The Uprising is Over. But What Is the Price of Bahrain's Victory?

For a recent publication on Bahrain, I was forced to go back and forth with an editor over the question of whether the February 14th uprising should be introduced in the present or past tense.  Is it correct to say that the uprising is over?, that is, or do the continued clashes between riot police and mostly-youthful protesters constitute a continuation, qualitatively-speaking, of the original movement of early 2011?

I took--and do take--the former position: the uprising proper has ended.  Or, rather, it was made to end by the sweeping security response initiated with the State of National Security and subsequently entrenched via Bahrain's effective "sectarianism as security" political strategy.  In this sense, the actual rebellion has long been over, and "major combat operations," as some like to say, essentially were concluded with the second clearing (and for good measure razing) of the former Pearl Roundabout.

Now, judging by the aforementioned debate with my editor, which incidentally I lost, such a view evidently is a controversial--or rather an uncomfortable and unpalatable--one to express.  To reference the "failed February 14 uprising" is seen as insulting the very memory of those who died, and who continue to die and risk bodily harm, in their pursuit of basic societal and political reform. In fact, however, it is simply to admit the overwhelming material and tactical superiority of one side over the other, a military dominance that students of insurgency and civil war have long noted.

As part of a cross-national study of civil war incidence, Fearon and Laitin (2005) examined the case of Bahrain as a sort of diagnostic check on their model of civil war, which predicted a "a negligible probability for civil war in Bahrain during the entire period of its independence from 1971-1999."  As they note in their introduction,

There has been no civil war in Bahrain, so our model did not let us down! There seems at first blush nothing to explain. A narrative of Bahrain’s political conflicts, however, allows us to address several themes. First, Bahrain’s contemporary history helps illuminate why there is no positive relationship between grievance level and civil war. Bahrain’s contemporary history reads like a litany of grievances; yet these do not easily translate into sustained violence.

While the authors offer a multidimensional response to examine this last observation--why grievances in Bahrain "do not translate easily into sustained violence"--they identify several tactical factors as being particularly important, in particular the extreme smallness of the community.  They continue,

In Khuri’s formulation (1980, pp. 245-6), Bahrain is a “metrocommunity,” a form of rule that requires intimate knowledge by the rulers of their constituents. He notices that the Al-Khalifah sheiks know practically every family in Bahrain, its history, its size, and its social status. They are thus able to micromanage gift-giving, favors, and government posts to co-opt rival claimants to power. Speaking of the then current leader and his family, Khuri points out that one of the ruler’s brothers “talks” to “moderninsts” and “freedom fighters”; the ruler’s eldest son “talks” to youths in the cultural and sports’ clubs. ... [This way], a unified family can -- if it is willing to use brutal suppression and call in foreign troops -- maintain order in a changing society.

In short, they conclude, "[a] combination of 'metrocommunity' scale and political will to be brutal partly accounts for Bahrain’s avoidance of insurgency."

Now, anyone who has followed the previous nineteen months in Bahrain cannot fail to see the accuracy of these observations.  With its sustained deployment of police and military units along with a labyrinthine edifice of security checkpoints, the state has largely succeeded in penning demonstrators into their respective villages, now isolated even more than they were prior to February 2011 (which is saying a lot).  (More recently, the state has shifted to allow protests in finite areas, namely along al-Budaiyi' Road, while blocking them elsewhere.) Such an effort, combined with the decades-long exclusion of Shi'a from those professions that entail the use of weapons, has created a sort of double defense.

In the first place, in the face of concerted state effort, would-be revolutionaries face an almost impossible task in organizing into a mass capable of physically taking over the institutions of the state.  Witness, for example, the repeated unsuccessful attempts to "re-take" the ground surrounding the now-demolished Pearl Roundabout.  In February and March, activists were able to occupy the monument only because the state initially lacked the desire or resolve to stop them.  But when the Field Marshal finally moved to put an end to the protesters' camp and preclude their return, this was easily done, not least with the help of pervasive communications monitoring by which opposition plans are easily discovered.

How could police have stopped this advanced tactical operation?!

In the second place, even if demonstrations could again achieve the levels of mass participation witnessed in February and March 2011, still these citizens lack the one thing they would require to do more than, say, block traffic or occupy the Financial Harbor and other downtown sites: that is to say, guns.  Indeed, I was once stopped at Bahrain Airport when I attempted to bring in a traditional Yemeni tribal dagger I had bought as a souvenir.  It is simply unimaginable that individuals or groups could smuggle in the sort of arms required to wage an effective guerrilla campaign. Meanwhile, Bahrain spent $883 million on its military in 2011 alone, while Stratfor reports (subscription needed) that the country is now recruiting an additional 5,000 police and military personnel from among Sunni refugees who have fled Syria (to go along with the many tens of thousands recruited and naturalized over the previous decade).

Bahrain has also seemingly won its other war on the international front.  Having done its diplomatic duty in allowing the BICI to investigate the uprising, it has successfully resisted pressure to do anything more.  On the contrary, since December 2011 political change has been in the opposition direction.  As witnessed once more only days ago, protesters continue to be met with deadly force in confrontations with police.  Activists, including Nabeel Rajab and most recently Zaynab al-Khawajah, have been sentenced to prison for no more than insulting the prime minister and King Hamad, respectively.  One political society ('Amal) has been dissolved, while another (al-Wifaq) may be on the brink.

And yet, on the occasion of Bahrain's recent human rights review at the United Nations, the most the U.S. State Department could muster was the following anemic statement by Michael Posner:

Today Bahrain is at a crossroads. The government showed great courage last year in commissioning and accepting the recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report, implementation of which 13 states recommended during the review. Ten months after the release of the report, however, we are concerned that the government is losing momentum on implementation. We urge you once again to fully and swiftly implement the BICI recommendations as well as those generated through the UPR process. This will help create an environment where meaningful dialogue can take place.

So that's one "concern" and one "urge," partly offset by one "showed great courage."  Not exactly a strong reprimand likely to spark a change in political calculations.

What is more, in the few days since its review in Geneva, Bahrain has somehow been selected as the "Asian group representative" on the U.N. Human Rights Council Advisory Committee--and this, as CNN points out, on "the same day a young protester in the country was killed."  The view from Bahrain's Information Affairs Authority is somewhat more optimistic: the nomination "represents the international community's confidence in Bahrain's progress in the human rights field."  One might also entertain a more cynical interpretation.

So, then, one may as well just say it: Bahrain's uprising is over.  The government has prevailed, and there is no reasonable expectation of either an internal change in political dynamics or outside pressure to tip the present balance of power.  But one must be careful in the conclusions one therefore draws.  In particular, that the government has won in its tactical battle with protesters (and diplomatic battle with disapproving but still dependent allies) does not mean that violence and instability is likely to dissipate.  On the contrary, it is precisely this victory--a victory that has magnified already-considerable grievances a thousand times while crushing any hope for their redress--that is likely to invite a new, even more destructive sort of violence.

Only two months into the uprising, Hussein Ibish asked in Foreign Policy, "Is Bahrain Creating a New Terrorist Threat?"  At the time, his question garnered no little rebuke from Bahraini activists, insulted by his insinuation that theirs was anything but a non-violent protest movement.  Some 18 months later, no one can deny his conclusion, that "[b]y leaving no room for peaceful dissent, the Bahraini monarchy is creating [or rather, has created] the conditions for a violent revolt."

Yet the issue is not simply that there is no longer any room in Bahrain for "peaceful dissent."  The problem is much more pervasive: that for an entire generation of Bahrainis, not least Shi'a Bahraini youth, there is simply no room for ordinary living.  Even were protest activities to end today and a political ceasefire declared, still an entire class of Bahrainis faces the reality of dead or incarcerated loved ones and/or family members; little prospect for employment or societal advancement (and thus marriage); trouble gaining admission to the country's one public university--in short, lifelong memories and repercussions of the February 14th uprising.

Last month in The New York Times was a poignant if disturbing article that examined the attitudes of young Syrian refugees toward their erstwhile 'Allawi oppressors.  It begins,

Like all the small children in the desert refugee camp here, Ibtisam, 11, is eager to go home to the toys, bicycles, books, cartoons and classmates she left behind in Syria.

But not if that means living with Alawites, members of the same minority offshoot of Shiite Islam as Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad. “I hate the Alawites and the Shiites,” Ibtisam said as a crowd of children and adults nodded in agreement. “We are going to kill them with our knives, just like they killed us.”

Even if the scale of the violence in Syria is greater than that witnessed in Bahrain, can one really expect a qualitatively different result in the latter case?  Even before the uprising, the country was divided into what Clive Holes aptly describes as an “almost apartheid-like system of voluntary segregation.”  What hope is there that this division--geographical and otherwise--will stand the chance of lessening in the near- to medium-term?

More to the point, with hope fading for any political solution to the present government-opposition standoff, and indeed with the mounting popular disillusion with the formal opposition societies in any case, it is not unthinkable that some will decide that the only way to get the attention of the government (and/or of foreign governments) is to pursue more radical alternatives.  Already in June the government claimed to find in Salmabad tons of materials for the production of homemade bombs.  Due to Bahrain's massive "boy who cried wolf" problem as a result of repeated past claims of "terrorist plots," it was (and I suppose still is) difficult to know what to make of this find.  But the incidence of attacks using homemade explosives has only increased, with deadly results on the side of both protesters and police.

Consider the latest casualty, a boy of 17 who died only last night.  Photos of the boy (warning: graphic) clearly show bullet holes from what seems to be bird shot.  The Interior Ministry, on the other hand, claims riot police acted in self-defense when protesters began throwing Molotov cocktails.

Now, following the death of the boy in the village of Sadad, youths in another village (Shahrakan) caused a large explosion when they ignited a gas cylinder. A video posted to YouTube describes the explosion, apparently meant as a threat, as having been carried out "in condemnation of the murder of martyr 'Ali Hussain."



Meanwhile, the father of the boy attended a press conference along with members of the (recently-dissolved) political society 'Amal in which he essentially blames his son's death on the stance of "opposition societies," i.e., al-Wifaq.  "I cannot stand hand-in-hand with political societies who are in dialogue with a murderous regime," he says.  This came apparently after remarks by Deputy Head of al-Wifaq Khalil al-Marzuq to the effect that protesters should not use Molotov cocktails against police.  Opposition message boards are now filled with condemnations of al-Marzuq, described among other things as an Interior Ministry spokesman.


Neither does the United States escape the blame of opposition activists.  A statement by al-Wafa', for example, dismisses Posner's remarks at the UN--in particular his suggestion of dialogue--as disingenuous and emblematic of the U.S.'s "negative, hostile, and hypocritical role toward our people, disguised as friendship and advice, meant to halt our people's march toward achieving [its] demands."

Yes, the uprising itself has been extinguished.  But what is the price of the government's victory?  So far, it is a fractured society; a more diffuse and more radical opposition (among both Sunnis and Shi'is); overwhelming economic and political reliance on Saudi Arabia; and a self-perpetuating cycle of suspicion and violence that only continues to fuel these trends.  How long until one must add genuine armed insurgency to this list?

Update: As an additional "f you" to its international critics, Bahrain has upheld the controversial convictions in the trial of the Salmaniyya medical workers.

Update 2: It's good to see that Al-Watan has not lost any of its journalistic integrity since Al Bin Khalil took over as editor-in-chief.  Last Sunday (sorry I just caught this), the newspaper dedicated a full page to publishing the names and photographs of Bahraini activists who were said to have participated in the UN human rights review in Geneva, i.e. "the participants in the discrediting of Bahrain."

The article also purports to outline the "funding network" behind the activists, using the same flowcharts as Al-Watan's famous outline of the opposition's "terrorist network."

Update 3: There is a very interesting paper just published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences that uses statistical techniques to detect two different types of electoral fraud.  Unfortunately, it looks like the method requires a relatively large number of electoral districts (the average population per district must be smaller than 5,000), because otherwise it would be interesting to repeat their procedure using 2002-2010 electoral data from Bahrain!

Update 4: The Bahrain Mirror reports that Bahrain is now attempting to strong-arm another of its traditionally supportive-to-politically-neutral communities, namely Bahrainis of Persian origin ('Ajam). Sh. Rashid is said to have sent a strongly-worded letter to both the al-Manama Club and the Grand 'Ajam Ma'tam, two of the country's most prominent Persian-dominated civil society organizations, threatening the community with "deportation" if it "continues supporting opposition activities."  I suppose, then, that this explains the recent (seemingly random) statement of the Grand 'Ajam Ma'tam "reiterating its loyalty to His Majesty King Hamad bin 'Isa Al Khalifa" and criticizing "perpetrators of rioting and terrorism."

Update 5: As if on cue, Bahrain has suffered yet another deadly homemade bomb attack on police in the village of Eker.

The Dangerous U.S. Double Standard on Islamic Extremism

I have an article in Foreign Policy's Mideast Channel today on "The Dangerous U.S. Double Standard on Islamic Extremism." The focus is the U.S.'s continued support for and tolerance of Sunni Islamic movements in Syria and (as examined in the bulk of the article) in Bahrain, even as it falls victim to adherents of this very same ideology in Libya and elsewhere. In short, the U.S. seems not to have learned the lesson either of its ill-fated support for the mujahidin in Afghanistan or, relatedly, the attacks of 9/11.

Also, Freedom House has released a new "Countries at the Crossroads" report on Bahrain covering the period through November 2011. Not surprisingly, Bahrain's scores have been downgraded across the board.

Update: Christian Caryl agrees with me in the New York Review of Books blog: "Islamist Déjà Vu: The Lessons of 1979."

Update 2: Obligatory story from The Onion (warning: multiple phalluses).

Update 3: Chatham House has released a summary report for its June 2012 workshop on Bahrain titled "Youth Perspectives on the Future."

Update 4: Definitely Not Exaggerated Story of the Day® courtesy of the Jerusalem Post: "Bahrain seizes items Iran likely sought for nukes." As Black Bush would say, "Do I need to tell you what the fuck you can do with an aluminum tube!?! ALUMINUM!"



Update 5: Intelligence firm STRATFOR reports (login required for full text) that "Bahrain -- with the support of Saudi Arabia -- has begun a process to naturalize Sunni Syrian refugees in an effort to augment the minority Sunni population amid rising Shiite dissent." Shocking.

To Ban or Not to Ban ... Al-Wifaq

The big news this week in Bahrain is actually old news. Following the latest "unauthorized" protest by al-Wifaq in response to the opposition leader court sentences, first the Ministry of Interior and now the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs is once again threatening to take legal action against the society. While the word "dissolve" has not yet been thrown around, the initial MoI statement confirmed that it "has taken legal action to file a case against Al Wefaq," whatever that means. For those keeping track, this is now at least the third time that the government has either moved to ban al-Wifaq (in April 2011) or seemed poised to do so (a few months ago in June) since the uprising.

The newest campaign would appear to be led at least in part by ordinary citizens. Activists have been circulating an online "Petition of Popular Demand for the Application and Enforcement of the Law against al-Wifaq." Addressed to Justice Minister Sh. Khalid bin 'Ali and consisting of the standard fare about the need to crack down on al-Wifaq terrorists and saboteurs, the initiative is not signed by any particular group apart from "Bahraini loyalists."


Coinciding conveniently with the anonymous online petition is a similar if more euphemistic statement by the Justice Ministry's High Committee for Islamic Affairs titled "A Statement by the 'Ulama' and al-Da'wa on the Matter of Condemning Violence and Sabotage." And, just so you're sure that this isn't a sectarian affair, the Justice Ministry's official Twitter account posted photos of both Sunni and Shi'i members of the committee signing the document. Of course, whereas the former photo of Sunni clerics was retweeted only 15 times, the latter--ostensible proof of Shi'a clerical disapproval for the (Shi'a-led) opposition--gained 42 retweets and various responses.




Yet, notwithstanding the Justice Ministry’s seeming support for action against al-Wifaq, it is not clear what Bahrain’s rulers would gain from such a move at the present time. If the aim is strictly a security calculation rather than appeasement of public opinion (which I doubt), then certainly banning al-Wifaq, which remains the most moderate of an increasing number of opposition factions, is unlikely to achieve that goal. If anything, it would simply further convince al-Wifaq supporters (and erstwhile supporters) of the ultimate futility of its post-2005 strategy, pushing them toward more radical alternatives.

But if, as seems more likely, legal action against al-Wifaq represents deference to those in society and in the royal court desirous of a harsher security crackdown, then still the timing seems wrong. Popular demands for “enforcement of the law” against al-Wifaq—i.e., a ban on (and appropriate security measures to physically prevent) its protest activities, and perhaps even legal proscription of the society altogether—are not new. Indeed, Al-Watan has been running stories and op-eds to this effect, decrying the machinations of "Bahraini Hizballah," for the past 18 months. So why heed them now? In the past month or so alone, Nabeel Rajab has been arrested and convicted, while the prison sentences of the main opposition leaders have been confirmed. Why expend all of one's political tools at one time?


"A present from the Sunni loyalists of Bahrain to the February 14th Shi'a."



A penetrating documentary linking al-Wifaq to Iran's Revolutionary Guard.
This dilemma is but the latest evidence of the destructive, self-perpetuating nature of Bahrain's present political strategy, which I discussed in the previous post. Having successfully mobilized citizens against the opposition, the state faces increasing pressure to finish the job it started, by executing a decisive crackdown on protest activities and in effect barring the entire (Shi'a-led) political opposition. Yet, at least from the perspective of those whose position forces them to take a long-term view of politics--namely the king and crown prince--such an option can only be seen as a last resort.

In the first place, it produces diminishing returns. Say, for instance, that al-Wifaq were banned. But now opposition activity continues and perhaps augments, not least in protest of the very decision to ban the group. So, after a few weeks, conservatives in society and in the ruling family again agitate for additional measures. What then? Arrest 'Ali Salman? 'Isa Qasim? Ban access to and from villages? What is the end game? It should be clear by now that protesters, most of whom now have one or another friend or family member arrested, injured, or killed, will not be deterred short of being physically locked inside their homes.

The state's most recent "solution" has been to allow the opposition a defined space to protest--namely, along al-Budaiyi' Road--while attempting to block access to Manama proper. But how sustainable is this? Western housing compounds that used to be located along this route, including that of U.S. Embassy employees, have been abandoned in favor of "safer" areas in the northeastern quarter of the island. But at the end of al-Budaiyi' Road is the Sunni-dominated area of al-Budaiyi', al-Janabbiya, al-Jasra, etc. Do all of these people need to move as well in order to get to work on time? Will they not eventually begin to complain? And what of all the opposition strongholds in the south (Sitra, Nuwaidrat, 'Akar) and west (Karzakhan, Dumistan)? Where will be the "permissible" area of protest for these villagers?

A second and no less significant question is whether it's even in the state's interest to rid itself of the formal opposition. Since al-Wifaq's departure from parliament, the body has assumed a decidely more confrontational posture vis-a-vis the state, as "pro-government" MPs no longer need to waste their energy fighting with al-Wifaq. Similarly, if al-Wifaq were banned as a legal opposition society, what is Bahrain left with? A loose coalition of genuinely pro-government tribal MPs, two Sunni Islamic groups--both affiliated with what are elsewhere powerful opposition parties: Salafis, and the Muslim Brotherhood--and two new Sunni movements in TGONU and Sahwat al-Fatih that may or may not represent a new opposition current. Oh, and Wa'ad sans Ebrahim Sharif. I think it goes without saying that this is not a political balance that favors the status quo.

So why then the threat of legal action against al-Wifaq every few months? The answer stems in large part from another aspect of Bahrain's current political strategy (which I describe in a forthcoming article as "The Securitization of the Shi'a Problem in Bahrain"): in short, it can be imposed unilaterally by dissenting members of the ruling family. That is, by using their own position and resources to mobilize society against al-Wifaq and political compromise with the opposition generally, conservatives within the Al Khalifa can effectively foreclose options--say, a resumption of political dialogue--that might be preferred by other members of the ruling family, even more senior members.

My article talks in particular about the post-uprising ascension of the khawalid. Yet one might now perhaps add another royal to this list, viz. King Hamad's son Nasr, who has been building a reputation for himself as uncompromising toward the opposition. (I've been told that he is held in particularly high esteem among members of the military establishment, in contrast to Crown Prince Salman, in no small part on account of the former's reputed involvement--true or false--in the torture of detainees during the State of National Security.) Some individuals with whom I've talked are even convinced that Prince Nasr is eying his brother's position as heir apparent.

Whatever the case, he most definitely is on a public relations offensive as of late. The most recent episode comes after a Sept. 10 article in Al-Watan about "A Bahraini family of seven living in a car by the sea." (Not, as has been reported elsewhere, in a van down by the river. For comparison:)

Living in a car down by the sea

Living in a van down by the river

Who will step in to help this family in distress? But Sh. Nasr of course. The Gulf News reports that

A Bahraini prince has stepped in to rescue a homeless family of seven forced to live in a rented car.

Shaikh Nasser Bin Hamad Al Khalifa, the chairman of the Royal Charity Foundation, offered a house to the Bahraini mother and her six children after hearing about their plight and how they were kicked out of their home and had nowhere to go.

The needs and school requirements of the children, aged between four and 16, should be met to help them and their mother live in dignity, Shaikh Nasser ordered. ...

Om Abdullah, the mother, said that she was deeply moved by the decision of Shaikh Nasser, the son of King Hamad Bin Eisa Al Khalifa, to assist her homeless family and rescue all its members from the relentless onslaught of difficult circumstances on them.

Now, I'm not here to make fun of homeless families (assuming the story of the family is true--we are talking about Al-Watan after all), but I think everyone can agree that a bit of opportunism is at work here. While Salman is conspiring to bargain away the country to Shi'a terrorists, Nasr is putting his position to use helping poor people. Of course, if Nasr were really THAT great he would be out hang-gliding with endangered Russian cranes. I mean, seriously, be a man like Comrade Putin!


In any case, Bahrain may soon have additional fuel for the primary debate here about the future of (the state's toleration of) al-Wifaq. According to this Al-Monitor story, al-Wifaq already has planned a new demonstration for this Friday along a contested route. Not to be outdone, the February 14th folks have organized an entire "Week of Loyalty to the Leadership" (presumably the opposition leadership), with a culminating demonstration planned for next Friday in Manama.

Update: Referring to a Sept. 9 press conference in which the Interior Ministry announced a new clampdown on blogs and forums due to what it called "defamation" of "national symbols and personalities," this thread in Bahrain's main Sunni forum asks "Are Sunnis the targets of the Interior Ministry's decision to prosecute blogs and forums?"

Update 2: In Libya, another example of why the mobilization of Salafi citizens against Western and Shi'a heretics is not in the long-term interests of the United States. How long until the State Department exerts pressure to put an end to it in Bahrain?

Bahrain Now Hostage to Its Own Sectarian Political Strategy

Whatever else it was, yesterday's verdict in the appeal of Bahrain's opposition leaders was certainly not a surprise. After a week in which the Minister of Justice was forced to retreat on a decision to relocate a critical Sunni cleric after protest from ordinary citizens and a "meeting" with Sunni 'ulama', it is difficult to see how the state could have weathered the storm of criticism that would have followed from an acquittal or even from reduced sentences for the main accused. (The sentence of one individual--Al-Har Yusuf Mohammed Al-Sumaikh--was reduced from 2 years to 6 months.) If Bahrain is unwilling to confront its nominal Sunni support base even over a minor matter, in other words, what were the chances it would initiate a much fiercer fight over the fate of opposition leaders--opposition leaders it has spent the previous 18 months demonizing as Iranian-backed terrorists?

In this sense, the outcome of the trial was determined long ago, back when 20-foot-tall billboards all across the island proclaimed the guilt of Bahrain's conspirators. "Disease," they read, "must be excised from the body of the nation: from now on, we won't keep quiet about any mistakes or excesses by those who abuse Bahrain and its people." Unfortunately for Bahrain, including for the government itself, these words would prove prophetic. The subject in this case, security-minded Sunni citizens, have indeed kept their word, refusing to "keep quiet" either about those seen as breaking the law with continued protest activities, or those deemed lax in enforcing it, including King Hamad himself.


Even today, following the confirmation of the original verdicts, Sunni message boards are dominated by those who want the state to go even further. As some are happy to celebrate the court's decision, another popular thread argues, "We need to go back to the State of National Security." Such is the catch-22 in which Bahrain finds itself: having fanned the flames of sectarian politics for so long, how can the government begin to pull the country back from the brink without igniting an even wider political conflagration by alienating its critical support base?

Here the recent episode regarding the (attempted) relocation of 'Adal Al Hamad is instructive. Instead of earning itself goodwill among Sunnis, the state's appeasement of Al Hamad's supporters has seemingly only emboldened them. One very popular thread on Bahrain's main Sunni forum offers photos of mosque-goers welcoming back a grinning Al Hamad. An attached article from the newspaper/magazine Al-Naba' gives the headline, "After the Return of Sh. 'Adal Al Hamad to the Pulpit of the Nusuf Mosque, Sh. Muhammad al-Husayni [says]: 'The Causes of Countries' Shame is the Lack of Deference to the 'Ulama'.'


At the same time, of course, Bahrain's appeasement of security-oriented citizens and royals (an action that includes also the recent arrest and conviction of Nabeel Rajab) serves only to further radicalize the Shi'a- and secular-led opposition, as the latter perceives increasingly little chance of a political resolution either of their post-uprising grievances or of their decade-old constitutional demands. The formal opposition has already announced mass demonstrations for Friday, while the U.S. Embassy in Manama has warned its citizens to brace for "72 hours" of potentially-violent protests.

The Reuters report on the court sentences quotes Jane Kinninmont as saying that "authorities may be trying to show their strength ahead of a planned dialogue with political societies." The article continues, "[She adds] this could backfire if protests and clashes escalated." Quite an understatement! In fact, the behavior of the opposition is only half of the government's problem with regard to a possible resumption of talks. Unless they have solved the riddle that has precluded dialogue since March, namely how to hold talks about political reform without the participation of Sunni groups that have substantive political demands of their own, it is very difficult to see how any dialogue will be able to proceed.

Moreover, as Jane also notes in the article, "[s]trong Saudi backing for Bahrain has made it less interested in what the West has to say." Not merely this, but the Saudis may well have drafted the blueprints of Bahrain's present political strategy, which is essentially Shi'a containment (and Sunni preoccupation) through selective Sunni mobilization. (A recent article by Toby Matthiesen on Saudi Arabia's crackdown on Shi'a activists describes this well.)


The time may come when the Al Sa'ud have bigger things to worry about than opposing a constitutional reform movement in their tiny island neighbor. King 'Abdallah is once again in New York seeking medical treatment, and the (also-ailing) crown prince is the last of a generation of leaders, with no clear successor in sight. Even more worrying, a new eye-opening report by CitiGroup suggests that by 2030 Saudi Arabia may be a net oil importer due to rising electricity demands, which are increasing at around 8% per year. But that time has not yet arrived.

Finally, one wonders about the seemingly paralyzed decision-making of the United States regarding Bahrain. One can appreciate the diplomatic stickiness of the situation at a time when elections are around the corner--to say nothing of a possible Israeli attack against Iran. Yet the long-term and even medium-term viability of Bahrain's present political strategy--or, more precisely, the lack thereof--must be clear enough to the policy gurus at the State Department and, one would hope, at the Pentagon. As one interlocutor aptly summarized recently:

I fully understand the constraints on the Obama administration by the current elections season, but Bahrain cannot continue business as usual. I don't think it will be long before that island country blows up in our faces in a big way. When you have angry Shia, "jihadist" Salafis, and xenophobic Sunnis in agreement against the US because of our perceived inaction (Shia), anti-Islam posture (Salafis), and pro-reform tendencies (Sunnis), Washington should take notice lest we truly become part of the problem. The Saudi driven Sunni strategy is rapidly reaching a dead end.

Hear, hear.

A cartoon from the main Sunni forum summarizes their view.

Update: A front-page (and 172-point font) headline in the Gulf Daily News warns citizens and diplomats to "RESPECT TERROR COURT VERDICTS!" The article cites a "comprehensive statement" issued by the Bahraini Human Rights Ministry that "rejected 'any intervention by any state'" in the case. United States: you're on notice!

Update 2: Emile Nakhleh develops many of the arguments here in a new op-ed, "Bahraini Repression Amidst a Failing Strategy."

Update 3: Third time's the charm? Bahrain once again is threatening to "take legal action" against al-Wifaq for its "unauthorized" march on Saturday. Oddly, though, this time it's the Interior Ministry leading the charge rather than the Justice and Islamic Affairs Ministry, despite the latter actually having jurisdiction over political societies. (Check that: Sh. Khalid has now weighed in with a statement of his own.)

Sunni Islamists Testing Political Boundaries Altered (Or Not) by the Uprising

The main subject of today's post is illustrative in that it follows conveniently from the main conclusion of the previous one. There, I argued that Bahrain's renewed crackdown on political protest--its effective ban on rallies, the recent arrest and prosecution of Nabeel Rajab, and so on--stems not primarily from the state's relationship with the Shi'a-led opposition, but from its tenuous balancing act involving Bahraini Sunnis.

The latter (excluding those from tribally-aligned families who have remained essentially apolitical even following the uprising) fall into two basic camps: (1) those who have used the opportunity of their post-February 2011 political mobilization to press for a harsher security posture vis-a-vis the opposition; and (2) those who have used it to articulate a wider political agenda independent of the state's dealing with protesters. So, in order to limit the appeal of the latter group, the government has sought to appease the former.

Yet the line between the two is of course blurred, as is the boundary beyond which acceptable petitioning among Sunnis becomes (from the standpoint of the government) unacceptable protest in its own right. This is all the more opaque as the true nature of Bahrain's largest post-February Sunni movements--the National Unity Gathering and Sahwat al-Fatih--itself remains ambiguous. Neither has demonstrated a willingness or desire to challenge the state directly on any specific matter of policy. As a result, it continues to be difficult to refute those who accuse the movements of being either an extension of existing political powers (al-Asalah and/or al-Manbar) or of (some faction of) the government.

To attempt to grasp the true significance of Bahrain's "Sunni Awakening," then, one can do little more than sit back and observe the progression of the ongoing political disorder. I have written previously that one possible litmus test will be the (eventual) restart of government-opposition dialogue. If Sunni groups remain insistent upon a seat at the bargaining table, one may be persuaded one way; if they relent and fail to press for their own political demands, one can be perhaps safe in forming the opposite opinion. The only problem is that renewed dialogue does not appear to be on the horizon.

Very interesting, therefore, is a development reported (Arabic here) last night. One will recall a recent post here that examined the controversy surrounding the building of a new Catholic Church in 'Awali, and indeed the relocation there of the church's entire Gulf vicariate, on land donated by King Hamad. As far as I can tell, the "controversy" was fueled almost exclusively by Sunni Islamists, who objected to the decision not only on religious grounds but also because it was seen to evince the government's (or at least King Hamad's) capitulation and/or thralldom to the West. (Unless I've missed something, Al-Wifaq and Shi'i clerics have stayed quiet about the issue. Update: According to this Washington Post story, 'Isa Qasim also has expressed opposition to the church, asking why resources should be diverted at a time when demolished Shi'a mosques have still yet to be rebuilt.) Recently, some 68 of Bahrain's Sunni clerics issued a statement carried in Akhbar al-Khaleej that called on "those who are responsible for order in this land to pull back the grant and the permission":


Now, one of the leading critics of the new church, Sh. 'Adal Hasan Al Hamad, has been removed from his longtime position as imam of the Nusuf Mosque in East Rifa' following a combative Friday sermon in which he repeated in harsher language the message of the 'ulama' statement. As reported in this informative Global Voices article, Al Hamad's sermon

described the land donation and allowing the church to be built as "Pro-Christian" and "an attempt to please Western nations." He urged worshipers to express their opposition, reminding them that they have previously drawn a "red line when it came to the leadership of this country" [in reference to their stand against the events of 2011] while the "rightful religion of Allah is far more superior and worthy of their support." He warned that “Silence in such matters could drag divine consequences."

In addition to the full (.mp3) audio of the sermon (as well as of previous Friday sermons), Al Hamad's website includes a thematic outline, which includes the following four questions:

1. "What is the justification for building the church in Bahrain?
2. Is Bahrain an Islamic state?
3. Is this a test of the people in the country, and will we pass the test?
4. Do you know, O listeners, the hypocrites in the country?"

Now, someone at the Ministry of Justice has a real sense of humor. Rather than bar Al Hamad from giving Friday sermons altogether, instead Sh. Khalid has offered him a lesson in religious tolerance and multiculturalism. Having spent 25 years at a grand mosque in an almost exclusively Sunni neighborhood of East Rifa', Al Hamad has been relocated to a much smaller mosque in Tubli, which depending on the exact location is either mixed or exclusively Shi'i. (Hopefully for him, his new home--Sheikha Kanoo Mosque--is not in the village portion of Tubli!)

The irony of the decision has not been lost among critics of the move. The aforementioned article notes a Tweet by Jamal Ibrahim Al-Najem:

"For his speech on the largest church in the Gulf and after spending more than a quarter of a century in East Riffa, Dr Adel AlHamad is moved to a Shia Area in Bahrain! We are All Adel Hassan!"

A similar sentiment echoes across various media. One popular Arabic-language article by blogger Rashid Ahmad Al-Rashid describes the situation as "A Tale from Another Planet with the Minister of Justice!" Elsewhere, on Twitter, Muhammad Khalid writes that "[t]he Sunnis of Bahrain reject moving the preacher of the Nusuf Mosque Dr. 'Adal Al Hamad to another mosque under any pretext":


Then, in another Tweet,Khalid goes even further:

"The transfer of Dr. 'Adal Al Hamad to another grand mosque is injustice against him and Sunnis as a whole and a test [case] for something larger that will soon shock the Sunni street. Be prepared."

Sunni Internet forums are no different.

• One popular thread calls for an end to Sunnis' "political closeness" with the state, saying, "We are with the leadership... We are with the government... But we are against the ongoing persecution against Sunnis simply to satisfy the traitors [i.e., the opposition] and the West!"


• Another insists that "the Sunni opposition will tip the scales in the future!!"


• Yet another announces a Sunni "gathering" this Friday at Al Hamad's new mosque in Tubli, presumably to protest his relocation.

Incidentally, this means that Bahrain will have at least three demonstrations on its hands on Friday, as al-Wifaq and other opposition societies already are on the books for their "Freedom and Democracy" rally along the familiar path of Budaiyi' Road; and the February 14th Coalition is holding week-long festivities--including a Molotov cocktail assault on a Sitra police station--in the run-up to next week's verdict in the opposition leader trial.


So, then, what to make of all of this? First, the government's message seems to be clear, and is something along the following lines: "Sunnis, we are happy to hear your complaints about the opposition, and have even tolerated with good humor a year's worth of complaints about our supposed hypocrisy in dealing with the opposition. But just because we've given you a bit of what you wanted--Nabeel Rajab's in jail; and in a week or so his friends' sentences will be renewed--don't think that you can dictate wider policy, especially when it threatens to hamper the international image we are seeking to cultivate and the international relationships that we depend on."

It is in this sense, I think, that Muhammad Khalid describes Al Hamad's removal as "a test [case] for something larger that will soon shock the Sunni street." Indeed, Al Hamad too refers to a "test" of Sunnis in his offending sermon, when he asks, "Is [the church issue] a test of the people in the country, and will we pass the test?" Whether this "something larger" refers to anything specific--say, a new government-opposition dialogue; or simply another item on the long list of percieved wrongs against Bahrain's Sunni community--it's hard to say. But inasmuch as any solution to Bahrain's political impasse requires resolution first of the government's "Sunni problem," it will be interesting to observe what, if anything, comes next.

A final question, which is admittedly pure speculation on my part, concerns the role of Saudi Arabia. Obviously, Bahrain's room to maneuver politically depends critically on the view from Riyadh. But, as Simon Henderson wrote only two days ago, there is renewed speculation about the health of King 'Abdallah (and even of the newly-anointed crown prince), who has left the Kingdom reportedly for treatment in New York. Thus, does the fact that the Saudis may soon have something much larger to worry about than avoiding possible government concessions in Bahrain--namely, a full-blown succession crisis--offer King Hamad, the crown prince, and their friends in the State Department a new window of opportunity to make some political progress?

Update: Two additional links that I forgot to incorporate. A first is an article by 'Abd al-Hadi Khalaf for the NYT's "Room for Debate" feature. A second is a new Chatham House paper by Jane Kinninmont (does she sleep?) on Kuwait's "experiment in semi-democracy."

Update 2: As a commenter notes, Sh. Rashid has now backed off his decision to transfer Al Hamad after "meeting with a number of Sunni sheikhs and 'ulama'." (Note that today was the planned Sunni "gathering" in support of Al Hamad.) Perhaps the political boundaries have indeed shifted in Bahrain.

Update 3: And someone points out this "documentary" on the U.S. Embassy in Bahrain.



Update 4: Still more documentaries. This Bahrain Mirror story describes a new video titled "The King and the Corruption of the State" making its way around the YouTubes. What's new, you ask? Well, this one comes not from the opposition but, purportedly at least, from Bahraini Sunnis. Subtitled "The Sunni response to the king of Bahrain," this thing is two hours long!

Part 1

Part 2

Update 5: A post in Bahrain's main Sunni forum casts doubt upon the origins of the aforementioned videos critical of King Hamad. It notes that the poster of the video--and of several previous critical videos--is based in the UK, a main center of the traditional opposition. Even if it is a fake, however, the video remains interesting in that it signifies a more concerted effort among activists to appeal (even if through propaganda) to disaffected Sunnis.

Update 6: No surprise here: "Bahrain court upholds sentences of opposition leaders." Why start another fight with security-minded Sunnis and royals if you don't need to?

Unable to Please Everyone, Bahrain Caves to Advocates of a New Crackdown

King Hamad congratulates 'Adal al-Ma'awdah on his recent trip to Syria

For the last post, I made the mistake of waiting for the court decision announcing the fate of Bahrain's political opposition leaders. Delayed now until September 4, chances are it will be postponed again--so no point in waiting a second time. As it turned out, however, Bahrain was indeed greeted with a prison sentence in time for the 'Eid holiday, namely that of BCHR president Nabeel Rajab. Once thought "off-limits" due to his international visibility, Rajab was given a three-year term for (ostensibly at least) participation in "illegal" gatherings. (See here for commentary by Jane Kinninmont and Toby Jones.)

In fact, Rajab's untouchability ended when he repeated the mistake of his BCHR predecessor 'Abd al-Hadi al-Khawajah, which is of course calling out Khalifa bin Salman. Just as Al-Khawajah's public criticism of the prime minister at the 'Uruba Club in 2004 earned him a trip to prison and the enduring enmity of the Bahraini premier, so it seems has Rajab's. In keeping with the times, Rajab's comments were delivered via Twitter on June 2, when he suggested that the pro-Khalifa rallies held by residents of Muharraq happened only because individuals were paid to attend. As Human Rights Watch documents, this "insult" against the good people of Muharraq earned Rajab a three-month sentence, to which was subsequently added the additional offense of organizing and participating in unauthorized demonstrations. The lesson: don't mess with Khalifa bin Salman--or Texas.

An artist's rendering of the Rajab courtroom
That said, Rajab's prosecution also serves a wider purpose: to appease those citizens who continue to demand a harsher crackdown on protest activities. Faced with two separate (and wholly unfamiliar) groups of politically-active Sunnis--those who simply want a tougher government stance against protesters, and those who desire a larger say in politics generally--the state has sought to appease the former in order to undermine the latter's appeal. So far, the strategy seems to be working well enough, with new Sunni movements like TGONU and Sahwat al-Fatih showing little desire to challenge the state directly. (Independent activists such as Mohammad al-Zayani, Mohammad Al Bu Flasa, and 'Isa Town MP Usama al-Tamimi are obviously another story; and for this they have earned the condemnation of some of their Sunni compatriots.)

One may wonder long this result will prevail. Having now caved to this social pressure (in addition, no doubt, to pressure from more security-minded members of the Al Khalifa), King Hamad is sure now to hear more of the same: "Why doesn't the interior ministry hold accountable other opposition leaders who also have organized illegal rallies?" "Why is the state afraid to go after 'Ali Salman and 'Isa Qasim himself?" And, of course, "How can the government think of reopening 'dialogue' with al-Wifaq and other opposition societies while the latter continue to practice violence and conspire against the nation?" (One shutters to think what would happen in the event of an acquittal for the opposition leaders.) One will find many similar questions simply by browsing the editorial page of Al-Watan. Or, for instance, in this popular thread on Bahrain's largest Sunni forum, titled "The king is the one responsible for what's happening today":


In the short term, then, throwing a political bone to citizen advocates of a security crackdown is a useful way to (1) diffuse some public pressure; and (2) change the subject away from the more thorny issue of the larger political role of Bahrain's Sunnis. Yet, in the long term it succeeds only in perpetuating the country's larger political crisis by foreclosing alternative options. By adopting a security response to what is a political problem, Bahrain is further radicalizing a Shi'a population already exasperated by a decade of violence confrontations with the state, thereby necessitating additional security measures, and feeding into a vicious cycle. At the same time, this radicalization leaves the government with no viable partner in dialogue, since al-Wifaq cannot be expected to convince the February 14 Coalition and like-minded movements of the efficacy of any political settlement. From the state's perspective, why bother holding talks with al-Wifaq if the group is unable to control its own constituency?

Yet, in fact, the problem is even more complicated than this, for even if the state had a willing and able interlocutor, still no dialogue could proceed. This is due to the newfound political expectations of Sunni groups, who as witnessed in March of this year are sure to reject any hint of political discussions, either (1) because there can be no dialogue until the opposition ends protest activities; or (2) because there can be no dialogue without the participation of Sunni societies. About the first objection the government need not worry so much, since it is essentially a different form of the same complaint already expressed by many Sunnis: namely, that the state--or King Hamad, or his secret U.S. advisers, or whomever--is too lenient with the opposition. It is the latter suggestion, however, that is simply intolerable from the ruling family's perspective: the idea that it should join representatives from all segments of Bahraini society at the political bargaining table--that it should sit together, as if equals, to plan the country's political future.

Rather than risk having to deny Sunnis the opportunity to participate, and thus the possibility of a concerted political mobilization around this specific issue, the Al Khalifa have opted instead simply to abstain from holding any new dialogue. Indeed, as evidenced by this Gulf News report on the prospect of new "talks" with "local political societies," it seems that the word "dialogue" is now being avoided altogether. Sponsored by Justice Minister Khalid bin 'Ali, these new "talks" (if one can call them that) were evidently held during Ramadan with "several formations" and aimed "to receive their feedback on the developments in the country and their views on ways to promote reconciliation following months of tension." To put this vague initiative in more precise terms, Sh. Khalid offered the following:

“We urge all political societies to actively participate in the promotion of positive attitudes supportive of the evolution and advancement of political action. The exchange of views by all constituents and segments of society through communication and joint meetings at the national level can significantly contribute to enhancing mutual confidence and understanding in political aspects, and enhance gains and advancement as well as building upon achievements realised through constitutional institutions.”

Well that sure clears things up. My suspicion is that the "initiative" actually consisted of Sh. Khalid or someone from the MoJ visiting a few Ramadan majalis held by political figures.

In short, Bahrain's ruling family sorely misses the time when its "several [political] formations" existed and operated along established lines: a bothersome but far from revolutionary Shi'a bloc in al-Wifaq; two Sunni Islamist political societies happy to expend more energy fighting al-Wifaq than advocating their own policy agenda; and an "illegal" Shi'a opposition whose leaders could be imprisoned and pardoned every year or so in time for the Bahrain Grand Prix. Yet in continuing down the road of its present security-based strategy, Bahrain's rulers are only cementing an opposite future, ensuring that their once-agreeable political arrangement will be that much more impossible to resurrect.

Update: An appeals court has now thrown out the original charge stemming from Rajab's tweet "insulting" the prime minister and the good folks of Muharraq. Unfortunately, as additional charges of organizing and participating in "illegal" rallies have since been added, this doesn't do him much good. If you're following along, then, the proper technique here is the following:

1. Arrest someone for saying something you don't like
   
2. While the person's in jail, think of another charge that is easier to defend
   
3. Convict on second charge
4. Acquit on first charge
5. The person remains in jail
   
6. ???
7. Profit
   

Update 2: Here's one for you. One of the individuals who testified at the recent congressional human rights hearing on Bahrain--a certain Walid Maalouf--has stirred up controversy with his remarks on the purported relationship between al-Wifaq and Hizballah. Maalouf, whom the Tom Lantos Commission website describes as a "former US Public Delegate to the UN" and "Former Director [of] Public Diplomacy [at] USAID" (and a Lebanese Christian, apparently), offered the commission some "facts between the so-called opposition in Bahrain and Hezbollah." Among these are:

3. Bahraini youth are seen receiving Al Qaeda and Hezbollah-style training. They crawl under barbed wire and walk in a paramilitary fashion. The fire and explosions heard are to highlight the mujahedeen fearlessness; they want to prove that they are unstoppable and can overcome any challenge. It shows their readiness to fight and die.

4. According to a confidential Bahraini Government Report submitted to the United Nations, specific evidence was presented linking Bahraini citizens to Hezbollah training camps in Syria.

5. In April 2011, Bahrain expelled 20 Lebanese citizens with known associations to Hezbollah.

Shit, barbed wire? And walking "in paramilitary fashion"! Well you've got me there--that must be a fact if barbed wire and paramilitary-walking is involved. What about repelling down drain pipes with only the use of a hose? Oh, and a "confidential Bahraini Government Report?" You mean like the kind of report that offers no independently-verifiable information and led the BICI to conclude that there was no external involvement in the uprising? Wow, tell me more! Wait, you're saying Bahrain deported random Lebanese citizens for supposed links with Hizballah? So has the UAE--some 120 families in 2009-2010 alone, per this HRW report. So is the UAE's al-Islah (Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated) opposition also in cahoots with Iran and Hizballah?

I'm unclear as to why this testimony, which was given more than three weeks ago, is just now being picked up by the media in Bahrain. (Of course, al-Wifaq now has a statement on its website rejecting the claims.) The irony, obviously, is that while Maalouf was busy talking about the relationship between Assad, Hizballah, and al-Wifaq, members of al-Asalah were planning a trip to Syria to share notes with the Free Syrian Army on how best to tackle the Safavid threat. And in this case, Maalouf need not even investigate the paramilitariness of their walk, since they proudly posted photos of the meeting on Twitter.

The difference?: the Free Syrian Army is a political faction/terrorist organization we (i.e., in the United States) support; Hizballah is a political faction/terrorist organization we don't support.

Update 3: The New York Times reports that U.S. arms sales tripled in 2011 to more than $66 billion, thanks mainly to high demand from Gulf states. The Arab Spring and Iran hysteria is good for biz!

Why Bahrain's Sunni Political Societies Are Unpopular—Among Sunnis

Naïve as I am, I was waiting to post here until the much-awaited verdict in the civilian retrial of Bahrain's main opposition leaders, scheduled for today. For some reason I had forgotten that the criminal justice system in Bahrain moves above all according to political expediency. Thus, at a time when rumors of yet another "new political dialogue" are rife, and when Bahrainis are waiting in anticipation of what King Hamad might reveal about this in his upcoming Ramadan/National Day address, it is perhaps no surprise that the sure-to-be-polarizing court decision was postponed until September 4. Remember the month-long postponement of the BICI's final report? (Also, announcing prison sentences for the country's political opposition on the eve of National Day is probably not the best idea.)

Of course, as the opposition has already scheduled rallies across the island today to coincide with the announcement, I suppose that demonstrators will have to be content to protest the postponement of the trial rather than the outcome itself. (NBC News' "Photo Blog" records some scenes from protests earlier this week.) Which is too bad because the February 14 folks had some really nice electronic fliers to mark the occasion:


Also:


With no news about the fate of the opposition leaders, then, the real story of the past week in Bahrain is a rather odd series of developments around the issue of religious tolerance. First, following other recent blasphemy cases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, a Bahraini blogger was sentenced to two years in prison for "insulting a religious icon," namely the prophet's wife Aisha. In fact, it sounds like this "blogger" was actually just a plain old Internet troll. A report in the Gulf News tells that he "often entered specific sites to insult Prophet Mohammad’s (PBUH) companions and wife." Evidently Bahrain's Internet police have not visited the forums of opposition and pro-government activists lately. That's probably a good thing, as the judicial system already suffers from chronic delays as it is.

One current thread on the main Sunni board asks, "Have the Jews become more merciful than the Shi'a?" Evidently a group of "moderate Jews" in the U.S. has allowed Sunnis to pray in a synagogue when their own mosque was full. By comparison, the author writes, "The Shi'a issue fatwas to kill Sunnis, in revenge for [the martyrdom of] Hussain, as they unjustly claim. So have the Jews really become more merciful than the Shi'a with respect to Sunnis?" So the poster succeeds in insulting at least two different religions--the Shi'a, for being terrorist murderers, and the Jews, for being arguably "less merciful" even than the Shi'a.

So as not to leave out Christians from the discussion, we move on to the next item on the topic of religious tolerance in Bahrain (and indeed in the wider Gulf). A few days ago, the Catholic Church announced that it is relocating its Gulf vicariate from Kuwait to Bahrain, ostensibly because "the country’s location is more accessible for meetings." It might also have to do with the fact that "King [Hamad] and royal family have granted 9,000 square meters of land, which will be used to build a larger church in Awali and to host the vicariate’s apostolic headquarters." For its part, Bahrain can now, as it already did on August 7, point to the vicariate “as a testament to the Kingdom’s religious and cultural openness.”

Moreover, the move might also have something to do with the fact that a Kuwaiti Salafi MP, Usama al-Munawir, announced his intention to submit a bill that would ban non-Muslim places of worship in the country. After facing criticism, he graciously "moderated" his plan to include only a ban on the construction of NEW non-Muslim places of worship. What tolerance!

Not to be outdone, and fresh off his liaison with fellow Salafis in the Free Syrian Army, president of al-Asalah and head of Bahrain's Parliamentary Committee on U.S. Hatred 'Abd al-Halim Murad has expressed his objections to the new church. Posting once again on Twitter--someone seriously needs to tell him to stop using Twitter--he said, inter alia, that "the 'ulama' agree that the building of churches in Muslim countries is haram"; that "the Arabian Peninsula is the domain of Muslims and churches may not be built in it"; and "the Arabian Peninsula is the cradle of Islam, and the sound of church bells cannot drown out the call to prayer." (The Manama Voice has a longer article here.)


Murad insists that al-Asalah will bring up the matter in parliament. Of course, objections of this sort from Bahrain's Sunni societies are not new. It was only recently that they clashed openly in parliament with Minister of Culture Shaikha Mai for her (what they deemed) overly-provocative "summer of culture" festival. Previous initiatives have centered around the banning of alcohol, crackdowns on prostitution, and of course the infamous Arab Big Brother television program that was filmed in Bahrain for only a short time in 2004 before being forced off the air due to public outcry.

In this case, however, the object of criticism would seem to be much more innocuous. In the first place, the location of the new church, 'Awali, is essentially a gated expatriate compound in the far south of the island (or, rather, as far south as you can go before hitting military fences). Absent the announcement, chances are no one would even have known the church was there, especially someone who lives on the opposite end of ANY ENTIRELY DIFFERENT ISLAND (Muharraq), as Murad does. Further, given that Murad just returned from Syria, a country notable for its until-now peaceful coexistence of Jews, Christians, 'Alawis, Sunnis, Druze, etc., it seems that he somehow left with the opposite lesson. Perhaps his friends in the Syrian Free Army wish to ban churches in Syria too?

Whatever the case, Bahrain's Internet tricksters are having a bit of fun with the faux controversy, as seen in the graphic at the top of this post depicting what appear to be Latvian Orthodox incarnations of Al Mahmud, Muhammad Khalid, Jasim al-Sa'idi, and 'Adal al-Ma'wadah.


Neither does King Hamad escape the photoshop treatment. Apparently some citizens predict that Bahrain's "commitment to cultural and religious openness" will soon extend to Tibetan Buddhism as well. This could make for an interesting situation, as it would likely spur criticism from the Chinese, from whose "interference" the Saudis would then need to defend Bahrain. So 2013: the year of the Sino-Saudi-Irano conflict?


The political analyst in me might be tempted to say that al-Asalah's recent expressions of religious intolerance--and threats to bring the matter into parliament--are somehow connected to the country's changing political dynamics. Perhaps the relative empowerment of Sunni groups in the post-February 14 period has afforded Murad and others greater independence from the state. In the end, however, al-Asalah's latest publicity stunt demonstrates only that Bahrain's formal political parties continue to do a poor job of representing ordinary Sunni citizens, the vast majority of whom I am confident have more pressing policy goals than the blocking of new churches--ending corruption, socioeconomic inequality, and unsustainable immigration policy, for starters. Is it any wonder why both al-Asalah and al-Manbar performed so badly in the 2010 elections?

At a time when most Bahrainis are eagerly awaiting King Hamad's annual Ramadan address for some sign of substantive political progress, Salafi MPs are waging political war on "deviant" religions in Bahrain, and physical war in other countries altogether. If such are its priorities, perhaps the group might do Bahrain the favor of recusing itself from any upcoming political dialogue, and leave the difficult task of social and political rebuilding to those sincerely interested in tackling it.

Update: So much for a dramatic announcement in the king's Ramadan/National Day speech (BNA summary). Quite far from it, as the biggest substantive discussions involved the OIC summit in Mecca, the Palestinian issue, which "is the central issue for joint Islamic action," and ending the violence in Syria. Strangely missing from this discussion of political action and crises elsewhere, then, was discussion of political progress in Bahrain apart from vague references to the importance of "dialogue." Video with English subtitles:


Update 2: An interesting story from Computer World oddly related to all this: al-Asalah's Salafi friends in Saudi Arabia are objecting to the creation of a variety of new specialized top-level domains (TLDs) for the Internet, including .gay, .wine, .porn, .sexy, .bar., and, wait for it, .bible. Their objection is quite odd, since it would be FAR easier to block content at the *.gay or *.bible level than to block millions of .com hosts serving up objectionable material.

Update 3: In light of the three-year prison sentence handed BCHR head Nabeel Rajab yesterday, perhaps we now know the reason for the postponement of sentencing for the rest of the opposition leaders. Namely, there is only so much bad news Bahrain wishes to give at one time. This New York Times article offers a fine summary of the case and, more usefully, connects the decision to King Hamad's recent Ramadan address. Unfortunately, Bahrain's "reformist" king is beginning to sound eerily like his uncle:

Mr. Jishi noted that representatives of several foreign governments, including the United States, were in the courtroom when the verdict was read. “They are sending a message,” Mr. Jishi said of the government, adding that a speech given by the country’s king earlier in the week — in which the monarch spoke of a duty to “protect peaceful, good-natured citizens who do not seek to usurp power” — reinforced the message. ...

In his address to the nation two days ago, the king again suggested that the protests in Bahrain were part of a foreign plot. "The kingdom of Bahrain has always remained throughout the ages a coveted place for the greedy, however, our people knew how to persistently tackle the enemy and to unite their ranks, consolidate their discourse and allegiance to the ruler and crush the ambitions of foes," he said.

The monarch added: "We have had to endure this year through challenging conditions due to hostile ambitions and foreign intervention which are yet to cease. We stood as united front in the face of strife mongers. We faced them with determination and persistent willpower as our duty and responsibility makes it imperative to defend this homeland, we will maintain our national unity and protect Bahraini people."

Update 4: Ken Katzman of the U.S. Congressional Research Service writes in Open Democracy on (the distinct lack of) "Security Sector Reform in Bahrain."