Understanding Sectarianism in the Persian Gulf

I know, two posts in one day: crazy, right? I just couldn't hold off on this one. Those who follow the blog somewhat regularly will know that I've made frequent mention of a book project sponsored by Georgetown University in Qatar (and edited by Columbia's Larry Potter) titled "Sectarian Politics in the Gulf," for which I contributed a chapter. Well, although we'll have to wait a bit long for the actual book to be published, Georgetown has now released its own "summary report" of the project, which includes a 2-3 page synopsis of my chapter. It is titled "Understanding Sectarianism in the Persian Gulf." Other contributors include, inter alia, Laurence Louër and Kristin Smith-Diwan. I encourage you to read it.

The Three Reinforcing Conflicts of Bahrain

In an unprecedented development, tonight's Brookings event on Bahrain went off without so much as a single thrown shoe or sectarian epithet. This is likely due to the fact that the panel--myself, POMED's Stephen McInerney, and Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi--did not include any actual Bahrainis (thanks to the government's refusal to participate and threats against any Bahrainis thinking of doing so). 

In any case, some attendees asked if I could e-mail my remarks, so I thought it would be easier simply to post them here.  Supposedly there will also be an audio and/or video recording (via Al-Jazeera Mubasher) of the entire event, so I will also post these once/if they materialize.

The theme of the talk was "The Three Reinforcing Conflicts of Bahrain":

Update: Audio is now up via the Brookings website.

---

I will say a little bit about the underlying social and political dynamics reinforcing the present conflict in Bahrain, a conflict which involves many more parties than simply “the government” and “the opposition.”

This discussion is useful I think for two separate reasons:

First, rather than simply describing Bahrain’s lack of implementation of the BICI recommendations, and its reluctance to undertake political reform generally, it helps explain why it has failed to do so in a way that avoids recourse to moral arguments or judgments. That is to say, understanding the web of conflict in Bahrain helps explains why the country’s decision-makers presently have no real incentive to alter their current, post-uprising political strategy.

Second, it is useful in focusing the discussion away from the BICI specifically and back to the larger political picture. Obviously, the BICI arose to investigate the aftermath of the uprising, and to recommend changes to help ensure that the violent mishandling of the crisis would not happen again. Somewhat lost in all this attention on what happened after February 14, then, are the root causes of the uprising itself, which are well-known and have been since at least the early 2000s. It also distracts from what has gone on since the BICI recommendations were issued, including additional arrests of political activists and critics, the upholding of sentences against opposition leaders and medical personnel, legal threats against senior Shi‘i religious leaders and religious institutions, and most recently the stripping of citizenship from opposition figures, including former members of parliament and even academics abroad.

The misdirection afforded by disproportionate focus on the BICI process of course is to the government’s benefit, and fits into its larger strategy of simply working to become better prepared (from a security and to a lesser extent diplomatic standpoint) to handle the next large-scale uprising—as if such a thing were inevitable anyway—rather than working to rectify the underlying conditions and grievances driving political discontent. And it’s probably safe to say that, as a result, Bahrain’s leaders will achieve a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Three Reinforcing Conflicts of Bahrain
Since I’m limited here to ten minutes, I will briefly outline what I would describe as Bahrain’s three mutually-reinforcing political conflicts, each working to preclude resolution of the others. You’ll notice that none of these three is “the opposition” versus “the government.” This is for two reasons. First, I think both groups are sufficiently heterogeneous that it makes little sense to speak in these terms. Second, even if we were revise this formulation to be something more workable such as “the moderate opposition” versus “moderates in the ruling family,” still I think this is not the main sticking point today in Bahrain. Disagreement between, say, al-Wifaq leaders and Bahrain’s nominal leader King Hamad, is not the primary cause of political stagnation or regression in Bahrain.

The Intra-Al Khalifa Conflict
On exactly this point, the first and arguably most important conflict precluding resolution of Bahrain’s political deadlock is disagreement among senior members of the ruling family. Unfortunately, this disagreement is not simply over the best way to handle the political problem posed by the uprising, but over the much more fundamental question of how to understand the problem itself—how to understand the problem of Shi‘a political mobilization in Bahrain. When you look at the period following King Hamad’s succession, and at the political and especially economic reforms that were introduced, it is easy to see what was the thinking underlying these initiatives. The idea was that by offering opponents at least some political space in which to operate, and by improving the living conditions of citizens through economic revitalization, diversification, and efforts to stamp out corruption, Bahrain could escape from the chronic discontent that had plagued the country—and King Hamad’s father—throughout the second half of the 1990s.

However, there were two significant problems related to this reform agenda. First, King Hamad’s initiatives, ultimately superintended by the crown prince, were a direct challenge to the economic-cum-political interests of other senior members of the ruling family, namely the prime minister whose political influence originates in expansive patronage networks with links to Saudi Arabia. Thus each of the tenets of the crown prince’s economic agenda—diversification away from reliance upon natural resources generally and away from Saudi Arabia in particular; labor market regulation; and efforts to limit corruption—all served to undermine the prime minister’s economic and thus political position. And indeed one assumes that this was precisely the intention.

So this was one problem. The second problem is that not everyone within the ruling family was sold on the basic premise of the economic and political reform program—or alternatively one could hypothesize that even King Hamad and his son had doubts about the state’s ability to co-opt political support through limited political liberalization and economic improvement. In either case, the upshot was that on the political front at the state proceeded on two parallel tracks—the second being a sort of preemptive back-up plan in the event opponents were not satisfied with the changes instituted.

So, for example, at the same time that Bahrain reintroduced an elected parliament, it also took steps to ensure that the opposition could never gain a majority, by redrawing electoral districts around sectarian boundaries. Even though Shi‘a citizens comprise a majority of the overall population, for example, al-Wifaq has never bothered to field candidates in more than 18 of the 40 total districts, out of recognition that it cannot hope to win the others. Besides redistricting, other preventative measures included the onset of Bahrain’s now decade-long program of naturalizing Sunnis from Syria, Yemen, Pakistan and elsewhere for work in the police and armed forces, as well as the near wholesale exclusion of Shi‘a citizens from those services. Finally, certain agencies of the state—in particular the royal court and its various public outlets, including the inflammatory newspaper Al-Watan—also worked to cultivate anti-Shi‘a orientations among ordinary Sunnis such that these citizens will be happy to fight the government’s battles for it if and when the need arises.

Perhaps the biggest substantive impact of the February 14 uprising, then, in my opinion, was to deal a real blow to the basic premise of Bahrain’s entire post-1999 reform agenda overseen by the king and crown prince. Those in the ruling family who opposed it on principle or out of self-interest, including not only the prime minister but also other security-minded individuals such as the royal court and defense ministers, were in their minds vindicated in their belief that citizens—in particular, Shi‘a citizens—will never be satisfied with anything less than wholesale political revolution, and that accordingly the only way to achieve social and political stability is through strong, proactive security measures and the incitement of ordinary citizens against the opposition as an imagined Iranian fifth column.

So, whether this means that King Hamad and his son have lost the internal Al Khalifa battle for political direction, or simply that they have finally come over to the view of more security-minded members of the family, the result is the same: Bahrain now working to solve its “Shi‘a problem” within a security, rather than a political, framework.

The Fractured Opposition  
The second conflict underlying Bahrain’s political stalemate is the division within the opposition itself—namely, between those who hold out hope for the formal, moderate opposition represented by al-Wifaq, and who remain open in principle to political dialogue, and those who continue to pursue more radical and more violent means of protest and who would reject any political compromise. Certainly, there has been much talk lately about increasing radicalization and violence among members of the opposition, including among al-Wifaq leaders themselves.

But despite this attempt to paint al-Wifaq as mastermind of violence, the fact is that the increase in violence represents something even more worrisome to the state: a protest movement entirely out of the hands of the formal (and more moderate) opposition.

Indeed, from the state's perspective, it would be preferable if al-Wifaq WERE behind the violence, since then the group could credibly commit to ending it as part of political negotiations. As it is now, with al-Wifaq wielding almost no command over Bahrain's revolutionary youth, any promise by al-Wifaq to end violent protest activities in exchange for political concessions is entirely non-credible, giving the government no incentive to engage in dialogue in the first place. This is a classic commitment problem.

In short, not only does increasing violence give security-minded royals and citizens more fuel for their arguments in favor of an even harsher security crackdown against protest activities, but, even more importantly, al-Wifaq appears an ever more unreliable and inefficacious partner in political dialogue.

The Other Opposition

The third domestic conflict in Bahrain involves what are usually referred to simplistically as “Sunni loyalists” or “the Sunni counter-opposition.” In fact, the various groups and movements that arose in opposition to the February uprising—the largest and most important being the National Unity Gathering and Sahwat al-Fatih—are neither exclusively Sunni nor strictly-speaking pro-government. In a recent Chatham House paper, Jane Kinninmont offers an illustrative quotation from a National Unity Gathering supporter, who told her, “We are not for the government, just temporarily aligned with it.” And I think that is about right for many ordinary Sunnis in Bahrain, who share most of the same basic political grievances of the opposition, including discontent with corruption and wasted resources; continued naturalization of foreigners for work in the police and military; and a lack of say in political decision-making.

Both before and after the uprising, the government has been successful in dissuading Sunni citizens from joining the opposition in significant numbers—or of forming a parallel opposition based around Sunni identity—by raising the specter of Shi‘a empowerment. Prior to al-Wifaq’s resignation, the primary function of the two main Sunni political societies in parliament was to obstruct the opposition, and any Sunnis who dared oppose the government were branded as complicit in the larger Iranian conspiracy represented by al-Wifaq.

In the aftermath of the uprising, which saw an unprecedented and only partly state-sponsored Sunni mobilization, Bahrain’s leaders found themselves with two groups of discontented Sunnis: those that disagreed with what was perceived to be its lax security response to opposition activities, and those that harbored substantive political misgivings independent of this concern, such as those already mentioned. Even if the state could somehow broker some political agreement with the opposition, then, still it would face a different set of problems involving Bahraini Sunnis stemming from its very own efforts to mobilize the community.

The government learned this lesson the hard way during its most recent attempt to restart talks with the opposition in March 2012, where the problem was not intransigence on the part of al-Wifaq but the reaction of Sunni groups. Both the National Unity Gathering and Sahwat al-Fatih rallied against the dialogue—not because they symbolized compromise with the opposition but because they had not been invited. That is, Sunnis were angry that the state would seek a political bargain without their input, particularly given their decisive role in turning the tide of the uprising in February and March 2011.

Not coincidentally, reports of this new “political dialogue initiative” stopped almost immediately. The state is willing to do a lot of things to appease Sunnis, but allowing them a seat at the negotiating table alongside members of the opposition is definitely not one of them. Indeed, this scenario above all others is the one that the ruling family will work to avoid. The chance that Sunni and Shi‘i political leaders could agree some set of political demands is far too dangerous to risk by agreeing to multiparty talks. (According to longtime Bahrain scholar ‘Abd al-Hadi Khalaf, who incidentally is among those whose citizenship was revoked last week, the last time that members of the ruling family sat at a negotiating table with leading Sunni and Shi‘i figures was in the 1960s.) In this case, then, rather than reject the Sunni demand for inclusion directly, the state appears instead to have ended its pursuit of a new dialogue initiative altogether, and in the eight months since there has been no hint of another one.

The state thus seems to have decided that if it cannot placate both sets of Sunnis—that is, those unhappy with the state’s security response to protesters, and those simply unhappy—then it will have to take steps to appease at least the former group of more security-minded citizens. This group, then, can be conveniently mobilized against the latter more reform-minded Sunnis, who may be branded “traitors” or fools duped by the opposition. It was this dynamic, I would argue, that led to the high-profile arrest of Nabeel Rajab, and of the recent legal action begun against Sh. ‘Isa Qasim, against ‘Ali Salman, against al-Wifaq as an organization, and others accused of fomenting violence.

The problem, of course, is that the state’s capitulation to this pressure reinforces the larger self-perpetuating cycle ongoing for the better part of two years in Bahrain. Additional arrests and more stringent security measures fuel further radicalization, desperation, and violence on the part of the youthful opposition, whose members see little hope for a promising future in Bahrain in terms of employment, education, and so on, much less an agreeable political settlement.

In conclusion, then, yes, Bahrain has successfully fended off substantive political change, and the incentives are in place for it to continue to do so. (And I’ve not even had time to mention the role of the United States or Saudi Arabia.) But at what cost?

Brookings Doha Event on Bahrain

Please excuse my extended absence from posting as I've been completely occupied finalizing the details of my longtime childhood friend Kim Kardashian's upcoming visit to Bahrain, where, as she's already made clear in comments to reporters, she will "set the record straight" while being ogled by members of the royal family. Asked what "record" exactly will be "set straight," she continued, "You know, about how all the Tutsi rebels are killing innocent Hutus and other Bahrainites."  I hope everyone will wish her well in her fact-finding and record-straightening mission.

I have some suitcases to unpack, so I don't have time to get into all the details of BICI anniversary mania; 'Ashura' madness (although I will say that I did get a chance to witness 'Ashura' celebrations among the Lawati in Muscat; very interesting); and, of course, Kim's trip to Bahrain.  Instead, I wanted to note that I will be taking part in one such BICI anniversary mania event this Wednesday at the Brookings Doha Center.  The forum, which is billed as "a policy discussion on the political situation in Bahrain" and will include a Q&A session, will run from 5:30 to 7:00pm.  My sole co-panelist (though they are looking for a third) is Jamal Khashoggi, whom I do not know personally but is a well-known Saudi journalist and editor-in-chief of the Saudi-owned but Bahrain-based Al-Arab news channel.  The executive director of POMED, which just released a comprehensive assessment of Bahrain's BICI implementation, will also be joining via the Interweb from Washington.  In any case, it should be good fun and not at all contentious, since discussions on Bahrain are usually very civil and always based on sober and objective consideration of relevant facts.

If you're in town but don't know where Brookings is located, here is a map.  The event is public but requires pre-registration by e-mailing DohaCenter@Brookings.edu.  Kim Kardashian may or may not be in attendance.

One additional note is that sometime in the next few days Middle East Policy will publish its Winter 2012 issue, which contains an article by me entitled "The Political Costs of Qatar's Western Orientation."  It is based on two years of survey data from Qatar and although not related to Bahrain may be of interest to some insofar as it is an analysis of popular political attitudes in a Gulf state.

Update: An informative article in Al-Ahram on Bahrain's recent revocation of opponents' citizenship. 

Kuwait, Not Escalating Violence, Could Be a Game-Changer for Bahrain

One day early last month I received several not-quite-frantic e-mails asking if I knew anything about a meeting said to be scheduled to take place in Doha, where I am located, between members of Bahrain's government and opposition.  As I was indeed not aware of it, I read with interest an article written by the editor of Akhbar al-Khaleej, Anwar 'Abd al-Rahman, decrying this "suspicious meeting in Doha" and comparing its prospective participants to those traitors who had returned just a week earlier from Bahrain's human rights review at the United Nations in Geneva.

Though some of his information proved to be wrong--the event was not organized by the Carnegie Endowment, for one--it turns out that there was an attempt to bring together a group of Bahrainis in a workshop format.  However, the editorial by 'Abd al-Rahman, combined with several other articles in various outlets, amounted to a preemptive strike on the whole enterprise, a less-than-discrete warning to those invited that it was in their interest not to go (to say nothing of Qatar's continued treachery in daring to allow such meetings in its territory). The event was called off for lack of participation and, one suspects, for fear of a possible diplomatic incident.

Later, at the end of October, The Guardian reported that an NGO run by a former aide of Tony Blair was "advising Bahrain on conflict resolution," with "Bahraini government and opposition figures ... being trained in negotiation and conflict resolution techniques." Once again, Bahrain would not tolerate the suggestion that it was anything but staunchly opposed to any political compromise with the opposition and to foreign interference in this "internal matter."  Minister of State for Crazy Affairs Sameera Rajab was promptly dispatched to deny explicitly the Guardian story in remarks later carried in the Bahrain News Agency.

Now, I've not written here for some time.  That is due in part to an increase in other commitments.  But it owes also to a more substantive cause, which is that it's tedious to rehash the same thesis week after week.  The securitization of politics in Bahrain has thrown the country into a destructive, self-perpetuating cycle, whereby the lack of even a hint of political compromise encourages increasingly radical protest tactics, which only reinforces the state's (and security-minded "pro-government" citizens') resistance to compromise or even dialogue.  Indeed, in the aftermath of yesterday's bombings (which occurred in my old neighborhood), Interior Minister Sh. Rashid was quick to declare that "there can be no negotiation with terrorists."  This is just as well, of course, since those responsible for the explosions are presumably not interested in talking either.

The question, accordingly, is not whether Bahrain is likely to continue down (or, in this case, around) the same political path, but what it would take for it NOT to.  That is to say, what event or development would be sufficiently transformative to alter the government's calculus on the usefulness and/or necessity of an actual political solution to Bahrain's conflict as opposed to the present (and now months-old) artificial stalemate imposed via a sweeping security crackdown? (A security crackdown that, as of a week ago, now includes an outright ban on demonstrations.)

In the first place, one can rule out homemade pipe bombs and other acts designed ostensibly to get the attention either of the government or, more likely, of the international community.  Momentarily stealing headlines away from Syria serves little purpose if the headline is something like "Two Killed in Terrorist Attack by Bahrain Opposition."  Similarly, targeting foreigners in areas popular with foreigners--and 'Adliya, the site of one of the injuries, is perhaps the most popular of all--is unlikely to convert additional supporters.  More fundamentally, such actions only feed into the narrative of those within the state and in society who are most opposed to "compromise with terrorists." Take the graphic below, for instance, which comes from Bahrain's main Sunni forum and compares yesterday's incident to a Hizballah bombing in Lebanon.

Not only do such events strengthen the resolve of those opposed to dialogue, moreover, but it gives fuel to those advocating a further escalation of the existing security crackdown, including most notably the immediate closure of al-Wifaq and arrest of 'Ali Saman and especially 'Isa Qasim as alleged inciters of violence.  Already last month the former was summoned for police questioning, while the Bahrain Mirror reported on October 1 that one of King Hamad's advisers, Nabeel al-Hamar, announced that "a number of Bahraini lawyers" are preparing to bring a legal case against 'Isa Qasim "next week"--i.e., this week--relating to his infamous "crush them" sermon.  (Remember this one?)

Leading the charge as usual is the editorial board at Al-Watan.  Of the five headlines on today's (electronic) front page, the top two are stories about 'Isa Qasim.  One, featuring a photo of one of yesterday's victims, reads: "MPs and Shura Council members: Qasim's incitement is behind the development of terrorist methods and mechanisms."

A second asks, "Why does 'Isa Qasim hate foreigners and incite [violence] against them?" I'm not even sure how to describe the photograph.

In keeping with the general cycle of violence and mutual recrimination which is now a defining feature of Bahrain, the response from the other side--both with respect to yesterday's events specifically as well as the larger attack on 'Isa Qasim--has been equally defiant.

The Islamic 'Ulama' Council--I'm not sure exactly whom this represents--continues to criticize the "attack on Ayatallah Sh. 'Isa Ahmad Qasim."  In a new statement released Sunday, the council says that "the defense of this symbol of jurisprudence ... is the defense of all the targeted [opposition leaders]," and closes with the words,  "May God help you [all] to protect the security of this nation and to defend its loyal symbols."

The February 14th movement has also joined in with the flashy graphic seen below, which offers a generic warning to no one in particular: "He is our Shaykh ['Isa] Qasim: Beware." 

Neither are al-Wifaq and 'Ali Salman adopting a conciliatory tone.  Caught between the dual threats of dissolution by the government and irrelevance on the street, al-Wifaq faces a precarious balancing act, to say the least.  Opposition forums have picked up on an interview by 'Ali Salman on the al-Mayadeen television channel (I have no idea what this is), in which he is reported to have said, "If a person entered my house I would kill him in self-defense." Some of course are taking "a person" to mean "a police officer," while others say it was a general statement now being blown out of proportion and to substantiate claims about incitement toward violence.

Al-Wifaq also has not done itself any favors with its Twitter response to yesterday's bomb blasts, which as you can see below is being interpreted as another lost opportunity to condemn acts of violence.

Finally, with the politically-charged festival of 'Ashura' little more than two weeks away, some--more specifically, Sh. 'Abd al-Wahhab Hussain's group al-Wafa'--are attempting to put the holiday to even more explicit political use, dubbing it the "'Ashura' of Resistance."  As the Interior Ministry has already announced that the new ban on public gatherings would not apply to 'Ashura' processions, it is perhaps not surprising that the latter would transform into genuine political marches.

In short, then, there is no reason to believe that yesterday's attack represents anything more than the new normal in Bahrain.  Certainly it will not prompt the state to rethink its present security-based strategy, nor invite outside pressure for it to do so.  Quite the opposite, such acts of violence will only engender a more complete crackdown as security-minded royals and citizens gain ever more fuel for their arguments, and, even more importantly, al-Wifaq appears an even more unreliable partner in political dialogue.  For, despite the attempt of some to paint al-Wifaq as mastermind of violence, the fact is that such violence represents something even more worrisome to the state: a protest movement entirely out of the hands of the formal (and more moderate) opposition.

Indeed, from the state's perspective, it would be preferable if al-Wifaq WERE behind the violence, since then the group could credibly commit to ending it as part of political negotiations.  As it is now, with al-Wifaq wielding almost no command over Bahrain's revolutionary youth, any promise by al-Wifaq to end violent protest activities in exchange for political concessions is entirely non-credible, giving the government no incentive to engage in dialogue in the first place.  Here is a classic commitment problem.

So, I return to the question asked at the outset: if not the recent escalation in violence, what is it that may force the government to reconsider its present security-cum-political strategy?  Previously I have suggested that such a revision in thinking would most likely be prompted by a substantive change in external/regional rather than internal political dynamics: the inevitable question of succession in Saudi Arabia, which may draw the kingdom's attention away from Bahrain; a shift (unlikely as it seems) in U.S. policy toward Bahrain; or the mobilization of Sunni citizens in Saudi Arabia--beyond the perennial protests in the Eastern Province--sparked by Sunni activism in Bahrain.

Now, none of these three scenarios has come to fruition.  But if you tweak the final item a bit, changing Saudi Arabia to Kuwait, then you may see where I am going.  Imagine, for instance, that Kuwait's ongoing parliamentary stalemate devolves into a full-blown political crisis, complete with violent clashes between protesters and riot police.  As already threatened by the emir, the Kuwaiti army is deployed to forcibly quell protests, and one popular uprising in the Gulf (excluding for now the case of Saudi Arabia) becomes two.

Such a scenario would have two important implications for Bahrain.  First, since there is no question of Iranian involvement or "outside interference" in the case of Kuwait, and since the Kuwaiti opposition is a rather heterogeneous coalition of nationalists, liberals, youth, tribes, and so on, it would be much more difficult for the United States and other Western countries to write off a Kuwaiti revolt as a "special case" not representative of the "truly democratic and popular" uprisings seen elsewhere in the Arab world.  If Bahrain is no longer viewed as an isolated and unique case, in other words, but as part of a larger phenomenon of "demands for political reform in the Gulf," then the entire narrative surrounding U.S. and Western support for GCC governments--including Bahrain--changes.  (Of course, some are already questioning, however fruitlessly, U.S. policy on Bahrain.)  And, since the U.S. election will have been decided by then, Washington may have more political will--assuming Obama is re-elected--to act.  Finally, the U.K.'s recent decision to launch a parliamentary review of its relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain could further isolate the U.S.

Second, it is possible that a Kuwaiti revolt could re-energize the large contingent of (mostly Sunni) Bahrainis whose fear and dislike of the opposition has so far precluded a coordinated and sustained pursuit of their own political agenda and resolution of their own grievances.  But these political grievances nonetheless persist, and individuals may be more likely to overcome their fear of inadvertent Shi'a empowerment if Kuwait's (also largely Sunni) opposition is seen to achieve substantive political gains--for example, a sizable number of cabinet seats or an elected prime minister.  Moreover, because the newly-reconvened Bahraini parliament now consists almost entirely of these nominally "pro-government" citizens, they already enjoy an institutional mechanism by which to push a reformist agenda if they so desired.  Signs that Bahraini Sunnis are re-awaking from their recent stupor, then, could push the government to end the current cycle of perpetual political crisis.

Gulf foreign ministers will meet tomorrow in Manama "in preparation" for next month's GCC summit, also to be held in Bahrain. I suspect that one of the agenda items will be how to stop isolated political sparks across the Gulf from transforming into a wider regional conflagration.

Update: Sh. Fawaz announces on Twitter that Bahrain is now returning to the methods of the 1990s, taking away the citizenship of 31 activists, including respected Bahrain scholar 'Abd al-Hadi Khalaf and two former al-Wifaq MPs (Jalal and Jawad Fayruz). The BNA has posted an English list of names. (Interestingly, in the English list they omit the "Khalaf" bit for 'Abd al-Hadi, presumably so he is not readily identified.)

Already, some ingenious Twitter activist has responded with the following:

@qasim_alhashmi هنيئاً لكم هذا الشرف .. و بترجعون و بكون هذا جوازكم #البحرين #bahrain #14FEB #اسقاط_الجنسية #يسقط_حمد twitter.com/abo9od/status/…
— ғ♥ⅎ (@abo9od) November 6, 2012

Will Bahrain's Parliament Go the Way of Kuwait?

As usual, I've been quite busy lately with various writing commitments. The most substantial of these is the fabled dissertation-to-book-manuscript project, a revision process of which I am sorry to say I have a lot remaining. In addition, grant proposal season is now upon us, sucking up additional free time. What is worse, since all of these submissions take an excruciatingly long time to play out, there is seemingly little immediate payoff for what are considerable investments in time and energy. One small piece that has finally made its way through the academic pipeline is this review of Sean Foley's The Arab Gulf States, published just a few days ago in IJMES.

More pertinent for today's post on Bahrain, however, is another recent writing project: a chapter for a forthcoming book on sectarian politics in the Gulf to which I've alluded before. The chapter, a theoretical framework for understanding the region's sectarian politics, explains why the outcome of "sectarianism" is in fact a particular case of the Gulf's more general tendency toward group-based politics of all sorts. The explanation, in short, is a combination of (1) specific institutional characteristics that privilege political coordination on the basis of ascriptive social categories--region, religion, ethnicity, tribe, etc.--and (2) active efforts on the part of Gulf rulers to institutionalize this group-based, as opposed to individual-based, political competition, in order to maximize their own economic and political welfare.

Now, one hardly needs a special occasion to point out the existence of group politics in Bahrain.  For almost no one is a Bahraini anymore, but BahrAni (بحراني), or 'Ajmi, or Mujannas, or Hawala, or Shirazi, or Al Khalifa, or Ahl al-Sunna, or whatever.  And, not coincidentally, that's the way the state likes it.  Indeed, when the opposition launched its well-publicized "No Sunni, No Shi'i, Just Bahraini" campaign at the height of mass demonstrations in March 2011, the government was none too pleased, as this image clashed with its reading (or at least its outward portrayal) of the uprising.  Those found wearing stickers and other "Just Bahraini" paraphernalia were singled out at security checkpoints and generally were dismissed either as disingenuous or as unthinking pawns in others' sectarian agenda.

In recent days, however, the government's manipulation of societal groupings qua political constituencies has reached notable levels even by local standards.  This may correspond to Sunday's opening of the new session of the National Assembly, or it may be entirely independent of the parliament.  However the case, Bahrain has gone out of its way to put various societal groups on notice, Stephen Colbert-style.

The fun kicked off last week when Sh. Rashid sent a "strongly-worded letter" to two institutions affiliated with Bahrain's sizable Persian community: the Grand 'Ajam Ma'tam and the Al-Manama Club.  According to an article in the Bahrain Mirror, members of the community, which in recent decades has attempted to remain apolitical, were threatened with "deportation" if they are found to "participate in opposition activities."  Almost immediately thereafter, the Information Affairs Authority carried a press release announcing that the Grand 'Ajam Mosque "reiterated its loyalty to His Highness the King and rejects the perpetrators of rioting and terrorism":

فيديو بنا // مأتم العجم الكبير يجدد الولاء لجلالة الملك المفدى ويستنكر أعمال الشغب والإرهاب |bna.bh/portal/news/52…#Bahrain
— وكالة أنباء البحرين(@bna_ar) October 9, 2012

Soon a loyalty stampede ensued among Bahrain's various civil society groups, especially football and sports clubs, including those not affiliated with Bahraini 'Ajam. God knows why; it's not like the government would arrest and/or torture athletes thought to support the opposition, right?

نادي الصم الرياضي يعلن رفضه واستنكاره لكافة الاعمال المخلة بالنظام العام | وكالة أنباء البحرين bna.bh/portal/news/52… #bahrain #bna
— وكالة أنباء البحرين(@bna_ar) October 10, 2012

Inevitably, of course, the state's public message to Bahraini Persians had the opposite effect of that intended, or in any case was likely only to convince those who were content to remain outside of politics in the first place.  Soon after the Grand 'Ajam Ma'tam's letter declaring its deference to King Hamad and denouncement of the opposition, another letter appeared signed by the "Movement of the Lovers of Martyrdom" (nice name) that said, in effect, that although "the Grand 'Ajam Ma'tam is one of the largest Hussainiyya in Bahrain, it doesn't represent all 'Ajam" and doesn't represent us.  So, once again, by demanding formal declarations of political support from a heterogeneous group of citizens, Bahrain has succeeded only in pushing would-be opponents underground.

The second group that has been put on notice is a more familiar face: al-Wifaq. In a seeming escalation of threats of "legal action" from the Islamic Affairs / Justice Ministry that have continued for the previous several months, on Sunday 'Ali Salman was summoned to a Manama police station to be questioned.  "What did he do this time?" you ask?  Perhaps it was al-Wifaq's latest rally over the weekend?  Or a controversial Friday sermon?  No, in fact, the summons indicates that he was to be questioned regarding his "interference in the internal affairs of a friendly nation," namely Egypt, whence he had recently returned.  I wonder if he talked to my old friend, 'Isa al-Qattan?

That's right: Bahrain, which in late August saw four members, including the former head and current deputy head, of al-Asalah LITERALLY SNEAK INTO SYRIA (or, as I've since heard, sneak NEAR the Syrian border in Turkey) to play guns with the Free Syrian Army, and then brag about it publicly--yes, this same country is now questioning the head of al-Wifaq about interference in another nation's affairs.  (By contrast, one of the al-Asalah members that went to Syria was received by King Hamad the next week for 'Eid.) In fact, over the weekend news even circulated on Twitter of a 21 year-old Bahraini fighter killed while WAGING WAR INSIDE SYRIA. In short, Bahrain seems to maintain an odd interpretation of what constitutes interference in other countries' affairs (perhaps the operative qualification is "friendly" countries).

The GDN reports that Salman was questioned after the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Revolution (whatever that is) "urged Bahraini authorities to ban him and other Al Wefaq National Islamic Society leaders from travelling to Egypt, describing them as 'pro-Iranian agents' who were a 'threat to the country's unity.'"  (Evidently the Bahraini government is now taking political orders from civil society groups abroad.)  More specifically, according to the Council's "general co-ordinator": "The presence of pro-Iranian agents on Egyptian soil is a threat to the country's unity and the true Islamic religion."  Yea, the Council should watch out lest those Shi'a Wifaqis introduce sectarianism into the group's otherwise very tolerant-sounding political agenda. (For those interested, the Bahrain Mirror has published what it claims is a full transcript of Salman's questioning. Sunni forums also have their own account.)

But here is where the story really gets weird.  For around the same time that Salman was called in for questioning, 'Isa Qasim made news of his own by reporting, in comments since rejected by various ministries, that Bahrain had reached out to Iran--in particular, the Iranian counsel in Bahrain--to help solve the country's political impasse.  According to Qasim, the initiative began as early as the August Islamic summit in Mecca, where King Hamad reached out to the Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar al-Salehi.  This report was later repeated via Twitter by al-Wifaq officials, including Khalil al-Marzuq, and denied by Sh. Khalid and others. (And, of course, Al-Watan's Sawsan al-Sha'ir has picked up on Qasim's "relationship" with the Iranian Consul with predictable journalistic consequences.)

The final group that the Bahraini government has put on notice, and I think not coincidentally, is the just-reopened parliament.  One will recall that, in the absence of al-Wifaq, the body has largely shed its traditional quiescence as it has enjoyed the luxury of pursuing a legislative agenda that goes beyond obstructing the opposition.  This led to considerable deadlock between the upper and lower houses of parliament, not to mention the memorable clash with Culture Minister Sha. Mai which required the timely intervention of Khalifa bin Salman himself.  After the latter's "visit" to parliament stressing legislative-executive "cooperation," MPs turned in traditional fashion to focus on a new political enemy, namely the United States and its wily ambassador, to the benefit of government ministers.


Now, in his inaugural address on Sunday, King Hamad reiterated that the current parliament will not be dissolved to make way for new elections or al-Wifaq participation, though he says that the "door for dialogue is still open."  Yet, at the same time, his remarks as well as those of parliamentary chairman al-Dhaharani make clear that the government is already anticipating another relatively confrontational session, and is preemptively warning MPs not to go down that road.  The GDN reports, for example (my emphasis):

Dr Al Dhahrani said His Majesty King Hamad has affirmed on numerous occasions that parliament will not be dissolved. However, he stressed that no one can abuse the principle behind publicly questioning ministers – there are clear guidelines about this. A number of draft laws have failed because the National Assembly has not sat in session, following disagreements between Shura Council and parliament. They will be reviewed again and re-submitted to the assembly.

One assumes that parliamentary gridlock must be on the mind of Bahrain's rulers especially following recent events in the only other Gulf state with a functioning parliament, Kuwait, where the emir has just been forced to dissolve the body for the fifth time since 2006 due to an obstinate opposition with a penchant for quizzing ministers from the ruling family. Whether or not Bahraini MPs will be inspired by their Kuwaiti brothers is anyone's guess, but I can't imagine that issues like corruption, political naturalization, or uneven economic development have dissipated since parliament last met.  Many parliamentarians may be united in their hatred for the opposition, or for the United States, or for burned Starbucks coffee.  But passing resolutions denouncing the opposition doesn't get you re-elected when most of the voters in your district are hit hard by Bahrain's post-uprising economic stagnation and witness other citizens--royals, elite families, and naturalized citizens--doing disproportionately better.

Bahrain is still busy playing the game of group politics, whipping Bahraini Persians in line while raising the stakes in its ongoing cat-and-mouse with al-Wifaq.  Ironically, in remaining outside of formal politics, both groups--the Baharnah and 'Ajam--are putting the government in a more difficult place, as it is left to face a parliament comprised almost exclusively of its own (nominally, at least) supporters.  There, the post-2005 excuse of opposition subterfuge no longer obtains, as al-Wifaq and others have abandoned the stage.  Whereas before the state could avoid a parliamentary inquisition by painting it an opposition initiative, which pro-government MPs would dutifully oppose, now there is nothing to stop members but fear of another visit from Khalifa bin Salman.  That fear is powerful, of course, but over the past two years it has shown itself to be a rather unreliable indicator of political behavior in the Middle East region, as the difference between fear and hatred is a difficult one to discern.

Update: Looks like we have a few Al-Watan readers over at DHS:

Update 2: The Manama Voice is reporting Iran's own response to the controversy surrounding the Bahraini government's claimed request for political mediation. The headline should clear things up: "Iran: Bahrain's King, Foreign Minister, and Ambassador Requested Mediation."

And, from the BBC, the Saudis are not too happy about the UK's parliamentary inquiry into its foreign relations with Saudi and Bahrain.

Update 3: In what is being seen as a severe provocation, Bahrain's Shi'a awqaf has announced that prayers at the Imam Sadiq Mosque in al-Diraz, home mosque of Sh. 'Isa Qasim, will be phased out as the mosque is replaced by a newer, much bigger one on land donated by the king. There is no mention of the fate of Sh. 'Isa Qasim--i.e., whether he will be reassigned to the new mosque--but there is likely to be a fight brewing here.

Update 4: Yet another deadly bomb attack on police in the southern village of Eker. I am not in the habit of quoting State Department spokesmen, but in this case it's appropriate: "[A resumption of political talks] is still the only path forward that we see and we are encouraging both sides to roll up their sleeves and get to it."

The Uprising is Over. But What Is the Price of Bahrain's Victory?

For a recent publication on Bahrain, I was forced to go back and forth with an editor over the question of whether the February 14th uprising should be introduced in the present or past tense.  Is it correct to say that the uprising is over?, that is, or do the continued clashes between riot police and mostly-youthful protesters constitute a continuation, qualitatively-speaking, of the original movement of early 2011?

I took--and do take--the former position: the uprising proper has ended.  Or, rather, it was made to end by the sweeping security response initiated with the State of National Security and subsequently entrenched via Bahrain's effective "sectarianism as security" political strategy.  In this sense, the actual rebellion has long been over, and "major combat operations," as some like to say, essentially were concluded with the second clearing (and for good measure razing) of the former Pearl Roundabout.

Now, judging by the aforementioned debate with my editor, which incidentally I lost, such a view evidently is a controversial--or rather an uncomfortable and unpalatable--one to express.  To reference the "failed February 14 uprising" is seen as insulting the very memory of those who died, and who continue to die and risk bodily harm, in their pursuit of basic societal and political reform. In fact, however, it is simply to admit the overwhelming material and tactical superiority of one side over the other, a military dominance that students of insurgency and civil war have long noted.

As part of a cross-national study of civil war incidence, Fearon and Laitin (2005) examined the case of Bahrain as a sort of diagnostic check on their model of civil war, which predicted a "a negligible probability for civil war in Bahrain during the entire period of its independence from 1971-1999."  As they note in their introduction,

There has been no civil war in Bahrain, so our model did not let us down! There seems at first blush nothing to explain. A narrative of Bahrain’s political conflicts, however, allows us to address several themes. First, Bahrain’s contemporary history helps illuminate why there is no positive relationship between grievance level and civil war. Bahrain’s contemporary history reads like a litany of grievances; yet these do not easily translate into sustained violence.

While the authors offer a multidimensional response to examine this last observation--why grievances in Bahrain "do not translate easily into sustained violence"--they identify several tactical factors as being particularly important, in particular the extreme smallness of the community.  They continue,

In Khuri’s formulation (1980, pp. 245-6), Bahrain is a “metrocommunity,” a form of rule that requires intimate knowledge by the rulers of their constituents. He notices that the Al-Khalifah sheiks know practically every family in Bahrain, its history, its size, and its social status. They are thus able to micromanage gift-giving, favors, and government posts to co-opt rival claimants to power. Speaking of the then current leader and his family, Khuri points out that one of the ruler’s brothers “talks” to “moderninsts” and “freedom fighters”; the ruler’s eldest son “talks” to youths in the cultural and sports’ clubs. ... [This way], a unified family can -- if it is willing to use brutal suppression and call in foreign troops -- maintain order in a changing society.

In short, they conclude, "[a] combination of 'metrocommunity' scale and political will to be brutal partly accounts for Bahrain’s avoidance of insurgency."

Now, anyone who has followed the previous nineteen months in Bahrain cannot fail to see the accuracy of these observations.  With its sustained deployment of police and military units along with a labyrinthine edifice of security checkpoints, the state has largely succeeded in penning demonstrators into their respective villages, now isolated even more than they were prior to February 2011 (which is saying a lot).  (More recently, the state has shifted to allow protests in finite areas, namely along al-Budaiyi' Road, while blocking them elsewhere.) Such an effort, combined with the decades-long exclusion of Shi'a from those professions that entail the use of weapons, has created a sort of double defense.

In the first place, in the face of concerted state effort, would-be revolutionaries face an almost impossible task in organizing into a mass capable of physically taking over the institutions of the state.  Witness, for example, the repeated unsuccessful attempts to "re-take" the ground surrounding the now-demolished Pearl Roundabout.  In February and March, activists were able to occupy the monument only because the state initially lacked the desire or resolve to stop them.  But when the Field Marshal finally moved to put an end to the protesters' camp and preclude their return, this was easily done, not least with the help of pervasive communications monitoring by which opposition plans are easily discovered.

How could police have stopped this advanced tactical operation?!

In the second place, even if demonstrations could again achieve the levels of mass participation witnessed in February and March 2011, still these citizens lack the one thing they would require to do more than, say, block traffic or occupy the Financial Harbor and other downtown sites: that is to say, guns.  Indeed, I was once stopped at Bahrain Airport when I attempted to bring in a traditional Yemeni tribal dagger I had bought as a souvenir.  It is simply unimaginable that individuals or groups could smuggle in the sort of arms required to wage an effective guerrilla campaign. Meanwhile, Bahrain spent $883 million on its military in 2011 alone, while Stratfor reports (subscription needed) that the country is now recruiting an additional 5,000 police and military personnel from among Sunni refugees who have fled Syria (to go along with the many tens of thousands recruited and naturalized over the previous decade).

Bahrain has also seemingly won its other war on the international front.  Having done its diplomatic duty in allowing the BICI to investigate the uprising, it has successfully resisted pressure to do anything more.  On the contrary, since December 2011 political change has been in the opposition direction.  As witnessed once more only days ago, protesters continue to be met with deadly force in confrontations with police.  Activists, including Nabeel Rajab and most recently Zaynab al-Khawajah, have been sentenced to prison for no more than insulting the prime minister and King Hamad, respectively.  One political society ('Amal) has been dissolved, while another (al-Wifaq) may be on the brink.

And yet, on the occasion of Bahrain's recent human rights review at the United Nations, the most the U.S. State Department could muster was the following anemic statement by Michael Posner:

Today Bahrain is at a crossroads. The government showed great courage last year in commissioning and accepting the recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report, implementation of which 13 states recommended during the review. Ten months after the release of the report, however, we are concerned that the government is losing momentum on implementation. We urge you once again to fully and swiftly implement the BICI recommendations as well as those generated through the UPR process. This will help create an environment where meaningful dialogue can take place.

So that's one "concern" and one "urge," partly offset by one "showed great courage."  Not exactly a strong reprimand likely to spark a change in political calculations.

What is more, in the few days since its review in Geneva, Bahrain has somehow been selected as the "Asian group representative" on the U.N. Human Rights Council Advisory Committee--and this, as CNN points out, on "the same day a young protester in the country was killed."  The view from Bahrain's Information Affairs Authority is somewhat more optimistic: the nomination "represents the international community's confidence in Bahrain's progress in the human rights field."  One might also entertain a more cynical interpretation.

So, then, one may as well just say it: Bahrain's uprising is over.  The government has prevailed, and there is no reasonable expectation of either an internal change in political dynamics or outside pressure to tip the present balance of power.  But one must be careful in the conclusions one therefore draws.  In particular, that the government has won in its tactical battle with protesters (and diplomatic battle with disapproving but still dependent allies) does not mean that violence and instability is likely to dissipate.  On the contrary, it is precisely this victory--a victory that has magnified already-considerable grievances a thousand times while crushing any hope for their redress--that is likely to invite a new, even more destructive sort of violence.

Only two months into the uprising, Hussein Ibish asked in Foreign Policy, "Is Bahrain Creating a New Terrorist Threat?"  At the time, his question garnered no little rebuke from Bahraini activists, insulted by his insinuation that theirs was anything but a non-violent protest movement.  Some 18 months later, no one can deny his conclusion, that "[b]y leaving no room for peaceful dissent, the Bahraini monarchy is creating [or rather, has created] the conditions for a violent revolt."

Yet the issue is not simply that there is no longer any room in Bahrain for "peaceful dissent."  The problem is much more pervasive: that for an entire generation of Bahrainis, not least Shi'a Bahraini youth, there is simply no room for ordinary living.  Even were protest activities to end today and a political ceasefire declared, still an entire class of Bahrainis faces the reality of dead or incarcerated loved ones and/or family members; little prospect for employment or societal advancement (and thus marriage); trouble gaining admission to the country's one public university--in short, lifelong memories and repercussions of the February 14th uprising.

Last month in The New York Times was a poignant if disturbing article that examined the attitudes of young Syrian refugees toward their erstwhile 'Allawi oppressors.  It begins,

Like all the small children in the desert refugee camp here, Ibtisam, 11, is eager to go home to the toys, bicycles, books, cartoons and classmates she left behind in Syria.

But not if that means living with Alawites, members of the same minority offshoot of Shiite Islam as Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad. “I hate the Alawites and the Shiites,” Ibtisam said as a crowd of children and adults nodded in agreement. “We are going to kill them with our knives, just like they killed us.”

Even if the scale of the violence in Syria is greater than that witnessed in Bahrain, can one really expect a qualitatively different result in the latter case?  Even before the uprising, the country was divided into what Clive Holes aptly describes as an “almost apartheid-like system of voluntary segregation.”  What hope is there that this division--geographical and otherwise--will stand the chance of lessening in the near- to medium-term?

More to the point, with hope fading for any political solution to the present government-opposition standoff, and indeed with the mounting popular disillusion with the formal opposition societies in any case, it is not unthinkable that some will decide that the only way to get the attention of the government (and/or of foreign governments) is to pursue more radical alternatives.  Already in June the government claimed to find in Salmabad tons of materials for the production of homemade bombs.  Due to Bahrain's massive "boy who cried wolf" problem as a result of repeated past claims of "terrorist plots," it was (and I suppose still is) difficult to know what to make of this find.  But the incidence of attacks using homemade explosives has only increased, with deadly results on the side of both protesters and police.

Consider the latest casualty, a boy of 17 who died only last night.  Photos of the boy (warning: graphic) clearly show bullet holes from what seems to be bird shot.  The Interior Ministry, on the other hand, claims riot police acted in self-defense when protesters began throwing Molotov cocktails.

Now, following the death of the boy in the village of Sadad, youths in another village (Shahrakan) caused a large explosion when they ignited a gas cylinder. A video posted to YouTube describes the explosion, apparently meant as a threat, as having been carried out "in condemnation of the murder of martyr 'Ali Hussain."



Meanwhile, the father of the boy attended a press conference along with members of the (recently-dissolved) political society 'Amal in which he essentially blames his son's death on the stance of "opposition societies," i.e., al-Wifaq.  "I cannot stand hand-in-hand with political societies who are in dialogue with a murderous regime," he says.  This came apparently after remarks by Deputy Head of al-Wifaq Khalil al-Marzuq to the effect that protesters should not use Molotov cocktails against police.  Opposition message boards are now filled with condemnations of al-Marzuq, described among other things as an Interior Ministry spokesman.


Neither does the United States escape the blame of opposition activists.  A statement by al-Wafa', for example, dismisses Posner's remarks at the UN--in particular his suggestion of dialogue--as disingenuous and emblematic of the U.S.'s "negative, hostile, and hypocritical role toward our people, disguised as friendship and advice, meant to halt our people's march toward achieving [its] demands."

Yes, the uprising itself has been extinguished.  But what is the price of the government's victory?  So far, it is a fractured society; a more diffuse and more radical opposition (among both Sunnis and Shi'is); overwhelming economic and political reliance on Saudi Arabia; and a self-perpetuating cycle of suspicion and violence that only continues to fuel these trends.  How long until one must add genuine armed insurgency to this list?

Update: As an additional "f you" to its international critics, Bahrain has upheld the controversial convictions in the trial of the Salmaniyya medical workers.

Update 2: It's good to see that Al-Watan has not lost any of its journalistic integrity since Al Bin Khalil took over as editor-in-chief.  Last Sunday (sorry I just caught this), the newspaper dedicated a full page to publishing the names and photographs of Bahraini activists who were said to have participated in the UN human rights review in Geneva, i.e. "the participants in the discrediting of Bahrain."

The article also purports to outline the "funding network" behind the activists, using the same flowcharts as Al-Watan's famous outline of the opposition's "terrorist network."

Update 3: There is a very interesting paper just published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences that uses statistical techniques to detect two different types of electoral fraud.  Unfortunately, it looks like the method requires a relatively large number of electoral districts (the average population per district must be smaller than 5,000), because otherwise it would be interesting to repeat their procedure using 2002-2010 electoral data from Bahrain!

Update 4: The Bahrain Mirror reports that Bahrain is now attempting to strong-arm another of its traditionally supportive-to-politically-neutral communities, namely Bahrainis of Persian origin ('Ajam). Sh. Rashid is said to have sent a strongly-worded letter to both the al-Manama Club and the Grand 'Ajam Ma'tam, two of the country's most prominent Persian-dominated civil society organizations, threatening the community with "deportation" if it "continues supporting opposition activities."  I suppose, then, that this explains the recent (seemingly random) statement of the Grand 'Ajam Ma'tam "reiterating its loyalty to His Majesty King Hamad bin 'Isa Al Khalifa" and criticizing "perpetrators of rioting and terrorism."

Update 5: As if on cue, Bahrain has suffered yet another deadly homemade bomb attack on police in the village of Eker.

The Dangerous U.S. Double Standard on Islamic Extremism

I have an article in Foreign Policy's Mideast Channel today on "The Dangerous U.S. Double Standard on Islamic Extremism." The focus is the U.S.'s continued support for and tolerance of Sunni Islamic movements in Syria and (as examined in the bulk of the article) in Bahrain, even as it falls victim to adherents of this very same ideology in Libya and elsewhere. In short, the U.S. seems not to have learned the lesson either of its ill-fated support for the mujahidin in Afghanistan or, relatedly, the attacks of 9/11.

Also, Freedom House has released a new "Countries at the Crossroads" report on Bahrain covering the period through November 2011. Not surprisingly, Bahrain's scores have been downgraded across the board.

Update: Christian Caryl agrees with me in the New York Review of Books blog: "Islamist Déjà Vu: The Lessons of 1979."

Update 2: Obligatory story from The Onion (warning: multiple phalluses).

Update 3: Chatham House has released a summary report for its June 2012 workshop on Bahrain titled "Youth Perspectives on the Future."

Update 4: Definitely Not Exaggerated Story of the Day® courtesy of the Jerusalem Post: "Bahrain seizes items Iran likely sought for nukes." As Black Bush would say, "Do I need to tell you what the fuck you can do with an aluminum tube!?! ALUMINUM!"



Update 5: Intelligence firm STRATFOR reports (login required for full text) that "Bahrain -- with the support of Saudi Arabia -- has begun a process to naturalize Sunni Syrian refugees in an effort to augment the minority Sunni population amid rising Shiite dissent." Shocking.