Tit for Tat in Bahrain

Only two months into the 2011 uprising, Hussein Ibish created something of a stir with an article for Foreign Policy titled, "Is Bahrain Creating a New Terrorist Threat?" Opposition activists in particular were offended by the suggestion that what was then an overwhelmingly peaceful protest movement could devolve into violence or terrorism.  Suffice it to say that Ibish likely avoided Twitter for a few days.

Of course, his question was not aimed at the integrity of demonstrators, but simply the political environment in Bahrain. "By leaving no room for peaceful dissent, " he summarized, "the Bahraini monarchy is creating the conditions for a violent revolt."

Such a thesis, I suspect, is no longer controversial, particularly following yesterday's sophisticated and premeditated attack on police in the village of Daih using a remotely-detonated bomb.  (Ugly opposition forum photos here.) While one can debate whether such an operation is best described as "terrorism" or "insurgency," given that the targets were police rather than civilians, still I think all can agree that Ibish's query is no longer rhetorical. (And we leave aside for the moment the question of Bahraini armed involvement in Syria, especially among Salafis.)

Of obvious concern is the nature of the bombing itself, which as the government has been quick to point out made use of exactly the sort of remote detonator confiscated in January on a boat apparently destined for Bahrain. At the time, the Ministry of Interior claimed that the detonators bore a "Made in Syria" label, though I have not seen this explicit connection made to yesterday's attack.

The following video, though dismissed by some as government fabrication, purports to show supporters of the group apparently responsible, the al-Ashtar Brigades, celebrating in Nuwaidrat the success of the deadly "operation" in Daih. The presence of small children certainly is not comforting.


Another unusual aspect of the case is the involvement of Emirati police personnel -- one of whom was among the dead -- in the anti-riot operation.  According to an Interior Ministry statement, the officer was in Bahrain "as part of the Amwaj Al Khaleej forces of the [GCC] Joint Security Agreement." He was not, then, part of the GCC's Peninsula Shield force, which the government continues to insist has never been involved in anti-demonstration operations (a claim supported by the BICI).

Yet the GCC joint security pact, agreed in 2012, is perhaps no less controversial.  Its terms still have not been released publicly, drawing anger and some protest among parliamentarians in Kuwait in particular.  Certainly, the presence of foreign police in Bahrain will come as an unwelcome surprise to many.

According to several people based in the Emirates with whom I've spoken, the case of the fallen UAE policeman has garnered national attention and given rise no little anti-Iranian sentiment.  Ruler of Dubai Sh. Muhammad bin Rashid has even taken to Twitter to eulogize "Tariq al-Shehi, Emirati father of four, ... martyred in Bahrain."

طارق الشحي .. إماراتي أب لأربعة أطفال .. شهيد الواجب الإماراتي في البحرين .. pic.twitter.com/K186dhjDN0
— HH Sheikh Mohammed (@HHShkMohd) March 4, 2014

One wonders how this sentiment will translate into international relations.  On the one hand, one could imagine redoubled regional support for Bahrain so as to appear united in the face of ostensive Iranian-backed terrorism.  On the other hand, one might just as well expect the opposite reaction, on the part of the UAE in particular, which is to say to the Al Khalifa: you really need to get your house in order, as it's increasingly affecting the rest of us.

In this regard, the recent elevation of Muhammad bin Nayf in Saudi Arabia, now in charge of the all-important Syria portfolio, is of potential consequence.  The Interior Minister is said to be more pragmatic than his father with regard to Saudi countenance of potential Bahraini concessions to the opposition, and was even rumored to have been involved in an ultimately-abandoned plan to bring al-Wifaq representatives to discussions in Riyadh.

One really hopes that such potential sources of regional pressure or mediation pan out, because it's difficult to see how Bahrain's political-turned-armed conflict can be resolved internally.  Unless one believes that the state has so far held its punches in its dealing with the violent opposition, and that its heretofore inability to stamp out attacks such as yesterday's stems primarily from moderation in tactics, then it's not clear what else it can do to end the escalating insurgency. Arresting 'Ali Salman or 'Isa Qasim isn't going to change anything (for the better).

At the same time, despite official statements to the contrary, one has to imagine that the government views the violent street movement as almost entirely out of the sphere of al-Wifaq's influence. The state has therefore little incentive to enter into serious negotiations with the group, as it cannot credibly promise to deliver what the state wants, i.e. an end to precisely this sort of bloodshed and bad publicity.

Unfortunately, an escalating tit-for-tat contest between the government and radical opposition appears already well underway.

Update: The blog Jihadology offers a detailed look at Saraya al-Ashtar.

America's 25 Most Awkward Allies

A while back I was asked to contribute to an interesting project for Politico's new magazine on the U.S.'s uncomfortable relationships with authoritarian regimes. The resulting report, "America's 25 Most Awkward Allies," is now out, with Bahrain placed at number 8 behind only Pakistan (1), Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, and Uzbekistan.

The list itself contains only relatively short blurbs. Click the image above for the longer article on Bahrain, titled "The Base."

The New York Times' Hijacked Bahrain Op-Ed Efforts

Continuing in its recently-established tradition of giving credibility to misleading and/or entirely erroneous arguments about Iranian "interference" in Bahrain, on February 18 the New York Times ran an op-ed by "Bahraini entrepreneur and political commentator on Gulf issues" Sarah bin Ashoor titled "Bahrain's Hijacked Reform Efforts."  (The piece even appeared in Wednesday's print edition of the International New York Times.) While one can glean the substance of the article from the title alone, still it is noteworthy for several reasons.

First, and as noted already, it is but the latest in a string of dubious editorials on Bahrain to have appeared in the newspaper over the past six months or so.  As one gathers from the screenshot below, four of the six most recent Bahrain op-eds, dating to mid-December, promulgate the idea that Iranian (material) support for the Bahraini opposition is not only fact, but is qualitatively no different from the country's involvement in Syria and Yemen.  Only Vali Nasr, the respected scholar of Shi'i political movements, and Roger Cohen, NYT's own columnist, avoid this conflation; and only Cohen calls out (sarcastically) this Saudi-sponsored disinformation.

A glance at this list also suggests a reason for the Times' recent turn toward Bahraini government mouthpiece.  Apart from Bin Ashoor's article, the subject of each is not Bahrain per se but Iran, more particularly its ostensive efforts to destabilize the whole of southwest Asia.  The pro-Bahraini anti-Iran PR machine has thus found an unlikely ally in the pro-Israeli anti-Iran PR machine.  On the other hand, this relationship simply mirrors the newfound shared interests and evolving ties between Israel and the Gulf states generally, and so perhaps can no longer be any surprise.

The second reason why "Bahrain's Hijacked Reform Efforts" bears mention is its author. Given the timing of the article -- just 4 days after the third anniversary of the uprising -- one would expect the Times to have sought out a reputable and independent analyst to deliver an op-ed in line with its news coverage of the anniversary. This is, after all, one of the two or three weeks a year when Bahrain can expect to attract any real media coverage at all.  Instead, however, we have an obscure "commentator."

Reassuringly, I am not the only one to have been struck by this.  A blog post by one Dylan Byers at Politico describes this "suspect op-ed" and, more interestingly, its author, concluding that -- gee-whiz! -- she appears to be a random Bahraini businesswoman.  Better yet, her description as a "founding member of the London-based Gulf Affairs Forum" would seem to be more accurately stated as: a) she is the founding member of a Bahraini pro-government group; and b) she lives in London. Byers tells,

There is no evidence of the Gulf Affairs Forum's existence online. A Google search returns only the article and subsequent discussion about the article. A Nexis search returns only the original op-ed, its republication in the Times international edition, and a mention of the piece in Gulf Daily News, a Bahraini paper. In interviews with British television channels in early 2012, Ashoor was simply described as a Bahraini businesswoman.

When asked by Byers to clarify, an editor at the Times eventually explained, presumably after following up with Bin Ashoor, that,

Sarah bin Ashoor formed the Gulf Affairs Forum in 2012 to advocate for political reform in Bahrain. Though it is registered in Bahrain and members of its board are fellow Bahrainis, Ms. bin Ashoor is the leader of the organization, and she is based in London. She organized a policy forum in 2012 at which speakers included members of Parliament, business people and journalists from The Guardian, the BBC, Reuters and other organizations, and has met with officials in Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office and with scholars at Chatham House, a London-based policy institute.

Sure, fair enough.

The final and by far least interesting thing about the article is its content, which follows so closely King Hamad's April 2011 apologia in the Washington Times that it makes me wonder whether Bin Ashoor wrote that one as well.  The second paragraph of King Hamad's op-ed, the part right after he talks about how the demands of the opposition will be taken seriously and that the people making them definitely won't just be thrown in prison and tortured, begins, "Unfortunately, the legitimate demands of the opposition were hijacked by extremist elements with ties to foreign governments in the region."

Compare, now, Bin Ashoor's piece on Wednesday,

Over the years, Bahrain has faced an analogous cycle of events: The state pursues political and economic reforms. These efforts are then hijacked by unpopular radical Shiite Islamists supported by Iran. Eventually, the state overcomes these challenges and restores stability — sometimes at the cost of initially pursued reform efforts.

HIJACKED, you say!?  Indeed, much like the New York Times editorial page.

While we're at it, then, let me hijack Bin Ashoor's regurgitation of King Hamad to offer a Bahraini political cycle of my own, one that works equally well for the periods, say, 1971-1999 and 1999-2014.  Stop me if you've already heard it:

Bahrain promises political and economic reforms.  The reality fails to live up to the promises, or better yet -- no, seriously, tell me if this sounds familiar -- the ruler simply reneges on the initial promises. This effort at political backtrack is then hijacked by extremists who demand the promises be upheld. Since they are already politically and economically marginalized and thus have more to gain and less to lose, this latter group of truth-terrorists consists disproportionately of Shi'a.  Yet this situation is perfect from the standpoint of the state, which eventually overcomes the challenge of popular but Shi'a-dominated opposition by convincing ordinary Sunnis -- not to mention gullible newspapers -- that if it were to cave in to these terrorist demands (read: make good on things it already promised), Iran would take over Bahrain, steal the keys to the Fifth Fleet, and use American aircraft carriers to launch nuclear strikes on Israel. And all this -- and here's the key line -- sometimes always at the cost of initially pursued promised but never pursued reform efforts.

(Not) Breaking Ranks for Reform

The temporary shot of adrenaline injected into the National Dialogue by the Crown Prince's meeting with opposition leaders did not last long.  Neither, apparently, did Sh. Salman's attempted political comeback, about which I may have jumped the shark due to an untimely let up in my natural pessimism.

It seems clear now that the Khawalid have managed to commandeer what was meant to be a serious agenda, the Crown Prince nowhere to be seen with the start of bilateral talks.  Instead, the Royal Court has as usual insinuated itself into the process in order to sabotage it from within.  The Bahrain Mirror summarized the first opposition meeting with Khalid bin Ahmad as follows: "cold, negative, and [Khalid bin Ahmad] has snatched leadership of the dialogue."  Even the BBC picked up on his obstructionism.

Meanwhile, KbA's brother in the Justice Ministry followed through in late January on threats to disband the (Shi'i) Ulama Council led by Isa Qasim, charging that it was unregistered, involved in politics, and otherwise operating "outside the constitution and law."  The body now faces potential repossession of assets and other penalties unless it agrees to "regularize its status" and abstain from politics.

It is under this rather negative backdrop that al-Wifaq and the rest of the opposition societies have just submitted their "roadmap" for formally restarting National Dialogue talks. It calls for three meetings per week to speed up the process, but also a referendum on the outcome, along with equally unlikely concessions such as a parliament with "full legislative powers" and an "elected government."  Other longstanding demands, like new electoral boundaries and independent electoral commission, probably stand a better chance at agreement.

Most interesting to me, though, is the roadmap's immediate rejection by al-Asalah, which says of the opposition vision,

We do not for instance support having an elected government as there is nothing that points to it in the charter or in the constitution. The formation of the government remains an essential element within the prerogatives of HM the king and he is the one who nominates the prime minister and the ministers. ...

Our view on the government also takes in consideration the character of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Bahrain cannot break out of the Gulf ranks.

That is why all the GCC member states seriously stand by Bahrain on this matter.

Indeed it is, and it is of course not difficult to see why other Gulf governments would not wish to see a precedent set in Bahrain.  But this is a strange sort of argument for someone meant to represent an independent political party to make.

It would seem to me that breaking ranks sits precisely atop the list of things Bahrain needs -- whether with respect to the ruling family, the GCC, or the sectarian-cum-political groupings that continue to run in circles so long as they are unable to mobilize individuals on some viable political basis.

On an unrelated note, finally, the commander in charge of the U.S. Fifth Fleet's one active carrier strike group, Rear Adm. Kevin Sweeney, has made headlines for having reportedly "reiterated [the U.S. navy's] commitment to Bahrain."  Yet, when one reads his comments, in fact he seems to go out of his way not to mention Bahrain by name, substituting instead "this region," "this area," and so on.

The Gulf Daily News quotes him as saying, for instance, “We have a full commitment to this area. ... Our presence in the region is a continuation of six-decade long commitment to stand by our partners in the region and we’ll continue to honour that commitment." But it seems to me that in these two sentences alone Sweeney spurned at least three different chances to mention Bahrain.  What it means, if anything, one can debate, but certainly this cannot be interpreted as an expression of commitment to anything other than the Gulf region generically.

Bahrain's Crown Prince Makes His Move—And It Might Just Work

I have a new article out at Foreign Policy on the crown prince's recent intervention in the national dialogue. More than that, though, it is about the larger political maneuver (in my view at least) being attempted by Sh. Salman vis-a-vis his royal challengers.

Update: Lost in all the attention on Sh. Salman's meeting with 'Ali Salman is a recent statement (characterized by some as a "fatwa," though I'm not sure that's correct) by Sh. 'Isa Qasim declaring that "terrorism is forbidden in Islam." According to an English translation carried in the Iranian ABNA, he said, among other things, "This is our clear and persistent word to all believers; no to terrorism. Nothing other than a nonviolent approach must be adopted while demanding reforms."

Of course, the sorts of people over whom 'Isa Qassim has religious sway are not necessarily the same individuals engaging in violent acts.  The message is probably more important for (and addressed to) the government and its Sunni support base, which continues to demand an explicit denunciation of violence from al-Wifaq, and to question why the state would agree to negotiate with "terrorists."  Thus, for instance, we have this photoshop, which would seem to summarize the opinion of the latter:

معكم معكم ياعلماء ! pic.twitter.com/B5yZNNPV8g
— Takrooz (@Takrooz) January 22, 2014

Update 2: Simon Henderson scours Robert Gates' new memoir for interesting bits on royal factionalism in Bahrain, which unfortunately seem to be relatively few. Mainly we are told what we already know, to wit:

The book recalls a February 2011 conversation in which Crown Prince Salman said "he was ready to become prime minister if asked." Yet despite describing him as "the voice of reason," Gates noted that Salman "was powerless" at the time. When visiting the island a month later, Gates "suggested to both the crown prince and king that they find a new and different role for the prime minister, who was disliked by nearly everyone but especially the Shia." Although Salman and the king responded positively to his suggestions, Gates concluded that "the royal family was split, and the hardliners had the edge."

Update 3: A pessimistic view from the BBC on the Crown Price's initiative, focusing in particular on the paradoxical role of Khalid bin Ahmad. This is in line with a notable Bahrain Mirror story that describes the first opposition meeting with the Royal Court Minister as follows: "cold, negative, and [Khalid bin Ahmad] has snatched leadership of the dialogue."

The Crown Prince Negotiates with Terrorists

HRH CP receives Chairmen of the Reps. & Shura Councils,Independent MPs & Heads & Reps. of Political Societies pic.twitter.com/Kr0tUNwBVc
— اخبار سمو ولي العهد (@BahrainCPnews) January 15, 2014

A dramatic change indeed from the recent unprecedented persecution of senior al-Wifaq leaders, with 'Ali Salman himself arrested but two weeks ago for supposed incitement to terrorism and hatred of the regime, yesterday saw a surprise meeting between Crown Prince Salman and political society leaders aimed at jump-starting the now-suspended national dialogue.

Of course, the question has never really been Sh. Salman's desire or sincerity in making a deal, but his practical ability to do so given ruling family dynamics. Perhaps the coming of 2014 -- an election year in Bahrain -- has given the government a renewed sense that the clock is ticking. Time will tell.

Truthiness in (and on) Bahrain

Today, no matter who you are, I've got good news for you. If you're one of those types of people who enjoys reading objective assessments of important social and political phenomena by people who have some knowledge of them, then you'll be happy to hear that Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, a volume to which I contributed and about which I've been talking for a year now, will finally, after some delay, be out this Friday. (Fred Wehrey's book on the same topic -- and bearing almost the exact same title -- has also recently been published.)  In addition to my theoretical introduction, there are chapters by Laurence Louër, Kristin Smith Diwan, J.E. Peterson, Marc Valeri, and others.

On the other hand, if you're the kind of guy (or gal) who gets a kick out of blatant propaganda and/or subtle, agenda-driven changes in language and interpretation that are eventually adopted uncritically by influential media outlets like the New York Times, then you also should read on.

For the former, we have none other than Sh. Khalifa bin Salman himself, who yesterday received a group of pro-government Twitter-ers to thank them for their effective "exploit[ation] of modern technology to first and foremost defend Bahrain" -- as opposed to, say, "first and foremost tell the truth about Bahrain." The GDN reports that he "stressed the need to counter campaigns defaming Bahrain's reform project and fledgling democratic strides. 'Confront anyone tweeting to harm Bahrain and lay bare all those who sold their souls to foreign parties,'" he said. This comes, one imagines, after last week's surprising decision by South Korea not to sell tear gas to Bahrain, an opposition victory owing largely to an effective social media campaign.

Already the day before, Bahrain had established a new "anti-hate speech" committee (announced at a cabinet meeting chaired by the prime minister), charged with "proposing and adopting policies and measures, as well as preparing effective programmes, that address the problem of hate speech."  Presumably this will follow the lead of Bahrain's nebulous anti-terrorism law of 2006, which defines terrorism as any oppositional act.

Yet, more worrying than Khalifa bin Salman's personal Internet army and hate-speech mutawwa'in is a more subtle question of language noted in a recent article by Jim Lobe (which also features extended commentary by Emile Nakhleh).  The issue concerns an article featured prominently in Sunday's New York Times about the ongoing negotiations over Iran's nuclear program.  In it, the authors seem to regurgitate various unsubstantiated claims of "proof" of Iranian interference in Bahrain cited by Elliot Abrams in a recent post at CFR. The upshot is that Bahrain now appears in the article alongside Syria and Yemen as veritable, established cases of Iranian interference in the Middle East, using as primary evidence the recent Caper of the Smoking Gun Boats, which as Lobe notes has not received serious treatment except by Abrams (and of course the indomitable Mitch Belfer).

Yet here the New York Times reports the Ministry of Interior's claims as fact:

In Bahrain, where Iran has ties to several Shiite groups, including some that have carried out small-scale attacks on the police, security officials last week seized a ship headed for the country with 50 Iranian-made hand grenades and nearly 300 commercial detonators marked “made in Syria.”

The two Bahrainis captured told interrogators that they had been trained in Iran and were directed by Bahraini opposition figures based there.

The country’s public security chief, Tareq al-Hassan, said that information provided by the suspects had also led to the seizure of plastic explosives, detonators, bombs, automatic rifles and ammunition in a warehouse.

Nakhleh addresses some obvious problems in a reply to Lobe, writing,

The veracity of the NYT report on Bahrain is questionable. The two reporters should know better and should have been more nuanced. Perhaps their report was a nod to some hardliners in Washington who oppose any deal with Iran on the nuclear program. I am afraid the Gordon/Schmitt report might give the impression the NYT is falling in the same neocon-Israeli trap about Iran. ...

The weapons were seized on a boat, not a “ship” as the Times has claimed. They could have come from a location on the Iranian coast or from any other place in the northern Persian Gulf or the Shatt al-Arab estuary. We should be very careful lest we are duped by information or intelligence, which the Bahraini security services might have obtained through “interrogations” of the people arrested on the boat. It’s disappointing the Times did not take a more strategic look at Iranian-Bahraini relations and published, as fact, a claim about Iranian weapons heading toward Bahrain.

Ironically, then, the most informed and balanced coverage of Bahrain in the major Western media last week came on a fake news program, as Stephen Colbert hosted Ken Roth of Human Rights Watch. See if you can spot Roth's old-fashioned use of facts and evidence in the linked video.