When Ruling Family Divisions Come to Society: Bahrain's New Civilian Police

There must be something about the start of summer in the Gulf, the knowledge that it's only the beginning of a five-month period of being more or less uncomfortable, that gets people particularly riled up. A few days after a homemade bomb exploded in al-'Akar in a deliberate targeting of police officers, now Sunni groups seem to be striking back in what threatens to become a repeat of last summer's open sectarian conflict that culminated in the Battle of UOB.

Certainly, part of the reason for heightened tensions is the continued controversy surrounding the case of al-Khawajah, and especially demonstrators' desire to play spoiler for the still-upcoming--but increasingly-uncertain--Formula 1 race. Yet, underlying these immediate causes, I think, is a deeper one, which is a growing recognition among ordinary people that--rumors of renewed "dialogue" notwithstanding--Bahrain's social, economic, and political crisis is unlikely to end anytime soon, and for reasons that are utterly beyond the reach of everyday citizens.

Or, "for a reason," I should say: namely, a crisis of political leadership--a hopelessly fractured ruling family--that is fomenting in turn a fractured population of various political constituencies. For the Bahraini who supports "the state," the question is whom exactly does one support: the king and crown prince? "The marshal" and his brother in the royal court? The prime minister? 'Abd al-Latif Al Mahmud? Muhammad Khalid? The Al-Fatih Awakening? And likewise for Bahrainis of "the opposition": is one convinced by the path of dialogue pursued by 'Ali Salman and al-Wifaq? Does one choose to follow Sh. 'Isa Qasim? Does one identify with the nebulous "February 14 Coalition?" Or does one retreat to more local identities tied to individual villages?

The upshot is not simply political indecision born of internal Al Khalifa squabbling (though, as the case of 'Abd al-Hadi most recently revealed, there is of course that too.) No, the real consequence is what happens when these rivalries are transferred to society at large, when, say, the "pro-government" supporters of Khalifa bin Salman pursue a strategy that undermines the initiatives of King Hamad. While the latter can attempt to marginalize the influence of these citizens, he is loath to go after them directly as they operate on some level at the pleasure of the prime minister. In the end, the contradictory positions of the various Al Khalifa factions are institutionalized in respective societal constituencies pushing and pulling in opposite directions, further augmenting the political clusterf-ck that is Bahrain.

Thus, for example, at the same time that the Bahraini government officially pursues "police reform," some citizens are showing their support for an even more aggressive approach with protesters by taking policing into their own hands, apparently with immunity. (Although I will note that we haven't heard much from 'Adal Flaifel since followers of his Military Society clashed with 'Ashura' procession-goers in January, so maybe Sh. Rashid has finally shut him up. [Oops, wrong: see Update below.])

Last night, a car driven by a Shi'i was overrun and literally flipped over by renegade citizens near the ALBA roundabout, apparently because it had a picture of Khalifa bin Salman hanging upside down in the window. The driver, still trapped inside, lay bleeding while local residents gathered to take photos and mock him. These were later joined by police, who eventually dispersed the crowd. (A fuller narration--in Arabic--is here, as well as many reactions by Sunnis abhorring the episode.) The scene is captured in a five-minute video on YouTube:



Photos of the melee were subsequently uploaded to a pro-government web forum along with a statement by "The Youth of East and West Rifa' and 'Isa Town," seemingly taking credit for the act. The statement takes the form of an ultimatum that threatens,

"1. If there is not a cessation of vandalism within the next 24 hours, and if the necessary steps [to end it] are not taken [i.e., by police], then the Rifa' Youth will get involved, using guns, against all traitors to the nation."

"2. There will be an end to the [presence of] traitors in the streets of Rifa'. ... [They] will be killed ... if the chaos does not end.

"3. Any traitor who undertakes any vandalism ... will be tortured ... until death.

"4. After the expiration of the specified time [i.e., 24 hours], if the necessary steps are not taken on the part of the regime's armed forces to stop the chaos and demonstrations, then the armed Rifa' youth will arm themselves fully and go into the streets to kill the traitors."

Later in the thread, "Sunni youth" coalitions based in other areas--al-Zallaq and Muharraq, for example--added their approval and asked for specific directions.

If all this sounds like an empty boast, a recent statement by the Ministry of Interior would seem to indicate otherwise. On Friday, the ministry essentially acknowledged the ownership of unlicensed weapons among civilians when it "affirm[ed] that those with unlicensed weapons or ammunitions should immediately approach the Licenses Office at the General Directorate of Crime Detection and Forensic Science." Obviously this implies illegal ownership among Sunni citizens, since in the first place no "license" would be granted legally to a Shi'i citizen, and any Shi'a thought to possess these would simply be hunted down and arrested as terrorists.

This popular Sunni involvement in policing is not limited to al-Rifa', however. Another video posted to YouTube shows a mob of citizens outside the (sole) entrance to the exclusively-Shi'i village of Nuwaidrat, (former) home of Sh. 'Abd al-Wahhab Hussain.

Meanwhile, conservative writers (Al-Zayzani in Al-Watan) as well as with Sunnis in parliament continue to call for more "support" for the security forces. The latter held a "closed-door meeting" with Sh. Rashid yesterday in which they "demanded the Interior Ministry use tougher measures to deal with saboteurs after Monday’s attack in Eker."

Finally, also tends to happen whenever tempers flare, there is renewed rumor of U.S. involvement in the conflagration of the past week. As reported on the pro-government Dilmun Times, some MPs in parliament are

call[ing] for the US Navy to be questioned following rumours that its personnel were in the area before the attack.

“A few days ago we heard about US Navy personnel’s involvement in some incidents in Bahrain and the bomb used to attack the policemen in Eker is clear evidence that reflects that,” claimed MP Abdulla Bin Howail during the parliament session yesterday.

Conveniently, "The Marshal" Khalifa bin Ahmad just met with the U.S. Ambassador yesterday, so perhaps he had a chance to ask Krajeski--in addition to his thoughts on the Irano-American-Al-Wifaq-Hizballah alliance--about his knowledge of U.S. marine involvement in the bombing in al-'Akar. I would have loved to have been at that meeting.

Update: Scratch that bit about 'Adal Flaifel. I missed this story in the GDN in which he plays the part of "military affairs analyst" regarding the explosion in al-'Akar. He offers, inter alia, the following (unbiased, of course) appraisal:

"Based on my 29 years of experience as an intelligence officer, this is certainly guerilla warfare and those men behind it are trained in Lebanon and Iran."

Update 2: The U.S. is taking notice.

Update 3: As Simon Henderson notes in his excellent article, "Bahrain on the Brink Jeopardizes U.S. Interests in the Gulf," yet another act of retaliation in response to the Nuwaidrat bombing was an attack against the (Shi'a-owned) Jawad 24-hour Supermarket. A security camera captured the incident, including what appears to be police participation (or passive collusion):


Update 4: Amnesty International has offered a preview of its anticipated April 17 report on Bahrain's (non-)implementation of reforms following the BICI. Helpfully, they have made the actual report unnecessary by aptly summarizing the situation in the first paragraph:

Despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary, state violence against those who oppose the Al Khalifa family rule continues, and in practice, not much has changed in the country since the brutal crackdown on anti-government protesters in February and March 2011.

Update 5: Missed this over the weekend: careful Bahrain observer Kristian Coates Ulrichsen writes for the Mideast Channel, "The hollow shell of security reform in Bahrain."

Update 6: Al-Wifaq and others in the formal opposition kick off a week of protests in the run-up to the Formula One. Until now, anyway, there has been no announcement of an Occupy Sakhir movement.

'Abd al-Hadi al-Khawajah: "Let's Bring Down the Ruling Gang"

The AFP reports that the lawyer for 'Abd al-Hadi al-Khawajah fears that the activist and founder of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights may have died as a result of his extended hunger strike, as the state has denied access to or communication with him since yesterday.

Over the weekend, there was hope that a last minute deal would send him (back) to Denmark (where he spent years in exile) for medical treatment, but, as seemingly everything in Bahrain, that was blocked as a result of disagreement within the Al Khalifa. The BBC reported yesterday,

The government is badly split on what to do, sources in Bahrain have told the BBC's Bill Law. They say the Foreign Minister, Sheikh Khaled bin Ahmad al-Khalifa, is keen to see a resolution.

However, Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa insists he should not be released, the sources told our correspondent.

The story continues,

An official [at the Supreme Judiciary Council ostensibly in charge of the matter] told the Bahraini state news agency: "The hand-over of accused and convicted persons to foreign countries takes place under specific conditions...

"This does not apply in Abdulhadi al-Khawaja's case."

The official did not elaborate.

Indeed, an apt summary of the state of law in Bahrain.

Yet, though "the official did not elaborate," one may surmise that part of Khalifa bin Salman's reluctance to see the release of 'Abd al-Hadi is the personal history between the two. Indeed, 'Abd al-Hadi owes much of his notoriety for a now-famous public lecture in 2004 at the 'Uruba Club in which he openly criticized the prime minister, singling him out as particularly responsible for Bahrain's social and economic problems.

Perhaps it's true what the Bahraini Sunni militiamen say: "Khalifa bin Salman will crown your head."


The point of this post is not to speculate about the current status of 'Abd al-Hadi or about the reasons why the deal with Denmark fell through. As part of my fieldwork in Bahrain during 2008 and 2009, I had two opportunities to meet al-Khawajah, once for a direct interview in his capacity as a political activist (before some readers go crazy, I also interviewed Jassim al-Sa'idi, so let's hold the accusations of pro-Shi'a bias); and once indirectly during his fiery speech on the tenth night of 'Ashura' on January 6, 2009, for which he was subsequently arrested.

Portions of the personal interview appear in my thesis on Bahrain (in Chapter 3), but what I would like to retell here is the story of that night in January, and in particular the content of 'Abd al-Hadi's speech, which seems eerily appropriate for the present occasion. Titled "Let's Bring Down the Ruling Gang," the address connected the political struggle of Bahraini Shi'a to the religious occasion of 'Ashura', drawing a stark distinction between those citizens content to accept political domination by a corrupt power, and those who choose to stand up it to even at the threat of retribution.

The following analysis of the speech, which also can be found in Chapter 3 (pp. 96-102) of my dissertation, is based largely on an Arabic text that I came across at some point. There is also a much shorter attempt at an English translation, which is (seemingly deliberately) moderated in parts. In any event, the entire thing is available on YouTube.

For the ease of reading, I have simply created a 7-page .pdf document of the relevant portions of the chapter, which is attached below:

Clash of Civilizations in Muharraq

Some Sunnis, at least, seem not to be listening to Faysal al-Shaykh.

On Monday, residents of Muharraq led by Muhammad Khalid and some local MPs ran Minister of Culture Shaikha Mae out of a "Spring of Culture" event organized by the state, which they said promoted sexual depravity and other un-Islamic values. Angry protesters held signs criticizing her for her "vice and corruption," saying, "Your culture is not the culture of the people of Muharraq." (A million other photos are here.)


The gathering also gave Muhammad Khalid a chance to go after the king once again:



When Sha. Mae eventually went to exit, she was serenaded by people chanting "the people want the fall of the minister":

Then, on Tuesday, Sha. Mae appeared in parliament accusing Muharraq MPs of "trying to undermine Bahrain's tourism industry" through their opposition to the annual event. As the GDN reports,

Culture Minister Shaikha Mai bint Mohammed Al Khalifa hit back after Islamist MPs accused artists taking part in the country's biggest cultural festival of being sexually provocative.

The MPs yesterday showed images of some Spring of Culture performances during their weekly session, claiming they promoted homosexuality.

However, Shaikha Mai responded by accusing MPs of taking the country backwards.

"It is people like you who are taking us backwards and those pictures are of an event six years ago, which we dealt with and that chapter has been closed," she said during the session.

Parliament was then suspended after one MP hurled insults at the minister, while others demanded her resignation.

On her way out she said she expected nothing less from Bahrain's MPs, since they were simply not "man enough".

"Not man enough!" Booya!

This insult, the Gulf News reports, "prompted the lawmakers to claim that they would not convene until Shaikha Mai is removed from the government."

As I've said a few times now, it's amazing how the parliament is not so reliably pro-government once Sunni societies are not entirely engrossed with stopping al-Wifaq from accomplishing anything. Ironically, the state could really use a few more al-Wifaq MPs; its "opposition-less" parliament isn't working out so well.

Update: On the other side of the spectrum, there is increased worry about the failing health of 'Abd al-Hadi al-Khawajah, now on day 50-something of a hunger strike. On Monday, a court denied a request to release him and the other 13 imprisoned opposition leaders pending their upcoming appeal.

Update 2: Two highly-recommendable new articles on Bahrain appeared last night.

The first is by Laurence Louër (a collaborator on the Gulf sectarianism project with which I am currently occupied) for Carnegie's Sada blog: "Houses Divided: the Splintering of Bahrain’s Political Camps."

A second is by Reuters reporter Andrew Hammond: "Sunnis seek own voice in Bahrain's turmoil."

Update 3: If 'Abd al-Hadi al-Khawajah dies in prison, part of the reason will be the same cause that afflicts Bahrain more generally: intra-Al Khalifa disputes. The BBC reports that,

The government is badly split on what to do, sources in Bahrain have told the BBC's Bill Law. They say the Foreign Minister, Sheikh Khaled bin Ahmad al-Khalifa, is keen to see a resolution.

However, Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa insists he should not be released, the sources told our correspondent.

I'm sure the latter fact has nothing to do with al-Khawajah's public attack against the prime minister that landed him in prison in 2004.

"Bahraini Sunnis, Watch Out!"—Or Else You Might Actually Get What You Want

I don't normally devote an entire post to a single news story or article, but this one deserves it--and moreover follows directly from my previous post regarding the centrality of Bahrain's Sunnis in dictating the direction of the political crisis. Writing in Al-Watan, Faysal al-Shaykh warns, "Bahraini Sunnis, watch out!" (Arabic here):

It has become crystal clear that what happened in Bahrain [i..e, the uprising] bears no relation to the Arab Spring movements. It was a sectarian and discriminatory movement led by deeply sectarian political forces that do not recognize any other components in society. [But now t]hey want to show the world that their alleged revolution is supported by the sweeping majority of all Bahrainis from all sects and that the change they are demanding is a popular one. ...

Therefore, their current tactic is based on winning the sympathy of Sunnis by dwelling on common grievances which consist in discontent with living conditions, the rampant corruption in state sectors, the housing problem and rising prices. Their objective is to drive Sunnis to discredit the measures that seek to protect Bahrain according to comprehensive and wider criteria and not narrow and petty considerations that could have cost the country a lot hadn’t it been for the proper and clever treatment of the situation so as to show the international community what is really happening inside Bahrain.

Those bastards! Attempting to "win[] the sympathy of Sunnis" by noting that in fact all Bahrainis share similar political and economic grievances? By noting "rampant corruption," "the housing problem," and "[poor] living conditions?" How could they?

He continues,

This is a key point about which loyal Bahrainis have to be vigilant. After the failure of their coup attempt, those people changed their strategy. Instead of continuing to focus their confrontation between them and the state, notably its security bodies, they are now trying to pull another element in the conflict with the state. Today, they are exploiting the feelings and emotional mood of Sunnis by showing that any action or initiative made by the state tends to neglect the loyal citizens’ rights and ignore their demands.

Wait, what!? What's the opposition doing now?--demonstrating that "the state tends to neglect [Sunnis'] rights and ignore their demands?" Those sons-a-bitches!

And a final warning:

We have to beware of falling in the quagmire of emotions and impetuous reactions, otherwise it would us a regime capable of securing the pillars of a civil state against the ambitions of those who seek to establish an entity controlled by a single category whose propensities cause a lot of distress to those with different sectarian or political affiliations and you can take the northern state an example for the hellish existence led by political opponents.

Indeed, watch out, Bahraini Sunnis, or else you might actually make progress toward realizing your longstanding political demands. And isn't that exactly what the terrorist Ziono-American-Hizballah alliance wants you to do?

Yeah, I guess it is.

Update: The New York Times reports on the lingering tensions at the University of Bahrain one year after the battle of the camel.

Update 2: A popular thread on the pro-government Sunni forum is calling for a televised debate involving Sunnis and Shi'i activists, pro- and anti-government. And in a related poll, 70% of forum-goers support the idea. Maybe another indication that at least some Sunnis are coming around to the idea that the opposition may not be the devil after all? All I have to say is: "Bahraini Sunnis, watch out!"

Update 3: The always-readable Simon Henderson reports to Foreign Policy from on deck the Fifth Fleet's USS Abraham Lincoln, currently on anti-Iran duty in the Persian Gulf.

Update 4: Bahrain police reform you can believe in.

Update 5: The Saudi worldview, via al-Hayat.


Update 6: How about that police reform? A protester (and citizen journalist) killed by plainclothes security forces shooting live rounds from a civilian car. (The Interior Ministry is appealing for "witnesses," presumably some that would confirm that the bullet came from a car with an Iranian plate.) It will be ironic if the state's own thugs prove responsible for its losing the Formula 1 race, now only weeks away.

Look Who's Boycotting Dialogue Now

Last week I had the pleasure of sitting on a conference panel with one 'Abd al-Hadi Khalaf, whose analysis of Bahrain's strategy in handling the uprising I much enjoyed. I was also happy to find out that we shared several common opinions about the nature of the struggle going forward, primary among which is the novelty and importance of the Sunni mobilization in Bahrain over against the same old story of Shi'a-led opposition.

As I've mentioned previously, I'm currently in the process of finishing a theoretical introduction to an upcoming volume on sectarianism in the Gulf being organized by Georgetown University's Center for International and Regional Studies. As such, I don't have time to write an entire lengthy post on this now, but it bears mentioning (especially in light of my discussions with 'Abd al-Hadi) the main political news out of Bahrain these days: that it is now the Sunnis (at least those in the National Unity Gathering) who are threatening boycott of the still-rumored upcoming second round of dialogue, ostensibly because the physical conflict is still ongoing--that is, because al-Wifaq and "its followers" in the street continue to fight for "regime change."

The irony of the situation has not been lost on observers. Al Bin Khalil writes,

This scenario is upside down and unfamiliar to us to some extent because local political affairs observers are used to seeing the radical opposition abstain from accepting continuous initiatives in order to stick to its demands and to preserve its interests. They are not used to seeing other non-radical political societies having reserves against such initiatives although these initiatives serve their interests.

A billboard in Muharraq depicts one "going to the dialogue."

In support of the boycott, the Al-Fatih Awakening used its Friday rally to counter those organized by opposition groups to demand a restart of talks. Importantly, however, their primary argument against the initiative is that it includes only the opposition groups--i.e., that they, Sunnis, are excluded from it. (On this point, see this previous post.) In other words, it's not that Bahraini Sunnis wish to prevent a political solution out of some hatred of Shi'a or fear of Iran, but that they simply don't want to be stuck watching the process unfold from the outside looking in. Thus the rally poster below: "No dialogue without Al-Fatih."


On the other hand, this decision to boycott has met with condemnation from other Sunnis--see Faysal al-Shaykh in Al-Watan--who, having witnessed the decisive impact of the National Unity Gathering in February and March, now fear the return of Sunnis to the political margins to the benefit (in their view) of precisely those who are responsible for the chaos of the previous year. A boycott, in the words of al-Shaykh, "would mean that the hundreds of thousands who stand behind the Rally won’t make their voices heard at the dialogue table."

In short, a government-opposition dialogue represents an attempt to return to the status quo ante, one that increasingly looks undesirable to ordinary Sunnis. A Sunni boycott--like that in post-2003 Iraq, or like al-Wifaq's pre-2005 boycott--will only ensure that they remain on the political sidelines, and gain disproportionately little from any eventual agreement. As al-Shaykh says, despite the dangers of accepting dialogue with a "radical" opposition, "leaving the field vacant can also prove disastrous."

Perhaps in view of this criticism, Al Mahmud has since publicly reversed the group's position, saying on the sidelines of a post-BICI event,

"Our decision earlier to boycott dialogue with the government is not final," he revealed.

"We could consider our stance depending on the situation.

"I would like to state here that the government should not engage in any dialogue under pressure [i.e., from al-Wifaq or from the U.S. (on the latter, see here)]."

The state, of course, or at least the king's faction, is I'm sure happy to hear of this boycott, which leaves it free to (attempt to) cut a deal with the opposition without fundamentally altering its position vis-a-vis the rest of society. Yet even if the National Unity Gathering or other Sunni groups did participate, under no circumstances will the government entertain three-way talks ('Abd al-Hadi mentioned that the last time that the ruling family, leading Sunnis, and leading Shi'is all sat at a negotiating table was in the 1960s), since even the outside chance that the leaders of al-Wifaq and the National Unity Gathering could agree on a (n albeit limited) set of political demands is enough to put the fear of God in the Al Khalifa.

In short, the restart of political dialogue in Bahrain involves an interesting set of tensions for all parties involved:

• For al-Wifaq and other Shi'a, Sunni participation is likely to complicate the search for a mutually-agreeable political solution, but if such a cross-societal agreement could be reached, it would be much more forceful and perhaps even revolutionary in its own way. (Of course, this is to say nothing of the many Shi'a who would reject the notion of a dialogue in any case.)
  


• For Sunnis who desire genuine political reforms such as an end to corruption and political naturalization, the dialogue is an opportunity to push these issues (since they will find easy agreement with Shi'a), but the danger of appearing to be in collusion with the Shi'a opposition--and efforts by some in the state to promote this notion--is a real one.


• For Sunnis who desire political reform in the opposition direction--i.e., a further-empowered prime minister--participation in the dialogue reinforces Bahrain's post-1999 political modus operandi of piecemeal political deals between the opposition and king following periods of instability and protest. But, absent some mass Sunni mobilization against the dialogue, a boycott would do nothing to help this situation, as the state could simply go ahead without Sunni involvement.
  


• For the king's faction, another dialogue with the opposition represents continuation down the same familiar political path. Sunni boycott would be a welcome development (so long as it is not accompanied by mass protests against the dialogue that preclude it altogether); and if they do participate their negotiations will almost certainly be held in parallel with those of al-Wifaq rather than together.


• For the immoderate Al Khalifa led by the prime minister, a second dialogue must be seen as a step in the wrong direction to the extent that it offers a chance an end to the political crisis that has aided in its empowerment over the previous year. Mobilizing Bahrainis against it--by suggesting, for example, that it is born of U.S. pressure--would seem to be the preferred course of action.

Update: A very interesting piece of news: National Unity Gathering Vice President, Muhammad al-Uthman, has left Bahrain seeking "political asylum" in Britain. It seems some Bahraini Sunnis at least are anticipating a clampdown on their newfound political activism. Perhaps the regime did not appreciate their effort to boycott its dialogue.

Government Inaction

I'm still writing away on soon-to-be-due papers and book chapters. (On the other hand, apart from continued protests and lingering rumors of "dialogue," I'm not sure what is new in the past two weeks anyway.) In the meantime, there's at least one other site on Bahrain with a good sense of humor. A spoof on the recently-launched govactions.bh meant to highlight the state's supposed implementations of BICI recommendations, a new group calling itself Bahrain Watch has launched a website of its own titled "Government Inaction." See what they did there?

The other interesting item I'll pass along comes via the so-called "Pearl Revolution Political Center," which, as you'll gather from the amusing banner below, "announces its first operation Code Name 'Countering the Counter-Revolution,'" which for a code-name does not leave a lot to the imagination. The inspiration is apparently the one-year anniversary of the Saudi involvement in the Bahrain uprising.


Among the groups with more stylish banners that are also organizing "resistance activities" (which include some good old-fashioned U.S. flag-burning) are the Sitra Youth:


And al-Wafa':


And the February 14th Coalition:


I'm sure the Peninsula Shield and the Fifth Fleet are manning their battle stations.

Finally, if you're looking to keep up with the full week's festivities:


Update: Bahrain has made the Internet gods angry.

More on Dialogue and Union

As I am attempting to finish a book review and book chapter for an upcoming volume on sectarianism in the Gulf, I have little extra time for an extensive post here. Thus I will pass along a well-informed report on the weekend's events from the G2K mailing list.

Before that, however, there are a number of interesting articles in Al-Watan regarding the rumored "union" between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and Sunni mobilization:

• Sawsan al-Sha'ir: "Gulf Peoples Union"
• Al bin Khalil: "The Decentralization of Bahrain's Sunni [Movement]"
  
• Al bin Khalil: "Sunnis and Decentralized Leadership"
• Al bin Khalil: "The Al-Fateh Awakening: Where To..?"
• Al-Zayani: "Al Mahmoud, the Awakening and the Coalition should sit at the same table"
• Al bin Khalil: "Is Youth [Mobilization] Spontaneous or Intentional?"
• Al-Zayani: "How long will the state remain silent?"
  

Now for Bahrain's latest developments:

1. The preacher of the "official" grand mosque in the Bahraini capital
(Ahmed Al-Fateh Islamic Centre) Sheik Fareed Al-Meftah spoke today
about the unity between Bahrain & Saudi Arabia, indicating that this
will be announced (may be end of the year) as a first step towards
achieving "union" amongst GCC states. Al-Meftah said "the Gulf Union
is a long-awaited dream… and here we are today, we witness God's
blessing for achieving this unity that will be for the advantages and
benefits to the citizens of the (GCC) countries in all social,
cultural, economic, security, and military aspects…". He went on to
say that the "first step for this unity" will be between Bahrain and
Saudi Arabia.

2. On the other hand, the opposition cleric Sheik Isa Qassim called for
"mass demonstrations" on 9 March 2012 that will stretch along the
strategic Budaya Highway next Friday. At the same time, the opposition
groups led by Al-Wefaq started on 2 Match 2012 a week-long "evening"
gatherings at the entrance "Muqsha'a village" on the Budaya Highway in
a place now called by these opposition groups "Freedom Square".

3. Three days ago, the crown prince visited four Shiite clashes-ridden
areas to offer his condolences for the families of victims of a car
accident (6 girls tragically died in this accident). He ventured into
these areas without extra security protection, and this was the first
time a leading member of the ruling family visits these areas since the
eruption of events last year on 14 February 2011, thus providing some
hope for a possible positive development in the near future.

4. Rumors are circulating that there are talks between Al-Wefaq and the
Royal Court Minister. This follows a very brief meeting around 2
February 2012 between Al-Wefaq and the minister. According to the
opposition sources, the meeting was extremely brief but the first of
its kind. Later on 14 February 2012, Al-Wefaq received an "untitled &
unsigned" single page from the minister stating four principles (or
pre-conditions) for a possible dialogue. A fifth pre-condition was
passed verbally, but Al-Watan newspaper (linked to the official circle)
announced it on its first page of 24 February 2012. These principles
are considered as "PRE-CONDITIONS" imposed on the opposition and are as
follows:

a. Recognition of the National Action Charter (passed on 14 February 2001 by a referendum that received 98.4% approval).

b. Recognition of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain (unilaterally issued by the King on 14 February 2002).

c. Recognition of the GCC Charter and the call for UNITY amongst its member states.

d. Accepting the outcome of the 'National Consensus Dialogue" concluded in July 2011 (which Al-Wefaq boycotted because the opposition were given 35 seats out of 300, and because the agenda was tightly preset & controlled).

e. Al-Wefaq must apologize for using violence in the health and education sectors during the events of last year - as published by Al-Watan newspaper on 24 February (something which the opposition denies it had done so anyway).

Needless to say these pre-conditions couldn't & wouldn't be accepted by the opposition, in the same [way that] pre-conditions couldn't & wouldn't be accepted by the official circle.

Update: Yesterday's AP article--"Saudi widens Arab Spring backlash with Bahrain 'union' plans"--covers the above main points and more.

Update 2: A story in Al-Ayam cites high-level sources in claiming that "there will be an announcement [of a new dialogue] in the new few days." No word whether there will also be a follow-up committee to study the announcement of a new dialogue.