A Conversation with Emile Nakhleh on Al Khalifa Family Dynamics

Two posts ago I linked to an article by Emile Nakhleh titled "Bahrain Repression Belies Government Stand on Dialogue." Nakhleh--a fellow former Fulbright to Bahrain; author of a recently-reissued book on the country; and frequent writer on Middle East politics--argues in short (and as he has previously) that that it is Khalifa bin Salman who is responsible not only for derailing attempts to exit the current crisis, but more generally for undermining the cause of democracy (or at least liberalization) in Bahrain since independence. Accordingly, he suggests American diplomats strengthen the prime minister's competitors within the ruling family so as to marginalize his deleterious influence on any future dialogue initiative.

Having communicated with him previously, I wrote Nakhleh in response to the article, asking in particular whether he might not have omitted an important player in the game of Al Khalifa politics, namely the Royal Court and Defense Ministers (i.e., the khawalid). What followed was a lengthy back-and-forth that included many insightful details based on Nakhleh's first-hand familiarity with many of the personalities involved owing not least to his time--15 years--with the CIA. The conversation for me proved so interesting, in fact, that I thought I would post it here (with his permission of course). Indeed, if there continues to be a lack of dialogue among the political forces in Bahrain, at least we may have a dialogue about the political forces in Bahrain.

Before this, however, some news-related housekeeping is in order. This Friday will see the crescendo of a week's worth of mass rallies organized by the five main (legal) opposition societies, including Wa'ad, al-Wifaq, and some others that don't matter so much. The slogan, "We won't leave the streets [literally, the squares]," is announced in a pretty flier that looks like it might be for an Apple product:


The rally is in fact a march beginning at 5:00pm from the Shakhura Roundabout to the Saar Roundabout, i.e. a good way down al-Budaiyi' Road. As Faysal al-Shaykh noted in the Al-Watan column I posted yesterday, "we will wait and see" as to the state's response to the rally given recent warnings directed at 'Isa Qasim about using Friday sermons to "incite" violence and political action. (Someone, apparently, has responded. Al-Wifaq reported on Tuesday that a hawza in Muharraq was attacked by "civilian militias." Recall that Muharraq was also the sight of clashes in December between 'Ashura' procession-goers and members of 'Adel Flaifel's "Military Society.")

Just in case Bahrain needs some additional encouragement to act, pro-government groups will hold their own counter-rally on Saturday in Muharraq and in al-Hinayniyya (i.e., al-Rifa'). Rather than at opposition terrorists, however, this is directed at "the influence of the U.S., British, etc.," according to organizers. (Sadly there is no flier, which raises serious questions about the latter's commitment.) More interesting still is that this "طوق القادسية," as it's being dubbed, was prompted explicitly (again, according to the announcement) by the exhortations of "writers in daily newspapers"--chief among them, presumably, Al-Watan. So yet another good reason for our Al-Watan Wednesday.

Combined with recent opposition protests outside the naval base in Juffair, then, the U.S. continues to get it from both sides--from Shi'a upset about continued American support for the government; and from Sunnis upset about continued American influence on government decisions. And here I thought preserving the political status quo in Bahrain was supposed to serve U.S. national interests.

With this as a perhaps off-topic introduction, I reproduce below my conversation with Emile Nakhleh. I hope readers find it interesting and/or useful.

Update: Going for the all-time intramural GCC co-ed record, Bahrain has foiled yet another terrorist plot. How can we be sure? Well the Interior Ministry blows stuff up in a video (see the last 2:00). Obviously. Interestingly, it seems that it is a rule of explosives detonation that the phrase "Fire in the hole!" be said only in English.

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A Conservation with Emile Nakhleh on Al Khalifa Dynamics

JG:

I wanted to write to say that I enjoyed your latest piece on the renewed hopes of dialogue in Bahrain for the Lobelog. I wonder, though, given your emphasis on Khalifa bin Salman, where you see the khawalid (Khalifa and Khalid bin Ahmad) in all of this? Even if the king and CP have been marginalized in the post-February period, surely the Royal Court and especially the Field Marshal have grown in stature. Do you not see them as an independent force within the ruling family?

I think this question is especially important now as the Saudi case serves to raise the issue of succession after the PM is finally gone. Obviously he backs (and you suggest the U.S. back) Muhammad bin Mubarak as his eventual successor; but the khawalid have their own rival candidate in Khalid bin 'Abdallah. If another from among the khawalid were to gain the premiership, they would then control that position along with the military and Royal Court--no small fact.

EN:

I knew Abdallah, Khalid's father, back in the early 70s and had frequent discussions with him. I believe he was the Minister of Justice at the time. He, like the PM, opposed the opposition’s demands for reform and in fact objected to the whole move toward a constitution and a National Assembly. He was very fond of Bahrain's heritage and culture and thought any reform that would limit the power of the family would not be good for Bahrain. When he would talk about Dilmun and the early inhabitants of the island, he conveniently forgot that al-Khalifa conquered the island only 200 plus years back!

I don't believe the PM would designate his deputy Shaykh Muhammad as his successor without making sure he has the Khawalids and other Khalifas on his side. I'm not even sure he would necessarily support Shaykh Muhammad. The old guard within the family never really trusted him—they viewed back then as ambitious and reformist. Besides, Some of them privately even mentioned his non-Khalifa mother.

I agree with the view that the Saudis would play a role in the succession to Khalifa. The interesting analytic question is what impact the Saudi intervention in the internal affairs of the family will have on the on-going friction among the different centers of power within the royals. I am sure Shaykh Muhammad, as he did in the past, will try to stay above the fray. That's how he survived on the inside track!

If the King loses the succession fight, Khalid bin Ahmed and Khalifa bin Ahmed (Royal Court and the Field Marshal) will likely dominate the scene with Saudi blessings and support. If this happens, I'm not sure they will be satisfied with keeping Hamad as a figurehead king or Salman as CP. I certainly expect the growing tensions within the ruling family to become more public and the in fighting more ugly. Perhaps for the sake of family survival, cooler heads would prevail.

In the meantime, violence continues and the ruling family does not have the luxury of time despite their sophisticated and rapid response PR. For example, the PM office responded to my previous op-ed in the FT in less than 24 hours with an op-ed that was published in the same newspaper the following day! Most people who follow Bahrain in Washington have come to believe that if serious dialogue were to occur, the King and his son should be involved and that the PM would not be a credible participant. The deputy PM could be a bridge between the old guard, the reformist faction, and the opposition.

JG:

I much enjoyed hearing your first-hand knowledge of some of the personalities involved.

As for Khalid's father 'Abdallah, from what I've heard his son seems to be of a like mind: opposed to reforms (and especially concessions to the Shi'a) on *ideological* rather than pragmatic political grounds. This seems to be a theme among the khawalid, a fact I have explored in a longish article I finished a month or so ago titled "The Securitization of 'the Shi'a Problem' in Bahrain."

As for your larger point regarding Khalifa's successor, who then do you see as a viable alternative to Muhammad? Not his son, presumably, who by all accounts sounds unliked and barely competent. And Khalifa must know that by choosing a weak candidate he is essentially ceding his position to the khawalid. Or do you believe that the latter is a more appealing alternative from the PM's point of view--i.e., better to leave the country in the hands of the Royal Court and military (with the implicit backing of Saudi) than an indecisive nephew and his upstart son (with the implicit backing of the U.S.)?

The main argument of my aforementioned article is that, as intellectually unappealing as it might be, the present conflict in Bahrain is at bottom a case of intra-familial competition, and little can be resolved on the ground until this works itself out--or until someone helps work it out. (Although I think I am less sanguine than you about the U.S.'s direct influence here. This business of "improving the position of the Crown Prince" through visits to DC and some spare helicopter parts is laughable. Better to pressure the Saudis to intervene I would say.) More and more, I think this interpretation is correct.

EN:

Tensions within the family are not new; they go back to the early days right after independence. To illustrate, when British diplomats in Bahrain reported to the Home Office on my book back in 1976, the point they found most "amusing" was my discussion of the internal tensions within the ruling family. The main point of the book they thought, according to declassified British diplomatic correspondence, was my "analysis of the first national elections to the constituent Assembly in 1972." (See Ali Rabi'a's book al-Tajriba al-Maw'uda: al-Haya al-Dimoqratiyya fi al-Bahrain, 2010, pp.338+).

I don’t think Muhammad's son will be seriously considered for the PM position. I think the tension will be between Khalifa and his nephew Hamad. If Khalifa loses, which is a distinct possibility, I won't be surprised to see Hamad appoint his son the CP as the PM. Precedents of such an appointment are all around them in the neighboring emirates, including in Saudi Arabia. If such an appointment occurs, the Royal Court and the Military would be held in check. The King could also appoint Muhammad (presumably as an interim) to provide continuity and even gravitas. I imagine this path would ultimately lead to Salman taking over the PM slot, while of course remaining the CP. The familial old-age respect, which Hamad has accorded his uncle, would not necessarily extend to the Khawalids or other Khalifas, especially if they don't support the King. If some sort of union occurs between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in the short-term, which I doubt, it would be a sign that Khalifa has maintained the upper hand within the family. If the King and some of his supporters push back on the unification scheme and succeed, he will end up on top.

Now that Nayef is gone, Khalifa has lost a major supporter within the Saudi powerful hierarchy. I don't think Salman ibn Abd al-Aziz (new CP) or Ali ibn Abd al-Aziz (new MoI) have the same ideological affinity toward Khalifa or are as invested in having Bahrain become another "province" of Saudi Arabia. Since they are not as viscerally opposed to reform domestically, and hence tend to be closer to King Abdallah's position, they might not be as opposed to some sort of reform in Bahrain. Perhaps this is wishful thinking.

I also don't think it's all that "laughable" to raise Salman's profile through visits to Washington. Much to my disappointment, the administration seems to play a very cautious game vis a vis Bahrain--presumably because of Saudi Arabia. Since the "Arab Spring" started, Washington was always focused on who is the most appropriate interlocutor in whatever country. Unfortunately, Bahrain is no exception. I've been arguing with my friends inside and outside the government that we must take a more forceful position toward Khalifa and his policies, for fear of terrorism against our presence in that country. What concerns me is that more and activists within the Bahraini opposition, including some of Khalifa’s strong Sunni supporters, are beginning to blame the US for perceived collusion with al-Khalifa. If Washington decides to push for genuine reform and meaningful dialogue in Bahrain, it can do it on its own without the urgent need for Saudi support. Riyadh would still be needed, however, to provide a cover.

JG:

Interesting your suggestion that Bahrain might preform a reverse Kuwait maneuver--combine the CP and PM for reasons of political expediency rather than split the roles. I suppose the CP does already have some experience in running a (shadow) cabinet, i.e. the EDB. Do you see the Khalifa - Hamad struggle as likely to come to a head before the former's eventual passing? or is the present situation sustainable if obviously destabilizing?

I suppose the GCC meeting in December will be useful is demonstrating the extent to which Saudi-Bahrain union remains on the list of priorities following the death of Nayf. On the other hand, it may complicate one's interpretation of the intra-Al Khalifa struggle insofar as the initiative's failure (assuming as I do that it will fail) may leave open two possibilities: that it failed because the King succeeded in obstructing Khalifa; or because the Saudis lost interest. Perhaps either alternative would strike a blow to the PM, but the internal situation could remain ambiguous.

EN:

As long as the situation is sustainable, the family will try to keep the internal struggle under wraps; they loathe airing their dirty laundry in public. However, if street confrontations escalate and repressive reaction becomes more noticeable internationally and more damaging to business and the economy, the King will come under more pressure, especially from respected members of the Sunni community, especially business people, and mainstream Shia families, to contain the situation and initiate meaningful dialogue to resolve the impasse. If the King responds positively to such pressure and begins to explore avenues for dialogue, Salman would re-emerge as a principal player. Khalifa's stature would then suffer. Unfortunately for Khalifa, the Bahraini situation is not a purely internal matter; international actors—including the US, Saudi Arabia, etc.—would have a stake in the outcome and therefore might push harder for dialogue. Most people don't expect the PM to be a key participant in the envisioned dialogue.

Announcing: Al-Watan Wednesdays

A recent Al-Watan article quotes al-Asalah MP 'Abd al-Halim Murad: "[U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain Thomas] Krajeski is either a Wifaqi or the ambassador for Tehran!"

Now that I've finished with several recent writing commitments and have a bit more time to spend updating here, I thought it would be nice to begin the summer vacation by introducing a new segment I like to call "Al-Watan Wednesday." This will be, as you might imagine, a weekly article from the Arabic-language Bahraini daily Al-Watan, which in addition to being a veritable mouthpiece of the Royal Court is more generally serious business whether in print or Internet form. In the words of a bad local rap group from near my hometown that weirdos in high school used to listen to, Al-Watan "is dominated, but never imitated; though others perpetrate it, but still we regulate it." Yea, that's right.

In fact, the timing of this new segment is fortuitous. For it has been recently reported that soon to be announced as new editor-in-chief of the newspaper is none other than long-time friend of the blog and current Al-Watan anti-American extraordinaire Yusif Al Bin Khalil. For the uninitiated, Al Bin Khalil is perhaps best known for his month-long series last summer "Ayatollah Obama and Bahrain," whose cogency was matched only by its subtlety. Eventually, the U.S. Embassy grew tired of the bit and pressured Bahrain's media authority to put an end to the articles, but not before Ayatollah Obama's nefarious plan to Shi'atize Bahrain was made bare for all to see.

So congrats, then, to Yusif Al Bin Khalil. The U.S. should be pleased to know what the Royal Court of its "staunchest Gulf ally" thinks of it. (Hint: see the article at the top of the post.)

Of course, one might therefore ask why I should choose to give any attention--much less an entire day of the week--to Al-Watan and its decidedly one-sided pseudo-journalism. Actually the reasons are many:

1. Al-Watan exemplifies the phrase "It'd be funny if it weren't so sad." And often in its coverage the funny is so strong as to overshadow the sad, which is no small thing. As one of the main principles of this site is not to take itself too seriously, Al-Watan is a kindred spirit insofar as one suspects that, deep down, its writers cannot take themselves too seriously either. (On the other hand, the site's post-uprising English-language version of the website is premised clearly on the idea that if only Western audiences had linguistic access to its insights, surely they would become converts to the Royal Court's position.)


2. Better than any other publication, Al-Watan reflects the views of a particular faction in Bahraini politics whose stature and importance continues to augment in the post-uprising period. This is, broadly speaking, that of the Royal Court and by association Defense Minister Field Marshal Khalifa bin Ahmad, brother of Royal Court Minister Khalid bin Ahmad (known together as the khawalid).
   


3. Further, to the extent that the khawalid are also seen as backing at least in part Sunni political groups--including both established societies as well as the new, post-February movements--Al-Watan also offers insights into the political demands and arguments of Bahraini Sunnis. The regular columnist Hisham al-Zayani is a clear partisan of Sahwat al-Fatih, for example, while Faysal al-Shaykh often writes from the perspective of the National Unity Gathering.
   


4. Finally, since the paper's soon-to-be editor-in-chief Al Bin Khalil recently became a follower of this site, it's perhaps only fair that we reciprocate:
   
   

Now some sixteen months removed from February 2011, it should be clear the prospects for genuine political change in Bahrain are and will be determined not by the traditional Shi'a and secular opposition but by the posture adopted by ordinary Sunni citizens. If fear of association with or manipulation by the Shi'a-led opposition continues to dissuade average Sunnis from being forceful in their political demands, then the state has little cause for worry. Only if Sunnis overcome their phobia of being made tools of Iran will Bahrain achieve the type of cross-societal popular pressure necessary to force the ruling family's hand.

With this in mind I conclude with the today's Al-Watan article, a reply by Faysal al-Shaykh to King Hamad's forceful cabinet speech of two days ago in which, inter alia, he reaffirmed the state's commitment to political reform as represented in the 2001 National Action Charter; rejected foreign mediation of the present political conflict; repeated the warning to al-Wifaq and 'Isa Qasim over the latter's alleged promotion of violence via sermons; and so on. In "The messages of Hamad bin Isa and our message to His Majesty,"* Faysal al-Shaykh responds to each of the king's main points by noting the contradiction between these stated goals and the government's actions heretofore in practice. He writes,

On Monday, June 25, 2012, His Majesty the king addressed many clear and direct messages when he presided over the cabinet meeting yesterday with His Highness the Prime Minister sitting on his right. His Majesty’s messages are supposed to shed light on the aspects of the coming phase and be taken as a framework of action by state institutions. What we listened to was not a common speech as it bears between its lines key issues that echo the wishes and demands of loyal citizens at this critical juncture in Bahrain’s history. ...

The first message was addressed to the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs and Endowments urging it to prevent the misuse of religious rostrums and take more rigorous measures to preserve its sublime mission. This leads us to wonder about the measures that need to be taken in the future against those who exploit religious platforms to incite people’s hatred of the state and disgust against members of other sects. We stress the need for such measures because we have already witnessed a certain inadequacy and laxity in dealing with those who used religious rostrums to fight the state and polarize society. We saw no measures taken against those who incited murder and issued calls to crush security men. Today, concerned state institutions bear a heavier responsibility to adequately respond to the calls of loyal citizens and civil society institutions especially after His Majesty the king, himself, commands them to enforce the law. Till next Friday, which has turned into a day of incitement, we will wait and see. ...

Finally, it mustn’t elude us to highlight His Majesty’s emphasis on citizens’ welfare, which is the ultimate goal of reform and development. His Majesty stressed the need for the government to do its utmost in this regard. He also urged the legislative power to play a more effective role by constantly cooperating with the executive power. As we stress the need to place citizens’ welfare on top of all priorities, we would also like to convey low-income and ordinary people’s messages directly to His Majesty the king concerning many unresolved issues and worries such as the housing problem and the rising cost of living.

People need more facilities and services which can be achieved when officials fulfill their duties appropriately, come in close contact with people and keep abreast their worries. Unfortunately, despite the clear and constant directives of His Majesty and His Highness the Prime Minister to officials to open their doors to citizens, some of them still obstruct people’s access to their doors. Such officials are the real setback to development and the achievement of citizens’ interests. Therefore, we still need to appoint the right persons in the right places.

In response to His Majesty’s optimistic and promising address which asserts the leadership’s constancy in defending Bahrain, we stress the unaffected and undiminished loyalty of faithful citizens to their land and leadership. We assert that this relationship is based on mutual trust, candidness, constructive criticism and true love away from hypocrisy and hollow flattery.

*Note in following links to Al-Watan that its English-language website is currently undergoing some sort of horrible reconstruction and may or may not require Netscape Communicator 5.0 to render properly.

Are Bahrain's Sunnis Still Awake?

In case you couldn't tell from the huge graphic, I have a new article in Carnegie's Sada blog that revisits the subject of Bahrain's "Sunni awakening," which I wrote about in January. In short, the piece tells why we may soon finally learn the nature of the country's post-February Sunni movements--specifically, the National Unity Gathering and the al-Fatih Awakening--as a result of a (rumored) new push for government-opposition dialogue. Yet, whether or not one believes that fresh talks are imminent (a prospect made perhaps more faint following 'Ali Salman's being shot on Friday and the king's cabinet speech yesterday), the larger point remains: only if Bahrain's new Sunni groups remain insistent upon a seat at the political negotiating table--as they were in March--can we conclude that they represent something new and independent of the state. And it is only this insistence, moreover, that can bring to bear the pressure required to push Bahrain toward genuine political change.

The full article is here. The Arabic version is here.

Update: Sunni internet forums are abuzz with news of the re-arrest of Muhammad Al Bu Flasa, the Salafi former army officer made famous for his address at the late Pearl Roundabout at which he urged sectarian political cooperation. Yesterday's detention stemmed reportedly from a "family dispute" relating to his political activities. Apparently his wife's family is not a huge supporter of the Sunni awakening.

Update 2: Also, unrelated funny graphics:


February uprising alternative ending


Khalifa bin Salman: "I wish you to rid me of all the Baharna!"
Genie: "Man, I told you! I'm a genie not a government thug [baltaji]!
Update 3: Emile Nakhleh: "Bahrain Repression Belies Government Stand on Dialogue."

Update 4: I've just come across the website of the National Unity Gathering, which judging by pro-government forum comments must be fairly new. For those interested, it includes sections detailing the groups "Principles," "Aims," "Political Platform," and so on.

The End of "Bahraini Hizballah"?

As you've no doubt noticed if you're visiting this site, I haven't updated in a while. This is because, as some of you already know, I've been offered and have accepted a position with the Government of Bahrain's Information Affairs Authority, and this blog will soon be replaced by a new one related to my work there. (Update: As I've now gotten several e-mails about this, I'll be clear that this was/is a joke. I thought it was obvious enough given the beginning of the next paragraph.)

Actually, I've been spending all of my free time attempting to finish a long report on Bahrain before traveling to a conference tomorrow. It doesn't look like I'll be able to do so, however, so I likely won't have a chance to write something of any length until the last week in June. Not that the Intertubes will run out of Bahrain analyses in my absence, but I just thought I would offer a note about my extended silence.

In any case, developments in Bahrain are relatively limited and obviously continue to be overshadowed by violence in Syria, which by all accounts seems to be only one or two more days away from successful implementation of Annan's peace plan. Not.

The main action in Bahrain is on the political societies front, with the Islamic Action Society being dissolved in what is a clear warning to al-Wifaq. The language used by the Ministry of Justice to justify the move--that Amal follows "a marja'iyyah that advocates violence"--is taken almost verbatim from the Prime Minister's recent threat directed at 'Isa Qasim, to the effect that the latter's support of "violence" via Friday sermons, etc. will not be tolerated. Does that mean we will see Round 2 of the government's attempt to ban al-Wifaq (the first being in April 2011), presumably to appease those advocating a more hard-line stance against protesters? Perhaps.


Others I've spoken to have alluded to a new sooper secret "dialogue"--isn't there always one?--in which the government is attempting to coerce al-Wifaq participation. But it's difficult to see why the government would have any inclination to restart talks given the current lack of outside pressure, al-Wifaq's current position of weakness, and the problem posed by Sunni demands for participation in any potential dialogue.

More likely, then, is that Bahrain is simply harassing al-Wifaq because it earns itself points among a certain (Sunni) societal constituency, and because no one--i.e., no one in the American or British or Sri Lankan Embassy--seems to be complaining about it. So why not, say, go ahead and bust out 'Ali Salman's security cameras at his house for no reason? They're probably in violation of some law or another, right? Sure.

Political dialogue, social reconciliation, and police reform: a winning combination for Bahrain.


Update: A day after the vandalization of his house, 'Ali Salman goes off in a speech to opposition rally-goers in Saar. If the state had been attempting to force some concession on the part of al-Wifaq with its threats of legal action and physical harassment, I don't think it worked.

If you're looking for good tidbits, he calls out al-Mushir by name at around 17:00 and proceeds to taunt him, saying of mass protests in February and March, "We didn't use 50% of our power. ... We could have marched in our akfan (white funeral shrouds), but we didn't wish to spill our blood and yours. ... You know that with two words of a fatwa we could have brought the masses to the streets ready to die. ... Whatever you use to [try to] crush us will not work. ... Even if you use the [GCC] Peninsula Shield [force] or even more forces, you could never make us surrender." Ok then. Time will tell whether that's a good way to go.



Update 2: Behold! Phase 2 of the (U.S.-backed?) Crown Prince Salman political revival project: The Bahrain Foundation for Reconciliation and Civil Dialogue.

Update 3: King Hamad responds to 'Ali Salman, even busting out the ol' military uniform.

Update 4: A highly-recommended paper by the well-informed Jane Kinninmont: "Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse."

Update 5: Al-Mushir gets the last laugh as 'Ali Salman is shot in the shoulder and back with tear gas canisters and/or stun grenades during Friday's march.

Update 6: News comes via the Bahrain Mirror that long-time friend of the blog and author of the last summer's insightful "Ayatollah Obama and Bahrain" series Yusif Al Bin Khalil has been tapped as the next editor-in-chief of Al-Watan! Congrats! All of that U.S. scare-mongering paid off. The U.S. must be happy to know that the Bahraini Royal Court thinks so highly of its staunch American ally.

Update 7: New penetrating investigation reveals systematic links between al-Wifaq and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard:

The (Sectarian) Politics of Public-Sector Employment in Bahrain

A cartoon posted to an opposition forum depicts a representative of the “Ministry of Sectarianism” distributing “government jobs” to “unemployed graduates” “of the Sunni sect” and “clerical positions” to “those of the Shi‘i sect”

As usual, I am currently occupied with various writing commitments, one of which is a paper for the upcoming Gulf Research Meeting, 11-14 July at the University of Cambridge. Meant to be a frank and open discussion among Gulf scholars, hopefully my panel on youth unemployment in the Gulf will turn out to be such--otherwise, it will be a long few days.

My paper, titled "The (Sectarian) Politics of Public-Sector Employment in Bahrain," argues that present analyses of the problem of unemployment in the region--youth or otherwise--consistently fail to address the proverbial elephant in the room: the political prerequisites for employment, especially in the public sector. From the introduction:

Analysis of the problem of youth unemployment in the Arab states of the Gulf centers overwhelmingly, as of course it should, around the region’s unique political economy. The continued influx of foreign workers; the persistence of traditional gender roles that see women disproportionately excluded from the labor market; a resource-funded welfare state whose promises of government employment and other material benefits offer few incentives for educational achievement or indeed work itself—these and other structural features of Gulf societies are used to explain why, despite sustained economic growth and job creation that are the envy of neighboring Arab countries, youth unemployment here remains extensive even by Middle East standards.

Given this wide recognition that the region’s youth unemployment problem is rooted at least in part in the very institutional characteristics of the Gulf state, it is curious that another prominent feature of the Gulf landscape—the existence of social and political divisions on the basis of ascriptive group distinctions such as religion, ethnicity, tribal background, and so on—is conspicuously absent from such explanations. Yet in a different sense this omission is not at all surprising, for it reflects a prevailing conception of employment in the Gulf, including public-sector employment, as politically-agnostic.

“Every citizen” of a rent-based economy, tells Beblawi in his seminal study of rentierism, “has a legitimate aspiration to be a government employee; in most cases this aspiration is fulfilled.” By establishing an entanglement of bloated government ministries; subsidizing large, state-owned conglomerates; and spending huge sums on disproportionately large and well-equipped militaries, Gulf states can sop up a young populace that is easily disaffected, eager to marry and find housing, and generally college-educated yet nonetheless unprepared (or uninterested) in the private sector. The upshot, so the argument continues, is that the latter will be content to live their days as government pensioners and social welfare recipients, careful not to kill the goose that lays the golden egg. For their part, ruling elites gain a political ally—at worst a self-interest-maximizing, apolitical animal—and need forfeit only a portion of their resource proceeds to guarantee continued enjoyment of the remainder.

In fact, however, the empirical record would indicate that public employment in the Gulf is better conceived as a privilege, extended to those citizens who demonstrate political support for the state (or at least do not demonstrate the opposite), rather than a right afforded to every individual qua citizen. To see the inherent political nature of public-sector employment in the Gulf one need only observe the aftermath of Bahrain’s February 2011 uprising led by the country’s politically-disenfranchised Shi‘a majority. Already by mid-May, more than 2,000 individuals had been fired from public-sector positions for suspicion of having taken part in mass protests in February and March, which authorities deemed an Iranian-backed coup attempt.

This summary termination of Shi‘a employees and beneficiaries extended, inter alia, to government agencies, publicly-owned companies, hospitals, schools, sports clubs, and university scholarship-holders. The response was so sweeping, in fact, that it prompted the U.S.-based AFL-CIO to file a labor rights complaint against the Bahraini government, contending that the firings violated its free trade agreement with the United States. At the urging of an independent commission tasked with investigating the state’s response to the uprising, Bahrain subsequently promised to bring back sacked workers, but few have been reinstated, and those who have were made to accept new contracts featuring downgraded positions and lower wages. Students returning to Bahrain’s only public university were even forced to sign a pledge of loyalty “for the leadership of the Kingdom of Bahrain represented in His Majesty King Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa.” The two-page document cautioned, “I acknowledge that not signing this document means I do not wish to continue my education at the University of Bahrain.”

Hence, in Bahrain and in other Gulf societies home to ascriptive social cleavages that are politically salient, the state has both the incentive and the ability to base hiring decisions in part or in whole on questions of religious, ethnic, tribal, or other group membership. Especially in light of mounting concern over the regional ambitions of Iran and its presumed support for local Shi‘a political movements, Gulf governments are increasingly wary of employing or otherwise empowering citizens whom they view as open or latent political opponents possibly serving foreign adversaries. As Bahrain’s minister of industry and commerce tellingly admitted during anti-government protests in 2007, “There is a lack of confidence between the ruled and the rulers. It is not unusual. There is a small percentage who do not have loyalty to the state. Sometimes, for good reasons, you have to be careful who you employ.” Fortunately for Gulf rulers, because citizens’ group affiliation is readily-observable via outward markers such as name, dialect, skin color, dress, and so on, this group-based discrimination in hiring is easily accomplished.

Using original, individual-level data from a 500-household mass survey of Bahraini political attitudes undertaken by the author in early 2009, this paper demonstrates that Shi‘i citizens are not only systematically less likely to be employed in Bahrain’s public sector, but they also tend to occupy lower-ranking professional positions when they are employed. For two citizens of identical age, gender, and education level, the probability of government-sector employment (given that one is employed) is predicted to be some 36% higher for a Sunni compared to a Bahraini Shi‘i. The professional discrepancy is estimated at about 15%.

Moreover, the data reveal, whereas 17% of working Sunni males who reported professional data indicated that they worked for the police or armed forces; and whereas 13% of all Sunni households reported at least one member employed in these services, not a single individual from among 127 employed Shi‘i males who offered occupational data reported working for the police or military. The patterns of government-sector employment in Bahrain thus tell a fundamentally different story from the one articulated by rentier theorists, and draw attention to a crucial feature of the Gulf context—social-cum-political divisions along ascriptive group lines—that remains absent from extant analyses of the problem of unemployment in Bahrain and elsewhere in the region.

I've posted the full (draft) paper here.

Update: Still busy. In the meantime, see "The March of Bahrain's Hardliners" at the Carnegie Endowment. I disagree with it in places, but still useful.

Update 2: The Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs has moved to dissolve the Islamic Action Society ('Amal). More interesting, however, is the language used to justify the move: namely, that 'Amal "follows a marja'iyyah that advocates violence." A clear reference to al-Wifaq and 'Isa Qasim?

Update 3: For those interested, the slides of my conference presentation are available here.

The End of Pragmatism; Or, Why Bahrain Would Have Locked Up Chen Guangcheng

I spent much of last week thinking and talking about political dynamics in Bahrain and other Gulf countries as part of a workshop for a book project on Sectarian Politics in the Gulf. A consistent theme of that discussion, especially in the Bahrain context, was what I've called elsewhere the "securitization of the Shi'a problem"--or, more generally, of the problem of religious-cum-political minorities.

As I see it, this phenomenon, toward which Bahrain's ruling family has now decisively shifted, involves two main elements: a political calculation, and an ideological orientation. The political calculation is that the entire economic and political reform model represented by post-1999 King Hamad and Sh. Salman is fundamentally flawed; that political stability in Bahrain or elsewhere will never come as a result of placating dissatisfied citizens with the promise of economic and (to a lesser extent) political benefits, but by repressing them--if possible with the help of like-minded neighbors.

The corresponding ideological orientation explains the rationale behind this political calculation: that Shi'a as a class of citizen will never be satisfied with anything less than total domination of the state and indeed the Muslim world generally. They are the Roman Catholics of Islam, harboring dual loyalty to Iran qua state-sponsor of Shi'ism. They are connected by a trans-national communal solidarity whose goal is only Shi'a empowerment. They are, in short, disloyal and unworthy subjects of the Gulf states and their rulers, the latter having succeeded in affording citizens both economic prosperity and modernization, as well as political stability in a region where it is otherwise unknown.

I would argue, then, that the post-February progression of Bahrain can be summarized exactly as this transition in political orthodoxy. The opposition's rejection of the crown prince's dialogue initiative in February and March 2011 set in motion a series of events that cemented this change in thinking from Bahraini Shi'a as a political problem to security problem. Whereas the state had long taken preventative measures--demographic re-engineering, electoral redistricting, Shi'a exclusions from the police/military--to hedge against the possibility that King Hamad's political and economic project failed, still these measures were always conceived as constituting a Plan B. The post-uprising record demonstrates clearly that this strategy has now graduated to Plan A.


One recent news item seems to my mind to illustrate perfectly this shift away from political pragmatism. No doubt one will have heard of the blind Chinese political dissident, Chen Guangcheng, who has just recently arrived in the United States following an unlikely ordeal involving an escape from house arrest to the American Embassy in Beijing, etc. etc. Now, the parallel of this case with that of another well-known dissident from Bahrain--'Abd al-Hadi al-Khawajah--should be obvious enough. Both are thorns in the sides of their respective regimes; both, on account of the latter's now 90-day-plus hunger strike, are physically disabled; and both were seeking to escape their imprisonment to a third-country. (One hesitates to imagine what would have happened if al-Khawajah or any other Bahraini activist had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Manama.)

Yet, while the Chinese government made the pragmatic political calculation that an activist Chen Guangcheng at New York University is better than an activist Chen Guangcheng in China, the Bahraini authorities have consistently rejected 'Abd al-Hadi's medical release to Denmark (where he holds citizenship and lived in exile for much of his life). Or, rather, some of the Bahraini authorities rejected the deal.

When talks about an agreement to release him heated up in early April, Bahrain's Foreign Minister (and one imagines his ally King Hamad) was pushing hard for a compromise that would see 'Abd al-Hadi leave Bahrain. Indeed, several individuals have mentioned that the transfer order was even signed by Interior Minister Sh. Rashid himself, only to be nullified by the prime minister at the 11th hour. Almost immediately thereafter, 'Abd al-Hadi was transferred from the Interior Ministry clinic to the BDF hospital under the control of the hard-line defense minister (and ally of the prime minster) Sh. Khalifa bin Ahmad, ostensibly for an upgrade in medical care but presumably to ensure that he could not be released.

Thus has ideology-induced myopia and personal vengeance (note al-Khawajah's now-famous attack on the prime minister in 2004) precluded in Bahrain what in the case of China and Chen Guangcheng seems such an obvious and efficacious solution: simply get rid of the guy. Not only do you avoid (in the case of al-Khawajah) his becoming a martyr, but you also probably earn a bit of goodwill from Western governments and others critical of your continued mistreatment of political opponents. Last but not least, it's likely also that shipping al-Khawajah off to Denmark would steal much of the power of his activism with respect to those still in Bahrain. Certainly, even Khomeini could not command a revolution from France.

That despite these many practical benefits Bahrain's rulers were unable to arrive at the same political calculation as the Chinese speaks both to the degree of fracture within the Al Khalifa, but more importantly to the nature of that fracture, which again is a division over the very conception of the problem facing Bahrain, and how to solve it. If China's policy embodies the idea of political pragmatism for the sake of a more important long-term aim, the path cut by Bahrain over the previous 16 months would seem to elude easy categorization. And that's precisely the problem.

Update: Wow, what can you say about this? Just.. wow. Robert Haddick in Foreign Policy: "The Persian Gulf Needs Its Own NATO, And America needs to lead it." Fix Bahrain by bringing the U.S. into the GCC? Of course!

Update 2: Writing in Al-Watan Sawsan al-Sha'ir explains in her ever-reasonable tone why Bahrain participants at this week's UN Human Rights conference in Geneva are "traitors":

"[modes of] treason may vary, but they all emit the same stench and are equally bleak and slimy. ... Our laws allow[] civil society institutions to be used as landfills of funds that pour from different sources. No wonder their members, accompanied by beauties, move from one European capital to another and thence to Washington where they blow their reeking sectarian venom and shed crocodile tears. ...

You wistfully think that, by dispatching those delegations and spending the money you took from Iranian, Bahraini or Kuwaiti Shiites, you can fulfill your plan. Right now, some of you are negotiating a deal which is about to be concluded. A traitor will always remain a traitor. Hard luck! Try again.

Now THERE is some pragmatism for you.

How Not to Help the Crown Prince

News comes today that the parting gift from Crown Prince Salman's trip to Washington last week was the resumption of some U.S. arms sales to Bahrain. It doesn't take a genius, of course, to see the purpose behind this sure-to-be-controversial move, namely the (attempted) reversal of Sh. Salman's utter political marginalization since his failed attempt to negotiate an end to the March 2011 crisis. Josh Rogin summarizes well this strategy in today's Foreign Policy with his headline: "Obama administration seeks to bolster Bahraini crown prince with arms sales."

Many--including the same senators that were instrumental in blocking previous attempts to sell arms to Bahrain that came to a head last October--have already rejected the deal on moral grounds. Rogin quotes Senator Wyden as saying, for example,

"This is exactly the wrong time to be selling arms to the government of Bahrain. Things are getting worse, not better. ... The country is becoming even more polarized and both sides are becoming more entrenched. Reform is the ultimate goal and we should be using every tool and every bit of leverage we have to achieve that goal. The State department's decision is essentially giving away the store without the government of Bahrain bringing anything to the table."

Yet one need not even appeal to a normative argument to explain why the arms sale is a bad move, for it is already flawed on strategic grounds. In case you missed it, the Obama Administration already tried this move last summer. A perceptive New York Times article from June 9, 2011, for example, told how the U.S. was "Cultivating a Prince to Coax an Ally to Change." Sh. Salman even met then with President Obama himself, unlike (officially, any way) last week.

Perhaps not coincidentally, this year's initiative has many parallels with last summer: not merely a politically-defeated crown prince, but rising anti-American sentiment, and an ongoing security crackdown against opposition activities. Compare, for instance, the analysis from last year's NYT story:

"But several analysts warn that even if Prince Salman is sincere, he is only one member of a family that includes hard-liners like his uncle, Prince Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, the long-serving prime minister. With his mild manner and fluent English, Prince Salman may be merely the monarchy’s friendly face, skeptical analysts say."

And then Rogin's piece today:

"The crown prince has been stripped of many of his official duties recently, but is still seen as the ruling family member who is most amenable to working constructively with the opposition and with the United States. It's unclear whether sending him home with arms sales will have any effect on internal Bahraini ruling family politics, however."

So why, exactly, is the State Department expecting a different result this year? One might say that the U.S. simply didn't want the crown prince to return home with nothing; that the arms deal represents not so much part of a concerted Bahrain strategy, but simply an attempt to give Sh. Salman something that he might use to help direct the country on a more moderate path. Yet the fact that the arms sale is but one part of what seems to be a multi-pronged effort--which includes also the visit and appearance on Bahrain TV of Indiana Congressman Dan Burton, for example, who was quick to criticize protesters and to laud Sh. Salman's efforts at dialogue--would seem to suggest a more deliberate strategy.

Unfortunately, it's difficult to see how the latter could succeed. Let us count the ways.

Who Benefits from an Arms Sale?

Given that the State Department has evidently grasped the facts that (1) Sh. Salman and his (at least outwardly) moderate orientation represents perhaps the best hope for a negotiated settlement in Bahrain; but that (2) he has been sidelined within the ruling family, it is strange indeed that the mechanism chosen to revive his political fortunes--military arms sales--serves directly to benefit one of his main political competitors and arguably the most obstructionist of all the Al Khalifa: Defense Minister Khalifa bin Ahmad. (Yes, Sh. Salman is nominally Deputy Supreme Commander of the Bahrain Defense Forces; but he is also, nominally, the second most powerful person in the country.)


To be sure, it was less than a year ago that "The Marshal" revealed to Al-Ahram that it was the U.S. itself, acting in concert with Iran, that orchestrated the entire February uprising. He has since expanded on these claims, telling Al-Ayam that 22 different NGOs "managed and funded by the U.S. and [an unnamed] Gulf state" were actively "working against" Bahrain. More generally, pro-government media, especially the sensationalist Al-Watan newspaper controlled by the defense minister's brother, Royal Court Minister Khalid bin Ahmad, has been fomenting anti-U.S. and anti-Western sentiment ("Ayatollah Obama," anyone?) for the better part of a year. And now the U.S. is rewarding these same individuals with additional resources (and holding out the promise of more), and all to the supposed benefit of the crown prince and Bahrain's "moderate" faction? Interesting.

Playing into the Security Narrative

This issue is symptomatic of a larger problem, which is that the arms deal only reinforces the political calculus that has helped get Bahrain into its current mess, namely the state's progressive securitization of the problem posed by its Shi'a-led opposition. If the goal of the U.S.'s "empowerment" of Sh. Salman is to get Bahrain's government and opposition back to the negotiating table, then agreeing new arms sales is almost exactly the opposite of the way to achieve it. So long as those in charge of Bahrain continue to conceive of the crisis in security--rather than political--terms, then they will seek to resolve it accordingly: not through dialogue, not through political negotiations, but through force. Boosting Bahrain's security and military capabilities is an effective way to ensure that the latter remains an attractive and viable option--and one that would seemingly enjoy the tacit approval of the ruling family's most important Western backer.

It is not difficult to understand: the very TARGET of this entire re-conceptualization of Bahrain's political-cum-security problem is PRECISELY the reform program initiated by King Hamad and increasingly deputized to Crown Prince Salman. The logic of this decade-long initiative is that economic opportunity born of diversification and modernization, combined with incremental political liberalization, can offer a way out of the chronic popular discontent that has plagued the country for decades.


The competing theory, the one articulated EXACTLY by Sh. Salman's detractors within the Al Khalifa, is that Bahraini Shi'a will never be satisfied with anything short of a wholesale takeover of the state, and that political and economic reforms are not only superfluous but, insofar as they only serve to encourage the opposition to pursue a more radical agenda, a cure that is worse than the disease. The only alternative, by this view, is a security-based strategy that both: (1) takes pre-emptive measures to limit the influence or potential influence of Shi'a; and (2) cultivates anti-Shi'a (and anti-Western) orientations among ordinary Sunnis such that these citizens will be happy to fight the government's battles for it if and when the need arises.

Any guess as to which of these two rival strategies resumed U.S. arms sales to Bahrain--to say nothing of U.S. Congressmen "rap[ping] Bahrain rioters" on state television--is likely to reinforce? And to whose benefit? As Tom Malinowski of Human Rights Watch notes in Rogin's piece for Foreign Policy,

"But there's no guarantee the government will do what we all hope it does. They might just as easily conclude ‘We don't have to empower the crown prince at home; we just have to send him to America."

The Need for Extra-Al Khalifa--not Intra-Al Khalifa--Pressure

Third, having already failed once to "revive" the crown prince, one would think that the United States Government would get the hint that it has apparently little influence on intra-Al Khalifa politics. The struggle for power within Bahrain's ruling family has had some fifteen months now to run its course, and it's difficult to see any scenario in which Sh. Salman and King Hamad come out victorious.

What is required instead, then, is a bit (or more likely a lot) of extra-Al Khalifa pressure, namely from Bahrain's landlord to the southwest, Saudi Arabia. Not only do the Saudis enjoy obvious leverage over the ruling family generally given their bankrolling of the entire country, but they are particularly well-connected to exactly the recalcitrant individuals in need of political arm-twisting, especially the prime minister. Whether there is any hope of convincing the Saudis that such pressure is in their interest is a separate question, and one made more complicated by the post-Arab Spring U.S.-Saudi fallout. Still, there would seem to be some movement already from the Saudis in this direction, if one would interpret their vague plans for Bahrain-Saudi "union" as a signal to the Al Khalifa to get their house straightened up.

In any case, a U.S. attempt to secure Saudi cooperation on Bahrain cannot be more of a failure than the current strategy of "reviving" Sh. Salman every 12 months or so. At this pace, he should be ready to challenge his ruling family adversaries some time in 2035.

Ignoring Bahrain's New Political Realities

Despite its best attempts, Bahrain cannot return to the pre-February 2011 political status quo. It is not only the Shi'a-led opposition but also ordinary Bahraini Sunnis for whom political expectations have fundamentally and likely irreversibly changed. The most important upshot of this fact is that the days of piecemeal government-opposition political settlements are over. Accordingly, the ability and desire of the government to partake in political negotiations is not governed simply by the relative power of Al Khalifa "moderates" and "hard-liners" but the political calculations of a ruling family facing an entirely different set of political challenges from those to which it has grown accustomed since King Hamad's ascension in 1999.

If the point of the arms sale is again to help jump-start dialogue efforts in Bahrain, the Obama Administration would do well to observe the outcome of the most recent attempt at this. As I noted in my previous post,

In March 2012, rumors surfaced of a new government-opposition dialogue sponsored by the Royal Court Minister Sh. Khalid bin Ahmad. The thinking, apparently, was that by involving the most hard-line Al Khalifa from the beginning, the state might avoid the initiative’s being undermined later. In the end, however, the problem was not Sh. Khalid, but the reaction of Sunni groups, some of which rejected the talks because they symbolized compromise with the opposition, others because they were not to be included. The National Unity Gathering initially declared a boycott of the dialogue until the opposition ended protest activities, although it was not clear that it had been invited in the first place. At the same time, the Al-Fatih Awakening rallied against the initiative not because they opposed it on principle, but because they weren't invited. Their slogan: “No dialogue without Al-Fatih.” Under pressure from Sunnis unhappy that the state would seek a political bargain without their input, Al Mahmud reversed his original decision to boycott.

Not coincidentally, one assumes, talk of this new "political dialogue initiative" stopped almost immediately. The state is willing to do a lot of things to appease Sunnis, but allowing them a seat at the negotiating table alongside members of the opposition is definitely not one of them. Indeed, this scenario above all others is the one that the ruling family will work to avoid. The chance that Sunni and Shi'i political leaders could agree some set of political demands is far too dangerous to risk by agreeing to multiparty talks. Rather than reject the Sunni demand for inclusion directly, then, the state appears instead to have ended its pursuit of a new dialogue initiative altogether.

While it is true, then, that among the barriers to a solution to Bahrain's political stalemate is the post-February 14 decline of Crown Prince Salman (or, more accurately, the post-uprising ascendancy of security-minded members of the Al Khalifa), this shift in power is connected inextricably to the no less dramatic transformation of Bahrain's domestic political dynamics. It is this altered reality on the ground that will ultimately determine the likelihood and efficacy of any new attempts at resolving Bahrain's political conflict, to which the number of parties seems to be increasing by the day.

Hopefully, the inevitable failure of the U.S.'s latest attempt to "bolster" the crown prince will lead to a change in strategy on Bahrain, one that may take into account such factors as those treated here.

Update: Gulf union fever is in full swing. Having failed in previous initiatives to establish a GCC monetary union and even a mere customs union, the Gulf Arab states would have us believe now that they are going direct to political-military union, starting with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Announcing some grandiose vision at a summit in Riyadh is one thing, backing it up with concrete institutional steps toward integration is another. Someone wake me when the latter has occurred.

Update 2: Via an anonymous commenter: the BBC's Adam Curtis examines the past 90 years of British involvement in Bahrain, i.e. the period after the arrival of Charles Belgrave. A suitable title: "IF YOU TAKE MY ADVICE - I'D REPRESS THEM."

Update 3: Surprise, surprise! The fabled Bahrain-Saudi union supposed to emerge from yesterday's GCC summit in fact is "a commission to continue studying" GCC integration, the findings of which will be discussed at December's summit. At which time they'll probably announce a follow-up commission, a sooper dooper follow-up commission, etc.

The New York Times also notes that participants in the conference "distributed a draft plan for the union to its members’ foreign ministers to review so they could resolve any issues." Oh no a draft plan!

Update 4: On the bright side regarding the U.S. arms sale to Bahrain, there are some shnazzy new anti-U.S. web fliers created by the February 14th people to correspond with their "Week of Exposing the American Conspiracy." Among them are this beaut featuring an AK-toting Statue of Liberty calling in air support. Perhaps this might open up the possibility for some much-needed Sunni-Shi'i political coordination, since the one thing upon which everyone seems to agree is that there is an American conspiracy in Bahrain.