"The Battle of Karbala' still rages between the two sides in the present and in the future. It is being held within the soul, at home and in all areas of life and society. People will remain divided and they are either in the Hussain camp or in the Yazid camp. So choose your camp." — 'Ashura' banner in Manama, 2006
Monday, December 9, 2013
Collective Frustration, But No Collective Action, in Qatar
I am currently traveling in Germany and the U.S. for conferences, but thought I would post a link to this article on Qatari domestic politics recently published in the Middle East Research and Information Project. Based on insights from new survey data collected earlier this year, it discusses the political road ahead for Qatar following the unprecedented leadership transition of late June. In this sense it is notable not only for its basis in empirical data, but also for its treatment of domestic politics rather than the standard concern for Qatar's international policy and strategy.
Tuesday, November 26, 2013
Terrorists, Not to be Confused with "Terrorists," Arrested in Bahrain
I recognize that I've been slacking a bit in posting over the past weeks and months, mainly owing to growing writing commitments. Primary among these is a book manuscript for a university press based on my dissertation, which feels not a little like déjà vu. The book will make use of the data from my Bahrain survey of 2009, as well as more recent data from projects in Qatar, to probe the individual-level assumptions of the rentier state framework. Theoretically, this can be summarized in two main questions:
Far from a similar political deal in Bahrain, the main news item seems to be public outcry -- and official embarrassment -- over the effects of what was by local standards a big rainstorm last week. While there were no resulting deaths as in Saudi Arabia, still residents were sufficiently annoyed to post photo evidence of the country's poor drainage infrastructure to social media. Among those affected were schools, some of which had to close as a result of flooding, and these joined in the fun by posting their own flood photographs to Instagram and elsewhere. As a result, the Education Ministry has now banned schools from publishing their own news and images, which now must be submitted to the ministry beforehand. Brilliant.
The other notable story is the arrest of two former Guantanamo inmates who attempted to cross into Bahrain with cash and forged passports in order, the Interior Ministry claims, to carry out terrorist attacks. Now, since we're dealing with actual terrorists in this case rather than tire-burning "terrorists" (or terrorists who upload photos of flooding to the Internet), the ministry has not identified the suspects nor released further details, including their nationality. Certainly, it would not be the first time that Salafis released to Saudi Arabia's custody from Guantanamo returned to the trade. The more interesting question, of course, is whether those arrested were planning to attack actual government (or U.S. government) targets, or Bahrain's Shi'a heretics.
Oh, and the neverending dialogue continues, though still without opposition participation. So there's that.
Update: The Bahrain Mirror reports that, notwithstanding early statements by the Interior Ministry, Bahrain's public prosecutor seems to have dropped references to "terrorism" in regard to the former Guantanamo prisoners arrested on the causeway last week. The individuals apparently were Salafi fighters/intermediaries bound for Syria, which would explain their money and forged passports. The Bahrain Mirror noted that the public prosecution is headed by the brother of the former leader of al-Asalah, prompting a statement from the latter to the effect that "We are honored to send aid to the Syrian revolution."
- On what basis do citizens actually qualify for the material benefits distributed by Gulf governments?
- To what extent are citizens' political behaviors and orientations actually a function of (their degree of satisfaction with) these material benefits?
Far from a similar political deal in Bahrain, the main news item seems to be public outcry -- and official embarrassment -- over the effects of what was by local standards a big rainstorm last week. While there were no resulting deaths as in Saudi Arabia, still residents were sufficiently annoyed to post photo evidence of the country's poor drainage infrastructure to social media. Among those affected were schools, some of which had to close as a result of flooding, and these joined in the fun by posting their own flood photographs to Instagram and elsewhere. As a result, the Education Ministry has now banned schools from publishing their own news and images, which now must be submitted to the ministry beforehand. Brilliant.
The other notable story is the arrest of two former Guantanamo inmates who attempted to cross into Bahrain with cash and forged passports in order, the Interior Ministry claims, to carry out terrorist attacks. Now, since we're dealing with actual terrorists in this case rather than tire-burning "terrorists" (or terrorists who upload photos of flooding to the Internet), the ministry has not identified the suspects nor released further details, including their nationality. Certainly, it would not be the first time that Salafis released to Saudi Arabia's custody from Guantanamo returned to the trade. The more interesting question, of course, is whether those arrested were planning to attack actual government (or U.S. government) targets, or Bahrain's Shi'a heretics.
Oh, and the neverending dialogue continues, though still without opposition participation. So there's that.
Update: The Bahrain Mirror reports that, notwithstanding early statements by the Interior Ministry, Bahrain's public prosecutor seems to have dropped references to "terrorism" in regard to the former Guantanamo prisoners arrested on the causeway last week. The individuals apparently were Salafi fighters/intermediaries bound for Syria, which would explain their money and forged passports. The Bahrain Mirror noted that the public prosecution is headed by the brother of the former leader of al-Asalah, prompting a statement from the latter to the effect that "We are honored to send aid to the Syrian revolution."
Wednesday, November 6, 2013
Movement at Last? Rumors of Change in and Outside Bahrain
I've recently returned from a very enjoyable weekend in Norway, where I had a chance to meet new and old acquaintances as part of the 2013 Rafto Prize ceremony. (Click here for a frightening photo of a Molotov cocktail-wielding Bahraini Shi'a mob terrorizing the streets of Bergen.) At the same time, I have managed to acquire some interesting pieces of (secondhand) information about some potentially significant domestic and international political developments concerning Bahrain. And, no, the rumors do not originate from the angry Shi'a mob.
The first item relates to everyone's favorite subject: the U.S. Fifth Fleet, and whether or how long it's likely to remain in Bahrain. As readers will know, until now the status of the base in Juffair has not been called into question by American defense officials, who claim instead (and one hopes disingenuously) to have no contingency plan in the event the political situation devolves even further. Thus, the question of the Fifth Fleet outwardly at least has failed to realize its potential as a political pressure point, precisely because the U.S. government has sent no costly signals to the effect that a re-evaluation of the base is even under consideration.
The rumor, then, originating from journalists at leading Western newspapers, is that one or more publications is preparing to publish in-depth feature article(s) recasting the Fifth Fleet in a new strategic light. Rather than an essential pillar in the fight to contain Iran's maritime belligerence, and of Gulf security generally, the role and importance of the base is described in more modest terms: as a mere "support" station (that is its name after all) rather than a lynchpin of regional security. To what extent these stories come at the direct instigation of U.S. officials was not made clear, yet it was said that the shift in tone and substance is justified in the articles as reflecting perceptible changes in the government's own language.
Of course, given the fluid strategic landscape of the Gulf, any potential change in policy or even tone regarding the Fifth Fleet may have less to do with Bahrain than a desire to moderate U.S. military posture vis-a-vis Iran. Yet it would in any case still serve the useful purpose of reinstating the question as a functional lever of American diplomacy.
The second item is, if possible, of even more potential significance, and one could speculate not unrelated to the first. This is the rumor of an impending political bargain, allegedly brokered by the British, between the mainstream opposition societies (i.e., al-Wifaq) and the Bahraini government. The announcement, again allegedly, will be made sometime in December, and the terms would be something like the following: revision of the country's gerrymandered electoral districts, along with a few junior ministers from the opposition, in exchange for al-Wifaq's return to parliament and a commitment to (put pressure on activists to) end protest activity. Whether the opposition ministers would be elected or appointed I have no information. The prime minister's position, reportedly, is not under question.
The possibility of a government-opposition bargain puts in a new light the unprecedented persecution of top al-Wifaq officials, including Khalil al-Marzuq and 'Ali Salman. As of Sunday, when the latter was charged with the heinous crime of "insulting the interior ministry" for his group's display of items and images from the uprising (in what was billed a "museum") at an al-Wifaq office in Bilad al-Qadeem, both individuals have been charged and subsequently released, and one presumes they are now awaiting trial or adjudication. For Salman, this is the first time he has been summoned, much less charged, since the uprising began.
As always, we have the conspiracy interpretation and the non-conspiracy interpretation. The latter would note that the government is likely using the court cases -- not only against individuals but against al-Wifaq as an organization -- as a way to pressure the group's acceptance of what are ultimately probably hard-to-swallow political terms, especially compared to what they might have gotten from the crown prince in March 2011. This would perhaps help clarify al-Wifaq's description of Salman's summons as "political extortion."
An alternative version, which one often hears when al-Wifaq is involved in some controversy, is that the arrest of the leadership is part of a deliberate effort to make the mainstream opposition appear more "radical" and thus in tune with the "Shi'a street." The latter, the argument goes, are assumed then to be more likely to accept the legitimacy of an eventual political deal.
Assuming for a moment that a compromise such as this is in the works, it will be interesting to see the relative importance of political ideals and political fatigue in shaping the response of various constituencies in Bahrain. Has nearly three years of daily fighting taken its toll on youthful activists such that they are now ready for peace or at least a ceasefire? Will Bahrain's Sunnis fall in line behind yet another compromise with the opposition brokered behind closed doors and ultimately at their political expense? Will security-minded royals in the royal court and defense ministry give up their campaign to deliver punitive justice to all those deemed traitors? One hopes that we will have the opportunity to find out.
Update: It have been told that Iran's English-language satellite station Al-'Alam is presently phasing out its daily hour-long program on events in Bahrain. Perhaps a coincidence, but also perhaps a bid to foster a calmer political environment.
Al-Wasat reports an "agreement" to resume Gulf Air flights between Bahrain and Iran, which have been suspended since 2011, beginning on December 15. More coincidence?
Update 2: Sh. Nasr demonstrates brilliant "leadership abilities" in leading Bahraini princes to an "honorable placing" in a Florida Ironman triathlon. Watch out, Crown Prince Salman!
Update 3: Over the weekend I happened to speak with a Western source familiar with political discussions in Bahrain, who confirmed efforts toward a December deal. Interestingly, however, he was not so sanguine about the political position of the prime minister, who the person said would be unlikely to retain his post even in the short term.
Tuesday, October 22, 2013
Fallout with Saudi Arabia Affords U.S. Even Less Leverage in Bahrain
It will come as no news to those who follow events in Bahrain when I say that little has changed since I last wrote here. Some sense of this may be gleaned by the fact that I was yesterday contacted by a journalist seeking permission to use a quotation proffered over a month ago(!), since nothing had changed essentially on the political front such as to make it outdated.
The remarkable thing, then, may be exactly this, the extent to which things have remained depressingly static particularly since the launch of the Neverending Dialogue, Part II. On the other hand, this is of course the entire point of the exercise from the standpoint of the government: to buy time indefinitely, picking off in the meantime all those whose frustration with the lack of progress causes them to transgress the line of what is tolerated. (Witness, e.g., Khalil al-Marzuq.) In a recent writing that takes a long view of events since the uprising, Mansoor al-Jamri has termed this Bahrain's political "cul-de-sac," an image that seems to fit the case nicely.
Beyond the intractable nature of Bahrain's underlying political conflict per se, this stagnation reminds one also of the central role of outside forces. Consider, for instance, the case of Britain, which continues to play an important (and critics would say unhelpful) part not only in backing and facilitating the national dialogue, but also in other post-BICI "reform" efforts such as those in the Interior Ministry. I am told that the British, whose praise for the capable and well-intentioned Justice Minister Sh. Khalid bin 'Ali I once heard first hand, have now come to recognize the purposeful futility of the dialogue process, but have little choice but to continue with it. (If this discouraging BCHR report about the new Ministry of Interior Ombudsman position is any indication, British efforts with that ministry also have seen uneven progress.)
More generally, both the British and United States appear to lack the leverage required to force the hand of the Bahraini government, which is to say the hand of Saudi Arabia. British interests in Bahrain are rooted in the economic, and the former colonial master seems content to take a cautious and non-confrontational tack on the political front. With regard to the U.S., despite sustained calls by academics and policymakers to play the ultimate diplomatic card -- the matter of the Fifth Fleet in Juffair -- the Defense Department has admitted to not having even a contingency plan in place in the event basing at Bahrain becomes untenable. So the Bahrainis and Saudis need not even call the U.S. bluff, as there is none to be made.
Yet American leverage in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia may be waning even more than we know. A very interesting Wall Street Journal report today offers new insight into the much-analyzed Saudi decision to reject a seat at the UN Security Council that it had worked for some two years to secure. The article claims that the Saudi decision aimed to send a message not to the UN but the U.S., and cites two previously-unreported events that occurred at the height of Western preparations to take military action against Syria in August. It tells,
Diplomats and officials familiar with events recounted two previously undisclosed episodes during the buildup to the aborted Western strike on Syria that allegedly further unsettled the Saudi-U.S. relationship.
In the run-up to the expected U.S. strikes, Saudi leaders asked for detailed U.S. plans for posting Navy ships to guard the Saudi oil center, the Eastern Province, during any strike on Syria, an official familiar with that discussion said. The Saudis were surprised when the Americans told them U.S. ships wouldn't be able to fully protect the oil region, the official said.
Disappointed, the Saudis told the U.S. that they were open to alternatives to their long-standing defense partnership, emphasizing that they would look for good weapons at good prices, whatever the source, the official said.
In the second episode, one Western diplomat described Saudi Arabia as eager to be a military partner in what was to have been the U.S.-led military strikes on Syria. As part of that, the Saudis asked to be given the list of military targets for the proposed strikes. The Saudis indicated they never got the information, the diplomat said.
There would seem, then, to be little hope of any effective outside pressure interested in or capable of moving along the political situation in Bahrain. Speculation earlier this year that new Saudi Interior Minister Muhammad bin Nayf might be more amenable to political compromise with the Shi'a opposition has so far received no tangible evidence, and in the current regional climate one imagines that whatever political window existed then has now passed. To be sure, one would rather suspect that Saudi Arabia views strong "security" measures in Bahrain (to say nothing of a new GCC security architecture generally) as more necessary than ever, particularly if the WSJ is correct in reporting that the U.S. was unwilling or unable to protect the Eastern Province from feared Syrian aggression in August.
Bahrain's double-life will continue, then -- new shipments of tear-gas and stun grenades to go along with a National Dialogue successful precisely in its failure. In December "national security leaders" will once again arrive for the annual IISS-hosted Manama Dialogue; April 2014 will see the annual Formula 1 circus; and, if Bahrainis are lucky, by 2016 the island will have its very own $51M indoor ski slope. What more could citizens ask for?
Sunday, September 29, 2013
Bahrain Grips for Pax Americana-Iranica
For one living in the Gulf region, the existence of an unspoken alliance between the United States and Iran aimed at undermining the Arab Gulf monarchies is a fact taken for granted. Indeed, how else does explain the U.S.'s systematic post-2001 program of overthrowing Iran's enemies, to say nothing of late-night phone calls between Presidents Obama and Rouhani? In Bahrain, Defense Minister Khalifa bin Ahmad knew as much way back in July 2011, when he told Al-Ahram that the uprising was "by all measures a conspiracy involving Iran with the support of the United States," the latter aiming "to draw a new map" of the region. "More important than talking about the differences between the U.S. and Iran," he insisted, are "their shared interests in various matters that take aim at the Arab welfare."
Yet for all this, there is still a misconception by many, especially those who've not spent much time in the region, that this idea of a U.S.-Iranian alliance is a view held only by a marginal, conspiratorial minority. So let me say this clearly: it is not. While I haven't spoken with enough non-Bahraini Shi'a around the Gulf to generalize, I can say based on extensive experience that GULF SUNNIS DO NOT TRUST U.S. INTENTIONS IN THE REGION. A prominent article in the weekend New York Times offers some indication of this in the context of the Obama-Rouhani phone call, but even here it is framed in a way that downplays the seriousness of the concern. Jamal Khashoggi is quoted as saying, for example, "There is a lot of suspicion and even paranoia about some secret deal between Iran and America," which again leaves one thinking, "Wow those crazy Gulf Arabs, always with their conspiracy theories!"
Indeed, it is ironic that the New York Times chose also to publish in this weekend's Sunday Review an interactive Middle East map imagining "how 5 countries [Iraq, Syria, Saudi, Yemen, Libya] could become 14," i.e. as a result of the ethnic and sectarian pressures wrought by the Arab uprisings:
The map is ironic in that it resembles closely another (in)famous map depicting a "New Middle East." Prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters and published in the Armed Forces Journal in June 2006, it aimed to illustrate a potential outcome of the so-described "New Middle East" project initiated by the Bush Administration with the Iraq War. The implication was that the United States was not simply witnessing the balkanization of the region but contributing to it and shaping it for its own ends. That such a map should reappear now, then, and with much greater geopolitical plausibility, will recall for many these fears of a decade ago, and the question of whether the U.S. has not perhaps succeeded in its principle of "constructive chaos" in the Middle East.
For government supporters, of course, Obama's remarks were interpreted somewhat less positively:

Indeed, even former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain Adam Ereli got in on the action, "attack[ing] his own country over its attitude to the kingdom." The Gulf Daily News tells, "He sounded an alarm over deteriorating relations with Bahrain and other Gulf countries, and warned that the US 'neglects its allies at its peril.'" Ereli continued,
As one senior member of a ruling family asked me, 'Why can't the US stand by us the way Russia stands by Syria?' We should. America must state clearly what it stands for and who it stands with. The unease we have sown among our allies is damaging to our national security and economic future.I wonder if Ereli's remarks are colored at all by his recent (early September 2013) exit from the State Department in favor of the private consulting firm Mercury, which "represents several foreign governments in Washington"?
Sooner or later, a crisis will strike this part of the world. It could be conflict with Iran or the bloody hand of terror. Domestic upheaval threatens the very foundation of states. And make no mistake - American jobs and financial stability will be at stake.
Now is the time to mend fences and rebuild frayed ties with our friends in the Gulf. President Barack Obama should take a page from President Clinton's play book. He should tell our friends in the GCC that we feel their pain. He should travel to the region and reassure troubled allies that America is on their side and will work with them in a spirit of common purpose to manage the challenges of a turbulent time. The administration must reverse this troubling trend of neglect. Our future prosperity depends on it.
Whatever the case, Ereli along with many Bahrainis may soon have more to complain about. A report yesterday in Lebanon's (admittedly pro-Hizballah) Al-Akhbar claims that President Obama recently delivered a letter to King Hamad via Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, in which he demands, inter alia, that Crown Prince Salman replace Khalifa bin Salman as head of government. It is not clear whether the directive came from President Rouhani, or from 'Ali Khamenei directly.
Update: Silly Obama thinks he can join a hawza without Bahraini Sunnis noticing:
Update 2: Front page story in yesterday's Al-Watan: "Krajeski Asks Al-Wifaq for a Mass Rally in Support of Obama." Cites a meeting between the U.S. ambassador and 'Ali Salman.
Update 3: Here's one for you: The Editor-in-Chief of Akhbar al-Khaleej Anwar 'Abd al-Rahman published an "expose" this weekend about a U.S. conspiracy against Bahrain and Egypt. "That sounds about right. So what?" you say. Well, this one claimed to be based on an "interview" given to Fox News by retired chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton, in which the latter has all kinds of crazy things to say. Following denials by the U.S. Embassy and Defense Department, which pointed out that Shelton had not been on Fox News since 2010, Akhbar al-Khaleej and English-language sister publication Gulf Daily News have doubled down, affirming they "stand by the story."
Thursday, September 26, 2013
How the Gulf Survived the Arab Spring (and Other Weekend Reading)
I don't normally do this, but given the recent release of several insightful publications on Bahrain and Gulf politics I thought it would be worth reviewing them, if not in a formal book review sort of way, here.
The first of these is an e-book by Elizabeth Dickinson, a journalist known for her good work at The National (which following the untimely demise of Al-Watan's English-language version is now one of the best English newspapers in the Gulf!). At just fifty-one pages, "Who Shot Ahmed?" is a relatively short but compelling look at the life and death of one Bahraini activist -- a fellow journalist, in fact -- at the very outset of the uprising. This it describes in vivid detail, offering a portrait of life in Bahrain's secluded Shi'a villages usually painted only in broad strokes in media coverage of opposition protests. In so doing, the narrative speaks to larger questions of justice, legitimacy and, ultimately, the uncertain future of those tens of thousands of individuals caught up directly or indirectly in the uprising.
A second publication is Toby Matthiesen's Sectarian Gulf, released over the summer. It is also in many ways a narrative (travelogue even) of the Arab Spring in the Gulf, as he was present in both Bahrain and the Eastern Province during the onset of protests. The book also has a larger theoretical aim, however (hence its publication by Stanford UP), which is a theme encountered often at this blog: namely, the purposeful activation and cultivation of sectarian political identities and conflict as a strategy of regime survival in the Gulf. Matthiesen examines in detail the cases of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Kuwait, demonstrating how ruling families were able in the end to rely upon their own citizens to protect them from ... their other citizens.
Last but certainly not least is Greg Gause's very recent paper for Brookings, "Kings for All Seasons: How the Middle East's Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring," whose great title is but one of many virtues. The essay is framed as a theoretical and empirical retort to what Gause describes as two separate "extreme" views of the Gulf monarchies: on the one hand, the view (à la Christopher Davidson) that the regimes are on the brink of implosion due to chronic economic, social, environmental, and political problems; and, on the other, the notion (as embodied in Victor Menaldo's 2012 Journal of Politics paper) that monarchies as a system of governance engender a unique "political culture" (or something else) that explains their resistance to overthrow.
Hold on there, killer, says Gause. In fact, he says, the explanation for the longevity (or not) of the Gulf monarchies is far less dramatic than either of these extremes:
Gause goes on to address in relative detail the subject of Toby's book (as well as that of the forthcoming volume to which I am a contributor, Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf; and Fred Wehrey's forthcoming book; see a trend here?), namely the use of sectarianism as a political strategy. This leads inevitably to the case of Bahrain, with which Gause concludes the paper. His final paragraph is notable in its pointedness:
The first of these is an e-book by Elizabeth Dickinson, a journalist known for her good work at The National (which following the untimely demise of Al-Watan's English-language version is now one of the best English newspapers in the Gulf!). At just fifty-one pages, "Who Shot Ahmed?" is a relatively short but compelling look at the life and death of one Bahraini activist -- a fellow journalist, in fact -- at the very outset of the uprising. This it describes in vivid detail, offering a portrait of life in Bahrain's secluded Shi'a villages usually painted only in broad strokes in media coverage of opposition protests. In so doing, the narrative speaks to larger questions of justice, legitimacy and, ultimately, the uncertain future of those tens of thousands of individuals caught up directly or indirectly in the uprising.A second publication is Toby Matthiesen's Sectarian Gulf, released over the summer. It is also in many ways a narrative (travelogue even) of the Arab Spring in the Gulf, as he was present in both Bahrain and the Eastern Province during the onset of protests. The book also has a larger theoretical aim, however (hence its publication by Stanford UP), which is a theme encountered often at this blog: namely, the purposeful activation and cultivation of sectarian political identities and conflict as a strategy of regime survival in the Gulf. Matthiesen examines in detail the cases of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Kuwait, demonstrating how ruling families were able in the end to rely upon their own citizens to protect them from ... their other citizens.
Last but certainly not least is Greg Gause's very recent paper for Brookings, "Kings for All Seasons: How the Middle East's Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring," whose great title is but one of many virtues. The essay is framed as a theoretical and empirical retort to what Gause describes as two separate "extreme" views of the Gulf monarchies: on the one hand, the view (à la Christopher Davidson) that the regimes are on the brink of implosion due to chronic economic, social, environmental, and political problems; and, on the other, the notion (as embodied in Victor Menaldo's 2012 Journal of Politics paper) that monarchies as a system of governance engender a unique "political culture" (or something else) that explains their resistance to overthrow.
Hold on there, killer, says Gause. In fact, he says, the explanation for the longevity (or not) of the Gulf monarchies is far less dramatic than either of these extremes:
Rather, the Arab monarchies have deployed their ample hydrocarbon wealth to blunt popular demand for reform; even the kingdoms that are comparatively resource-poor have been backstopped by their wealthier allies. And each Arab monarchy has maintained a powerful supporting coalition of domestic interest groups, regional allies, and (typically Western) foreign patrons to buttress regime stability.That sounds about right.
Gause goes on to address in relative detail the subject of Toby's book (as well as that of the forthcoming volume to which I am a contributor, Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf; and Fred Wehrey's forthcoming book; see a trend here?), namely the use of sectarianism as a political strategy. This leads inevitably to the case of Bahrain, with which Gause concludes the paper. His final paragraph is notable in its pointedness:
That said, the ultimate rationale for keeping an American military base in a country is not to use it to exercise leverage on that country’s domestic politics. Rather, it is to serve larger American strategic interests. Maintaining a base in an unstable country detracts from its military purpose and runs the risk that the United States will be drawn into domestic conflicts in ways that would damage U.S. interests. Political instability in the host country requires the diversion of resources and attention to force protection. Most importantly, having a base in an unstable country puts American service people at risk. For these reasons, Washington has to make clear to the Al Khalifa government that it cannot sustain its military presence in Bahrain if current conditions continue. The United States should be taking serious steps to explore alternative basing arrangements for the Fifth Fleet in the Gulf region, not as a bluff to move the Bahrainis toward reform, but as a way to insure our own military interests in the area. The United States does not need bases in unstable countries.Update: Also, for those interested in Qatar, Mehran Kamrava has just published Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (Cornell UP).
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
Bahrain's Legal "War on Terror"
I was listening the other day to a program on Al-Jazeera, in which a historian of Algeria's civil war argued that Egypt's present campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood represents a strategy similar to that of Algeria's military government decades ago. The idea is this: to persecute members of an opposition with such violent disregard that the movement transforms from a political current that does or might elicit popular support to an armed insurgency, popular fear of which would preclude any political sympathy and ultimately harden citizens in their support of a government with whose policies and even legitimacy they might not otherwise agree.
Now, it would be oversimplistic to say that Bahrain's own security-cum-political strategy follows precisely the same formula, not least because the violence even of the post-February 14 period cannot match that of the slaughter in Algeria. Rather, the government's strategy has always followed a more legalistic tack, perhaps because its unique societal configuration affords it that luxury. In July 2005, the Sunni Islamist-dominated parliament passed what is now the Political Societies Law, which divides political groupings neatly into two legal distinctions: those registered with the Ministry of Justice (and thus "legal"), and those unregistered ("illegal"). King Hamad decreed the bill into law that August. All this occurred, of course, prior to al-Wifaq's electoral participation, and perhaps even helped spur it.
The state's clear purpose was to delegitimize and indeed criminalize those groups that refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the unilaterally-promulgated 2002 Constitution (and so refused to register), who were thereafter given the label "terrorist organization." (Hence the need for Bahrain's infamous "anti-terrorism" statute of 2006; see, e.g., this MA thesis by Fatemah Al-Zubairi.) This proved to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy, with now-underground movements such as al-Haqq, al-'Amal, and others resorting from time to time to violence -- if obviously not "terrorism" in the accepted sense -- of their own. So, even if this criminalization did not provide relief from political opposition or violence, still it offered a legal cover for the state's intermittent crackdowns on protest activities and their leaders.
We return then to the Bahrain of September 2013, where the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs is busy further tightening the noose around the political sphere. Measures announced on Sept. 4 require political societies to seek Ministry approval prior to any meetings with foreign entities, including diplomats. (See Al-Watan for a defense by Sh. Khalid.) Then, yesterday, the Ministry filed a lawsuit to dissolve the Shi'i Islamic Ulama Council led by 'Isa Qasim. Its violations were said to include:
the adoption of the call for the so-called ‘revolution,’ the violation of the laws, support and assistance to a political society that had been dissolved by a court ruling for openly supporting violence, alliance and continuous coordination with a licensed political association and unlawful interference in the elections by supporting specific candidates.All the while, delegates at the National Dialogue -- a dialogue sponsored by none other than the Minister of Justice -- continue to fail to even begin. On Saturday the Gulf News provided an update on this farcical process:
The 27 participants, representing a coalition of opposition societies, another coalition of political societies, the parliament and the government, have held more than 25 meetings that were quiet at times and stormy at others.The lesson, then?: play by our rules, however ridiculous and inefficacious, or risk legal banishment from politics altogether. Moreover, as with the Political Societies Law of 2005, the state can claim that such a position represents in fact the will of the public itself, as each of the Ministry's new measures is being sold as stemming from July's extraordinary joint session of parliament organized in response to the summer's upswing in violence. As in 2005, the opposition was not represented owing to its own boycott, and now appears to be suffering similar consequences.
Yet [dramatic pause], they still have to agree on a platform and an agenda for the talks.
In addition to the legal fate of 'Isa Qasim, whom the state and its supporters have been targeting since the beginning of the uprising, it will be interesting to see whether the new ban on contact with foreign entities is invoked in the context of the civil war in Syria. In a very interesting article, the Wall Street Journal reported yesterday that would-be Shi'a fighters from "Iraq, Syria, and other Arab countries" have been flocking "by the busload" to a training site outside Tehran in preparation of entering the conflict in Syria. Already a year ago, members (and indeed the leaders) of Bahrain's Salafi society al-Asalah boasted of their heroic exploits with members of the Free Syrian Army. Only ten days ago the group announced the martyrdom of yet another of its followers in Syria, bringing the total to six. What chance that the Bahraini government would countenance similar involvement (or accused involvement) by members of, say, al-Wifaq, particularly following its explicit ban on foreign contact? I would love to see that Gulf Daily News headline.
Finally, notable in this context of heightened political repression -- not only for Shi'i but for Sunni groups as well -- is King Hamad's conspicuous trip on Sunday to China, where he met with the country's president and top political advisor. Joining the King were, among others, Muhammad bin Mubarak, Khalifah al-Dhaharani, Hamad's son 'Abdallah, Khalid bin Ahmad, and Ahmad bin 'Attiyatallah. (There is no mention of Crown Prince Salman, despite the visit's having taken place on the sidelines of a trade expo.) Apart from King 'Abdullah II of Jordan, King Hamad was the only Arab head of state to attend the event. One wonders whether this conspicuous appearance wasn't meant in part to suggest Bahrain's cultivation of new strategic partners less concerned about its domestic political affairs.
Update: Appropriately, given the substance of today's post, an e-mail message from the al-Wifaq offshoot Bahrain Justice and Freedom Movement reports that former deputy head of al-Wifaq Khalil al-Marzuq "was detained this morning after being summoned to the Budaiya Police Station yesterday," apparently for a speech delivered September 7 that government officials have characterized as "supporting terrorist activities, violence and the downfall of the regime."
Update 2: The story of al-Marzuq's arrest (provoked apparently by his raising the flag of the February 14 coalition at a rally on September 6) is making the rounds. In response, not only al-Wifaq but all the opposition societies have suspended participation in the National Dialogue, which will of course be a big setback for the progress parties had been making.
Update 3: Many have been noting the State Department's distinct lack of outrage over the arrest of al-Marzuq, particularly in the context of the other recent legal measures discussed in this post. Indeed, when asked about the arrest, a State spokeswoman spent more time chiding the opposition for suspending its participation in the dialogue. The Washington Post editorial board describes the situation thus: "Bahrain arrests opposition leader; U.S. shrugs." HRW gets even snarkier, writing, "U.S. Thinks Arresting Peaceful Opposition is OK – in Bahrain, at Least."
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