but it has remained steadfast in its peaceful [protest]." This, as one can imagine, was not perceived by authorities in the same light as probably intended by Sh. 'Ali. One can hear the former asking suspiciously, "So, from whom exactly are you receiving encouragement and advice?!"<br />
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<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="368" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/upljbvU4rto" width="490"></iframe></center>
<br />
<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update 2</b></span>: A BNA <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/648334">statement</a> about the extension of Sh. 'Ali Salman's detention confirms that the charges he faces surround his contact with foreign groups (implied in the speech posted above), saying that during his interrogation<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"[Sh. 'Ali] confirmed that he had contacted a number of overseas regimes and political organisations to discuss the internal affairs of the Kingdom. These detailed discussions outlined Bahrain’s political situation and were aimed at achieving active interference in the internal affairs of the country and highlighted the willingness of a number of bodies approached to do so. The defendant did not inform any official authority in the Kingdom of these communications."</blockquote>
Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-87678890384188994582014-12-02T08:03:00.000+03:002014-12-02T08:26:26.039+03:00Electoral Rules (and Threats) Cure Bahrain's Sectarian Parliament<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/01/electoral-rules-and-threats-cure-bahrains-sectarian-parliament/" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg947hSACz2AtcXNsAsSbO2fqBnGuuG9UZRHw_CoY-pgCViLgVM4VcwrrDDcL98UvuMhZbNaP3hqTN4XyGDrRBr2dnpu5z-tRZC43E9aM-ihhqs1bb0UCtDi-h3DZ0oh22USJkKRDIIMSI/s1600/monkeycageart.jpg" /></a></div>
<br />
We knew that Bahrain was a beacon of democracy in the Middle East, but with the <a href="http://www.citizensforbahrain.com/index.php/entry/preliminary-analysis-of-the-final-results-of-the-2014-bahrain-parliamentary-elections">results</a> of the just-concluded 2014 parliamentary elections, the country really is taking it up a notch. In line with the liberal vision articulated by America's Founding Fathers, Bahrain has succeeded in neutralizing -- indeed, all but doing away with -- that thing deemed most dangerous of all to the democratic ideal: what James Madison called "majority factions," otherwise known as political parties.<br />
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I've broken my work-induced abstinence from blogging to write something for the <i>Washington Post</i>'s political science blog "The Monkey Cage" on this issue of Bahrain's near party-less 2014-2018 parliament, especially as it relates to the Sunni community. I argue that the pitiful performance of both established and new Sunni political groupings, including members of the Al-Fatih Coalition, cannot be understood as "popular frustration with the prevailing order" alone, not least because TGONU and other groups were designed precisely as an antidote to the established Sunni Islamist coalitions. Rather, there are specific electoral rules and incentives that directly contributed to Bahrain's new-look parliament. I discuss in particular the issues of (1) general polling stations; (2) the newly-redrawn electoral districts; and (3) artificially high turnout as a result of threats against non-voters.<br />
<br />
The article is <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/01/electoral-rules-and-threats-cure-bahrains-sectarian-parliament/" target="_blank">here</a>.<br />
<br />
Not addressed in the article, finally, is another topic of much discussion presently, including in a <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/between-isis-and-iran-bahrain-tweaks-washington" target="_blank">piece</a> yesterday by Simon Henderson, namely the question of the future of Khalifa bin Salman, whom King Hamad duly reappointed as prime minister on Sunday following his constitutionally-mandated resignation following the election. Of course, past reports of Khalifa bin Salman's ill-health and imminent political and/or corporeal death have been greatly exaggerated, and this case may be no different.Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-73738520615875327902014-10-13T06:15:00.000+03:002014-10-22T13:32:44.293+03:00Bahrain's New Electoral Districts: No Help for the Opposition; Bad for Troublesome Sunnis<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj66UsAbu1NDVyyQdacvZeoYH1XDkVuQVTy1hbddbGzMiR3796afb7-DXPSqewHTnr0c2FSivCNtZNVjg2imvAuNudBHnG009bSf2tbZa1Yf-sYOU9ZVuzvJW-RVfonLPrkiET_Mh4wvo4/s1600/main_loc-35.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj66UsAbu1NDVyyQdacvZeoYH1XDkVuQVTy1hbddbGzMiR3796afb7-DXPSqewHTnr0c2FSivCNtZNVjg2imvAuNudBHnG009bSf2tbZa1Yf-sYOU9ZVuzvJW-RVfonLPrkiET_Mh4wvo4/s1600/main_loc-35.jpg" height="333" width="500" /></a><br />
<br />
It's been a while since I've had a chance to write here properly, and if I had more time and resources it would be nice to sustain Stephen Colbert-style coverage of the impending shit-storm that is likely to be Bahrain's November parliamentary elections. The main headline from today (or yesterday) is the opposition bloc's decision to <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29583378" target="_blank">boycott</a>, yet such a decision was but a formality following, among other things, yet another unilateral redrawing of Bahrain's electoral constituencies announced in late September, ostensibly to make them more "<a href="http://www.alwatannews.net/NewsViewer.aspx?ID=7vnwxRxHYGgvProJEqhnjA933339933339" target="_blank">equal in size</a>." <br />
<br />
I will spare readers all the details of the change, a visual depiction of which can be <a href="http://www.alwasatnews.com/4403/news/read/924028/1.html" target="_blank">found</a> at <i>Al-Wasat</i>, but the upshot is that the Central Governorate has been dissolved and its constituencies distributed among the remaining four regions: Al-Muharraq, Capital, Northern, and Southern. The claimed purpose, again, was to "equalize" the constituencies in line with opposition demands, and in accordance with the crown prince's latest <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/633493" target="_blank">dialogue framework</a> announced Sept. 18, one element of which is "[a] commitment to re-defining electoral districts to ensure greater representation and measures to further enhance electoral oversight."<br />
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So, then, what is the opposition so upset about?<br />
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As with many things, the problem here is the imprecise use of language, or perhaps more accurately the (deliberate) use of imprecise language. While it is true that the new changes do address differences in size among districts -- the Justice Minister <a href="http://www.alwatannews.net/NewsViewer.aspx?ID=7vnwxRxHYGgvProJEqhnjA933339933339" target="_blank">has claimed</a> that now "90% of the districts are approximately equal in size," whatever that means -- it is obvious that this was never the question of primary concern to the opposition. Rather, the question revolves around the <i>communal</i> <i>representativeness </i>of the districts, which, even in their new iteration, are drawn along sectarian geographical boundaries and thus are almost certain to produce a parliament that is not reflective of Bahrain's national-level demographic and thus political landscape.<br />
<br />
This result is evident from the map below, which superimposes Bahrain's 2010 electoral district winners on a sectarian demographic map of the country.<br />
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<a href="http://www-personal.umich.edu/%7Ejgengler/bahrain%27s.ethnic-based.electoral.districts.gif" target="_blank"><img src="http://www-personal.umich.edu/%7Ejgengler/bahrain%27s.ethnic-based.electoral.districts.gif" /></a>
<br />
<br />
Indeed, the now-dissolved Central Governorate, based around the confessionally-mixed 'Isa Town, was arguably the most diverse of all Bahrain's regions. Now, its neighborhoods have been divided carefully between the Sunni-dominated Southern Governorate (whose seats increased from 6 to 10), Shi'a-dominated Northern Govenorate (9 to 12), and more mixed Capital Govenorate (8 to 10). Muharraq retains its original 8 districts; more on this below. Finally, boundaries in remaining districts have been shifted considerably; more on this later as well.<br />
<br />
After studying the changes, al-Wifaq has concluded that its electoral prospects are entirely unchanged: in the latest vote it contested, 2010, it ran candidates in only 18 of 40 districts in recognition that it could not hope to win in the other Sunni-dominated 22. Last month, 'Ali Salman confirmed that the group's calculations remain the same, <a href="http://www.alwasatnews.com/4403/news/read/924028/1.html" target="_blank">saying</a> it is inevitable that 22 seats will be filled by pro-government candidates.<br />
<br />
Al-Wifaq does not seem to be the only -- or even primary -- political target of the changes, however. While the group's chances have been neither improved nor harmed, the same cannot be said of troublesome Sunni MPs. For instance, the outspoken anti-government Osama al-Tamimi, whose business famously was shot up in 2012 after he called for a corruption investigation into the prime minister on the floor of parliament, represented 'Isa Town in the former Central Governorate, and it is unclear how the changes will affect his prospects. And Wa'ad also traditionally has enjoyed strong support in this mixed Sunni-Shi'i area, Muneera Fakhro nearly winning Wa'ad's only-ever seat here in 2006. (Incidentally, it will be interesting to see how the state reacts to Wa'ad's September <a href="http://www.aldemokrati.org/en/details.php?artid=7484" target="_blank">reaffirmation of Ebrahim Sharif</a> as Secretary General. The Justice Ministry had threatened the group with dissolution in the case of his re-election.)<br />
<br />
The story is similar for Sunni Islamist candidates, which is sure to please not only the U.S. but also the Muslim Brotherhood-hating Saudis. Although the Islamist stronghold of Muharraq was spared redistricting, it was, on the other hand, the only governorate not to gain seats. At the same time, Islamist candidates in the South now face greatly-expanded local electorates, as the region takes on additional neighborhoods to correct its especially low elector-to-MP ratio. No longer will candidates be able to depend on localized bases of support in and around Riffa. Three-term Salafi firebrand Jassim al-Sa'idi, for instance, now faces an uphill battle against fellow MP Khamis al-Rumaihi, the two being forced through the new changes to <a href="http://www.citizensforbahrain.com/index.php/featured-articles/entry/implications-of-redrawn-constituency-borders-in-bahrain" target="_blank">contest the same seat</a> in the 8th Southern district.<br />
<br />
Indeed, the implications for Sunnis are such that even the pro-government (and I would guess Crown Prince-linked) advocacy group Citizens for Bahrain is forced to concede that "it is unclear whether the societies belonging to the Al-Fateh Coalition will succeed in forming a political bloc. The change in constituency boundaries seems to have complicated this process." (For more, see this quite informative <a href="http://www.citizensforbahrain.com/index.php/featured-articles/entry/implications-of-redrawn-constituency-borders-in-bahrain" target="_blank">district-by-district analysis</a> of the electoral changes.)<br />
<br />
On the other hand, pro-government independents, including tribesmen and minority MPs useful in demonstrating Bahrain's commitment to diversity, will continue to do well. Notwithstanding the government's claim that its motivation for redistricting was to make electoral districts more "equal in size," famed 'first-female-MP-in-the-Gulf' Lateefa Gaood's manufactured 10th district in the barren Southern Governorate desert remains intact, along with all 750 or so of its registered voters. I guess hers is one of the remaining 10% of unequal districts the Justice Minister was talking about.<br />
<br />
This conclusion -- that Bahrain's new electoral districts seem aimed at Sunnis as much as at Shi'a -- speaks to a larger truth increasingly evident both in Bahrain as well as around the Gulf and indeed the Middle East generally: growing international (i.e., U.S.) concern over the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and support for it among Gulf populations. This offers Gulf leaders newfound diplomatic leverage over an American policy often at odds with their own strategic calculations since 2011, and it also relegates further to the back burner intermittent American concern over human rights abuses, lack of reform, and so on. (The implicit threat of <a href="http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/753948" target="_blank">gravitation toward Russia</a> and other Asian powers also seems to be a preferred Bahraini tactic these days.) <br />
<br />
For now, the U.S. needs redoubled access to strategic military facilities in the region, intelligence gathering and sharing, and commitment by Gulf states to help fight ISIS at home and at least pay lip service to Western-led intervention against it in Iraq and Syria. On the other hand, one suspects that U.S. policymakers are influenced by an increasingly dampened appetite for political reform that, in the eyes of uninformed State Department officials in Washington, may well pave the way for the empowerment of Islamists more or less sympathetic to ISIS. (See the recent U.S. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/world/middleeast/kerry-visits-egypt-seeking-aid-in-isis-fight.html?_r=0" target="_blank">about-face in Egypt</a>, where Kerry seems to visit now on a weekly basis with nary a mention of the domestic political situation.)<br />
<br />
In the case of Bahrain, I am told by a reliable source that the U.S. has now firmly gone over to the British camp of supporting modest, ultimately meaningless political change at the margins. "This is politics," one Bahraini political figure was reportedly told by an American official, with reference to the U.S. need for Bahraini support on ISIS. Despite apparently intending originally to remain in Bahrain to see through the Crown Prince's newest dialogue initiative and pre-electoral negotiations, it seems that Ambassador Krajeski now will return to Washington before the November vote. (Now largely a moot point anyway with the opposition boycott.)<br />
<br />
Thus, rather than implement the spirit of the <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/633493" target="_blank">five-point reform plan</a> announced by Crown Prince Salman on Sept. 18, which included (admittedly vague) provisions not only on electoral redistricting but also changes in the areas of legislative authority, cabinet formation, the judiciary, and the security sector, instead it seems that Bahrain is faced with yet another <i>fait accompli</i> à la the National Action Charter more than a decade ago: delineation of a comprehensive liberalization strategy cautiously welcomed by the opposition along with the vast majority of society, followed by unilateral execution of selective aspects of the proposed reforms, renewing widespread disillusion and confirming citizens' original suspicions.<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update</b></span>: Shortly after I posted here, the (I presume) Crown Prince-linked advocacy group Citizens for Bahrain, whose district-by-district analysis of electoral changes I reference above, posted a long <a href="http://www.citizensforbahrain.com/index.php/entry/response-to-justin-gengler-the-opposition-give-election-reforms-a-chance" target="_blank">response</a> to my article apparently pointing out all its flaws and exhorting me, who is not even allowed to enter Bahrain much less a local stakeholder, to "give the reforms a chance." While I don't typically engage in these sorts of back-and-forths, I will in this case in the hope that it will help avoid similar confusion and/or deliberate misreading.<br />
<br />
The main charge is that I base my analysis on a biased measuring stick, namely the extent to which the reforms will aid al-Wifaq's electoral chances. In fact, my point was that the opposition's underlying aim in pushing for electoral reforms was to achieve electoral districts that would allow it to compete on a fair footing through elections, i.e. to win seats in parliament in proportion to its relative support among the population. Yet, before and after the changes, a party with a nominal constituency of at least 50% of voters (to use a conservative lower bound) <b>chooses voluntarily </b><b>to forego </b>competition in 22 (55% of) districts for knowledge, not that it will face a difficult electoral competition, but that it has utterly no chance of winning on account of demographic composition. The upshot is that opposition societies, in agreeing to participate, must accept beforehand that they will always be a minority in parliament irrespective of their actual support in society. <br />
<br />
Citizens for Bahrain extols the reforms as visionary and more "radical" than anyone could have anticipated, and rue the fact that Bahraini elections inevitably turn around sectarian identity. Yet such is a direct, predictable consequence of the single-member districts employed in the electoral system. It is well-known that this system -- such as seen in the United States and Britain -- systematically reduces the number of viable political parties, since, unless they have very localized bases of support (the Scottish Nationalist Party in Britain, e.g.) smaller parties simply have no chance of winning. Consider again the electoral history of Wa'ad, which earned between 5% and 10% of the total vote in 2006 and 2010 yet did not win a single seat.<br />
<br />
If the Crown Prince wants to institute truly "radical" electoral reform, then scrap the single-member districts in favor of any number of other electoral systems and rules -- proportional representation, party lists, etc. -- many of which are designed precisely for use in contested environments. We can agree on one thing, that Bahrain would be far better served if parliament included the spectrum of views represented in society, the most liberal of which today are weeded out by the electoral system itself. Unilaterally redrawing districts in a way designed to favor certain constituencies (independents), harm others (Sunni Islamists), and leave the electoral chances of others largely unchanged (the opposition) is not radical or progressive reform. (And, as it took al-Wifaq only a day to calculate its electoral hopes under the new system, do not pretend that the state did not do the same in redrawing the lines.)<br />
<br />
A second point Citizens for Bahrain make is that I chalk up the new changes to some U.S. conspiracy to disenfranchise Sunni Islamists. Here I think less needs to be said in response since this is a strange reading I assume not shared by many. I was making two points: 1) as acknowledged by the group itself, it seems clear that one target of the reforms was Sunni Islamist candidates, which is likely to please Saudi Arabia given recent tension over the usually well-represented (in parliament) Muslim Brotherhood in Bahrain, as well as the U.S.; and 2) that by all accounts the United States has resigned itself to the relatively limited electoral reforms in lieu of pushing for something more substantive, partly because they need Saudi and Bahraini support on ISIS. <br />
<br />
Finally, the group notes that Osama al-Tamimi is not running for re-election, which I did not know and which is too bad since he seems like a funny guy. On the other hand, I did not suggest that getting rid of him was the "sole intention" of government in dissolving the Central Governorate; rather, I wrote that "the outspoken anti-government Osama al-Tamimi ... represented 'Isa Town in the former Central Governorate, and it is unclear how the changes will affect his prospects." Misinterpret much?<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update 2</b></span>: In its latest effort to drum up popular enthusiasm for -- or more likely, given that it writes in English, international appreciation of -- Bahrain's upcoming elections, Citizens Bahrain has <a href="http://www.citizensforbahrain.com/index.php/entry/definitive-guide-to-bahrain-s-parliamentary-elections" target="_blank">published</a> what it calls the "definitive guide" to the parliamentary vote. Without subscribing to the group's conclusions about the substantive significance of the vote, or about the "appropriateness" of Bahrain's bicameral system in which the unelected Shura Council maintains veto power over legislation, one can nonetheless praise the comprehensiveness of the guide, which breaks down the race in some detail in each of the 40 districts.<br />
<br />
Some interesting facts: Bahrain will be without the famed Lateefa al-Gaood, who has apparently tired of representing her non-existent constituents in the South; and Jassim al-Sa'idi has already frightened his opponent, a sitting MP of some renown, into withdrawing. Finally, al-Asalah has broken ranks with the National Unity Gathering folks, who are on the other hand coordinating with al-Manbar, no doubt renewing speculation about the NUG's links with the Brotherhood in Bahrain.<br />
<br />
Finally, if some intrepid individual were to compute the average number of registered voters per governorate, and in Sunni- vs. Shi'i-dominated districts, that would be interesting to see.Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-76843590921652181222014-09-05T15:07:00.001+03:002014-09-16T13:11:36.964+03:00Bahrain Drain<a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141963/justin-gengler/bahrain-drain" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgufT69244L_hHaWj5E4fV8jdnQ0YVWHcX3YrmmOZ8bBDr3nvn6g35th-vl4sKZ1rB4RfH1lvCkRPjyG_DEZdmBhdu4T4344TkHOXTAVeJTPcsYxDUFxYfzHLqYR1MGMMJO1a8vm4ua7I8/s1600/Screen+Shot+2014-09-05+at+8.02.39+AM.png" height="419" width="500" /></a><br />
<br />
Yes, I know it's been a while since I've posted here, but that's what happens when you're traveling around the U.S. with a three-year-old and three-month-old.<br />
<br />
Despite this preoccupation, I've managed to produce at least one thing over the summer, and it's something I've been meaning to write about for a long time (even alluding to it here on occasion): the matter of Sunni tribal emigration from Bahrain, rumors of which have been swirling for a year or more. By all accounts, most or all of these migrants have headed to Qatar, giving an added dimension to the ongoing GCC dispute.<br />
<br />
You can read the article at <i>Foreign Affairs</i> using the links above. But, as is often the case, the published version differs considerably from my original formulation, so I thought I would also post the latter here as I'm in no danger of violating copyright rules. <br />
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I wouldn't say I prefer my original per se, but the focus and audience are certainly different, and the latter section especially examines some issues that are of more interest to people who care about Bahrain than people who care about foreign affairs generally, and thus didn't make the final cut. <br />
<br />
So, without further ado:<br />
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<hr />
<br />
<b>Bahrain Drain</b><br />
<br />
To the long list of maladies presently afflicting the Persian Gulf kingdom of Bahrain – protracted political deadlock and violence, poisonous sectarianism, and a diplomatic row with longtime political-military patron the United States – one can now add this to the list: the country is losing citizens. Or rather, its citizens are, in increasing numbers, losing Bahrain. And those heading for the exits are not all whom one might expect.<br />
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There are, of course, the thousands of mainly Shi‘a Muslim opponents who have sought refuge or formal asylum abroad in the aftermath of Bahrain’s popular rebellion begun in February 2011, many of whom remain active from Washington, London, and other European capitals. So too have many younger Shi‘a left the country not for any immediate fear of punishment, but in pursuit of better economic and educational opportunities, Bahrain’s favorable jobs and scholarships – such as exist -- reserved disproportionately for “loyal” Sunnis. Finally, there are the one hundred or so individuals, among them academics and former parliamentarians, stripped altogether of their Bahraini nationality for crimes allegedly committed during or since the uprising.<br />
<br />
Yet such exiles, if lamentable, are not unexpected or even recently unprecedented. Similar forces of exodus and banishment accompanied another Shi‘a-led <i>intifada</i> spanning the latter half of the 1990s, citizens returning home only after a series of goodwill pardons and reform promises by King Hamad bin ‘Isa Al Khalifa upon his 1999 succession. In times of heightened discrimination and oppression, Bahraini Shi‘a have never shied from exercising the option of political exit – whether to ride out the storm elsewhere, or to start anew in friendlier lands.<br />
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These, however, are not the source of Bahrain’s present demographic troubles. Indeed, from the state’s perspective, if dissidents and job-seekers opt to burden some other government, all the better. Rather, the problem is that Bahraini Shi‘a are today being joined by a far less likely group of émigrés: tribal Sunnis. Indispensible allies of the Al Khalifa since aiding in the eighteenth century conquest of the island, the tribal element in Bahraini society forms the bedrock of support for the ruling dynasty by remaining essentially apolitical, a sturdy counterweight to perennial, destabilizing confrontations between religious and ideological factions.<br />
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In parliament, for instance, whereas non-tribal Sunnis and Shi‘is are organized into political societies defined strictly along confessional lines, tribal MPs run and serve euphemistically as “independents,” affording a reliable bloc of pro-government votes largely unmoved by the political battles of the day. Though typically controlling only around a third of seats in the elected lower house, the tribal bloc, which includes parliament’s three-term speaker, has remained a reactionary force successful in blocking unwanted legislation, topics of debate, and procedures such as the quizzing of ministers.<br />
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That some in this constituency have tired of playing the role of reserve division, faithfully helping to forestall needed progress to their own political and economic detriment, is understandably the source of no little consternation on the part of Bahrain’s rulers. Yet, still refusing to admit their own culpability in the social and economic disintegration of their country since February 2011, the Al Khalifa are laying blame for Bahrain’s Sunni flight elsewhere.<br />
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Tribal families are not fleeing the political dysfunction and economic malaise that has characterized the latter half of King Hamad’s reign, Bahraini authorities insist, but instead are being “lured” away by promises of nationality and attendant benefits by neighboring Qatar. This accusation, and its practical political significance to Bahrain, goes far toward explaining the latter’s otherwise odd involvement in the ongoing diplomatic dispute between Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.<br />
<br />
<i>Beyond the Brotherhood</i>
<br />
<br />
When Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates took the unprecedented step of withdrawing their ambassadors from Doha in March 2014, they were joined in their protest by the far less influential Bahrain. The unusual and unforeseen nature of this “family spat” between Gulf monarchs, combined with the apparently obvious cause of the dispute, overshadowed the curious nature of Bahrain’s involvement, largely ignored as less intrinsically consequential, a reflexive position of solidarity with political-economic patron Saudi Arabia, or both.<br />
<br />
Indeed, if the diplomatic measure was uncharacteristically public, the reason behind it seemed clear enough: longstanding frustration over Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and its real or imagined affiliates in the Gulf. Officially, Qatar was accused of violating a GCC internal security pact agreed only several months prior, which barred “interference” in other members’ affairs. Yet such an offense applied not at all to Bahrain, where the Brotherhood’s political wing, al-Manbar al-Islami, enjoys an unblemished pro-government pedigree and, alongside tribal and Salafi blocs, forms the core of state legislative support. Outside of parliament, the group also was instrumental in organizing the popular Sunni counter-revolution of February and March 2011.<br />
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So it is that when Saudi Arabia and the UAE declared political war on the Brotherhood, labeling it a terrorist organization just two days after their ambassadorial recall, Bahrain baulked. Speaking at a conference in Pakistan, Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa indicated that his country would not follow suit, insisting al-Manbar was a strictly domestic actor with no link to the “global movement” destabilizing governments elsewhere. Subsequent clarifications attempted to bridge Bahrain’s tenuous position between GCC unity and domestic stability, achieving a sufficiently ambiguous policy on the Brotherhood as to allow it to maintain the status quo.<br />
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Bahrain’s clear interest in preserving good relations with one of its core constituencies, one moreover with close ties to senior members of the ruling Al Khalifa family, raises the question of why it joined the dispute with Qatar in the first place. If Bahrain’s perception of the Brotherhood differs wildly from that of its more skeptical neighbors, and if the latter seem at least to accept the realities behind Bahrain’s position, then why needlessly rattle the domestic political cage at a time when ordinary Sunnis continue to provide an essential pillar of stability in the face of continued Shi‘a opposition? Was Bahrain simply compelled to fall in line behind Saudi Arabia, whose oil subsidies provide nearly two-thirds of state revenues annually? Or did Bahrain have reasons of its own?<br />
<br />
<i>
Reengineering a Nation</i>
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<i><br /></i>
Until very recently, little of substance could be tied definitively to the latter possibility. Rumors of Bahrainis moving to Qatar to join local branches of extended tribes – prominent families such as the al-Manna‘i, al-Rumaihi, al-Muhannadi, al-Musallam, and al-Jalahma – have swirled for more than a year, some corroborated by Qatari contacts with familial ties to recent and soon-to-be migrants. Yet other Bahrainis insisted that the government had succeeded in dissuading citizens from leaving with promises of benefits in line with those offered by Qatar.<br />
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By early July, there remained little doubt where the truth lay. A hasty amendment to Bahrain’s nationality law stipulated stiff fines or forfeiture of citizenship for those who, without official approval, took the nationality of another country “whether of their own volition or through others’ incitement.” Less than a week later, Bahrain’s foreign minister gave a candid television interview in which he accused Qatar directly of engaging in “sectarian naturalization” for its explicit targeting of families with local tribal ties, employing the same term used by critics of Bahrain’s own program of naturalizing Arab and non-Arab Sunnis in return for police and military service.<br />
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Former Qatari Justice Minister Najeeb al-Nuaimi would acknowledge recent changes in both the scope and modality of his country’s naturalization of Bahrainis, telling Doha News, “Before, people had to move to Qatar, drop their Bahraini citizenship and then live in Qatar for three years before being granted Qatari citizenship, but now decisions are being made in just 24 hours.” Sitting officials were less forthcoming, yet it is no mystery why Qatar might seek to bolster a citizenry of around 275,000, which at less than 15% of the total population is vastly outnumbered by expatriates even by Gulf standards.<br />
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After a month of mutual recriminations played out over diplomatic and social media channels, on August 15 the Saudi-owned Al-Sharq Al-Awsat reported that Qatar had agreed to stop offering citizenship to GCC nationals, among other concessions, and raised the hope that withdrawn GCC ambassadors may soon return to Doha. But Bahrain’s rulers ought to take little solace, for this forced cessation does nothing to address the underlying incentives driving Bahrainis abroad. Just as the promise of relative stability and better pay draws to Bahrain Sunni recruits from Pakistan, Yemen, and Syria, so too will Bahrain’s own citizens — Shi‘i and Sunni — continue to be enticed by favorable social and economic conditions prevailing elsewhere in the Gulf and beyond. <br />
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This raises for Bahrain several worrying prospects. First and most obviously, Sunni defection could obstruct or at least delay the government’s key goal of reducing Bahrain’s historical Shi‘a majority to a demographic minority. Second, with an estimated 100,000 foreign Sunnis having already received Bahraini citizenship since the late 1990s, representing perhaps a third of the total Sunni population, a gradual exodus of indigenous tribes would mean that an ever higher proportion of remaining Sunnis are in many important cultural respects non-Bahraini and indeed non-khaleeji or even non-Arab, further complicating what is already a highly contested national identity and balkanized society.<br />
<br />
Finally and most importantly, whereas prominent tribal families contribute a political and economic surplus for the state, being both stalwart supporters and major pillars of private industry, naturalized Sunnis are net extractors. Already Bahrainis of both sects complain bitterly of public housing and other benefits going disproportionately to new Sunni arrivals at the expense of “original” citizens. And while it true that the state can expect loyalty in return for its investment in the short term, the example of Kuwait demonstrates the long-term pitfalls of citizens purchased in this fashion, whose commitment is only so steady as the stream of benefits they expect to gain.<br />
<br />
With the potential slow dissipation of its tribal element, Bahrain thus stands to lose more than just a reliable pro-government constituency. Allied tribes are the bedrock of the ruling regime, yes, but they also are productive in the non-oil economy, and represent – at least in the imagination of the Al Khalifa – the essence of what it means to be Bahraini.<br />
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In May 2013, eighteen months after revoking the nationality of 31 Shi‘a citizens for having “damaged state security,” Bahrain granted citizenship to 240 permanent British residents for “making a major contribution to the prosperity of the kingdom.” Personally announced by King Hamad on a visit to the United Kingdom, he insisted that their “loyal service more than justifies it.” Yet, unless the ruling family begins to focus similarly on the prosperity of its kingdom, instead of continued punitive measures against opponents, the notion of nationality will be an increasingly hollow one in Bahrain, as an ever greater number of its indigenous population is driven away.<br />
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<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update</b></span>: Citing a story at Al-Bawaba News, <i>Akhbar al-Khaleej</i> <a href="http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/13325/article/43152.html">reports</a> that patriotic Bahraini families are "refusing Qatari nationality despite all temptations," instead renewing their pledges of allegiance to King Hamad. According to the article, the "intransigent country" of Qatar continues to pursue Bahraini families despite earlier reports that it had agreed to end naturalization of Bahrainis; "nd thus the issue ... is still ongoing and [the two sides] are at a standstill."Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-18720177095076335442014-07-13T23:01:00.000+03:002014-07-13T23:22:32.609+03:00The New Bahraini Diplomacy: Screw All You Guys<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<br />
<i>-- "Man, I love this guy right here!"<br />-- "No, THIS guy!"</i><br />
<br />
It is a telling descriptor of the state of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East that a American diplomat's expulsion from a country -- an allied country, no less -- elicits no more than perfunctory "deep concern" from the State Department, in the way that it might be "deeply concerned" about recent inflammatory comments by the Ecuadorian Minister of Agriculture, or about the recent<i> </i>shortage of hamour<i> </i>at LuLu.<br />
<br />
Yet that's precisely where we are today in Bahrain, which does not even bother to call the U.S. bluff any longer, telling its longtime political-military patron instead to take its Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and shove it. Tom Malinowski, former Washington director for Human Rights Watch appointed to his current position in 2012, <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-07-09/news/sns-rt-us-bahrain-usa-20140707_1_sheikh-ali-salman-wefaq-u-s-fifth-fleet" target="_blank">got the boot</a> Tuesday two days after attending the Ramadan majlis of al-Wifaq, where, as seen above, he caught up with his old buddy 'Ali Salman over some Johnny Walker Blue.<br />
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It would seem that photos from the event went viral -- including one that also included the DCM of U.S. Embassy Manama -- sparking mass spontaneous ventricular tachycardia among Bahraini Sunnis, who then appealed to the state to take action. And the rest, as they say -- as they say -- is history. Before Malinowski could even land in Washington, 'Ali Salman was brought in for questioning, having violated the newly-instituted law against meetings with diplomatic representatives without official permission. (It would seem to be the first time that the law, prompted in the first place by public outrage at the U.S. Ambassador's meetings with al-Wifaq, has been enforced.) Reuters <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/10/us-bahrain-usa-alwefaq-idUSKBN0FF1ZI20140710" target="_blank">reports</a> that Sh. 'Ali has since been charged, along with Khalil al-Marzuq, himself only recently cleared on separate "terrorism" charges. <br />
<br />
Apart from the aforementioned "deeply concerned" from the State Department and some <a href="http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/us-diplomat-says-bahrain-expulsion-not-about-me-1.292434" target="_blank">comments</a> by Malinowski himself, Bahrain's unprecedented move seems to have generated a disproportionately muted official reaction. Perhaps State realizes now that it may not have been a great idea to send as political ambassador the former Washington Director of Human Rights Watch and author of a summer 2012 article titled "<a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/07/bahrain-prison-island" target="_blank">Bahrain: Prison Island</a>." As Simon Henderson says in <a href="http://online.wsj.com/articles/bahrain-moves-to-expel-u-s-official-for-meeting-opposition-group-1404764756" target="_blank">coverage</a> at the <i>Wall Street Journal</i>, "It's pretty provocative to send someone who is an outspoken critic of your country to go and preach human rights. ... It might have been appropriate, but it's not diplomatic. ... You're asking the Bahrainis to eat humble pie."<br />
<br />
Such is all the more true as Malinowski's apparent mission for the trip was to attempt to broker an agreement between al-Wifaq and "regime moderates" (i.e., the Crown Prince) that would secure the former's participation in upcoming parliamentary elections. (Though it isn't clear from what I've read whether he met Sh. Salman before being booted.) At a time when Gulf Sunnis see the U.S. aiding the Shi'a-led government in Iraq against a Sunni insurgency, continue to show no interest in stopping the bloodshed against Sunnis in Syria, and poised to sign a nuclear agreement with Iran, one could see where American involvement in Bahrain, symbolized in the person of Malinowski, may not have been viewed as impartial or to the likely benefit of ordinary Sunnis.<br />
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<i>A cartoon in Akhbar al-Khaleej. Malinowski to "Snake of the Embassy" (presumably U.S. Ambassador Krajeski): "You're a snake like me; why didn't they kick you out too?"</i></div>
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Finally, not helping matters also were recent events prior to Malinowski's visit, including a long <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/world/middleeast/power-struggles-in-middle-east-exploit-islams-ancient-sectarian-rift.html" target="_blank">piece</a> in the <i>New York Times</i> tracing post-Arab Spring sectarianism back to Bahrain (one that did not include any quotations from government officials), and more importantly the <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/07/05/Bahrain-police-officer-killed-in-terrorist-bombing.html" target="_blank">killing</a> of a police officer in a bombing in East Ekar the day before Malinowski's visit. Of course, critics would say that al-Wifaq and other oppositions societies, while claiming human rights violations and cultivating U.S. and Western attention on that basis, in fact are violating the rights of the rest of the country's residents by continuing to foment deadly extremism among members of their own community.<br />
<br />
Illustrative of this range of reactions is a <i>New York Times</i> editorial that appeared after the expulsion titled "<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/opinion/bahrains-bad-decision.html?_r=0" target="_blank">Bahrain's Bad Decision</a>." The article is useful not in its substance, which is highly critical of the Bahraini move and does not even cite Malinowski's previous role at HRW, but in the readers' comments on the piece, which fall into the following three familiar categories:<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>Idealist: Of course the U.S. is right to be critical of Bahrain's human rights record. The U.S. should have pulled out the Fifth Fleet a long time ago; if not for the U.S. Navy, the Al Khalifa wouldn't have a country left to oppress.</li>
<li>Anti-Imperialist: Of course the U.S. is trying to overthrow the Bahraini government. Just look what they did in the Ukraine. How is that working out exactly? The Gulf monarchies are dictatorships but they're the only real friends the U.S. has, and we should stop repaying them by destabilizing their countries whenever we get a chance.</li>
<li>Realist: If human rights were so important to the State Department or the U.S. government, then they should stop sending Assistant Secretaries every six months and instead do something about it, like threaten to pull out the Fifth Fleet. Short of that or some other costly signal that they are serious, they need to shut up about human rights in Bahrain and elsewhere, which only serves to give unfounded hope to the opposition, rile up government supporters, and insult everyone's intelligence. </li>
</ul>
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Finally, also on the subject of playing nicely (or not) with friends, Bahrain's FM finally has come out in the open with long-rumored <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/bahrain-accuses-qatar-of-sectarian-naturalisation-1.1359196">accusations</a> that Qatar is stealing its (Sunni) citizens, which Sh. Khalid cites as a main reason for the suspension of diplomatic relations in a televised interview. Gulf News quotes him as saying,
<br />
<blockquote>
Many Bahraini citizens have been lured by Qatari nationality under the pretext that they have families in Qatar. The issue of nationality has a security dimension. Another issue is that the Qataris are discriminating between the citizens of Bahrain and are acting on a sectarian basis. If the Bahraini is Sunni and member of an Arab tribe in Bahrain, then the door is wide open [for Qatari citizenship]. However, if he is Shiite, the door is shut."</blockquote>
Of course, since the families being "lured" are all tribal families (I've heard Al Jalahma and Al Mana'i, e.g.) with other branches in Qatar, the characterization as "sectarian" in nature, while perhaps true in the sense of their being Sunni, owes simply to the fact that there are no Shi'i tribes in the northern Arabian Peninsula.Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-47720767003800702152014-06-24T05:37:00.000+03:002014-06-25T08:25:48.476+03:00Bahrain Contra Iraq: Foreign-backed "Terrorism" vs. Indigenous "Uprising"<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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Bouncing around in my mind for a while now have been two big-picture thoughts related to Bahrain, which at some point soon hopefully I will have time to write about more formally than here.<br />
<br />
One of these is the disparity in narratives regarding what's going on today in Iraq and the discussion -- to the extent that one still exists in the mainstream media -- surrounding the continued political deadlock in Bahrain, which seems likely to be reiterated soon in the form of yet another <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/bahrain-opposition-boycott-election-unless-political-deal-reached-182104172.html" target="_blank">opposition boycott</a> of parliamentary elections this fall.<br />
<br />
Obviously, the ideology and tactics of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham have earned it few supporters, certainly not among governments, but one imagines also among ordinary people in Iraq and Syria. Yet notwithstanding Western antipathy to the group, still the ongoing rebellion in Iraq has forced U.S. and other policymakers to engage very seriously with the longstanding grievances of Sunni citizens in particular -- so much so that President Obama has openly made American aid for the country contingent on substantive efforts to redress them.<br />
<br />
On Friday, for instance, Obama is <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript-obamas-remarks-on-crisis-in-iraq/2014/06/13/a4fb72fe-f310-11e3-bf76-447a5df6411f_story.html" target="_blank">quoted</a> in the <i>Washington Post</i> as saying, <br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
So, any action that we make take to provide assistance to Iraqi security forces has to be joined by a serious and sincere effort by Iraq's leaders to set aside sectarian differences, to promote stability and account for the legitimate interests of all of Iraq's communities, and to continue to build the capacity of an effective security force. ...<br />
<br />
So this should be a wake-up call. Iraq's leaders have to demonstrate a willingness to make hard decisions and compromises on behalf of the Iraqi people in order to bring the country together.</blockquote>
A sectarian group systematically marginalized from politics? Security forces composed disproportionately and systematically of the politically-dominant sect? A frustrated out-group largely oppositional to the government -- including a small minority of individuals willing to pursue even violence in order to rectify perceived discrimination in all aspects of society?<br />
<br />
Why does that sound familiar? Oh that's right -- that's a description of the status quo in Bahrain since (in the post-King Hamad period at least) 2002.<br />
<br />
Except that whereas Iraq's Sunni community is recognized as having legitimate, domestically-rooted grievances owing to the retributive policies of the Shi'a-led government since 2006, in Bahrain the analogous complaints of the Shi'a are met with accusations of outside influence, as if decades (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Bahrain_(1783%E2%80%931971)#Palm_cultivation_and_estate_administration" target="_blank">centuries</a>, really, but who's counting right?) of marginalization were insufficient cause for popular rebellion. Iraq's is a Sunni "<a href="https://news.yahoo.com/iraq-s--sunni-war-of-liberation-171632109.html" target="_blank">war of liberation</a>," in the words of one former Iraqi army general (or, according to the <i>Akhbar Al-Khaleej</i> cartoon at the top of this post, an "<i>intifada</i> by Arab tribes"), while Bahrain's February 2011 uprising and aftermath continues to be nothing more than an Iranian-sponsored "attempted coup". <br />
<br />
And in case you require some recent examples of the origins of such grievances in Bahrain, here are some choice ones from the past month:<br />
<ul>
<li>Following a historic <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-parliament-votes-for-minister-s-public-quizzing-1.1303174" target="_blank">vote</a> in March to publicly quiz Bahrain's Finance Minister over accusations of corruption, a decision later invalidated on a technicality under government pressure, on June 3 the opposition-less elected lower house of parliament voted to limit *its own ability* to question ministers. The change increases the threshold of votes required to question a minister from one-half to two-thirds. Among other things, such a change would effectively preclude a parliamentary quizzing even if al-Wifaq and/or other opposition groups (hypothetically) returned to parliament in the fall. </li>
<br />
<li>On the same day, parliament also approved a bill to replace the elected municipal council of the Capital Governorate -- a body that in February <a href="http://manamavoice.com/news-news_read-18469-0.html" target="_blank">called</a> for the resignation of its Al Khalifa governor over allegations of corruption -- with a General Secretariat appointed by the king and elected members of civil society institutions. </li>
<br />
<li>Two weeks later on June 17, parliament approved a bill allowing the <a href="http://www.alwasatnews.com/4302/news/read/896459/1.html">revocation</a> of Bahraini nationality from any citizen who acquires another nationality without written approval from Minister of Interior. Likely targets include political activists who hold dual-nationality, already no strangers to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/world/middleeast/bahrain-revokes-citizenship-of-31-people-in-bid-to-quell-dissidents.html" target="_blank">cancellation of their Bahraini citizenship</a>, as well as Sunni tribal families rumored to be leaving the country for greener (and less burning-tire-filled) pastures elsewhere in the GCC. </li>
</ul>
A final item deserves a paragraph of its own. This is the continued athletic and international jet-setting <a href="http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=379727" target="_blank">exploits</a> of Bahrain's "national" triathlon team. This important Bahraini institution, which seems constantly to receive no little feigned fanfare and local media coverage, is indicative of the extent to which the ruling family and other elites apparently remain, in the space of a very small island, a world apart from the daily issues facing Sunni and Shi'i citizens alike. (See the final bullet point about potentially significant Sunni emigration.)<br />
<br />
Of the 15 team members reported in the <i>Gulf Daily News</i> story, five (one-third) are Al Khalifa, including two sons of King Hamad, and three others are Westerners. A perfect symbol of the "new Bahrain": Brits and royals.<br />
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<a href="http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=379727" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2HPU_TSDK1HxX1x_ICvjDr_3aeEkL8cTrUYIV3YgkXhi6GniIVcrTBMP8E0Be6yDka64LWILzEUWOAcDTcq6G00DhXSVXiIL1hina-tSjOZDC4I1Jxbu4Hv5NrdN0bvVyEzPhza4VLMU/s1600/teampic2.jpg" /></a></div>
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Indeed, I was told in a recent conversation with a well-placed individual that Riffa increasingly is returning to its historical status as a tribal capital and seat of government, the King barely leaving his palace and members of the ruling family using a private airport there, avoiding altogether the hassle of coming into Manama. Of course, why go to Manama when in 10 hours you can be swimming and biking in Syracuse, New York!<br />
<br />
Bahrain: the first post-oil state. Not the first to run out of oil or money from oil -- Abu Safaa takes care of that -- but the first to stop using oil money to provide for ordinary citizens, prioritizing instead royal jogging and biking trips to far-flung destinations.<br />
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<b><span style="color: #e06666;">Update</span></b>: The Bahrain News Agency has finally issued its <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/623594" target="_blank">summary</a> of Joe Biden's seemingly random "consultation" with King Hamad on Monday, ostensibly on the situation in Iraq. Of course, one suspects that Biden was on the giving rather than receiving end of the advice, which one hopes should have touched on some of the points in this post. According to the BNA, the two "agreed on the need for the Iraqi leaders to set aside their sectarian strife and confront the serious security threat to their country." *Ahem* And the similar situation in Bahrain.<br />
<br />
Not appearing in the BNA version, however, is another section of the joint statement, which the Kuwait News Agency helpfully <a href="http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2384311&Language=en" target="_blank">reports</a>:<br />
<blockquote>
It added that Biden and King Hamad also spoke about ongoing efforts at reform and dialogue within Bahrain, where Biden "encouraged the Government of Bahrain, opposition parties, and all segments of Bahraini society to reach agreement on meaningful reforms and a path forward that addresses the legitimate aspirations of all Bahrainis."</blockquote>
Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-28982462710515138702014-06-15T06:22:00.000+03:002014-06-15T12:28:48.259+03:00Iraq Chaos, Fear of U.S. Realignment Feeds Bahrain Conspiracy Mill<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<a href="http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/source/XXXVII/087/pdf/page01.pdf" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 0em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiGJZV0Khiv3ybtjH4hYeaLPPMcEdOuWY_qvFDwmxyfxH58Y89n9xcuMsMoKAWzg8FQxhCeKAQt2gRGhpBGu6a_RWTcdTUBewTfopSHY7Y_slsxn7W9B-rFOGR56XSOCdxFPOs8Odr7QeI/s1600/help.jpg" height="342" width="490" /></a></div>
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If there's one thing disliked by most people, not to mention stock markets and autocratic leaders of nations held together by tenuous overlapping domestic and international political alliances, it's uncertainty. Unfortunately, the somehow-unnoticed-until-four-days-ago ISIS takeover of broad swaths of Syria and Iraq has generated quite a bit of it now, and we seem to be approaching a full freak-out stage.<br />
<br />
For most of the Arab Gulf, Kuwait being the notable exception given what happened after the last one, the specter of what Juan Cole <a href="http://www.juancole.com/2014/06/second-american-switch.html" target="_blank">calls</a> the coming "Second Iran-Iraq War" is most frightening not because the GCC is likely to be caught in the (direct) cross-fire, but because it may finally cement what's been worrying Gulf Arabs -- leaders and ordinary citizens alike -- for the better part of three years: a tangible U.S.-Iranian rapprochement and, in the longer term, inevitable strategic alliance.<br />
<br />
A post in Friday's <i>New York Times</i> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/13/world/middleeast/in-iraq-crisis-a-tangle-of-alliances-and-enmities.html?ref=middleeast&_r=0" target="_blank">gives</a> a useful breakdown of the conflicting interests of the U.S., Iran, al-Maliki, the Gulf monarchies, Turkey, and the Iraqi Kurds, but the principle at work is simple enough: the enemy (Iran) of my enemy (radical Sunni insurgents) <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/06/iran-and-the-us-the-enemy-of-my-enemy.html" target="_blank">is my friend</a>. And when one begins to consider all the potential issue linkages that may be in play -- the Iranian nuclear program, the U.S. position on Syria, Iranian involvement with the Huthis in Yemen -- then the regional implications grow even more dizzying.<br />
<br />
The upshot is that once-crazy-sounding claims by the likes of Khalifa bin Ahmad about secret U.S.-Iranian plots to overthrow Bahrain and the Gulf monarchies start to sound just un-crazy enough to get otherwise reasonable people riled up. Hence the <i>GDN</i>'s rendering of the U.S.S. George H. W. Bush preparing to unleash uranium-tipped Tomahawk missiles on Riffa, above.<br />
<br />
Apart from analyses about converging U.S. and Iran rhetoric on Iraq, feeding this fear in Bahrain also is a more standard sort of scandal: reports of <a href="http://mebriefing.com/?p=789">a "secret" U.S. document</a> outlining a State Department program to "unseat" the Bahraini government. The paper, apparently obtained by a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from the Middle East Briefing (more on these guys later), in fact is a classified overview of the well-known Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) program. <br />
<br />
The Middle East Briefing "exposé" begins,<br />
<blockquote>
The Obama Administration has been pursuing a policy of covert support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other insurgent movements in the Middle East since 2010. MEB has obtained a just-released U.S. State Department document through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit that confirms the Obama Administration’s pro-active campaign for regime change throughout the Middle East and North Africa region.<br />
<br />
The October 22, 2010 document, titled “Middle East Partnership Initiative: Overview,” spells out an elaborate structure of State Department programs aimed at directly building “civil society” organizations, particularly non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to alter the internal politics of the targeted countries in favor of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.
</blockquote>
In short, this "secret" document essentially repeats what <a href="http://mepi.state.gov/">appears</a> very prominently on the front page of the MEPI website, namely that "MEPI supports organizations and individuals in their efforts to promote political, economic, and social reform in the Middle East and North Africa." (In any case, one has a hard time believing that any real "secrets" would be disclosed to a Dubai-based risk analysis firm, FOIA or no FOIA.) Indeed, if the "analysts" at Middle East Briefing were looking for real controversy, they would have done better simply to browse MEPI's Wikipedia entry, which includes among other historical details its creation by George W. Bush and the appointment of Dick Cheney's daughter as its first supervisor at the State Department. <br />
<br />
On the other hand, how one connects this decade-long program to a "policy of covert support for the Muslim Brotherhood" is beyond my powers of intuition. I recall many Bahraini students on MEPI programs while I was in the country, and the Muslim Brotherhood is about as far from their politics as one can imagine.<br />
<br />
One presumes, then, that the anti-MB purpose relates to the particular views of the founders of this Middle East Briefing, whose website <a href="http://mebriefing.com/?page_id=8">tells</a> that its parent company, "Orient Advisory Group, ... is a research and risk assessment firm based in both Washington DC and Dubai UAE." Hrm, imagine that -- Muslim Brotherhood hysteria coming out of the UAE! Methinks things are beginning to make sense.<br />
<br />
The mebriefing.com domain name was registered less than a year ago on September 26, 2013, and since then the Muslim Brotherhood seems to be a sustained focus. For instance, <a href="http://mebriefing.com/?p=807" target="_blank">this</a> article on "cooperation" between Washington and the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood announces that "MEB will publish a series of reports based on documents it obtained under the Freedom of Information Act from the US State Department focusing on the US-Muslim Brotherhood 'understandings' in different moments of the relation between the two sides" -- of which the MEPI report is presumably one.<br />
<br />
Of course, don't tell this to Bahraini officials, including the Interior Ministry's Assistant Undersecretary for Legal Affairs, as well as al-Asalah MP and anti-American extraordinaire Abd al-Halim Murad, who are busy calling for <a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2014/June/middleeast_June129.xml&section=middleeast" target="_blank">formal investigations</a> and <a href="http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=379159" target="_blank">emergency parliamentary sessions</a>, respectively. Let's just pray they don't catch wind of the National Democratic Institute -- or the U.S. Navy base in Juffair!<br />
<br />
Now for a few couple of items in lazy bullet-point form:<br />
<ul>
<li>The <i>GDN </i>has <a href="http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=379026" target="_blank">published </a>Bahrain-related excerpts from Hillary Clinton's new submission in the category of the contrived pre-presidential-run memoir.</li>
<br />
<li>Bassiouni gave an <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/cherif-bassiouni-bici-bahrain-uprising-violations.html#" target="_blank">interview</a> to Al-Monitor<i> </i>on Bahrain's BICI implementation on the sidelines of last week's U.S.-Islamic Forum in Doha, where he chaired a panel.</li>
</ul>
Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-31417355035557685542014-05-18T06:51:00.000+03:002014-05-24T15:30:44.968+03:00A Tangled Web of Gulf Politics<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2014/april/28/140428-hq-in-bahrain" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhIkOKevaTgqPvOHDlJzVjvQoku_4ZVt_mOr-cx2vQ8O3hiPxcoieEBCcZ2GbrFlMFc-HRSxI2xEIYyfMYgEAxgT3K-Xr6LzsjKlccAlh7J8gFnUIfdEVv8xfev0oLz3LIbLI5qr4LOrYo/s1600/breakground.jpg" height="356" width="500" /></a></div>
<center>
<i>"So this means you guys are going to protect us no matter what -- right?"</i></center>
<br />
It's been a while since I've had a chance to post here. The manuscript for my forthcoming book on Bahrain was due May 1, and my family is set to be enlarged by one any day now. Oh, and I've spent the last few weeks moving across town. So I've gotten a bit behind.<br />
<br />
The book, for which I'm still thinking of a catchy title, is based (on the empirical side) on my Ph.D. fieldwork in Bahrain, but deals conceptually with the case of ascriptive group conflict in the rentier state. As such, it should be of interest both to those who study Bahrain and the Gulf as well as political scientists generally. I don't have an exact publication date, but I suspect it will be out (in the Indiana University Press Series in Arab and Islamic Studies) sometime in the fall. I'll probably write more about it here once we're closer to that time.<br />
<br />
As far as events in Bahrain go, it seems that the most notable news -- as has been the case for a few months -- is on the diplomatic front. Something of a perfect storm of geopolitics now embroils the Gulf region: lingering but ostensibly easing intra-GCC tensions, lingering but ostensibly thawing Saudi-Iran tensions, seemingly progressing but could-derail-anyday-now nuclear talks between Iran and the U.S., and, with respect to Bahrain in particular, diplomatic maneuvering featuring its two Western patrons.<br />
<br />
At the risk of being uncreative, we can just take these in order.<br />
<ul>
<li>The GCC says that its internal "spat" has ended. Yet this despite no apparent change in behavior by the offending Qatar, and even more curiously absent the return of the Saudi, Emirati, and Bahraini ambassadors to Doha. See <a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/cook/2014/05/06/how-personal-politics-drive-conflict-in-the-gulf/" target="_blank">David Roberts</a> for the Council on Foreign Relations for some sense of what is going on. Moreover, I've heard from several places about a secondary dispute involving Bahrain and Qatar particularly, related to accusations that the latter is attempting to <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-s-long-list-of-contention-with-qatar-1.1311924" target="_blank">poach</a> (or already has poached) some noted Bahraini families, among them the Bahraini Al Jalahma.</li>
<br />
<li>I follow less and know less about the course of Saudi-Iran diplomacy. But I read the newspaper enough to know that, after spending the past few months denying having done so, finally Saudi Arabia has <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-thaw-saudi-extends-invite-to-iran/2014/05/13/b89a1d19-3b62-4e3e-9f56-730b8819e4e2_story.html" target="_blank">admitted</a> reaching out to Tehran for an official visit to Riyadh in an apparent effort to thaw relations. At the same time, Simon Henderson <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/surprise-rotation-of-saudi-defense-officials" target="_blank">reports</a> on a "surprise rotation" of senior Saudi defense officials.</li>
<br />
<li>The status of U.S.-Iran negotiations I know and care even less about, mainly because following such things too deeply is a quick way to become disillusioned with the entire American political system. And since merely reading headlines in the <i>New York Times</i> is usually sufficient to do that, I try not to overdo it. So you can do your own research here.</li>
</ul>
On Bahrain we have too many items for a single bullet point:<br />
<ul>
<li>The annual visit of a senior Bahraini dignitary--this year King Hamad himself--to the Royal Windsor Horse Show is turning out predictably, with rights groups and op-eds <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/13/uk-bahrain-relations-scrutiny-gulf-state-king-visits-uk" target="_blank">slamming</a> the UK's support for dictatorships, etc. etc. Longtime friend of Bahrain Prince Andrew, who was set to be a keynote speaker at a Bahrain-organized "promotional event," has even been <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/10834388/Prince-Andrew-withdraws-from-promotional-event-for-Bahrain.html" target="_blank">shamed</a> into cancelling. Of course, the UK having just in late April <a href="http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2014/april/28/140428-hq-in-bahrain" target="_blank">broke ground</a> in Bahrain on the largest naval facility outside of the British mainland (see picture at the top), it's hard to imagine British-Bahrain relations undergoing a reversal anytime soon. Indeed, if the case is anything like British-Saudi relations, al-Wifaq is likely to be added to Britain's list of terrorist organizations à la the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/cameron-muslim-brotherhood-orders-inquiry-extremism" target="_blank">Muslim Brotherhood</a>.</li>
<br />
<li>In contrast to the Brits' thoughtful horse show invitation, the U.S. sent King Hamad Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Anne Patterson, whom he was, one imagines, rather less pleased to receive. Far from chairing promotional events, Patterson spent her <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-bahrain-idUSBREA3T13Y20140430" target="_blank">two days</a> in the country "underscor[ing] US encouragement of reform and reconciliation through the ongoing [sic] National Dialogue." (Someone really should tell her about the National Dialogue.) One suspects she may also have reiterated U.S. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-bahrain-idUSBREA3T13Y20140430" target="_blank">annoyance</a> at Bahrain's recent signing of trade deals with Russia. </li>
<br />
<li>The Washington Institute continues its coverage of Iranian destabilization of Bahrain and thus the Gulf and thus we can't trust them to follow through on any nuclear deal!$@% in "<a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iran-and-bahrain-crying-wolf-or-wolf-at-the-door" target="_blank">Iran and Bahrain: Crying Wolf, or Wolf at the Door?</a>" This latest article is more clever than usual for its framing, on evidence in the rhetorical title and summary, as a piece critical of the Bahraini government. In fact, the "criticism" is that Bahrain needs to do a better job of marshaling (what is already presumed valid) evidence in demonstration of Iranian involvement with the opposition, and should stop referring to everyone as "terrorists" so that Western observers can better make out who the <i>real </i>(Iranian-backed) terrorists are. Thus:<br />
<blockquote>
Moving forward, the Bahraini government will need to exhibit a clearer commitment to rule of law, distinguishing between demonstrators and terrorists and dealing with each accordingly. Only then will its foreign partners be able to effectively assess new evidence of Iranian support for local militants.</blockquote>
Ah, I see what you did there.</li>
</ul>
Finally, no longer Bahrain-related, but: The Monkey Cage, a new political science-y blog at the <i>Washington Post </i>run by former <i>Foreign Policy</i> Mideast Channel editor Marc Lynch, recently featured a great <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/08/kuwaits-royals-are-taking-their-feuds-public/" target="_blank">article</a> by Kristin Smith Diwan on Kuwait's ongoing and unusually public royal feud.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #e06666;">Update</span></b>: A post on Carnegie Endowment's Sada blog <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/05/20/bahrain-between-its-backers-and-brotherhood/hb88" target="_blank">discusses</a> Bahrain's Muslim Brotherhood conundrum. Nothing new as far as I can see, but it's good that some others are highlighting this issue, which obviously involves a tenuous domestic and regional political balance that will be interesting to watch going forward.Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-51030607362732493622014-04-16T06:11:00.000+03:002014-04-17T08:30:51.371+03:00Ambassadors for Hire<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=375017" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhCU2cOVoWY6Ti-hCGMc8jajy7BLC9n-THTRT_K14LJdwF3oJyfE6etxdoPtF-uvKsp77FUgaDCSdyRKemgr-uH5LrH7u_VrWXcPmYAKduW8utIGTXVtS9K9NOJNYFpVvNImSPqbvPeZ4g/s1600/ereli.jpg" /></a></div>
Given the State Department's own recent <a href="http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.com/2014/04/an-embassygate-to-overshadow-gccgate-in.html" target="_blank">negative evaluation</a> of current U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain Thomas Krajeski, which of course only reinforced the views of many Bahrainis, perhaps it is no surprise that a former American envoy should seize the opportunity to jump back into the diplomatic spotlight -- and potentially pocket a bit of money for his new consulting firm in the process. Just as President Clinton remains a more popular figure among ordinary Americans (and certainly Arabs) than Bush or Obama, representing as he does the "good old days" of a strong economy and relative security, so too does former Ambassador Adam Ereli seem to symbolize the less complicated diplomacy and geopolitics of the pre-Arab Spring period. <br />
<br />
Now vice-chairman of the Washington-based PR firm Mercury, Ereli is fresh off a tour last week of Qatar, where he weighed in on what he euphemistically called the "family spat" between GCC member states. While he seemed to avoid overt criticism, he was not far from the Saudi position in highlighting the "unsustainability" of Qatar's foreign policy. The <i>Gulf Times</i> <a href="http://www.gulf-times.com/qatar/178/details/387729/gulf-row-a-%E2%80%98family-spat%E2%80%99%2c-says-ex-envoy" target="_blank">reports</a>,<br />
<blockquote>
He said that no country in an integrated world economy could afford to go it alone.<br />
<br />
"In 2002, Saudi Arabia stopped sending aggregates that you need to make cement for concrete to Qatar.<br />
<br />
"What if they were to do that today? What will that do to the multi-billion dollar worth of infrastructure that is being built today? It will be like turning off the water or turning off the electricity,” he said.</blockquote>
He <a href="http://qatar-tribune.com/viewnews.aspx?n=192B3FFC-04E8-4E03-B45F-1B295775D988&d=20140408" target="_blank">concludes</a> in a separate interview,<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Qatar has to follow a proactive approach in defending its reputation and it must be persuasive in explaining to the people the thinking behind its policy and make a case for itself to generate its response to the critics.
</blockquote>
If only there were a seasoned veteran of the region with close ties to neighboring states as well as to Washington! But, in fact, one need not even rely on such insinuations, as <i>Gulf Times</i> piece states explicitly that Ereli "said his company Mercury could help Qatar build its image in the US":<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
“Having Al Jazeera America TV network was not enough to build a positive image,” Ereli observed.<br />
<br />
“I think Al Jazeera America has a great future in the US but they’ve got to overcome some very entrenched negative attitudes to gain an audience,” he added.
</blockquote>
Gosh, what a helpful and totally non-opportunist guy that Ereli is! <br />
<br />
Having already demonstrated his potential usefulness for the Qataris, then, Ereli next sprung into action on the other side of the GCC "family spat." As today's <i>Gulf Daily News</i> front page <a href="http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=375017" target="_blank">suggests</a>, Ereli made clear in nuanced fashion that he is <span class="storyDetails" id="ctl00_ContentPlaceHolder1_lblStory">"not a fan of US policy towards Bahrain right now," saying that the Obama Administration </span><span class="storyDetails" id="ctl00_ContentPlaceHolder1_lblStory">"pulled an Egypt" in Bahrain following the unrest of 2011. See, Qatar, these are the sorts of hard-hitting American colloquialisms you can expect when you roll with Ereli and Mercury!</span><br />
<br />
Never mind, of course, that Ereli was ambassador in Bahrain until June
2011, and presumably had a hand in crafting the flawed U.S. response to the
uprising of which he is such a detractor, given that there is no discernible difference between "US policy towards Bahrain right now" and US policy towards Bahrain when he was running the show.<br />
<br />
In case you haven't yet had your fill of American catch-phrases, Ereli is quoted further as saying,<br />
<blockquote>
The reason I think we have pulled an Egypt is because we threw Hosni Mubarak under the bus in a very unseemly way.<br />
<br />
I don't think we are doing that with the Al Khalifas [sic] and I don't think we will do that with the Al Khalifas [sic].<br />
<br />
But let me be clear, if I was an Al Khalifa I'd be asking myself 'where's my friend in need?'<br />
<br />
We [the US] beat up on them all the time, in public, for no reason and with no justification.</blockquote>
However, Ereli's remarks are probably on point in at least one respect. The balance of violence in Bahrain between government and anti-government forces is far different today from what it was in February 2011 -- and it will be difficult for U.S. policymakers to ignore this fact with continued hedging along the reform-security continuum.<br />
<br />
The pro-government group Citizens for Bahrain, which I'd not be surprised to discover is a product of Mercury itself given its fluent, Americanized English and prodigious production, recently spammed my Inbox with an <a href="http://www.citizensforbahrain.com/index.php/featured-articles/entry/bahrain-unrest-death-toll-april-2014-update" target="_blank">article</a> titled, "A year of Bahrain martyrs: 0 protestors, 6 police." The gimmick is that, according to al-Wifaq's own statistics on fatalities, between April 2013 and April 2014 the death toll has fallen entirely on the side of riot police. (The protester deaths the group discounts as unsubstantiated or as having occurred while engaged in violence.)<br />
<br />
Whatever the exact ratio, it is clear that the near-daily attacks on riot police are what dominate the headlines today on Bahrain, rather than continued (and thus from a media standpoint boring) coverage of political stagnation or repression. Coverage of this year's Formula One race, for instance, which just concluded, seemed tilted far more toward actual race coverage than in previous years. I guess the partial annexation of Eastern European countries doesn't hurt either.<br />
<br />
From the state's perspective, of course, this is all welcome news. If the unfortunate cost is a few lives of largely-non-national security personnel, then such is the political game. Indeed, just a month ago King Hamad was in Pakistan for the first <a href="http://www.dawn.com/news/1093974/king-of-bahrain-in-pakistan-six-agreements-on-cooperation-signed" target="_blank">visit</a> of a Bahraini head of state in 40 years, to discuss, among other things, "ways to increase export of Pakistani manpower to Bahrain."<br />
<br />
Another casualty of the present focus on opposition violence is media coverage of another compelling story from last week, which is the untimely if predictable end of a parliamentary effort to quiz the Finance Minister over alleged financial irregularities. The effort by MPs would have been the first public quizzing since the 2002 reinstatement of parliament, yet it has died a week after having been declared "<a href="http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=374183" target="_blank">invalid</a>" on a procedural technicality. In the words of one member, "We were on our way to make history but it seems history will have to wait because the government has managed, as usual, to get a ruling in its favour from a so-called independent body." It is unclear for now at least how failures of U.S. policy toward Bahrain contributed to the outcome.<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update</b></span>: Bahrain Watch has just <a href="https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2014/04/16/bahrain-govt-signs-new-20m-pr-contract/" target="_blank">released</a> an article detailing Bahrain's PR contracts and relationships since the publication of the group's first "PR Watch" report in August 2012. Among the items noted in the press release is the following one of special relevant to this post:<br />
<blockquote>
US firm Mercury Public Affairs hired former US Ambassador to Bahrain Adam Ereli in September 2013. Shortly thereafter, Mercury’s Managing Director Morris Reid accompanied Ereli on a “listening tour” to Bahrain and other Middle East countries. Following his tour Ereli criticised the US government’s perceived failure to fully support the Bahraini government. Ereli reiterated his criticism in a recent interview. The <i>Gulf Daily News</i> reported that Reid had been “heavily involved in fostering trade links between the US and the Middle East, including Bahrain”. Reid previously served as a Managing Director for Washington DC PR firm BGR Group, which contracted with Bahrain’s government.</blockquote>
Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-57733684219613560652014-04-01T06:35:00.000+03:002014-04-07T11:00:41.164+03:00An "Embassygate" to Overshadow GCCgate in Bahrain<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/224205.pdf" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiUMBJYviO9-Nto9wdZQ2nxwW-33QVJ5UCDBr_Eb6Jyg2r67hb_aYEeADhK7sJBQr4351yw-Qve8etmQX8Sn41v0CrQpykVKrEoDxOk1Rjkjx4IuJQkvLbXfbZ9A6ZUG9h_3HoHpUkfP-g/s1600/auditreport.jpg" height="320" width="313" /></a></div>
The publication of a damning new State Department Office of the Inspector General <a href="http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/224205.pdf" target="_blank">audit</a> into the operations of U.S. Embassy Manama has sparked what Brian Dooley has coined "<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-dooley/embassygate-in-bahrain-no_b_5063857.html" target="_blank">Embassygate</a>." The 48-page report, which may or may not have been written by Dr. Salah al-Bandar, addresses all aspects of the mission's operation, yet the main takeaway has been what the <i>Washington Times</i> gleefully refers to as the "<a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/27/poor-leadership-at-key-diplomatic-post-in-bahrain-/" target="_blank">poor leadership</a>" of Ambassador Thomas Krajeski. No, this isn't an April Fool's joke, etc. etc.<br />
<br />
Such a finding is of course welcome and one imagines vindicating news to many Bahrainis, not least those from the pro-government side who, largely on account of his role in the Shi'ization of Iraq while serving there as a post-war adviser to Paul Bremer in 2003, never accepted Krajeski's appointment. Such suspicion was of course confirmed for skeptics when the U.S. Embassy continued its wavering position on the question of political reform vs. political stability in Bahrain following his arrival, which was taken as further proof of his preference for the Shi'a. <br />
<br />
As indicated by Dooley's scandalous title, Washington at least seems abuzz about the report, which I suppose is appropriate coming as it does from an U.S. institution. Yet, among other things, the U.S.-based reporters seem to have little understanding of the background of the story. A <i>Washington Post</i> blog <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2014/03/31/bahrain-official-wants-u-s-ambassador-out-immediately/" target="_blank">post</a>, for instance, carries the headline, "Bahrain official wants U.S. ambassador out 'immediately.'" So, who is this official, one asks? <br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
[W]hen Abdullatif al-Mahmood, head of the National Unity Assembly (a political group that’s part of a Sunni-oriented pro-government political federation) demands the “immediate” recall of U.S. Ambassador Tom Krajeski, <i>Gulf Daily News</i> reported Monday, attention perforce must be paid.
</blockquote>
Here the writer would have done well to follow his own advice, and perforce pay attention (a) to the definition of the word "official"; and (b) to the dozens of other times that Al Mahmud and other pro-government Sunnis have called for the recall and/or forced expulsion of the ambassador, including when they attempted to pass parliamentary legislation to that effect. Remember this back in June 2012? No? I guess the <i>Washington Post </i>Google-machine is broken.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.com/2012/06/announcing-al-watan-wednesdays.html" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9ZUXBj-RxakLac0XOR6hZ_YOvYeAXCTYvewCOWoPNhd5gb0Bd8Mi5NWus5DrudexZIWstP9H6KgXpaLHXbBY7yD4ijDHoqlY9kNkJT9Zsiu9afJZqVAaTf4HXO1B0R-Oemj9qyJ4AQmc/s1600/AwPO2QsCIAEpo9w.jpg" height="350" width="500" /></a></div>
<br />
More fundamentally, as Brian Dooley points out, the interesting part of the State Department's report is not limited to what it says about Krajeski and other embassy operations, but includes also -- even more so -- the very explicit statement of the State Department's understanding of the U.S.-Bahrain relationship. The report tells, "Bahrain's ongoing political crisis has forced the U.S. Government to strive for an effective balance between military objectives, reform, and human rights."<br />
<br />
Notice the order of those three priorities.<br />
<br />
Finally, as with the larger Arab Spring, one gets the sense that in Bahrain the U.S.'s initial optimism that some positive political change might come out of the uprising has given way to a pragmatic desire to go back to the status quo ante. This is on most obvious display in Egypt, where the Obama Administration has made a complete u-turn in supporting the military government. Yet even the President's recent trip to Saudi Arabia had something of the same air, a mending of diplomatic fences by reassuring the one Arab ally most resistant to change that change was indeed not coming.<br />
<br />
As Gary Sick outlines in a recent <i>NYT </i><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/world/middleeast/rice-offers-a-more-modest-strategy-for-mideast.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&hp" target="_blank">piece</a> on the "Obama Doctrine," in the face of comittments and challenges elsewhere, most notably in Asia, the U.S. has decided upon a "more modest strategy" for the Middle East. Thus, if Krajeski "has done little to plan for the future of the diplomatic mission, is providing poor leadership to staff members and has earned the ire of the local population," as summarized by Bahrain's favorite U.S. newspaper the <i>Washington Times</i>, then the State Department has only its own indecision and lack of vision to thank for it.<br />
<br />
Change is coming, however. Recent reports talk of the ill-health (and worse) of Saudi King 'Abdallah, who was taking oxygen in his meeting with Obama. The king also recently took the unprecedented step of preemptively <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/03/30/Saudi-Prince-Muqrin-receives-oaths-of-allegiance.html" target="_blank">appointing</a> the next crown prince, Muqrin, by royal decree, fueling speculation of an imminent abdication. The decree is likely aimed at avoiding a possible succession dispute owing to the latter's non-tribal lineage (his mother was a Yemeni slave of Ibn Sa'ud), for which reason some senior royals oppose his selection. Indeed, the very royal order appointing Muqrin reads,<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
[S]upporting Our selection and that of Our Crown Prince for Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz [was] an overwhelming majority of more than three-fourths of the members of the Pledge-Allegiance Commission.</blockquote>
In other words, as one G2K member points out, one fourth of the senior princes -- eight or nine out of thirty-five or so -- presumably with-held their allegiance to Muqrin.<br />
<br />
In this context, it is no secret that the U.S. is said to favor Muhammad bin Nayf for the eventual post of king, which, if reports of his relative "pragmatism" vis-a-vis the Shi'a have any truth, could have interesting implications for Bahrain. Best known as Saudi's counter-terrorism chief and head of the program to "re-educate" citizens returning from (and, in the case of AQAP at least, often heading back to) <i>jihad</i>, it seems reasonable to think that Muhammad bin Nayf might hold a different view of the relative threats posed to the kingdom and region of Shi'a empowerment and (Sunni) religious radicalization. (It doesn't hurt, probably, that he was the target of the first-ever <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/28/prince-mohammed-bin-nayef_n_270999.html" target="_blank">assassination</a> attempt on a member of the Al Sa'ud, carried out by AQAP, back in 2009.)<br />
<br />
Arguably, Muhammad bin Nayf's fingerprints already are appearing in Bahrain. The country has, reluctantly it seems, followed the Saudi/Emirati line in declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. (Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmad has spent the past few days <a href="http://m.gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-confirms-support-to-uae-saudi-arabia-1.1307125" target="_blank">backtracking</a> on comments made during a recent trip to Pakistan that seemed to contradict this view.) Now, Bahrain has adopted the Saudi stance in <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-gives-two-weeks-to-jihadists-to-return-1.1309859" target="_blank">giving</a> its foreign fighters -- some of which have included the (now-dead) children of prominent Salafis -- two weeks to return to the country or face prosecution. And, yes, there's even a "special counseling program to assist [them]" upon their return.<br />
<br />
Of course, to the extent he is interested in reorienting security policy toward Sunni rather than Shi'a political movements, Muhammad bin Nayf will be up against the Gulf- and increasingly U.S.-based anti-Iranian establishment, for whom the notion of Iranian "destabilization" of the U.S.'s Gulf allies is used as primary evidence of why it cannot be trusted to uphold its end of a nuclear bargain. <br />
<br />
<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update</b></span>: This <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/bahrain-uprisinginterventionsaudiarabiaemirates.html" target="_blank">piece</a> in Al Jazeera America equating the GCC Peninsula Shield intervention in Bahrain to Russia's annexation of the Crimea has the Bahrainis riled up. Qatar MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD!!#@!<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update 2</b></span>: An <a href="http://www.lobelog.com/pro-regime-talking-heads-spin-bahrain-state-department-report/" target="_blank">op-ed</a> by Emile Nakhleh cuts through the "spin" of "pro-regime talking heads" to put into context the State Department audit. Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-46037222411791189612014-03-13T22:12:00.000+03:002014-03-16T12:04:25.458+03:00Bahrain and the GCCC: The Gulf Convenient Cooperation Council<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://dohanews.co/cartoons-gcc-strains-maintain/" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNJ-NhZKFcIm9TUSrSUYDr-ojICxC2lpVbDErQE8Qb8M248gqXgo6K13KB2kT5c9ZJy9ANH52xemhx0ALB8hQxOWa9VG0CTYxLrizGSYF9_6jHVBbLWVlnoZ5wfghvUCIwl0sTPLujIQU/s1600/qatarsaudi.jpg" height="231" width="320" /></a></div>
The news of the week, not least here in Doha, is of course the rare public spat between GCC member states. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the Emirates have taken their Qatar ambassadors and gone home, which if it means three less vehicles on the roads here then I am all for it.<br />
<br />
Notwithstanding the shock of Gulf ruling families' longstanding private dispute having been brought into the open, the move wasn't exactly unforeseen. As early as February 18, for instance, the London-based <i>Al-Arab</i> published a report titled "Saudi Arabia running out of patience with Qatar and is planning to take punitive actions." It told not only of a possible suspension of diplomatic relations, but also other sanctions, including possible closure of Saudi airspace to Qatar and the suspension of trade agreements.<br />
<br />
There is no shortage of analyses of the origins and meaning of the Gulf's newest (and this time entirely self-made) political crisis. I will say only that, glowing post-Arab Spring statements of solidarity and impending Gulf Union aside, the six GCC states are -- gasp -- six different states guided by six different interpretations of national interest that often but not always coincide. The Omanis are aloof, the Bahrainis do whatever the Saudis and their Abu Sa'afa oil tells them, the Kuwaitis don't really want to get involved beyond mediation, the Qataris don't need to take orders from the Saudis, and the Emiratis AHH MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD!~!!<br />
<br />
If the Saudi-Bahraini-Emirati move was meant to put pressure on Qatar's new ruler by evoking fears among ordinary Qataris of being ostracized from the extended Gulf Arab tribe, then it would seem to have failed thus far. For example, following an <a href="http://manamavoice.com/news-news_read-19029-0.html" target="_blank">article</a> published today in <i>Al-Ayam</i> by King Hamad's "Adviser for Scientific and Cultural Affairs" Muhammad Jabar al-Ansari, in which the latter writes that Qatar "will pay the price" (he also goes after Oman), the editor of the Qatari daily <i>Al-Arab </i>used his column today to <a href="http://bhmirror.no-ip.biz/news/14137.html" target="_blank">call</a> on the state to end its financial assistance to Bahrain as part of the so-called post-2011 "GCC Marshall Plan."<br />
<br />
More generally, Qataris I've talked to seem moderately apprehensive but mostly annoyed. Indeed, much more affected seem to be Saudi, Bahraini, and Emirati nationals living and working in Qatar, many of whom I've heard have been asked more or less politely by their respective governments to resign from their positions and return home. No collaboration with the enemy and all that. <br />
<br />
For those really interested in Qatar's possible strategic options going forward, see <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/gulf-arabs-in-crisis" target="_blank">this</a> piece by Simon Henderson.<br />
<br />
More interesting from my perspective, however, is what the new political fault lines portend for Bahrain. It is no secret that Saudi and Emirati displeasure with Qatar stems from its support of the Muslim Brotherhood, yet in Bahrain (and Kuwait; see Elizabeth Dickinson on this <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/muslim-brotherhood-kuwait-saudi-terror.html" target="_blank">here</a>) the group has long been not simply tolerated, but accepted as a legitimate political party. More than that, it is an open secret (<a href="https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MANAMA592_a.html" target="_blank">repeated</a> even by the U.S. Embassy in Manama) that Bahrain's Muslim Brotherhood society al-Manbar al-Islami is bankrolled in large part by the Royal Court itself.<br />
<br />
Remember when opponents of the Gulf Union expressed trepidation at the prospect that the political and cultural orientations of Saudi Arabia would, in the event of further integration, inevitably be imposed on the rest of the GCC member states? Well, here we have an early example. In Bahrain, instability born of the Muslim Brotherhood is<i> </i>decidedly <i>not</i> a domestic concern; indeed, until al-Wifaq's departure from parliament, the group represented, along with al-Asalah, one-half of the government's legislative majority whose job it was to block the opposition. Will Bahrain now thank the society for its decade of service by declaring it an illegal "terrorist" organization? If so, how long is popular enthusiasm for the idea of closer political ties with Saudi Arabia going to last among ordinary Bahraini Sunnis?<br />
<br />
On the other hand, perhaps a new political witch hunt is just what the doctor ordered. Yesterday, members of the Bahraini parliament, who since 2011 have gained a new lease on legislative life now that they need not concern themselves always with al-Wifaq, took the unprecedented step of voting to <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-parliament-votes-for-minister-s-public-quizzing-1.1303174" target="_blank">quiz</a> the Minister of Finance, an Al Khalifa no less, for alleged financial irregularities. Despite efforts by pro-government MPs to block the procedure, it seems that it will go forward, though a date has yet to be set. And, in fact, those MPs that voted <i>against</i> the grilling are themselves being <a href="https://bahrainforums.com/vb/%E5%E4%C7-%C7%E1%C8%CD%D1%ED%E4/1129204.htm" target="_blank">grilled</a> (also <a href="https://bahrainforums.com/vb/%E5%E4%C7-%C7%E1%C8%CD%D1%ED%E4/1129084.htm" target="_blank">here</a>) on Bahrain's main Sunni (and nominally pro-government) forum.<br />
<br />
Even more ironic than this, however, is the background to the quizzing. From the <i><a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-parliament-votes-for-minister-s-public-quizzing-1.1303174" target="_blank">Gulf News</a></i>:<br />
<blockquote>
The Financial Audit Bureau report published in November detailed several financial abuses, prompting the Prime Minister Prince Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa to order the formation of a committee to probe the allegations of financial irregularities.<br />
<br />
The committee, chaired by Crown Prince and First Deputy Premier Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa, comprised the four deputy premiers. It sat with all ministers and addressed all the issues and loopholes mentioned in the report. The Follow-up Affairs Ministry, tasked with scrutinising the report, covered 462 cases outlined by the report and recommended referring 20 cases of non-compliance to the anti-corruption and economic and electronic security general directorate.
</blockquote>
What this summary does not mention, however, is that the Crown Prince's unusually forceful follow-up to the National Audit Bureau report followed public outcry over the Alba corruption scandal that implicated -- wait for it -- the Prime Minister. Thus, Khalifa bin Salman "appointed" the Crown Prince to a committee to investigate charges of corruption ... by him.<br />
<br />
On an unrelated note, finally, I want to extend a congratulations to my colleague Toby Matthiesen for the recent publication of the Arabic version of his book, <i>Sectarian Gulf</i>, and also for his apparent recent acceptance into the Muslim Brotherhood. It's a shame that his Saudi-based publisher should have <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2014/03/12/edgy-saudi-bans-local-publisher/">borne</a> the brunt of his indiscretion, though. Friends, don't let friends publish books on sectarian politics in Saudi Arabia:<br />
<br />
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<a href="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BiH38TUIAAAClKe.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="400" src="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BiH38TUIAAAClKe.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<b><span style="color: #e06666;">Update</span></b>: Forgot to include this. Fred Wehrey <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/10/new-u.s.-approach-to-gulf-security/h30d">outlines</a> a "New U.S. Approach to Gulf Security," in which he proposes "mak[ing] Bahrain the focus of U.S. reform promotion in the Gulf."<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update 2</b></span>: The Project on Middle East Democracy has sent a <a href="http://pomed.org/pomed/experts-call-on-president-obama-to-discuss-reform-in-bahrain-during-visit-to-saudi-arabia/" target="_blank">letter</a> to Barack Obama "calling on him to discuss the political crisis in Bahrain during his upcoming visit to Saudi Arabia. The bipartisan letter, signed by 27 former government officials, regional experts, and security specialists, urged the Saudi leadership to play a more productive role in resolving the ongoing conflict by promoting genuine political reform in Bahrain."<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update 3</b></span>: It seems that the campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood in Bahrain has already started--though it seems the government is so far content to let the UAE do the fighting. Last week Bahrain TV <a href="http://bh-mirror.zapto.org/news/14187.html" target="_blank">broadcast</a> a program in which Dubai Police Chief Dhahi Khalfan accused Bahraini Al-Islah, the Muslim Brotherhood's social wing that shares a name with its beleaguered counterpart in the Emirates, of, among other things, "terrorism." Following the obligatory denial from al-Manbar al-Islami, the MB-affiliated writer for <i>Akhbar al-Khaleej</i> Ibrahim al-Shaykh has hit back, <a href="http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/13141/article_touch/12375.html" target="_blank">asking</a>, "Fragmentation of the Sunni Street ... In Who's Interest?" Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-17733805514428765852014-03-04T17:21:00.001+03:002014-03-05T08:43:30.282+03:00Tit for Tat in BahrainOnly two months into the 2011 uprising, Hussein Ibish created something of a stir with an article for <i>Foreign Policy</i> titled, "<a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/14/is_bahrain_creating_a_new_terrorist_threat">Is Bahrain Creating a New Terrorist Threat?</a>" Opposition activists in particular were offended by the suggestion that what was then an overwhelmingly peaceful protest movement could devolve into violence or terrorism. Suffice it to say that Ibish likely avoided Twitter for a few days.<br />
<br />
Of course, his question was not aimed at the integrity of demonstrators, but simply the political environment in Bahrain. "By leaving no room for peaceful dissent, " he summarized, "the Bahraini monarchy is creating the conditions for a violent revolt." <br />
<br />
Such a thesis, I suspect, is no longer controversial, particularly following yesterday's sophisticated and premeditated <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/03/uk-bahrain-unrest-idUKBREA221CI20140303" target="_blank">attack</a> on police in the village of Daih using a remotely-detonated bomb. (Ugly opposition forum photos <a href="http://bahrainonline.org/showthread.php?t=669441" target="_blank">here</a>.) While one can debate whether such an operation is best described as "terrorism" or "insurgency," given that the targets were police rather than civilians, still I think all can agree that Ibish's query is no longer rhetorical. (And we leave aside for the moment the question of Bahraini armed involvement in Syria, especially among Salafis.)<br />
<br />
Of obvious concern is the nature of the bombing itself, which as the government has been quick to <a href="http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=371809" target="_blank">point out</a> made use of exactly the sort of remote detonator <a href="http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.com/2014/01/bahrains-smoking-gun-boat.html" target="_blank">confiscated</a> in January on a boat apparently destined for Bahrain. At the time, the Ministry of Interior claimed that the detonators bore a "Made in Syria" label, though I have not seen this explicit connection made to yesterday's attack.<br />
<br />
The following video, though dismissed by some as government fabrication, purports to show supporters of the group apparently responsible, the al-Ashtar Brigades, celebrating in Nuwaidrat the success of the deadly "operation" in Daih. The presence of small children certainly is not comforting.<br />
<br />
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="281" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/ReuOuk_c7KI" width="500"></iframe>
<br />
Another unusual aspect of the case is the involvement of Emirati police personnel -- one of whom was among the dead -- in the anti-riot operation. According to an Interior Ministry <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-moves-to-tackle-murderous-attacks-1.1298758" target="_blank">statement</a>, the officer was in Bahrain "as part of the <i>Amwaj Al Khaleej</i> forces of the [GCC] Joint Security Agreement." He was not, then, part of the GCC's Peninsula Shield force, which the government continues to insist has never been involved in anti-demonstration operations (a claim supported by the BICI).<br />
<br />
Yet the GCC joint security pact, agreed in 2012, is perhaps no less controversial. Its terms still have not been released publicly, drawing anger and some <a href="http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/190016/reftab/96/t/Fears-for-efficacy-of-Kuwait-democracy/Default.aspx" target="_blank">protest</a> among parliamentarians in Kuwait in particular. Certainly, the presence of foreign police in Bahrain will come as an unwelcome surprise to many.<br />
<br />
According to several people based in the Emirates with whom I've spoken, the case of the fallen UAE policeman has garnered national attention and given rise no little anti-Iranian sentiment. Ruler of Dubai Sh. Muhammad bin Rashid has even taken to Twitter to eulogize "Tariq al-Shehi, Emirati father of four, ... martyred in Bahrain."<br />
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">
طارق الشحي .. إماراتي أب لأربعة أطفال .. شهيد الواجب الإماراتي في البحرين .. <a href="http://t.co/K186dhjDN0">pic.twitter.com/K186dhjDN0</a><br />
— HH Sheikh Mohammed (@HHShkMohd) <a href="https://twitter.com/HHShkMohd/statuses/440816663940694017">March 4, 2014</a></blockquote>
One wonders how this sentiment will translate into international relations. On the one hand, one could imagine redoubled regional support for Bahrain so as to appear united in the face of ostensive Iranian-backed terrorism. On the other hand, one might just as well expect the opposite reaction, on the part of the UAE in particular, which is to say to the Al Khalifa: you really need to get your house in order, as it's increasingly affecting the rest of us.<br />
<br />
In this regard, the recent elevation of Muhammad bin Nayf in Saudi Arabia, now in charge of the all-important Syria portfolio, is of potential consequence. The Interior Minister is said to be more pragmatic than his father with regard to Saudi countenance of potential Bahraini concessions to the opposition, and was even <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f695afdc-87e9-11e2-b011-00144feabdc0.html" target="_blank">rumored</a> to have been involved in an ultimately-abandoned plan to bring al-Wifaq representatives to discussions in Riyadh.<br />
<br />
One really hopes that such potential sources of regional pressure or mediation pan out, because it's difficult to see how Bahrain's political-turned-armed conflict can be resolved internally. Unless one believes that the state has so far held its punches in its dealing with the violent opposition, and that its heretofore inability to stamp out attacks such as yesterday's stems primarily from moderation in tactics, then it's not clear what else it can do to end the escalating insurgency. Arresting 'Ali Salman or 'Isa Qasim isn't going to change anything (for the better).<br />
<br />
At the same time, despite official statements to the contrary, one has to imagine that the government views the violent street movement as almost entirely out of the sphere of al-Wifaq's influence. The state has therefore little incentive to enter into serious negotiations with the group, as it cannot credibly promise to deliver what the state wants, i.e. an end to precisely this sort of bloodshed and bad publicity.<br />
<br />
Unfortunately, an escalating tit-for-tat contest between the government and radical opposition appears already well underway.<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update</b></span>: The blog Jihadology <a href="http://jihadology.net/2014/03/04/hizballah-cavalcade-saraya-al-ashtar-bahrains-illusive-bomb-throwers/">offers</a> a detailed look at Saraya al-Ashtar.
Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-62702614562777087502014-02-27T10:02:00.001+03:002014-02-27T10:02:25.436+03:00America's 25 Most Awkward Allies<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<br />
A while back I was asked to contribute to an interesting project for Politico's new magazine on the U.S.'s uncomfortable relationships with authoritarian regimes. The resulting report, "<a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/americas-most-awkward-allies-103889.html?ml=m_u1_1">America's 25 Most Awkward Allies</a>," is now out, with Bahrain placed at number 8 behind only Pakistan (1), Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, and Uzbekistan.<br />
<br />
The list itself contains only relatively short blurbs. Click the image above for the longer article on Bahrain, titled "<a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/bahrain-the-base-103875.html">The Base</a>."Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-89984619189613727192014-02-22T12:17:00.001+03:002014-02-22T12:44:21.124+03:00The New York Times' Hijacked Bahrain Op-Ed EffortsContinuing in its recently-established <a href="http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.com/2014/01/truthiness-in-and-on-bahrain.html" target="_blank">tradition</a> of giving credibility to misleading and/or entirely erroneous arguments about Iranian "interference" in Bahrain, on February 18 the <i>New York Times</i> ran an op-ed by "Bahraini entrepreneur and political commentator on Gulf issues" Sarah bin Ashoor titled "<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/19/opinion/bahrains-hijacked-reform-efforts.html?_r=0" target="_blank">Bahrain's Hijacked Reform Efforts</a>." (The piece even appeared in Wednesday's print edition of the <i>International New York Times</i>.) While one can glean the substance of the article from the title alone, still it is noteworthy for several reasons.<br />
<br />
First, and as noted already, it is but the latest in a string of dubious editorials on Bahrain to have appeared in the newspaper over the past six months or so. As one gathers from the screenshot below, four of the six most recent Bahrain op-eds, dating to mid-December, promulgate the idea that Iranian (material) support for the Bahraini opposition is not only fact, but is qualitatively no different from the country's involvement in Syria and Yemen. Only Vali Nasr, the respected scholar of Shi'i political movements, and Roger Cohen, NYT's own columnist, avoid this conflation; and only Cohen calls out (sarcastically) this Saudi-sponsored disinformation.<br />
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<br />
A glance at this list also suggests a reason for the <i>Times</i>' recent turn toward Bahraini government mouthpiece. Apart from Bin Ashoor's article, the subject of each is not Bahrain per se but Iran, more particularly its ostensive efforts to destabilize the whole of southwest Asia. The pro-Bahraini anti-Iran PR machine has thus found an unlikely ally in the pro-Israeli anti-Iran PR machine. On the other hand, this relationship simply mirrors the newfound shared interests and evolving ties between Israel and the Gulf states generally, and so perhaps can no longer be any surprise.<br />
<br />
The second reason why "Bahrain's Hijacked Reform Efforts" bears mention is its author. Given the timing of the article -- just 4 days after the third anniversary of the uprising -- one would expect the <i>Times</i> to have sought out a reputable and independent analyst to deliver an op-ed in line with its news coverage of the anniversary. This is, after all, one of the two or three weeks a year when Bahrain can expect to attract any real media coverage at all. Instead, however, we have an obscure "commentator."<br />
<br />
Reassuringly, I am not the only one to have been struck by this. A <a href="http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2014/02/at-ny-times-a-suspect-oped-183740.html" target="_blank">blog post</a> by one Dylan Byers at Politico describes this "suspect op-ed" and, more interestingly, its author, concluding that -- gee-whiz! -- she appears to be a random Bahraini businesswoman. Better yet, her description as a "founding member of the London-based Gulf Affairs Forum" would seem to be more accurately stated as: a) she is the founding member of a Bahraini pro-government group; and b) she lives in London. Byers tells,<br />
<blockquote>
There is no evidence of the Gulf Affairs Forum's existence online. A Google search returns only the article and subsequent discussion about the article. A Nexis search returns only the original op-ed, its republication in the Times international edition, and a mention of the piece in <i>Gulf Daily News</i>, a Bahraini paper. In interviews with British television channels in early 2012, Ashoor was simply described as a Bahraini businesswoman.</blockquote>
When asked by Byers to clarify, an editor at the <i>Times</i> eventually explained, presumably after following up with Bin Ashoor, that,<br />
<blockquote>
Sarah bin Ashoor formed the Gulf Affairs Forum in 2012 to advocate for political reform in Bahrain. Though it is registered in Bahrain and members of its board are fellow Bahrainis, Ms. bin Ashoor is the leader of the organization, and she is based in London. She organized a policy forum in 2012 at which speakers included members of Parliament, business people and journalists from The Guardian, the BBC, Reuters and other organizations, and has met with officials in Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office and with scholars at Chatham House, a London-based policy institute.</blockquote>
Sure, fair enough.<br />
<br />
The final and by far least interesting thing about the article is its content, which follows so closely King Hamad's April 2011 <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/19/stability-is-prerequisite-for-progress/" target="_blank">apologia</a> in the <i>Washington Times</i> that it makes me wonder whether Bin Ashoor wrote that one as well. The second paragraph of King Hamad's op-ed, the part right after he talks about how the demands of the opposition will be taken seriously and that the people making them definitely won't just be thrown in prison and tortured, begins, "Unfortunately, the legitimate demands of the opposition were hijacked by extremist elements with ties to foreign governments in the region."<br />
<br />
Compare, now, Bin Ashoor's piece on Wednesday,<br />
<blockquote>
Over the years, Bahrain has faced an analogous cycle of events: The state pursues political and economic reforms. These efforts are then hijacked by unpopular radical Shiite Islamists supported by Iran. Eventually, the state overcomes these challenges and restores stability — sometimes at the cost of initially pursued reform efforts.</blockquote>
HIJACKED, you say!? Indeed, much like the <i>New York Times</i> editorial page.<br />
<br />
While we're at it, then, let me hijack Bin Ashoor's regurgitation of King Hamad to offer a Bahraini political cycle of my own, one that works equally well for the periods, say, 1971-1999 and 1999-2014. Stop me if you've already heard it:<br />
<br />
Bahrain promises political and economic reforms. The reality fails to live up to the promises, or better yet -- no, seriously, tell me if this sounds familiar -- the ruler simply reneges on the initial promises. This effort at political backtrack is then hijacked by extremists who demand the promises be upheld. Since they are already politically and economically marginalized and thus have more to gain and less to lose, this latter group of <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1733785/" target="_blank">truth-terrorists</a> consists disproportionately of Shi'a. Yet this situation is perfect from the standpoint of the state, which eventually overcomes the challenge of popular but Shi'a-dominated opposition by convincing ordinary Sunnis -- not to mention gullible newspapers -- that if it were to cave in to these terrorist demands (read: make good on things it already promised), Iran would take over Bahrain, steal the keys to the Fifth Fleet, and use American aircraft carriers to launch nuclear strikes on Israel. And all this -- and here's the key line -- <strike>sometimes</strike> always at the cost of initially <strike>pursued</strike> promised but never pursued reform efforts.Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-28986281472905145562014-02-10T06:37:00.000+03:002014-02-10T10:41:12.520+03:00(Not) Breaking Ranks for ReformThe temporary shot of adrenaline injected into the National Dialogue by the Crown Prince's meeting with opposition leaders did not last long. Neither, apparently, did Sh. Salman's attempted political comeback, about which I may have jumped the shark due to an untimely let up in my natural pessimism.<br />
<br />
It seems clear now that the Khawalid have managed to commandeer what was meant to be a serious agenda, the Crown Prince nowhere to be seen with the start of bilateral talks. Instead, the Royal Court has as usual insinuated itself into the process in order to sabotage it from within. The Bahrain Mirror <a href="http://bhmirror.no-ip.biz/news/12970.html">summarized</a> the
first opposition meeting with Khalid bin Ahmad as follows:
"cold, negative, and [Khalid bin Ahmad] has snatched leadership of the
dialogue." Even the BBC <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25918628" target="_blank">picked up</a> on his obstructionism.<br />
<br />
Meanwhile, KbA's brother in the Justice Ministry followed through in late January on threats to <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-bans-clerics-council-1.1283796" target="_blank">disband</a> the (Shi'i) Ulama Council led by Isa Qasim, charging that it was unregistered, involved in politics, and otherwise operating "outside the constitution and law." The body now faces potential repossession of assets and other penalties unless it agrees to "regularize its status" and abstain from politics.<br />
<br />
It is under this rather negative backdrop that al-Wifaq and the rest of the opposition societies have just submitted their "<a href="http://alwefaq.net/cms/2014/02/09/26690/" target="_blank">roadmap</a>" for formally restarting National Dialogue talks. It calls for three meetings per week to speed up the process, but also a referendum on the outcome, along with equally unlikely concessions such as a parliament with "full legislative powers" and an "elected government." Other longstanding demands, like new electoral boundaries and independent electoral commission, probably stand a better chance at agreement.<br />
<br />
Most interesting to me, though, is the roadmap's immediate <a href="http://www.zawya.com/story/Bahrains_Salafist_society_says_dialogue_vision_based_on_statute-GN_09022014_100210/" target="_blank">rejection</a> by al-Asalah, which says of the opposition vision, <br />
<blockquote>
We do not for instance support having an elected government as there is nothing that points to it in the charter or in the constitution. The formation of the government remains an essential element within the prerogatives of HM the king and he is the one who nominates the prime minister and the ministers. ...<br />
<br />
Our view on the government also takes in consideration the character of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Bahrain cannot break out of the Gulf ranks.<br />
<br />
That is why all the GCC member states seriously stand by Bahrain on this matter.</blockquote>
Indeed it is, and it is of course not difficult to see why other Gulf governments would not wish to see a precedent set in Bahrain. But this is a strange sort of argument for someone meant to represent an independent political party to make. <br />
<br />
It would seem to me that breaking ranks sits precisely atop the list of things Bahrain needs -- whether with respect to the ruling family, the GCC, or the sectarian-cum-political groupings that continue to run in circles so long as they are unable to mobilize individuals on some viable political basis.<br />
<br />
On an unrelated note, finally, the commander in charge of the U.S. Fifth Fleet's one active carrier strike group, Rear Adm. Kevin Sweeney, has made <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/us-navy-reiterates-commitment-to-bahrain-region-1.1287844" target="_blank">headlines</a> for having reportedly "reiterated [the U.S. navy's] commitment to Bahrain." Yet, when one reads his comments, in fact he seems to go out of his way <i>not</i> to mention Bahrain by name, substituting instead "this region," "this area," and so on.<br />
<br />
The <i>Gulf Daily News</i> <a href="http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=370227" target="_blank">quotes</a> him as saying, for instance, “We have a full commitment to this area. ... Our presence in the region is a continuation of six-decade long commitment to stand by our partners in the region and we’ll continue to honour that commitment." But it seems to me that in these two sentences alone Sweeney spurned at least three different chances to mention Bahrain. What it means, if anything, one can debate, but certainly this cannot be interpreted as an expression of commitment to anything other than the Gulf region generically.Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-16590226065902731102014-01-21T06:24:00.000+03:002014-02-02T11:22:04.828+03:00Bahrain's Crown Prince Makes His Move—And It Might Just Work<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/01/20/bahrains_crown_prince_makes_his_move" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjpGpDyI-7AbThsgBWu3d7HDrFt1rJ8sekKQQofiwGb5zIhb7pQGIt6e6-lMqV1FPGT6F8bkVxIh59Ke7_cWkR0be0PEmSYnt7f9VF9NxL-TgpBH7IMI494W5IM8AYH1Ky3RjmvPimZnsc/s1600/cpmove.jpg" /></a></div>
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I have a <a href="http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/01/20/bahrains_crown_prince_makes_his_move">new article</a> out at Foreign Policy on the crown prince's recent intervention in the national dialogue. More than that, though, it is about the larger political maneuver (in my view at least) being attempted by Sh. Salman vis-a-vis his royal challengers.<br />
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<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update</b></span>: Lost in all the attention on Sh. Salman's meeting with 'Ali Salman is a recent <a href="http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=494906">statement</a> (characterized by some as a "<i>fatwa</i>," though I'm not sure that's correct) by Sh. 'Isa Qasim declaring that "terrorism is forbidden in Islam." According to an English translation carried in the Iranian ABNA, he said, among other things, "This is our clear and persistent word to all believers; no to terrorism. Nothing other than a nonviolent approach must be adopted while demanding reforms."<br />
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Of course, the sorts of people over whom 'Isa Qassim has religious sway are not necessarily the same individuals engaging in violent acts. The message is probably more important for (and addressed to) the government and its Sunni support base, which continues to demand an explicit denunciation of violence from al-Wifaq, and to question why the state would agree to negotiate with "terrorists." Thus, for instance, we have this photoshop, which would seem to summarize the opinion of the latter:
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<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">
معكم معكم ياعلماء ! <a href="http://t.co/B5yZNNPV8g">pic.twitter.com/B5yZNNPV8g</a><br />
— Takrooz (@Takrooz) <a href="https://twitter.com/Takrooz/statuses/425870423943680000">January 22, 2014</a></blockquote>
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<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update 2</b></span>: Simon Henderson <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/royal-rivalry-bahrains-ruling-family-and-the-islands-political-crisis">scours</a> Robert Gates' new memoir for interesting bits on royal factionalism in Bahrain, which unfortunately seem to be relatively few. Mainly we are told what we already know, to wit:<br />
<blockquote>
The book recalls a February 2011 conversation in which Crown Prince Salman said "he was ready to become prime minister if asked." Yet despite describing him as "the voice of reason," Gates noted that Salman "was powerless" at the time. When visiting the island a month later, Gates "suggested to both the crown prince and king that they find a new and different role for the prime minister, who was disliked by nearly everyone but especially the Shia." Although Salman and the king responded positively to his suggestions, Gates concluded that "the royal family was split, and the hardliners had the edge."</blockquote>
<span style="color: #e06666;"><b>Update 3</b></span>: A pessimistic <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25918628">view</a> from the BBC on the Crown Price's initiative, focusing in particular on the paradoxical role of Khalid bin Ahmad. This is in line with a notable <i>Bahrain Mirror </i>story that <a href="http://bhmirror.no-ip.biz/news/12970.html">describes</a> the first opposition meeting with the Royal Court Minister as follows: "cold, negative, and [Khalid bin Ahmad] has snatched leadership of the dialogue."
Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-58697691811238430802014-01-16T14:56:00.001+03:002014-01-16T15:55:49.858+03:00The Crown Prince Negotiates with Terrorists<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">
HRH CP receives Chairmen of the Reps. & Shura Councils,Independent MPs & Heads & Reps. of Political Societies <a href="http://t.co/Kr0tUNwBVc">pic.twitter.com/Kr0tUNwBVc</a><br />
— اخبار سمو ولي العهد (@BahrainCPnews) <a href="https://twitter.com/BahrainCPnews/statuses/423434025257013248">January 15, 2014</a></blockquote>
<script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
A dramatic change indeed from the recent unprecedented persecution of senior al-Wifaq leaders, with 'Ali Salman himself <a href="http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.com/2013/12/the-arrest-of-ali-salman-breaking-new.html" target="_blank">arrested</a> but two weeks ago for supposed incitement to terrorism and hatred of the regime, yesterday saw a surprise meeting between Crown Prince Salman and political society leaders aimed at jump-starting the now-suspended national dialogue.<br />
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Of course, the question has never really been Sh. Salman's desire or sincerity in making a deal, but his practical ability to do so given ruling family dynamics. Perhaps the coming of 2014 -- an election year in Bahrain -- has given the government a renewed sense that the clock is ticking. Time will tell.Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8391958287808959571.post-82258029151079683442014-01-15T07:01:00.000+03:002014-02-22T12:18:55.574+03:00Truthiness in (and on) Bahrain<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=368716" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgfrPwORMX31qMngBfSO5Ni1QEcGtmp9K_YwFMAakZF40IeHn3meAtNfbQrJsEwtYWZpyjuIMT_qWJid3rqMDVFKtZN5b4aSAnMEPntsKarPvIuAycuoRKRA-PlvkAZ2O2TbzHlM_4iLRs/s1600/defendbahrain.jpg" height="273" width="500" /></a></div>
Today, no matter who you are, I've got good news for you. If you're one of those types of people who enjoys reading objective assessments of important social and political phenomena by people who have some knowledge of them, then you'll be happy to hear that <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Sectarian-Politics-Persian-Lawrence-Potter/dp/1849043388"><i>Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf</i></a>, a volume to which I contributed and about which I've been talking for a year now, will finally, after some delay, be out this Friday. (Fred Wehrey's <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Sectarian-Politics-Gulf-Uprisings-Columbia/dp/0231165129" target="_blank">book</a> on the same topic -- and bearing almost the exact same title -- has also recently been published.) In addition to my theoretical introduction, there are chapters by Laurence Louër, Kristin Smith Diwan, J.E. Peterson, Marc Valeri, and others. <br />
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On the other hand, if you're the kind of guy (or gal) who gets a kick out of blatant propaganda and/or subtle, agenda-driven changes in language and interpretation that are eventually adopted uncritically by influential media outlets like the <i>New York Times</i>, then you also should read on.<br />
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For the former, we have none other than Sh. Khalifa bin Salman himself, who yesterday received a group of pro-government Twitter-ers to thank them for their effective "exploit[ation] of modern technology to first and foremost defend Bahrain" -- as opposed to, say, "first and foremost tell the truth about Bahrain." The <i>GDN <span id="goog_1143357153"></span></i><a href="http://www.blogger.com/">reports<span id="goog_1143357154"></span></a> that he "stressed the need to counter campaigns defaming Bahrain's reform project and fledgling democratic strides. 'Confront anyone tweeting to harm Bahrain and lay bare all those who sold their souls to foreign parties,'" he said. This comes, one imagines, after last week's surprising decision by South Korea not to sell tear gas to Bahrain, an opposition victory owing largely to an effective social media campaign. <br />
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Already the day before, Bahrain had <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-sets-up-anti-hatred-committee-1.1276854" target="_blank">established</a> a new "anti-hate speech" committee (announced at a cabinet meeting chaired by the prime minister), charged with "proposing and adopting policies and measures, as well as preparing effective programmes, that address the problem of hate speech." Presumably this will follow the lead of Bahrain's nebulous anti-terrorism law of 2006, which defines terrorism as any oppositional act.<br />
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Yet, more worrying than Khalifa bin Salman's personal Internet army and hate-speech <i>mutawwa'in</i> is a more subtle question of language noted in a recent <a href="http://www.lobelog.com/iran-and-bahrain-the-new-york-times-uncritical-take/" target="_blank">article</a> by Jim Lobe (which also features extended commentary by Emile Nakhleh). The issue concerns an <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/13/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal.html" target="_blank">article</a> featured prominently in Sunday's <i>New York Times</i> about the ongoing negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. In it, the authors seem to regurgitate various unsubstantiated claims of "proof" of Iranian interference in Bahrain cited by Elliot Abrams in a recent <a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2014/01/03/iran-continues-subversion-despite-the-nuclear-negotiations/" target="_blank">post</a> at <i>CFR</i>. The upshot is that Bahrain now appears in the article alongside Syria and Yemen as veritable, established cases of Iranian interference in the Middle East, using as primary evidence the recent Caper of the <a href="http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.com/2014/01/bahrains-smoking-gun-boat.html" target="_blank">Smoking Gun Boats</a>, which as Lobe notes has not received serious treatment except by Abrams (and of course the indomitable Mitch Belfer).<br />
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Yet here the <i>New York Times</i> reports the Ministry of Interior's claims as fact:<br />
<blockquote>
In Bahrain, where Iran has ties to several Shiite groups, including some that have carried out small-scale attacks on the police, security officials last week seized a ship headed for the country with 50 Iranian-made hand grenades and nearly 300 commercial detonators marked “made in Syria.”<br />
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The two Bahrainis captured told interrogators that they had been trained in Iran and were directed by Bahraini opposition figures based there.<br />
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The country’s public security chief, Tareq al-Hassan, said that information provided by the suspects had also led to the seizure of plastic explosives, detonators, bombs, automatic rifles and ammunition in a warehouse.
</blockquote>
Nakhleh addresses some obvious problems in a reply to Lobe, writing,<br />
<blockquote>
The veracity of the NYT report on Bahrain is questionable. The two reporters should know better and should have been more nuanced. Perhaps their report was a nod to some hardliners in Washington who oppose any deal with Iran on the nuclear program. I am afraid the Gordon/Schmitt report might give the impression the NYT is falling in the same neocon-Israeli trap about Iran. ...<br />
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The weapons were seized on a boat, not a “ship” as the Times has claimed. They could have come from a location on the Iranian coast or from any other place in the northern Persian Gulf or the Shatt al-Arab estuary. We should be very careful lest we are duped by information or intelligence, which the Bahraini security services might have obtained through “interrogations” of the people arrested on the boat. It’s disappointing the Times did not take a more strategic look at Iranian-Bahraini relations and published, as fact, a claim about Iranian weapons heading toward Bahrain.</blockquote>
Ironically, then, the most informed and balanced coverage of Bahrain in the major Western media last week came on a fake news program, as Stephen Colbert <a href="http://www.colbertnation.com/full-episodes/mon-january-6-2014-ken-roth" target="_blank">hosted</a> Ken Roth of Human Rights Watch. See if you can spot Roth's old-fashioned use of facts and evidence in the linked video.
Justin Genglerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07926253352423304711noreply@blogger.com0