Why Bahrain's Sunni Political Societies Are Unpopular—Among Sunnis

Naïve as I am, I was waiting to post here until the much-awaited verdict in the civilian retrial of Bahrain's main opposition leaders, scheduled for today. For some reason I had forgotten that the criminal justice system in Bahrain moves above all according to political expediency. Thus, at a time when rumors of yet another "new political dialogue" are rife, and when Bahrainis are waiting in anticipation of what King Hamad might reveal about this in his upcoming Ramadan/National Day address, it is perhaps no surprise that the sure-to-be-polarizing court decision was postponed until September 4. Remember the month-long postponement of the BICI's final report? (Also, announcing prison sentences for the country's political opposition on the eve of National Day is probably not the best idea.)

Of course, as the opposition has already scheduled rallies across the island today to coincide with the announcement, I suppose that demonstrators will have to be content to protest the postponement of the trial rather than the outcome itself. (NBC News' "Photo Blog" records some scenes from protests earlier this week.) Which is too bad because the February 14 folks had some really nice electronic fliers to mark the occasion:


Also:


With no news about the fate of the opposition leaders, then, the real story of the past week in Bahrain is a rather odd series of developments around the issue of religious tolerance. First, following other recent blasphemy cases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, a Bahraini blogger was sentenced to two years in prison for "insulting a religious icon," namely the prophet's wife Aisha. In fact, it sounds like this "blogger" was actually just a plain old Internet troll. A report in the Gulf News tells that he "often entered specific sites to insult Prophet Mohammad’s (PBUH) companions and wife." Evidently Bahrain's Internet police have not visited the forums of opposition and pro-government activists lately. That's probably a good thing, as the judicial system already suffers from chronic delays as it is.

One current thread on the main Sunni board asks, "Have the Jews become more merciful than the Shi'a?" Evidently a group of "moderate Jews" in the U.S. has allowed Sunnis to pray in a synagogue when their own mosque was full. By comparison, the author writes, "The Shi'a issue fatwas to kill Sunnis, in revenge for [the martyrdom of] Hussain, as they unjustly claim. So have the Jews really become more merciful than the Shi'a with respect to Sunnis?" So the poster succeeds in insulting at least two different religions--the Shi'a, for being terrorist murderers, and the Jews, for being arguably "less merciful" even than the Shi'a.

So as not to leave out Christians from the discussion, we move on to the next item on the topic of religious tolerance in Bahrain (and indeed in the wider Gulf). A few days ago, the Catholic Church announced that it is relocating its Gulf vicariate from Kuwait to Bahrain, ostensibly because "the country’s location is more accessible for meetings." It might also have to do with the fact that "King [Hamad] and royal family have granted 9,000 square meters of land, which will be used to build a larger church in Awali and to host the vicariate’s apostolic headquarters." For its part, Bahrain can now, as it already did on August 7, point to the vicariate “as a testament to the Kingdom’s religious and cultural openness.”

Moreover, the move might also have something to do with the fact that a Kuwaiti Salafi MP, Usama al-Munawir, announced his intention to submit a bill that would ban non-Muslim places of worship in the country. After facing criticism, he graciously "moderated" his plan to include only a ban on the construction of NEW non-Muslim places of worship. What tolerance!

Not to be outdone, and fresh off his liaison with fellow Salafis in the Free Syrian Army, president of al-Asalah and head of Bahrain's Parliamentary Committee on U.S. Hatred 'Abd al-Halim Murad has expressed his objections to the new church. Posting once again on Twitter--someone seriously needs to tell him to stop using Twitter--he said, inter alia, that "the 'ulama' agree that the building of churches in Muslim countries is haram"; that "the Arabian Peninsula is the domain of Muslims and churches may not be built in it"; and "the Arabian Peninsula is the cradle of Islam, and the sound of church bells cannot drown out the call to prayer." (The Manama Voice has a longer article here.)


Murad insists that al-Asalah will bring up the matter in parliament. Of course, objections of this sort from Bahrain's Sunni societies are not new. It was only recently that they clashed openly in parliament with Minister of Culture Shaikha Mai for her (what they deemed) overly-provocative "summer of culture" festival. Previous initiatives have centered around the banning of alcohol, crackdowns on prostitution, and of course the infamous Arab Big Brother television program that was filmed in Bahrain for only a short time in 2004 before being forced off the air due to public outcry.

In this case, however, the object of criticism would seem to be much more innocuous. In the first place, the location of the new church, 'Awali, is essentially a gated expatriate compound in the far south of the island (or, rather, as far south as you can go before hitting military fences). Absent the announcement, chances are no one would even have known the church was there, especially someone who lives on the opposite end of ANY ENTIRELY DIFFERENT ISLAND (Muharraq), as Murad does. Further, given that Murad just returned from Syria, a country notable for its until-now peaceful coexistence of Jews, Christians, 'Alawis, Sunnis, Druze, etc., it seems that he somehow left with the opposite lesson. Perhaps his friends in the Syrian Free Army wish to ban churches in Syria too?

Whatever the case, Bahrain's Internet tricksters are having a bit of fun with the faux controversy, as seen in the graphic at the top of this post depicting what appear to be Latvian Orthodox incarnations of Al Mahmud, Muhammad Khalid, Jasim al-Sa'idi, and 'Adal al-Ma'wadah.


Neither does King Hamad escape the photoshop treatment. Apparently some citizens predict that Bahrain's "commitment to cultural and religious openness" will soon extend to Tibetan Buddhism as well. This could make for an interesting situation, as it would likely spur criticism from the Chinese, from whose "interference" the Saudis would then need to defend Bahrain. So 2013: the year of the Sino-Saudi-Irano conflict?


The political analyst in me might be tempted to say that al-Asalah's recent expressions of religious intolerance--and threats to bring the matter into parliament--are somehow connected to the country's changing political dynamics. Perhaps the relative empowerment of Sunni groups in the post-February 14 period has afforded Murad and others greater independence from the state. In the end, however, al-Asalah's latest publicity stunt demonstrates only that Bahrain's formal political parties continue to do a poor job of representing ordinary Sunni citizens, the vast majority of whom I am confident have more pressing policy goals than the blocking of new churches--ending corruption, socioeconomic inequality, and unsustainable immigration policy, for starters. Is it any wonder why both al-Asalah and al-Manbar performed so badly in the 2010 elections?

At a time when most Bahrainis are eagerly awaiting King Hamad's annual Ramadan address for some sign of substantive political progress, Salafi MPs are waging political war on "deviant" religions in Bahrain, and physical war in other countries altogether. If such are its priorities, perhaps the group might do Bahrain the favor of recusing itself from any upcoming political dialogue, and leave the difficult task of social and political rebuilding to those sincerely interested in tackling it.

Update: So much for a dramatic announcement in the king's Ramadan/National Day speech (BNA summary). Quite far from it, as the biggest substantive discussions involved the OIC summit in Mecca, the Palestinian issue, which "is the central issue for joint Islamic action," and ending the violence in Syria. Strangely missing from this discussion of political action and crises elsewhere, then, was discussion of political progress in Bahrain apart from vague references to the importance of "dialogue." Video with English subtitles:


Update 2: An interesting story from Computer World oddly related to all this: al-Asalah's Salafi friends in Saudi Arabia are objecting to the creation of a variety of new specialized top-level domains (TLDs) for the Internet, including .gay, .wine, .porn, .sexy, .bar., and, wait for it, .bible. Their objection is quite odd, since it would be FAR easier to block content at the *.gay or *.bible level than to block millions of .com hosts serving up objectionable material.

Update 3: In light of the three-year prison sentence handed BCHR head Nabeel Rajab yesterday, perhaps we now know the reason for the postponement of sentencing for the rest of the opposition leaders. Namely, there is only so much bad news Bahrain wishes to give at one time. This New York Times article offers a fine summary of the case and, more usefully, connects the decision to King Hamad's recent Ramadan address. Unfortunately, Bahrain's "reformist" king is beginning to sound eerily like his uncle:

Mr. Jishi noted that representatives of several foreign governments, including the United States, were in the courtroom when the verdict was read. “They are sending a message,” Mr. Jishi said of the government, adding that a speech given by the country’s king earlier in the week — in which the monarch spoke of a duty to “protect peaceful, good-natured citizens who do not seek to usurp power” — reinforced the message. ...

In his address to the nation two days ago, the king again suggested that the protests in Bahrain were part of a foreign plot. "The kingdom of Bahrain has always remained throughout the ages a coveted place for the greedy, however, our people knew how to persistently tackle the enemy and to unite their ranks, consolidate their discourse and allegiance to the ruler and crush the ambitions of foes," he said.

The monarch added: "We have had to endure this year through challenging conditions due to hostile ambitions and foreign intervention which are yet to cease. We stood as united front in the face of strife mongers. We faced them with determination and persistent willpower as our duty and responsibility makes it imperative to defend this homeland, we will maintain our national unity and protect Bahraini people."

Update 4: Ken Katzman of the U.S. Congressional Research Service writes in Open Democracy on (the distinct lack of) "Security Sector Reform in Bahrain."

Bahraini Salafis Fighting the Infidels Wherever They Find Them

Murad (#2) showing up the Syrians with his ironically-long hipster beard
With the 2014 parliamentary elections a mere 28 months away, Bahrain's Salafi bloc al-Asalah is making a strong push for the hearts and minds of the country's God-fearing (and Shi'a-hating) citizens. Looking to improve on its disappointing performance in 2010, al-Asalah has adopted the Obama strategy of campaigning outside of your home country. Then-candidate Obama delivered rousing speeches in Berlin, London, and other capitals; al-Asalah is in Syria hanging out with the Free Syrian Army.

The above photo was posted to Twitter "from inside Syria" by two-term MP 'Abd al-Halim Murad, showing the latter along with al-Asalah's former head Sh. 'Adal al-Ma'awdah and current deputy Hamad al-Muhannadi. All are shown posing and breaking bread with rebel fighters.


More notable than this, however, is the language Murad uses (again on Twitter) to describe visit, which he says is in support of "the falcons of al-Sham [i.e., either the Levant or Damascus itself]" against "the hated Safavids" [i.e., Shi'a]:


The irony here hardly needs pointing out: al-Asalah, which has spent the last 18 months complaining of foreign interference in Bahrain's affairs, and of al-Wifaq's supposed collaboration with Shi'a groups abroad, is now openly--indeed proudly--involving itself in another country's political-military conflict in collaboration with co-sectarians. After campaigning to have al-Wifaq disbanded for violating Bahrain's Political Societies Law, which bars society members from also being affiliated with any "foreign organization," the bloc is now seemingly treading this same line itself.

The even greater irony, if such is possible, is that both al-Asalah in general and Murad in particular have turned their attention more recently to the political "interference" of the United States, especially via its double agents at Embassy Manama. One will recall, for instance, this photo from less than two months ago, captioned (in Al-Watan) with Murad's accusation in parliament: "[The U.S. ambassador to Bahrain] is either a Wifaqi or the ambassador for Tehran!"


Except, wait: who is it again that, according to a recent New York Times headline, is "focused on forcibly toppling the Syrian government," including via "increasing aid to the rebels and redoubling efforts to rally a coalition of like-minded countries?" That would be the United States. I'm afraid that for his next outburst in parliament Murad is going to need a larger sign, one big enough to fit the qualification: "Ambassador: Leave Us Alone (unless we're talking about Syria in which case it's fine but seriously stay out of Bahrain)."


On the other hand, all of this cross-border cooperation between Gulf Sunni Islamists in the wake of the Arab Spring should be fodder for an interesting research project for someone who wishes to undertake it--a sort of Sunni companion to Louer's Transnational Shia Politics. In the Bahraini case I am thinking, e.g., of Kuwaiti professor 'Abdallah al-Nafisi's address at a Sahwat al-Fatih rally during the February 14th anniversary festivities in 2012. But see also Kristian Ulrichsen's article yesterday on the recent crackdown undertaken in the United Arab Emirates, where it is not transnational Salafism but the Muslim Brotherhood that poses a challenge to the state.

Update: My sources inside Syria can neither confirm nor deny that al-Asalah's presence in the country precipitated the defection today of the Syrian prime minister.

Update 2: CNN Arabic has picked up this story in an article titled "Manama: Controversy Following Bahraini MPs' Visit to Syria." It lists a fourth individual--Faysal al-Gharir--as another al-Asalah member who made the trip. Aside from that, I had also forgotten that al-Ma'wadah is the current vice president of parliament, which the article notes. Probably not the best role model for Bahrain's budding democrats.

Update 3: The government finally speaks, though says little. A BNA statement:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the entry by a number of Bahraini members of Parliament (MPs) to Syrian territories had taken place without any prior knowledge or coordination with the Ministry and without their having submitted any application for permission nor informing the Ministry ahead of that visit.

And emanating from the Kingdom of Bahrain's keenness on the safety of all Bahraini citizens abroad, the Ministry urged all citizens and officials in the Kingdom to avoid travelling to armed conflict zones and to take the necessary precautionary measures to ensure their physical safety which is of paramount importance to the Kingdom's Government.

Which boils down to: "Next time, let us know--and stay safe!" What, no Ministry of Justice investigation into al-Asalah? Shocker!

Update 4: In a public lecture in Hamad Town, 'Adal Ma'awdah tells of his harrowing exploits with the Free Syrian Army, including the time they ate lunch together, and posed for a photo together, and that other time they posed for a photo while eating lunch:



Update 5: Bam! Three months later, The Washington Post slams the U.S.'s entire Crown Prince Salman resuscitation strategy in Bahrain.

Update 6: Syrian state television has picked up on the Bahraini MP story, airing a 2 1/2-minute segment titled "Al Khalifa Terrorism in Syria":

Bahrain Understands the Need for Further (Police) Reforms

All in all, it's a pretty good time to be the Bahraini royal family. In the past 18 months, it's successfully defended itself against one Irano-American coup (the uprising), one Saudi coup (GCC union), and, though somewhat less successfully, one internal coup (compliments of Khalifa bin Salman and the khawalid). Moreover, as seen from the graph above, the government has also been relatively successful in defending against undue media attention, though much of this is a result of competing storylines elsewhere in the region.

Thanks to Google, we can see that at only one time in the previous year has Bahrain (almost) stolen attention away from Syria and Iran (to say nothing of Egypt, which I couldn't even include here because it obscured the other results), namely during April's Formula 1 race. Since then, Bahrain has faded both from Google searches and more markedly from news reference volume (the lower half of the graph). Civil war in Syria and prospects of war with Iran are, I suppose, rather more interesting--and, more to the point, more likely to generate ad revenue.

The picture since the beginning of 2011 is even more revealing. Interest in Bahrain spiked, obviously, in February and March, and since then has largely been on par (in terms of Google searches) with Syria. Iran is of course far ahead. More notable, though, is the bottom half of the graph. Although overall INTEREST in Bahrain (as measured by searches) has remained more or less equal with that in Syria, its volume of NEWS COVERAGE has been considerably less save for, again, during the Formula 1. Even the release of the BICI report at the end of November 2011 generated almost no bump in coverage.


Finally, the picture is still starker when one looks at interest and coverage within the United States specifically. We see that among policy wizards in Washington, D.C., Bahrain comes dead last (excepting February and March 2011) in search frequency behind Iran, Syria, and even Yemen.


Among the results (or causes?) of this trend is that Bahrain's rulers have been under no effective external pressure to take seriously citizens' demands for actual political reform. Instead, as the title of this post suggests, substantive political changes have been off the table, replaced by a nearly single-minded concern for police reform. (Yes, I know that "Bahrain has successfully implemented XX of the BICI recommendations.") Don't get me wrong: stopping security personnel from killing, torturing, and otherwise harming protesters is great. But even better would be to begin to address some of the underlying concerns motivating people to take to the streets for the past decade or more. What about that? Bahrain's head of security reports that in the past year "more than 700" policemen have been injured in clashes with demonstrators. In other news, "over 9,000 people were bitten by rattlesnakes after smacking them around with sticks."

In fact, Bahrain has seemingly come to the very same conclusion, although its solution is different. Rather than avoiding police-demonstrator clashes in the first place by starting to reduce the number of reasons people have for demonstrating, Bahrain has simply banned demonstrations. That's one way to go. Strangely, this new initiative is not included among those listed by Bahrain's Ambassador to the U.S. Houda Ezra Nonoo in her op-ed yesterday in congressional favorite The Hill, titled "Bahrain Understands the Need for Further Reforms." (See what I did there? She also apparently has a blog.)

Aside from her obligatory mention of "my story – that of a Jewish woman who rose on her merits to the top of Bahrain’s civil society," Nonoo rattles off several factoids about post-BICI police reform, including that "21 different police officers, including a lieutenant-colonel," have been prosecuted for abuse. No mention of the nationalities of these individuals, however, or an explanation for why those responsible for directing not only the 2011 crackdown but also previous crackdowns throughout the 2000s have not been held accountable. Indeed, the only high-level official to be "reprimanded" in light of BICI findings, former NSA chief Khalifa bin 'Abdallah, was simply shuffled around in the cabinet, reappointed as an adviser to the king at the rank of minister.

Other police-related moves in the previous month alone include: a new investigation into 15 police officers; a separate investigation announced by Sh. Rashid himself into "violations of personal rights committed during security officers crack-downs on protesters"; and a high-profile visit yesterday by Crown Prince Salman (dressed in full regalia, no less) to the Interior Ministry's Officers' Club, where he urged police to excerice restraint in dealing with protesters. Reuters, which has a useful analysis, quotes him as saying, inter alia,

"Force should not be used unless all alternative methods to the security approach are exhausted, and there should be no discrimination in dealing with all citizens of all affiliation and sect."

The entire video is available for your viewing pleasure:



I presume this is Step 37 of Sh. Salman's political comeback initiative. Good luck with that. At least he is earning some fair reviews in Al-Watan, no small feat. (Update: and in The Wall Street Journal.)

On the other hand, perhaps there is a more simple explanation, namely that both the crown prince and Houda Nonoo enjoy the ability of precognition. Just a day after their coordinated PR effort, the group Physicians for Human Rights released a scathing report on the widespread use of teargas in Bahrain. The New York Times opens with the following:

Despite a pledge to stop abuses by its security forces, the ruling Sunni minority in the tiny Persian Gulf kingdom of Bahrain is engaged in systematic and disproportionate use of tear gas on its restive Shiite majority, permitting police officers to routinely fire volleys at point-blank range at crowds and into homes and vehicles in Shiite neighborhoods.

Somehow, that sounds relatively less positive than Ambassador Nonoo's op-ed.


Oh, right, and there's also that little thing called the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Hearing on the Implementation of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry Report--to be held today with participation from, among others, Assistant Secretary Posner as well as Matar Matar. I wonder if that has anything to do with it?

A Sectarian Ramadan Kareem to You!

Coming to the "ethnic greetings" section of a Hallmark near you, Sunni and Shi'i Ramadan cards.

First, the late Pearl Roundabout shimmering among the mountains of Bahrain and among the clouds:



Whereas, someone posts in the Bahrain's main Sunni forum, "This is how the Sunni Lions break the fast in Syria":


Can you feel the togetherness and reconciliation?

A Final Political Salvo before Ramadan: The Sectarianization of Bahrain's Labor Unions

I've now returned from Cambridge, where participants on my panel were witnesses to a good show compliments of the Bahraini government, which sent a contingent from the Bahrain Centre for Strategic, International and Energy Studies (formerly the Bahrain Centre for Studies and Research) to refute my paper on the politics of public-sector employment in Bahrain. Notably, this 6- or 7-strong group included no less than former Information Minister and current chairman of the aforementioned center Dr. Muhammad 'Abd al-Ghaffar. Fortunately, my paper was (strategically, I'm sure) reserved for the very last spot, so the fireworks did not disrupt the panel generally, which was mostly very informative.

In addition to my paper, the group also attacked (on my panel) the presentation of Laurence Louër as well as (on other panels) those of 'Abd al-Nabi al-'Akri, Muhammad Matar, and others discussing Bahrain. I am also told that the group then proceeded to the other main Gulf studies conference at the University of Exeter, only to repeat the procedure anew. You stay classy, Bahrain!

Of course, as tends to happen, the hecklers succeeded only in making the state's case look worse. If Al-Watan has finally conceded that its English-language website was a liability rather than a tool to convert Western audiences to its position, then one wonders why the government cannot reach a similar conclusion, namely that it has failed to gain sympathizers not because its arguments are unknown but because they are unpersuasive.

In any case, with all this traveling it's been a while since I've posted, and much has happened in the meantime. Most notable is the formation of a new, Sunni-oriented labor union to compete with the current General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU), which is presumed, like everything in Bahrain, to be controlled by al-Wifaq and the opposition. Please excuse the bullet points.

• On July 10 the BNA reported that new editor-in-chief of Al-Watan and personal friend of this blog Yusif Al Bin Khalil has been received by "the Field Marshal" Khalifa bin Ahmad. Quite strange for a defense minister to congratulate the editor of a newspaper, you say? Well, when you consider their shared interests in anti-Americanism and riling Bahrain's Sunnis with the specter of foreign interference in the country, then it is perhaps less so. Oh, and the defense minister's brother bankrolls Al-Watan. It could be that too.


• While we're on the theme of Al-Watan and newspapers, the recent re-arrest (and three-month jail sentence) of Nabeel Rajab has occasioned an interesting spat involving Reuters. It seems that the government was/is upset with an article describing the circumstances of Rajab's arrest, which Reuters linked (correctly) to his Tweet claiming that citizens in Muharraq held a rally in support of the prime minister only because they were paid to do so. Two separate articles--first in Al-Watan, then in Al-Ayam--accuse the agency of false reporting, partiality, etc., while the Information Affairs Authority submitted its own formal complaint.
  
  
  The sticking point seems to be the explicit linking of Rajab's arrest to the prime minister (Al-Ayam is run by one of his cronies). Perhaps this is because, according to Rajab's lawyer Muhammad al-Jishi, the complaint that led to his arrest was filed by around 50 residents of Muharraq, including "Military Society" organizer 'Adel Flaifel. For one with a vivid imagination, such circumstances might suggest that--*gasp*--Khalifa bin Salman is somehow involved with Flaifel and other of his militant supporters, whether financially or otherwise. Support for the prime minister based on patronage relationships?? No way!
  
  
  Beyond Bahrain's continued persecution of journalists and media attempting to offer substantive coverage of events in the country, the other implication of the Reuters spat involves new Minister of State for Information Affairs Samira Rajab. From what I've been told, her April appointment was meant to offer a more media-friendly (and, more to the point, less prime minister-controlled) foil to the Information Affairs Authority led by Sh. Fawaz. Her ability to serve such a function in practice, however, would seem to be in question, as any movement on this front has been in the wrong direction.
  
  
• Bahrain is now home to yet another offshoot political "movement," this one known as the "Front for Jihad and Change" (or 'Aqab for short). No one seems to know quite what the group does; indeed, one opposition forum commentator asks derisively whether it is a "movement" or a "media organization," since despite a threatening manifesto its main activity thus far seems to be limited to the publishing of photographs, including of guns and ammo. (Curiously, the photograph below is taken from a pro-government Sunni forum, and the song in the YouTube video also has a Sunni feel and dialect.) The group does have a cool logo, though, so that's something I guess.
  
  
  And obligatory martial YouTube video:
  
  
  
  The Front's website only has three posts dating to July 14, the first a message of congratulations from al-Sayyid Qasim al-Hashimi, "Bahraini political opponent."(Al-Hashimi is a former member of the IFLB, then of al-Wifaq, and now directs the revolution from his computer in London.) In any case, the group clearly styles itself a Shi'i movement, but it's probably too early to tell what to make of it. Some Shi'a already assume it is a government front meant to smear the opposition.
  
  
• We arrive at the most significant news item. The National Unity Gathering has been busy lately, and its relationship with the state continues to grow in ambiguity. Al Mahmud and other TGONU leaders were prominent attendees of yesterday's press conference announcing the creation of a rival to the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU), called the Bahrain Labour Union Free Federation (BLUFF). In effect, BLUFF is meant to be the Sunni counterpoint to the GFBTU, which critics accuse of being controlled by al-Wifaq. Notably, one of the founding members of BLUFF is the union chairman at Alba, 'Ali Al bin 'Ali. Given Bahrain's success with political societies based around religious affiliation, the polarization of the country's trade unions along the same lines must be a welcome development. (That's sarcasm.)
  
  
  As always seems to be the case with the National Unity Gathering and the other post-uprising Sunni groups, this latest move lends itself to two competing interpretations depending on one's view of the movements themselves. On the one hand, given the historical importance of labor unions in spurring political action in Bahrain--whether in the 1950s, 1990s, or in 2011--one might suppose that the post-uprising Sunni movements are seeking to embed themselves more deeply into Bahraini political life, especially given their absence from other formal institutions such as the parliament. By this view, the launching of a competing labor union is not aimed necessarily at the opposition but perhaps at bolstering Sunnis' position vis-a-vis the state. If one would ask whether such a thing is necessary, consider, for instance, the recent arrest of outspoken Sunni Muhammad al-Zayani, former BDF colonel-turned-government critic, which has not gone unnoticed by the TGONU:
  
  
  Moreover, an article in Al-Ayam (linked on TGONU's Twitter feed) reports on a joint statement by al-Asalah and al-Manbar expressing their wonderment over the failure of the Labor Minister (Jamil Hamidan, a Shi'i appointed in King Hamad's post-uprising cabinet shake-up) to attend the press conference. The groups accuse the minister of bias in favor of the (Shi'i-controlled) GFBTU and say that he does not want a "free union."
  
  Others remain convinced, on the other hand, that the move is no more than a state-backed attempt to break the relatively powerful GFBTU, which one will recall organized several nationwide strikes in the early days of the uprising. Such an interpretation coincides with the more general view of TGONU and other Sunni movements as being far from politically-independent--to say nothing of a genuine Sunni political opposition. According to this view, the state is simply applying the lesson of the majlis al-nuwab, which is that so long as political factions exist along sectarian lines they will expend a majority of their energy fighting each other rather than focusing together on resolving shared grievances.
  
  As noted already (and as examined in a classic paper on "Bahrain's Labor Movements" by 'Abd al-Hadi Khalaf), trade unions have been a perennial loci of popular--cross-sectarian--political movements in Bahrain since the discovery of oil. By structurally dividing the labor movement into Sunni and Shi'i components, one eliminates an important potential source of the type of cross-societal mobilization that represents the only real threat to the maintenance of the political status quo in Bahrain. Whether or not the government (or certain factions of it) had a hand in the creation of the new union, one suspects it will be very happy at the news.
  
  
• If TGONU and the other new Sunni movements thus continue to elude easy political categorization, at least one can be more sure about the nature of some others. Earlier this week a group in Muharraq held a protest demanding the release of three imprisoned Sunnis--'Abd al-Rahman al-Murabati, 'Abdallah al-Na'imi, and Muhammad al-'Ubaidli (I'm not familiar with the background of the cases)--as a Ramadan makrama. A thread on the main Sunni forum explains that the individuals have been held for 4, 10, and 15 years, respectively, without being tried. (A million photos here.)
  
  
  Interestingly, one commenter asks why the thread is directed at the "Good Sunnis" of Muharraq, saying, "Why calling on Sunnis only? If you're being wronged then you should appeal to the Bahraini people as a whole? Don't you agree?"
  
  Acknowledgment that you're in the same boat as the Shi'a? "She's a witch! Get her!"
  
  Muhammad Al Bu Flasa likewise is continuing his quest to be re-imprisoned, appearing in a rally in front of Nabeel Rajab's house following the latter's arrest.
  
  
  
• Finally, some random interesting stories:
  
  
  1. An American passenger traveling to Bahrain from Italy was accused in an al-'Arabiyya report of attempting to smuggle in $11m in cash destined for the opposition. Bahrain then denies the report, but it sure does get you thinking... See what they did there?
  2. A report from the Danish Institute for International Studies: "Bahrain and the Global Balance of Power."
  3. Toby Matthiesen in Foreign Policy: "Saudi Arabia's Shiite Escalation."
  4. 'Abbas Bu Safwan writes in the Bahrain Mirror on ruling family politics and King Hamad's post-1999 project to unseat Khalifa bin Salman: "The King Stymies the Prime Minister in the (Constitutional) Arena."

Update: Quite clever are these new Sunni trade unionists. Not only is BLUFF now pushing for a minimum wage for Bahrainis in the private sector (as well as additional social benefits), but also for a minimum wage for skilled and unskilled EXPATRIATES. Since the new union cannot currently compete with the GFBTU in terms of membership, it seems it is reaching out to an untapped pool of potential supporters (and perhaps even members?): expats.

They've also apparently figured out that BLUFF is probably not the best English acronym to go with.

Update 2: An insightful update on the state of the National Unity Gathering by Hasan Tariq al-Hasan.

With al-Wifaq out of Parliament, Bahrain's Pro-Government Bloc Needs a New Enemy

I am preparing to leave for the annual Gulf Research Meeting in Cambridge, where I am happy to have learned recently I will sit on a panel along with Laurence Louër, whose 2008 book on transnational Shi'a politics includes some of the best insights on Bahrain in many years. I have had very good luck with conferences lately, as my most recent panel also included 'Abd al-Hadi Khalaf, whom I'd not met previously.

As I've mentioned before, I will present a paper on the politics of public-sector employment in Bahrain, while Laurence's is titled "The political dimension of the labor market reform in Bahrain." It should be quite interesting. For those interested, I have uploaded my presentation slides here.

While I don't have too much time now to write on substantive matters, a few weekend developments deserve some attention. All relate to the same issue, namely the ongoing push among Bahrain's Sunni and "independent" (i.e. pro-government tribal) MPs to remove the sitting U.S. Ambassador for his--what else?--"interference in Bahrain's internal affairs." More specifically, according to al-Asalah MP 'Abd al-Halim Murad (from Muharraq):

"He is demanding the empowerment of Al Wefaq under the guise of democracy and human rights. ... The ambassador has since his appointment been particularly active in putting pressure on Bahrain and on threatening and blackmailing the country. His meetings with the opposition do not stop and the US interference in our affairs has reached unprecedented levels."

Of course, by modern Interweb standards this story is old news. Yet coverage thus far has been superficial, and no one seems to be making the most obvious connection. A partial exception is regular Bahrain Mirror contributor 'Abbas Bu Sawfan, who offers an extended analysis (Arabic) in Thursday's al-Quds al-Arabi. The source of the anti-ambassador drive, he argues, is the royal patron of the Sunni groups in parliament, Khalid bin Ahmad. So his explanation revolves around Al Khalifa politics.

Which is perhaps true. But the more obvious observation is this: with the absence of al-Wifaq, Sunni groups in parliament have lost their raison d'être, which since 2006 has been precisely to obstruct any opposition efforts--legislative or otherwise. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that Bahrain is the only country in which the Muslim Brotherhood serves as a pro-government political faction. This is because it MUST be such if the opposition is to remain a minority in parliament.

A question--and, for the state, a problem--thus arises: if they need not concern themselves with blocking al-Wifaq, at whom exactly should (nominally) pro-government groups in parliament direct their energy? Since last fall's by-elections, the answer has been clear, with MPs assuming an increasingly confrontational stance vis-a-vis the government. They have blocked state proposals regarding the reorganization of the flagging Gulf Air; they have clashed on the streets and in parliament with (and even attempted to quiz) Bahrain's Culture Minister Sha. Mai for her purported support of "un-Islamic" events; and one Sunni opposition MP, Usama al-Tamimi, has been calling for corruption investigations into the practices of the ruling family (his business was subsequently attacked). In the second instance, the conflict was so severe that parliament was paid a visit by no less than Khalifa bin Salman, who urged "cooperation" between the legislative and executive branches.

The newfound concern among parliamentarians with the actions of the United States and its representatives in Bahrain is therefore at the very least a welcome development for the state, no longer the main focus of Sunni ire. But the main question, of course, is the nature of this shift in agenda. Pro-government movements and media have been decrying U.S. "interference" in Bahrain for more than a year, yet only now has the issue been taken up systematically by MPs. Has the sustained media onslaught finally served its purpose of encouraging popular action against Western influence (and precluding cooperation with the Shi'a and secular opposition)? Or is there more direct prodding on the part of the government--or, that is, on the part of certain members of the ruling family (which is Bu Sawfan's conclusion)?

This question becomes even more interesting when one notes the disparity between the actions of Bahrain's parliamentary blocs and other politically-active Sunni personalities. While MPs from al-Asalah and al-Manbar are busy petitioning the Foreign Ministry to convert the U.S. Embassy into a shrine to Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab, other Sunnis are reaching across the sectarian aisle to the opposition. Muhammad Al Bu Flasa, the Salafi former army officer who gained notoriety (and a 3-month detention) for his speech at the Pearl Roundabout in the early days of the uprising, has recently reappeared on the political scene. He was rearrested several weeks ago for what was called a "family dispute," and then last week requested the release of a video statement addressed "to the regime and to the people of Bahrain." (My understanding from this forum thread is that the video was actually recorded sometime in early 2011.)


Then, on Friday, Al Bu Flasa--along with outspoken opposition MP Usama al-Tamimi of 'Isa Town--visited several Shi'a villages. Al Bu Flasa turned up in a village in Sitra, while al-Tamimi went to Tubli and Nuwaidrat, the latter being the (somewhat claustrophobic) home village of al-Wafa' leader Sh. 'Abd al-Wahhab Husain. Not only did these two prominent Sunnis visit "dangerous" Shi'a villages, moreover, but they visited on the very Shi'i religious occasion of the birthday of the Mahdi. Both were received with much fanfare. (Pro-government Sunnis seem to be split. See this thread addressed "To those who criticize Al Bu Flasa.")

Al Bu Flasa apparently exiting/entering a mosque/ma'tam:


Al-Tamimi in Nuwaidrat, where he also visited a ma'tam:


Thus, as they say, is the battle for Sunni hearts and minds in Bahrain. As usual, the losers are ordinary Sunni citizens, as their MPs in parliament debate not corruption or political reform or economic revitalization but the nefarious role of Bahrain's most important Western ally (and probably the main reason why the political status quo was not qualitatively altered by the February uprising). And al-Asalah and al-Manbar wonder why they fared so poorly in the 2010 elections.

Also as usual, it will be up to charismatic Sunni activists outside the mainstream political fold--whether Ebrahim Sharif, Al Bu Flasa, al-Tamimi, or others--to see through the game of preoccupation that the state is so adept at playing. If not the Shi'a opposition, it is Iran, or the United States, that must be opposed--so long as it is not the government. In fact, anything sufficiently threatening (that is to say, an actor whose true interests are not easily discerned) will do the trick, such that it is likely that we will soon find tsunamis, earthquakes, and sharks on the list of foreign conspirators against Bahrain.


On the other hand, depending on one's view, Al Mahmud and other leaders of the new Sunni movements may have a more constructive role to play. Jane Kinninmont's recent Chatham House paper on Bahrain contained the following observation from a Sunni supporter (but not representative) of the National Unity Gathering: "We are not for the government, just temporarily allied with them" (p. 8, n26). I suppose we'll see about that.

The Downside of Bahrain's Counter-Terrorism Prowess

Bahrain: 3,017, Terrorists: 0!
By now readers will have heard of the "bomb plot" uncovered by the Interior Ministry (with dramatic video) and now being investigated with the help of a forensic team from the British Metropolitan Police. (It seems that Yates' advisory role with the Interior Ministry did not end as scheduled in April after all.) Three individuals have already been named as suspects, and anonymous "senior political officials" have told the BBC that the devices are so sophisticated that they "could not have been put together without help from outside the country"--namely from Hizballah, with whom the three suspects are purported to have trained.

In fact, however, as one contributor to the Gulf2K mailing list notes,

The "bombs...with hundreds of iron balls" sound like a standard AP device, in which (steel) ball-bearings are laid over the explosive charge to function as shrapnel. The set up has been used in suicide vests, in improvised hand-grenades, and in "claymore" type devices, whether improvised or manufactured. Such a system in itself is not indicative of any particular geographic or organisational origin.

One will observe further that the original report in the Gulf Daily News of "five tonnes of explosive materials" has since been downgraded (in the BBC story linked above) to "over 100kg," a difference of merely 1.5 orders of magnitude (~45 times). So more or less the same.

Yet, media exaggerations aside, the more general difficulty in knowing what to make of Bahrain's newest foiled terrorist plot is that the country may well be the historical origin behind Aesop's "The Boy Who Cried Wolf." (Which would vindicate Sunni claims of being the original inhabitants of the island!) When every activity of the unregistered opposition or trip to Lebanon by someone linked to Shi'a groups--to say nothing of the February uprising--is a new terrorist scheme, who can blame observers for being skeptical when the Interior Ministry insists, "No, srsly, this time it's a real plot we even have a video LOL!!1"

On the other hand, could one really be surprised if after 18 months of political stalemate and little hope for a breakthrough individuals would begin to turn to more radical alternatives in order to get the state's attention? Indeed, already in April 2011 Hussein Ibish wrote a Foreign Policy article asking, "Is Bahrain Creating a New Terrorist Threat?" Since then, few in Bahrain have escaped involvement in the turmoil either directly or indirectly via family and friends. At the same time, Bahrain's political factions have undergone marked polarization, with many in the opposition oriented not only against the government, but also against the state's Sunni and Western supporters. On the other hand, Sunni movements continue to decry the Iranian-backed opposition as well as Western (i.e., British and especially U.S.) meddling, and this has been actively encouraged by none other than ranking government officials such as Defense Minister Khalifa bin Ahmad.

The signs indeed are not encouraging:

"My blood is at your command, Sh. 'Ali Salman."

"Muhammad Al Mahmud: WANTED: alive not dead"
for spreading sectarianism, etc.


"The Sunni Lions" with al-Qa'ida-style flag

The main question for the Metropolitan Police, then, will be not simply who is behind the alleged plot, but at whom it was aimed. Given the recent escalation in anti-Western rhetoric, one wouldn't be surprised to find that its target was not the regime in Bahrain but some other government.

Whatever the case, having already denounced the plot and those involved, al-Wifaq plans to continue on this Friday with its weekly "The People Won't Retreat" protest marches; while its opponents have seized on the story to redouble calls for a crackdown on its "promotion of violence." Writing in Al-Watan (which seems to have removed its English-language site, sorry), al-Zayani tells that as the government is busy talking of dialogue, the opposition plots against it with impunity:

When 'Ali Salman says [see here for background], "We didn't use 50% of our power," is this the peacefulness he alleges and that the state believes? This is a clear threat of terrorism and the use of violence, and it's not the first. So with whom are they dialoguing? We all know what he wants Bahrain to become, and we all know the plan called the terrorism of February 14th, which is the seizure of the entire Bahraini state. And perhaps ['Ali Salman] will do with the people of Bahrain what Bashar is doing to his people, as they are of the same thinking and of the same sectarian tendencies. We all know the plan, but we lie to ourselves and say "dialogue." And we say a lot of things, but we know within ourselves that the question isn't of "reform," or of "democracy," but of an obsessive, exclusionary sectarian project.

To our dear brothers in the Ministry of Justice, [the minister of justice] said a while back that there will be accountability for and control over any provocative voice coming from the pulpit, and certainly this statement came after the king's talk before the Council of Ministers. But allow us brothers in the Ministry of Justice, and allow us Mr. Minister, Minister of Justice, [to say] that what we see and what we are witnessing is not the case. Talk in the press is one thing, and practice is something else. Stop all the voices of incitement from any party whatsoever--this is what we ask, to apply the law to everyone. But your ministry [has] applied [it] in one direction only, and is unable to apply the law to others, and this is disaster. Give us one example, Ministry of Justice, of any arrest [of] the instigators at the pulpits? Or do you even to this day still not hear [their] voices?"

Update: The Metropolitan Police have released the following photo of the suspected terrorist plotters. Can you help identify these individuals? Please write in!