A Sectarian Ramadan Kareem to You!

Coming to the "ethnic greetings" section of a Hallmark near you, Sunni and Shi'i Ramadan cards.

First, the late Pearl Roundabout shimmering among the mountains of Bahrain and among the clouds:



Whereas, someone posts in the Bahrain's main Sunni forum, "This is how the Sunni Lions break the fast in Syria":


Can you feel the togetherness and reconciliation?

A Final Political Salvo before Ramadan: The Sectarianization of Bahrain's Labor Unions

I've now returned from Cambridge, where participants on my panel were witnesses to a good show compliments of the Bahraini government, which sent a contingent from the Bahrain Centre for Strategic, International and Energy Studies (formerly the Bahrain Centre for Studies and Research) to refute my paper on the politics of public-sector employment in Bahrain. Notably, this 6- or 7-strong group included no less than former Information Minister and current chairman of the aforementioned center Dr. Muhammad 'Abd al-Ghaffar. Fortunately, my paper was (strategically, I'm sure) reserved for the very last spot, so the fireworks did not disrupt the panel generally, which was mostly very informative.

In addition to my paper, the group also attacked (on my panel) the presentation of Laurence Louër as well as (on other panels) those of 'Abd al-Nabi al-'Akri, Muhammad Matar, and others discussing Bahrain. I am also told that the group then proceeded to the other main Gulf studies conference at the University of Exeter, only to repeat the procedure anew. You stay classy, Bahrain!

Of course, as tends to happen, the hecklers succeeded only in making the state's case look worse. If Al-Watan has finally conceded that its English-language website was a liability rather than a tool to convert Western audiences to its position, then one wonders why the government cannot reach a similar conclusion, namely that it has failed to gain sympathizers not because its arguments are unknown but because they are unpersuasive.

In any case, with all this traveling it's been a while since I've posted, and much has happened in the meantime. Most notable is the formation of a new, Sunni-oriented labor union to compete with the current General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU), which is presumed, like everything in Bahrain, to be controlled by al-Wifaq and the opposition. Please excuse the bullet points.

• On July 10 the BNA reported that new editor-in-chief of Al-Watan and personal friend of this blog Yusif Al Bin Khalil has been received by "the Field Marshal" Khalifa bin Ahmad. Quite strange for a defense minister to congratulate the editor of a newspaper, you say? Well, when you consider their shared interests in anti-Americanism and riling Bahrain's Sunnis with the specter of foreign interference in the country, then it is perhaps less so. Oh, and the defense minister's brother bankrolls Al-Watan. It could be that too.


• While we're on the theme of Al-Watan and newspapers, the recent re-arrest (and three-month jail sentence) of Nabeel Rajab has occasioned an interesting spat involving Reuters. It seems that the government was/is upset with an article describing the circumstances of Rajab's arrest, which Reuters linked (correctly) to his Tweet claiming that citizens in Muharraq held a rally in support of the prime minister only because they were paid to do so. Two separate articles--first in Al-Watan, then in Al-Ayam--accuse the agency of false reporting, partiality, etc., while the Information Affairs Authority submitted its own formal complaint.
  
  
  The sticking point seems to be the explicit linking of Rajab's arrest to the prime minister (Al-Ayam is run by one of his cronies). Perhaps this is because, according to Rajab's lawyer Muhammad al-Jishi, the complaint that led to his arrest was filed by around 50 residents of Muharraq, including "Military Society" organizer 'Adel Flaifel. For one with a vivid imagination, such circumstances might suggest that--*gasp*--Khalifa bin Salman is somehow involved with Flaifel and other of his militant supporters, whether financially or otherwise. Support for the prime minister based on patronage relationships?? No way!
  
  
  Beyond Bahrain's continued persecution of journalists and media attempting to offer substantive coverage of events in the country, the other implication of the Reuters spat involves new Minister of State for Information Affairs Samira Rajab. From what I've been told, her April appointment was meant to offer a more media-friendly (and, more to the point, less prime minister-controlled) foil to the Information Affairs Authority led by Sh. Fawaz. Her ability to serve such a function in practice, however, would seem to be in question, as any movement on this front has been in the wrong direction.
  
  
• Bahrain is now home to yet another offshoot political "movement," this one known as the "Front for Jihad and Change" (or 'Aqab for short). No one seems to know quite what the group does; indeed, one opposition forum commentator asks derisively whether it is a "movement" or a "media organization," since despite a threatening manifesto its main activity thus far seems to be limited to the publishing of photographs, including of guns and ammo. (Curiously, the photograph below is taken from a pro-government Sunni forum, and the song in the YouTube video also has a Sunni feel and dialect.) The group does have a cool logo, though, so that's something I guess.
  
  
  And obligatory martial YouTube video:
  
  
  
  The Front's website only has three posts dating to July 14, the first a message of congratulations from al-Sayyid Qasim al-Hashimi, "Bahraini political opponent."(Al-Hashimi is a former member of the IFLB, then of al-Wifaq, and now directs the revolution from his computer in London.) In any case, the group clearly styles itself a Shi'i movement, but it's probably too early to tell what to make of it. Some Shi'a already assume it is a government front meant to smear the opposition.
  
  
• We arrive at the most significant news item. The National Unity Gathering has been busy lately, and its relationship with the state continues to grow in ambiguity. Al Mahmud and other TGONU leaders were prominent attendees of yesterday's press conference announcing the creation of a rival to the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU), called the Bahrain Labour Union Free Federation (BLUFF). In effect, BLUFF is meant to be the Sunni counterpoint to the GFBTU, which critics accuse of being controlled by al-Wifaq. Notably, one of the founding members of BLUFF is the union chairman at Alba, 'Ali Al bin 'Ali. Given Bahrain's success with political societies based around religious affiliation, the polarization of the country's trade unions along the same lines must be a welcome development. (That's sarcasm.)
  
  
  As always seems to be the case with the National Unity Gathering and the other post-uprising Sunni groups, this latest move lends itself to two competing interpretations depending on one's view of the movements themselves. On the one hand, given the historical importance of labor unions in spurring political action in Bahrain--whether in the 1950s, 1990s, or in 2011--one might suppose that the post-uprising Sunni movements are seeking to embed themselves more deeply into Bahraini political life, especially given their absence from other formal institutions such as the parliament. By this view, the launching of a competing labor union is not aimed necessarily at the opposition but perhaps at bolstering Sunnis' position vis-a-vis the state. If one would ask whether such a thing is necessary, consider, for instance, the recent arrest of outspoken Sunni Muhammad al-Zayani, former BDF colonel-turned-government critic, which has not gone unnoticed by the TGONU:
  
  
  Moreover, an article in Al-Ayam (linked on TGONU's Twitter feed) reports on a joint statement by al-Asalah and al-Manbar expressing their wonderment over the failure of the Labor Minister (Jamil Hamidan, a Shi'i appointed in King Hamad's post-uprising cabinet shake-up) to attend the press conference. The groups accuse the minister of bias in favor of the (Shi'i-controlled) GFBTU and say that he does not want a "free union."
  
  Others remain convinced, on the other hand, that the move is no more than a state-backed attempt to break the relatively powerful GFBTU, which one will recall organized several nationwide strikes in the early days of the uprising. Such an interpretation coincides with the more general view of TGONU and other Sunni movements as being far from politically-independent--to say nothing of a genuine Sunni political opposition. According to this view, the state is simply applying the lesson of the majlis al-nuwab, which is that so long as political factions exist along sectarian lines they will expend a majority of their energy fighting each other rather than focusing together on resolving shared grievances.
  
  As noted already (and as examined in a classic paper on "Bahrain's Labor Movements" by 'Abd al-Hadi Khalaf), trade unions have been a perennial loci of popular--cross-sectarian--political movements in Bahrain since the discovery of oil. By structurally dividing the labor movement into Sunni and Shi'i components, one eliminates an important potential source of the type of cross-societal mobilization that represents the only real threat to the maintenance of the political status quo in Bahrain. Whether or not the government (or certain factions of it) had a hand in the creation of the new union, one suspects it will be very happy at the news.
  
  
• If TGONU and the other new Sunni movements thus continue to elude easy political categorization, at least one can be more sure about the nature of some others. Earlier this week a group in Muharraq held a protest demanding the release of three imprisoned Sunnis--'Abd al-Rahman al-Murabati, 'Abdallah al-Na'imi, and Muhammad al-'Ubaidli (I'm not familiar with the background of the cases)--as a Ramadan makrama. A thread on the main Sunni forum explains that the individuals have been held for 4, 10, and 15 years, respectively, without being tried. (A million photos here.)
  
  
  Interestingly, one commenter asks why the thread is directed at the "Good Sunnis" of Muharraq, saying, "Why calling on Sunnis only? If you're being wronged then you should appeal to the Bahraini people as a whole? Don't you agree?"
  
  Acknowledgment that you're in the same boat as the Shi'a? "She's a witch! Get her!"
  
  Muhammad Al Bu Flasa likewise is continuing his quest to be re-imprisoned, appearing in a rally in front of Nabeel Rajab's house following the latter's arrest.
  
  
  
• Finally, some random interesting stories:
  
  
  1. An American passenger traveling to Bahrain from Italy was accused in an al-'Arabiyya report of attempting to smuggle in $11m in cash destined for the opposition. Bahrain then denies the report, but it sure does get you thinking... See what they did there?
  2. A report from the Danish Institute for International Studies: "Bahrain and the Global Balance of Power."
  3. Toby Matthiesen in Foreign Policy: "Saudi Arabia's Shiite Escalation."
  4. 'Abbas Bu Safwan writes in the Bahrain Mirror on ruling family politics and King Hamad's post-1999 project to unseat Khalifa bin Salman: "The King Stymies the Prime Minister in the (Constitutional) Arena."

Update: Quite clever are these new Sunni trade unionists. Not only is BLUFF now pushing for a minimum wage for Bahrainis in the private sector (as well as additional social benefits), but also for a minimum wage for skilled and unskilled EXPATRIATES. Since the new union cannot currently compete with the GFBTU in terms of membership, it seems it is reaching out to an untapped pool of potential supporters (and perhaps even members?): expats.

They've also apparently figured out that BLUFF is probably not the best English acronym to go with.

Update 2: An insightful update on the state of the National Unity Gathering by Hasan Tariq al-Hasan.

With al-Wifaq out of Parliament, Bahrain's Pro-Government Bloc Needs a New Enemy

I am preparing to leave for the annual Gulf Research Meeting in Cambridge, where I am happy to have learned recently I will sit on a panel along with Laurence Louër, whose 2008 book on transnational Shi'a politics includes some of the best insights on Bahrain in many years. I have had very good luck with conferences lately, as my most recent panel also included 'Abd al-Hadi Khalaf, whom I'd not met previously.

As I've mentioned before, I will present a paper on the politics of public-sector employment in Bahrain, while Laurence's is titled "The political dimension of the labor market reform in Bahrain." It should be quite interesting. For those interested, I have uploaded my presentation slides here.

While I don't have too much time now to write on substantive matters, a few weekend developments deserve some attention. All relate to the same issue, namely the ongoing push among Bahrain's Sunni and "independent" (i.e. pro-government tribal) MPs to remove the sitting U.S. Ambassador for his--what else?--"interference in Bahrain's internal affairs." More specifically, according to al-Asalah MP 'Abd al-Halim Murad (from Muharraq):

"He is demanding the empowerment of Al Wefaq under the guise of democracy and human rights. ... The ambassador has since his appointment been particularly active in putting pressure on Bahrain and on threatening and blackmailing the country. His meetings with the opposition do not stop and the US interference in our affairs has reached unprecedented levels."

Of course, by modern Interweb standards this story is old news. Yet coverage thus far has been superficial, and no one seems to be making the most obvious connection. A partial exception is regular Bahrain Mirror contributor 'Abbas Bu Sawfan, who offers an extended analysis (Arabic) in Thursday's al-Quds al-Arabi. The source of the anti-ambassador drive, he argues, is the royal patron of the Sunni groups in parliament, Khalid bin Ahmad. So his explanation revolves around Al Khalifa politics.

Which is perhaps true. But the more obvious observation is this: with the absence of al-Wifaq, Sunni groups in parliament have lost their raison d'être, which since 2006 has been precisely to obstruct any opposition efforts--legislative or otherwise. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that Bahrain is the only country in which the Muslim Brotherhood serves as a pro-government political faction. This is because it MUST be such if the opposition is to remain a minority in parliament.

A question--and, for the state, a problem--thus arises: if they need not concern themselves with blocking al-Wifaq, at whom exactly should (nominally) pro-government groups in parliament direct their energy? Since last fall's by-elections, the answer has been clear, with MPs assuming an increasingly confrontational stance vis-a-vis the government. They have blocked state proposals regarding the reorganization of the flagging Gulf Air; they have clashed on the streets and in parliament with (and even attempted to quiz) Bahrain's Culture Minister Sha. Mai for her purported support of "un-Islamic" events; and one Sunni opposition MP, Usama al-Tamimi, has been calling for corruption investigations into the practices of the ruling family (his business was subsequently attacked). In the second instance, the conflict was so severe that parliament was paid a visit by no less than Khalifa bin Salman, who urged "cooperation" between the legislative and executive branches.

The newfound concern among parliamentarians with the actions of the United States and its representatives in Bahrain is therefore at the very least a welcome development for the state, no longer the main focus of Sunni ire. But the main question, of course, is the nature of this shift in agenda. Pro-government movements and media have been decrying U.S. "interference" in Bahrain for more than a year, yet only now has the issue been taken up systematically by MPs. Has the sustained media onslaught finally served its purpose of encouraging popular action against Western influence (and precluding cooperation with the Shi'a and secular opposition)? Or is there more direct prodding on the part of the government--or, that is, on the part of certain members of the ruling family (which is Bu Sawfan's conclusion)?

This question becomes even more interesting when one notes the disparity between the actions of Bahrain's parliamentary blocs and other politically-active Sunni personalities. While MPs from al-Asalah and al-Manbar are busy petitioning the Foreign Ministry to convert the U.S. Embassy into a shrine to Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab, other Sunnis are reaching across the sectarian aisle to the opposition. Muhammad Al Bu Flasa, the Salafi former army officer who gained notoriety (and a 3-month detention) for his speech at the Pearl Roundabout in the early days of the uprising, has recently reappeared on the political scene. He was rearrested several weeks ago for what was called a "family dispute," and then last week requested the release of a video statement addressed "to the regime and to the people of Bahrain." (My understanding from this forum thread is that the video was actually recorded sometime in early 2011.)


Then, on Friday, Al Bu Flasa--along with outspoken opposition MP Usama al-Tamimi of 'Isa Town--visited several Shi'a villages. Al Bu Flasa turned up in a village in Sitra, while al-Tamimi went to Tubli and Nuwaidrat, the latter being the (somewhat claustrophobic) home village of al-Wafa' leader Sh. 'Abd al-Wahhab Husain. Not only did these two prominent Sunnis visit "dangerous" Shi'a villages, moreover, but they visited on the very Shi'i religious occasion of the birthday of the Mahdi. Both were received with much fanfare. (Pro-government Sunnis seem to be split. See this thread addressed "To those who criticize Al Bu Flasa.")

Al Bu Flasa apparently exiting/entering a mosque/ma'tam:


Al-Tamimi in Nuwaidrat, where he also visited a ma'tam:


Thus, as they say, is the battle for Sunni hearts and minds in Bahrain. As usual, the losers are ordinary Sunni citizens, as their MPs in parliament debate not corruption or political reform or economic revitalization but the nefarious role of Bahrain's most important Western ally (and probably the main reason why the political status quo was not qualitatively altered by the February uprising). And al-Asalah and al-Manbar wonder why they fared so poorly in the 2010 elections.

Also as usual, it will be up to charismatic Sunni activists outside the mainstream political fold--whether Ebrahim Sharif, Al Bu Flasa, al-Tamimi, or others--to see through the game of preoccupation that the state is so adept at playing. If not the Shi'a opposition, it is Iran, or the United States, that must be opposed--so long as it is not the government. In fact, anything sufficiently threatening (that is to say, an actor whose true interests are not easily discerned) will do the trick, such that it is likely that we will soon find tsunamis, earthquakes, and sharks on the list of foreign conspirators against Bahrain.


On the other hand, depending on one's view, Al Mahmud and other leaders of the new Sunni movements may have a more constructive role to play. Jane Kinninmont's recent Chatham House paper on Bahrain contained the following observation from a Sunni supporter (but not representative) of the National Unity Gathering: "We are not for the government, just temporarily allied with them" (p. 8, n26). I suppose we'll see about that.

The Downside of Bahrain's Counter-Terrorism Prowess

Bahrain: 3,017, Terrorists: 0!
By now readers will have heard of the "bomb plot" uncovered by the Interior Ministry (with dramatic video) and now being investigated with the help of a forensic team from the British Metropolitan Police. (It seems that Yates' advisory role with the Interior Ministry did not end as scheduled in April after all.) Three individuals have already been named as suspects, and anonymous "senior political officials" have told the BBC that the devices are so sophisticated that they "could not have been put together without help from outside the country"--namely from Hizballah, with whom the three suspects are purported to have trained.

In fact, however, as one contributor to the Gulf2K mailing list notes,

The "bombs...with hundreds of iron balls" sound like a standard AP device, in which (steel) ball-bearings are laid over the explosive charge to function as shrapnel. The set up has been used in suicide vests, in improvised hand-grenades, and in "claymore" type devices, whether improvised or manufactured. Such a system in itself is not indicative of any particular geographic or organisational origin.

One will observe further that the original report in the Gulf Daily News of "five tonnes of explosive materials" has since been downgraded (in the BBC story linked above) to "over 100kg," a difference of merely 1.5 orders of magnitude (~45 times). So more or less the same.

Yet, media exaggerations aside, the more general difficulty in knowing what to make of Bahrain's newest foiled terrorist plot is that the country may well be the historical origin behind Aesop's "The Boy Who Cried Wolf." (Which would vindicate Sunni claims of being the original inhabitants of the island!) When every activity of the unregistered opposition or trip to Lebanon by someone linked to Shi'a groups--to say nothing of the February uprising--is a new terrorist scheme, who can blame observers for being skeptical when the Interior Ministry insists, "No, srsly, this time it's a real plot we even have a video LOL!!1"

On the other hand, could one really be surprised if after 18 months of political stalemate and little hope for a breakthrough individuals would begin to turn to more radical alternatives in order to get the state's attention? Indeed, already in April 2011 Hussein Ibish wrote a Foreign Policy article asking, "Is Bahrain Creating a New Terrorist Threat?" Since then, few in Bahrain have escaped involvement in the turmoil either directly or indirectly via family and friends. At the same time, Bahrain's political factions have undergone marked polarization, with many in the opposition oriented not only against the government, but also against the state's Sunni and Western supporters. On the other hand, Sunni movements continue to decry the Iranian-backed opposition as well as Western (i.e., British and especially U.S.) meddling, and this has been actively encouraged by none other than ranking government officials such as Defense Minister Khalifa bin Ahmad.

The signs indeed are not encouraging:

"My blood is at your command, Sh. 'Ali Salman."

"Muhammad Al Mahmud: WANTED: alive not dead"
for spreading sectarianism, etc.


"The Sunni Lions" with al-Qa'ida-style flag

The main question for the Metropolitan Police, then, will be not simply who is behind the alleged plot, but at whom it was aimed. Given the recent escalation in anti-Western rhetoric, one wouldn't be surprised to find that its target was not the regime in Bahrain but some other government.

Whatever the case, having already denounced the plot and those involved, al-Wifaq plans to continue on this Friday with its weekly "The People Won't Retreat" protest marches; while its opponents have seized on the story to redouble calls for a crackdown on its "promotion of violence." Writing in Al-Watan (which seems to have removed its English-language site, sorry), al-Zayani tells that as the government is busy talking of dialogue, the opposition plots against it with impunity:

When 'Ali Salman says [see here for background], "We didn't use 50% of our power," is this the peacefulness he alleges and that the state believes? This is a clear threat of terrorism and the use of violence, and it's not the first. So with whom are they dialoguing? We all know what he wants Bahrain to become, and we all know the plan called the terrorism of February 14th, which is the seizure of the entire Bahraini state. And perhaps ['Ali Salman] will do with the people of Bahrain what Bashar is doing to his people, as they are of the same thinking and of the same sectarian tendencies. We all know the plan, but we lie to ourselves and say "dialogue." And we say a lot of things, but we know within ourselves that the question isn't of "reform," or of "democracy," but of an obsessive, exclusionary sectarian project.

To our dear brothers in the Ministry of Justice, [the minister of justice] said a while back that there will be accountability for and control over any provocative voice coming from the pulpit, and certainly this statement came after the king's talk before the Council of Ministers. But allow us brothers in the Ministry of Justice, and allow us Mr. Minister, Minister of Justice, [to say] that what we see and what we are witnessing is not the case. Talk in the press is one thing, and practice is something else. Stop all the voices of incitement from any party whatsoever--this is what we ask, to apply the law to everyone. But your ministry [has] applied [it] in one direction only, and is unable to apply the law to others, and this is disaster. Give us one example, Ministry of Justice, of any arrest [of] the instigators at the pulpits? Or do you even to this day still not hear [their] voices?"

Update: The Metropolitan Police have released the following photo of the suspected terrorist plotters. Can you help identify these individuals? Please write in!

A Conversation with Emile Nakhleh on Al Khalifa Family Dynamics

Two posts ago I linked to an article by Emile Nakhleh titled "Bahrain Repression Belies Government Stand on Dialogue." Nakhleh--a fellow former Fulbright to Bahrain; author of a recently-reissued book on the country; and frequent writer on Middle East politics--argues in short (and as he has previously) that that it is Khalifa bin Salman who is responsible not only for derailing attempts to exit the current crisis, but more generally for undermining the cause of democracy (or at least liberalization) in Bahrain since independence. Accordingly, he suggests American diplomats strengthen the prime minister's competitors within the ruling family so as to marginalize his deleterious influence on any future dialogue initiative.

Having communicated with him previously, I wrote Nakhleh in response to the article, asking in particular whether he might not have omitted an important player in the game of Al Khalifa politics, namely the Royal Court and Defense Ministers (i.e., the khawalid). What followed was a lengthy back-and-forth that included many insightful details based on Nakhleh's first-hand familiarity with many of the personalities involved owing not least to his time--15 years--with the CIA. The conversation for me proved so interesting, in fact, that I thought I would post it here (with his permission of course). Indeed, if there continues to be a lack of dialogue among the political forces in Bahrain, at least we may have a dialogue about the political forces in Bahrain.

Before this, however, some news-related housekeeping is in order. This Friday will see the crescendo of a week's worth of mass rallies organized by the five main (legal) opposition societies, including Wa'ad, al-Wifaq, and some others that don't matter so much. The slogan, "We won't leave the streets [literally, the squares]," is announced in a pretty flier that looks like it might be for an Apple product:


The rally is in fact a march beginning at 5:00pm from the Shakhura Roundabout to the Saar Roundabout, i.e. a good way down al-Budaiyi' Road. As Faysal al-Shaykh noted in the Al-Watan column I posted yesterday, "we will wait and see" as to the state's response to the rally given recent warnings directed at 'Isa Qasim about using Friday sermons to "incite" violence and political action. (Someone, apparently, has responded. Al-Wifaq reported on Tuesday that a hawza in Muharraq was attacked by "civilian militias." Recall that Muharraq was also the sight of clashes in December between 'Ashura' procession-goers and members of 'Adel Flaifel's "Military Society.")

Just in case Bahrain needs some additional encouragement to act, pro-government groups will hold their own counter-rally on Saturday in Muharraq and in al-Hinayniyya (i.e., al-Rifa'). Rather than at opposition terrorists, however, this is directed at "the influence of the U.S., British, etc.," according to organizers. (Sadly there is no flier, which raises serious questions about the latter's commitment.) More interesting still is that this "طوق القادسية," as it's being dubbed, was prompted explicitly (again, according to the announcement) by the exhortations of "writers in daily newspapers"--chief among them, presumably, Al-Watan. So yet another good reason for our Al-Watan Wednesday.

Combined with recent opposition protests outside the naval base in Juffair, then, the U.S. continues to get it from both sides--from Shi'a upset about continued American support for the government; and from Sunnis upset about continued American influence on government decisions. And here I thought preserving the political status quo in Bahrain was supposed to serve U.S. national interests.

With this as a perhaps off-topic introduction, I reproduce below my conversation with Emile Nakhleh. I hope readers find it interesting and/or useful.

Update: Going for the all-time intramural GCC co-ed record, Bahrain has foiled yet another terrorist plot. How can we be sure? Well the Interior Ministry blows stuff up in a video (see the last 2:00). Obviously. Interestingly, it seems that it is a rule of explosives detonation that the phrase "Fire in the hole!" be said only in English.

---

A Conservation with Emile Nakhleh on Al Khalifa Dynamics

JG:

I wanted to write to say that I enjoyed your latest piece on the renewed hopes of dialogue in Bahrain for the Lobelog. I wonder, though, given your emphasis on Khalifa bin Salman, where you see the khawalid (Khalifa and Khalid bin Ahmad) in all of this? Even if the king and CP have been marginalized in the post-February period, surely the Royal Court and especially the Field Marshal have grown in stature. Do you not see them as an independent force within the ruling family?

I think this question is especially important now as the Saudi case serves to raise the issue of succession after the PM is finally gone. Obviously he backs (and you suggest the U.S. back) Muhammad bin Mubarak as his eventual successor; but the khawalid have their own rival candidate in Khalid bin 'Abdallah. If another from among the khawalid were to gain the premiership, they would then control that position along with the military and Royal Court--no small fact.

EN:

I knew Abdallah, Khalid's father, back in the early 70s and had frequent discussions with him. I believe he was the Minister of Justice at the time. He, like the PM, opposed the opposition’s demands for reform and in fact objected to the whole move toward a constitution and a National Assembly. He was very fond of Bahrain's heritage and culture and thought any reform that would limit the power of the family would not be good for Bahrain. When he would talk about Dilmun and the early inhabitants of the island, he conveniently forgot that al-Khalifa conquered the island only 200 plus years back!

I don't believe the PM would designate his deputy Shaykh Muhammad as his successor without making sure he has the Khawalids and other Khalifas on his side. I'm not even sure he would necessarily support Shaykh Muhammad. The old guard within the family never really trusted him—they viewed back then as ambitious and reformist. Besides, Some of them privately even mentioned his non-Khalifa mother.

I agree with the view that the Saudis would play a role in the succession to Khalifa. The interesting analytic question is what impact the Saudi intervention in the internal affairs of the family will have on the on-going friction among the different centers of power within the royals. I am sure Shaykh Muhammad, as he did in the past, will try to stay above the fray. That's how he survived on the inside track!

If the King loses the succession fight, Khalid bin Ahmed and Khalifa bin Ahmed (Royal Court and the Field Marshal) will likely dominate the scene with Saudi blessings and support. If this happens, I'm not sure they will be satisfied with keeping Hamad as a figurehead king or Salman as CP. I certainly expect the growing tensions within the ruling family to become more public and the in fighting more ugly. Perhaps for the sake of family survival, cooler heads would prevail.

In the meantime, violence continues and the ruling family does not have the luxury of time despite their sophisticated and rapid response PR. For example, the PM office responded to my previous op-ed in the FT in less than 24 hours with an op-ed that was published in the same newspaper the following day! Most people who follow Bahrain in Washington have come to believe that if serious dialogue were to occur, the King and his son should be involved and that the PM would not be a credible participant. The deputy PM could be a bridge between the old guard, the reformist faction, and the opposition.

JG:

I much enjoyed hearing your first-hand knowledge of some of the personalities involved.

As for Khalid's father 'Abdallah, from what I've heard his son seems to be of a like mind: opposed to reforms (and especially concessions to the Shi'a) on *ideological* rather than pragmatic political grounds. This seems to be a theme among the khawalid, a fact I have explored in a longish article I finished a month or so ago titled "The Securitization of 'the Shi'a Problem' in Bahrain."

As for your larger point regarding Khalifa's successor, who then do you see as a viable alternative to Muhammad? Not his son, presumably, who by all accounts sounds unliked and barely competent. And Khalifa must know that by choosing a weak candidate he is essentially ceding his position to the khawalid. Or do you believe that the latter is a more appealing alternative from the PM's point of view--i.e., better to leave the country in the hands of the Royal Court and military (with the implicit backing of Saudi) than an indecisive nephew and his upstart son (with the implicit backing of the U.S.)?

The main argument of my aforementioned article is that, as intellectually unappealing as it might be, the present conflict in Bahrain is at bottom a case of intra-familial competition, and little can be resolved on the ground until this works itself out--or until someone helps work it out. (Although I think I am less sanguine than you about the U.S.'s direct influence here. This business of "improving the position of the Crown Prince" through visits to DC and some spare helicopter parts is laughable. Better to pressure the Saudis to intervene I would say.) More and more, I think this interpretation is correct.

EN:

Tensions within the family are not new; they go back to the early days right after independence. To illustrate, when British diplomats in Bahrain reported to the Home Office on my book back in 1976, the point they found most "amusing" was my discussion of the internal tensions within the ruling family. The main point of the book they thought, according to declassified British diplomatic correspondence, was my "analysis of the first national elections to the constituent Assembly in 1972." (See Ali Rabi'a's book al-Tajriba al-Maw'uda: al-Haya al-Dimoqratiyya fi al-Bahrain, 2010, pp.338+).

I don’t think Muhammad's son will be seriously considered for the PM position. I think the tension will be between Khalifa and his nephew Hamad. If Khalifa loses, which is a distinct possibility, I won't be surprised to see Hamad appoint his son the CP as the PM. Precedents of such an appointment are all around them in the neighboring emirates, including in Saudi Arabia. If such an appointment occurs, the Royal Court and the Military would be held in check. The King could also appoint Muhammad (presumably as an interim) to provide continuity and even gravitas. I imagine this path would ultimately lead to Salman taking over the PM slot, while of course remaining the CP. The familial old-age respect, which Hamad has accorded his uncle, would not necessarily extend to the Khawalids or other Khalifas, especially if they don't support the King. If some sort of union occurs between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in the short-term, which I doubt, it would be a sign that Khalifa has maintained the upper hand within the family. If the King and some of his supporters push back on the unification scheme and succeed, he will end up on top.

Now that Nayef is gone, Khalifa has lost a major supporter within the Saudi powerful hierarchy. I don't think Salman ibn Abd al-Aziz (new CP) or Ali ibn Abd al-Aziz (new MoI) have the same ideological affinity toward Khalifa or are as invested in having Bahrain become another "province" of Saudi Arabia. Since they are not as viscerally opposed to reform domestically, and hence tend to be closer to King Abdallah's position, they might not be as opposed to some sort of reform in Bahrain. Perhaps this is wishful thinking.

I also don't think it's all that "laughable" to raise Salman's profile through visits to Washington. Much to my disappointment, the administration seems to play a very cautious game vis a vis Bahrain--presumably because of Saudi Arabia. Since the "Arab Spring" started, Washington was always focused on who is the most appropriate interlocutor in whatever country. Unfortunately, Bahrain is no exception. I've been arguing with my friends inside and outside the government that we must take a more forceful position toward Khalifa and his policies, for fear of terrorism against our presence in that country. What concerns me is that more and activists within the Bahraini opposition, including some of Khalifa’s strong Sunni supporters, are beginning to blame the US for perceived collusion with al-Khalifa. If Washington decides to push for genuine reform and meaningful dialogue in Bahrain, it can do it on its own without the urgent need for Saudi support. Riyadh would still be needed, however, to provide a cover.

JG:

Interesting your suggestion that Bahrain might preform a reverse Kuwait maneuver--combine the CP and PM for reasons of political expediency rather than split the roles. I suppose the CP does already have some experience in running a (shadow) cabinet, i.e. the EDB. Do you see the Khalifa - Hamad struggle as likely to come to a head before the former's eventual passing? or is the present situation sustainable if obviously destabilizing?

I suppose the GCC meeting in December will be useful is demonstrating the extent to which Saudi-Bahrain union remains on the list of priorities following the death of Nayf. On the other hand, it may complicate one's interpretation of the intra-Al Khalifa struggle insofar as the initiative's failure (assuming as I do that it will fail) may leave open two possibilities: that it failed because the King succeeded in obstructing Khalifa; or because the Saudis lost interest. Perhaps either alternative would strike a blow to the PM, but the internal situation could remain ambiguous.

EN:

As long as the situation is sustainable, the family will try to keep the internal struggle under wraps; they loathe airing their dirty laundry in public. However, if street confrontations escalate and repressive reaction becomes more noticeable internationally and more damaging to business and the economy, the King will come under more pressure, especially from respected members of the Sunni community, especially business people, and mainstream Shia families, to contain the situation and initiate meaningful dialogue to resolve the impasse. If the King responds positively to such pressure and begins to explore avenues for dialogue, Salman would re-emerge as a principal player. Khalifa's stature would then suffer. Unfortunately for Khalifa, the Bahraini situation is not a purely internal matter; international actors—including the US, Saudi Arabia, etc.—would have a stake in the outcome and therefore might push harder for dialogue. Most people don't expect the PM to be a key participant in the envisioned dialogue.

Announcing: Al-Watan Wednesdays

A recent Al-Watan article quotes al-Asalah MP 'Abd al-Halim Murad: "[U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain Thomas] Krajeski is either a Wifaqi or the ambassador for Tehran!"

Now that I've finished with several recent writing commitments and have a bit more time to spend updating here, I thought it would be nice to begin the summer vacation by introducing a new segment I like to call "Al-Watan Wednesday." This will be, as you might imagine, a weekly article from the Arabic-language Bahraini daily Al-Watan, which in addition to being a veritable mouthpiece of the Royal Court is more generally serious business whether in print or Internet form. In the words of a bad local rap group from near my hometown that weirdos in high school used to listen to, Al-Watan "is dominated, but never imitated; though others perpetrate it, but still we regulate it." Yea, that's right.

In fact, the timing of this new segment is fortuitous. For it has been recently reported that soon to be announced as new editor-in-chief of the newspaper is none other than long-time friend of the blog and current Al-Watan anti-American extraordinaire Yusif Al Bin Khalil. For the uninitiated, Al Bin Khalil is perhaps best known for his month-long series last summer "Ayatollah Obama and Bahrain," whose cogency was matched only by its subtlety. Eventually, the U.S. Embassy grew tired of the bit and pressured Bahrain's media authority to put an end to the articles, but not before Ayatollah Obama's nefarious plan to Shi'atize Bahrain was made bare for all to see.

So congrats, then, to Yusif Al Bin Khalil. The U.S. should be pleased to know what the Royal Court of its "staunchest Gulf ally" thinks of it. (Hint: see the article at the top of the post.)

Of course, one might therefore ask why I should choose to give any attention--much less an entire day of the week--to Al-Watan and its decidedly one-sided pseudo-journalism. Actually the reasons are many:

1. Al-Watan exemplifies the phrase "It'd be funny if it weren't so sad." And often in its coverage the funny is so strong as to overshadow the sad, which is no small thing. As one of the main principles of this site is not to take itself too seriously, Al-Watan is a kindred spirit insofar as one suspects that, deep down, its writers cannot take themselves too seriously either. (On the other hand, the site's post-uprising English-language version of the website is premised clearly on the idea that if only Western audiences had linguistic access to its insights, surely they would become converts to the Royal Court's position.)


2. Better than any other publication, Al-Watan reflects the views of a particular faction in Bahraini politics whose stature and importance continues to augment in the post-uprising period. This is, broadly speaking, that of the Royal Court and by association Defense Minister Field Marshal Khalifa bin Ahmad, brother of Royal Court Minister Khalid bin Ahmad (known together as the khawalid).
   


3. Further, to the extent that the khawalid are also seen as backing at least in part Sunni political groups--including both established societies as well as the new, post-February movements--Al-Watan also offers insights into the political demands and arguments of Bahraini Sunnis. The regular columnist Hisham al-Zayani is a clear partisan of Sahwat al-Fatih, for example, while Faysal al-Shaykh often writes from the perspective of the National Unity Gathering.
   


4. Finally, since the paper's soon-to-be editor-in-chief Al Bin Khalil recently became a follower of this site, it's perhaps only fair that we reciprocate:
   
   

Now some sixteen months removed from February 2011, it should be clear the prospects for genuine political change in Bahrain are and will be determined not by the traditional Shi'a and secular opposition but by the posture adopted by ordinary Sunni citizens. If fear of association with or manipulation by the Shi'a-led opposition continues to dissuade average Sunnis from being forceful in their political demands, then the state has little cause for worry. Only if Sunnis overcome their phobia of being made tools of Iran will Bahrain achieve the type of cross-societal popular pressure necessary to force the ruling family's hand.

With this in mind I conclude with the today's Al-Watan article, a reply by Faysal al-Shaykh to King Hamad's forceful cabinet speech of two days ago in which, inter alia, he reaffirmed the state's commitment to political reform as represented in the 2001 National Action Charter; rejected foreign mediation of the present political conflict; repeated the warning to al-Wifaq and 'Isa Qasim over the latter's alleged promotion of violence via sermons; and so on. In "The messages of Hamad bin Isa and our message to His Majesty,"* Faysal al-Shaykh responds to each of the king's main points by noting the contradiction between these stated goals and the government's actions heretofore in practice. He writes,

On Monday, June 25, 2012, His Majesty the king addressed many clear and direct messages when he presided over the cabinet meeting yesterday with His Highness the Prime Minister sitting on his right. His Majesty’s messages are supposed to shed light on the aspects of the coming phase and be taken as a framework of action by state institutions. What we listened to was not a common speech as it bears between its lines key issues that echo the wishes and demands of loyal citizens at this critical juncture in Bahrain’s history. ...

The first message was addressed to the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs and Endowments urging it to prevent the misuse of religious rostrums and take more rigorous measures to preserve its sublime mission. This leads us to wonder about the measures that need to be taken in the future against those who exploit religious platforms to incite people’s hatred of the state and disgust against members of other sects. We stress the need for such measures because we have already witnessed a certain inadequacy and laxity in dealing with those who used religious rostrums to fight the state and polarize society. We saw no measures taken against those who incited murder and issued calls to crush security men. Today, concerned state institutions bear a heavier responsibility to adequately respond to the calls of loyal citizens and civil society institutions especially after His Majesty the king, himself, commands them to enforce the law. Till next Friday, which has turned into a day of incitement, we will wait and see. ...

Finally, it mustn’t elude us to highlight His Majesty’s emphasis on citizens’ welfare, which is the ultimate goal of reform and development. His Majesty stressed the need for the government to do its utmost in this regard. He also urged the legislative power to play a more effective role by constantly cooperating with the executive power. As we stress the need to place citizens’ welfare on top of all priorities, we would also like to convey low-income and ordinary people’s messages directly to His Majesty the king concerning many unresolved issues and worries such as the housing problem and the rising cost of living.

People need more facilities and services which can be achieved when officials fulfill their duties appropriately, come in close contact with people and keep abreast their worries. Unfortunately, despite the clear and constant directives of His Majesty and His Highness the Prime Minister to officials to open their doors to citizens, some of them still obstruct people’s access to their doors. Such officials are the real setback to development and the achievement of citizens’ interests. Therefore, we still need to appoint the right persons in the right places.

In response to His Majesty’s optimistic and promising address which asserts the leadership’s constancy in defending Bahrain, we stress the unaffected and undiminished loyalty of faithful citizens to their land and leadership. We assert that this relationship is based on mutual trust, candidness, constructive criticism and true love away from hypocrisy and hollow flattery.

*Note in following links to Al-Watan that its English-language website is currently undergoing some sort of horrible reconstruction and may or may not require Netscape Communicator 5.0 to render properly.

Are Bahrain's Sunnis Still Awake?

In case you couldn't tell from the huge graphic, I have a new article in Carnegie's Sada blog that revisits the subject of Bahrain's "Sunni awakening," which I wrote about in January. In short, the piece tells why we may soon finally learn the nature of the country's post-February Sunni movements--specifically, the National Unity Gathering and the al-Fatih Awakening--as a result of a (rumored) new push for government-opposition dialogue. Yet, whether or not one believes that fresh talks are imminent (a prospect made perhaps more faint following 'Ali Salman's being shot on Friday and the king's cabinet speech yesterday), the larger point remains: only if Bahrain's new Sunni groups remain insistent upon a seat at the political negotiating table--as they were in March--can we conclude that they represent something new and independent of the state. And it is only this insistence, moreover, that can bring to bear the pressure required to push Bahrain toward genuine political change.

The full article is here. The Arabic version is here.

Update: Sunni internet forums are abuzz with news of the re-arrest of Muhammad Al Bu Flasa, the Salafi former army officer made famous for his address at the late Pearl Roundabout at which he urged sectarian political cooperation. Yesterday's detention stemmed reportedly from a "family dispute" relating to his political activities. Apparently his wife's family is not a huge supporter of the Sunni awakening.

Update 2: Also, unrelated funny graphics:


February uprising alternative ending


Khalifa bin Salman: "I wish you to rid me of all the Baharna!"
Genie: "Man, I told you! I'm a genie not a government thug [baltaji]!
Update 3: Emile Nakhleh: "Bahrain Repression Belies Government Stand on Dialogue."

Update 4: I've just come across the website of the National Unity Gathering, which judging by pro-government forum comments must be fairly new. For those interested, it includes sections detailing the groups "Principles," "Aims," "Political Platform," and so on.