Al-Wifaq to National Dialogue: "We're Out, Baby!"

You have to hand it to the guys at al-Wifaq. For whatever else you might say about them, they are certainly not slow to take a hint. It has taken the group all of one session of the National Dialogue™ to conclude what it had assumed (and said publicly) well before it agreed begrudgingly to participate: that the initiative could not possibly lead to the sort of substantive political reform demanded by the opposition, and indeed that sparked the entire February 14 uprising in the first place. (Why this is so has been discussed here and here. And in this good Reuters article.)

Following Tuesday's opening session of talks, Khalil al-Marzuq announced (see also the Bahrain Mirror's coverage) that al-Wifaq delegates would not be attending two of the dialogue's four committees--the "social" and "economic" committees--but only the "political" and "human rights" committees. Which is a polite way of saying that the former two are altogether beside the point of the dialogue, which according to King Hamad is to bring political reform and reconciliation. More generally, the move continues al-Wifaq's rejection since the start of protests of the notion that the root of Bahrain's current crisis is fundamentally socioeconomic rather than political, an image the Bahraini government would very much like to cultivate.

The AP quotes al-Marquz as saying,

We believe the dialogue should discuss major political and security issues. ... This dialogue will not lead to a solution ... and it does not fulfill the needs to pull Bahrain out of its political crisis.

Given this less than positive evaluation of the first session, the Bahrain Mirror reports that al-Wifaq made its continued participation in the National Dialogue contingent on the success of the second session held today, Thursday. This, of course, is in line with 'Ali Salman's warning when the group announced its participation that it would leave the talks if it become obvious that they would be unfruitful.

Well, evidently al-Wifaq was no more impressed with today's session than with Tuesday's. For, as reported once again by the Bahrain Mirror, it "has decided to pull out of the dialogue and will announce the decision tomorrow at its rally" in the northern village of Karranah. Moreover, the report says, the al-Wifaq source confirmed that the decision "has been made known to concerned countries working to resolve the Bahrain crisis"--that is, one assumes, to the United States.

(This comes after a Tuesday Financial Times story claiming that al-Wifaq's participation was brokered by the State Department. It quotes "one opposition politician" as saying, "'The argument of the Americans is that we would be blamed for failure of the dialogue so tactically we had to be part of it.'")


Appropriately, then, al-Wifaq's planned mass rally for tomorrow (the fourth installment of its "Our National Demands" Festival series) in Karranah is titled "An Elected Government." Among its many electronic fliers is one that offers a quote from Sh. 'Ali Salman:

"Our demand: an elected government representing the will of the people.

Isn't that what is enjoyed by 90% of the people on Earth?
Isn't this the demand of the revolting Arab populations?
Isn't that what is called for in international agreements such as The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that [the Government of] Bahrain signed?
Isn't that modernization?
Isn't that a "national" demand?
Or is it just a ploy to elicit adherence to governments stuck in the Middle Ages?"


Irrespective of what tomorrow's rally in Karranah will bring, al-Wifaq's decision to leave the dialogue, if perhaps sudden, can come as little surprise, particularly if it was indeed the U.S. that ultimately convinced it to take part rather than its own judgment. Apart from the intrinsic problems stemming from the very structure of the dialogue itself, we might name a few others:

1. At the same time that Bahraini society was supposed to be engaged in "dialogue," the same sorts of government behaviors that necessitated the dialogue in the first place--in particular, violent repression of peaceful demonstrations--continued unabated, as covered in a recent Economist piece.


2. Originally scheduled to take place prior to the start of the National Dialogue, authorities postponed until September the appeal hearing for the 21 opposition leaders sentenced in June, a move widely seen as an overt attempt to coerce al-Wifaq cooperation in the dialogue and, more generally, to use the appeals as a bargaining chip in government-opposition negotiations. (And this, of course, is in addition to the two military cases against former al-Wifaq MPs Matar Matar and Jawad Fayruz, due for sentencing any day.)
   


3. The timing of the dialogue initiative--which is set to end as the holy month of Ramadan begins--is not random, and works very much in the government's favor. Ramadan being a month for fasting and avoidance of conflict, the opposition will be in a tricky situation in which carrying on a political fight in August is likely to be viewed as irreligious or simply out of place. As such, for some 40 days (counting 'Eid) after the dialogue ends, Bahrain will see a lull in political action that will make it difficult to carry on the momentum of July. Indeed, one gets the impression that the government hopes everyone will have forgotten about the "recommendations" (assuming there are any) of the National Dialogue by the time the Ramadan and 'Eid holidays end.


4. After its protest resignation from parliament and assumption of leadership of the February and March demonstrations (helped later by the fact that most other opposition figures had already been arrested), al-Wifaq gained widespread support among Bahraini Shi'a, many of whom had long criticized it for having been co-opted through its parliamentary experiment. But its decision to join the dialogue undoubtedly reversed much of this gain in support. So once it became clear that the (largely international PR) benefits from participation were not worth the (domestic) harm to its following, the decision quit the dialogue presumably was an easy one to make.

The ball is now back in the government's court.

But--hey--if nothing else, at least regime supporters will be happy that al-Wifaq is out of the talks. A new billboard (see our previous post on Bahraini billboards) spotted in Busaiteen declares, "We [Sunnis, I guess, or maybe Salafis] will stand shoulder to shoulder against a Wilayat al-Faqih"--which, as everyone knows, 'Isa Qasim and 'Ali Salman were pushing for at the National Dialogue.


On an unrelated note, finally, I should say a word about our friend Yusif Al Bin Khalil, Al-Watan's professional anti-U.S. op-ed columnist. It seems his newest series, titled "Ayatollah Obama and Bahrain," has caught the attention of the U.S. Embassy, which has been pressuring Bahrain's Information Affairs authority to put an end to it. But, as another pro-government newspaper (Al-Watan is run by the Royal Court), Al-Ayam, reports, the Bahraini Society of Journalists is rejecting this U.S. effort. A spokesman insists that Al Bin Khalil "did not defame either directly or indirectly the character of the [U.S.] president or degrade [him], but dealt objectively with [U.S.] foreign policy, which does not conflict with the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution; nor [does it conflict with] the [Bahraini press law], which [i.e., freedom of the press] has been in place in the United States of America for a long time."

I, for one, hope Al Bin Khalil is able to continue his writing long enough for it to appear on the reportedly-upcoming English-language online version of Al-Watan, which will be great fun for everyone.

(Update: Al Bin Khalil has written a new article today in which he mocks the pressure from the American Embassy. It is titled, "Dear Obama: This is How You Ban Freedom in Bahrain.")

Update: the Bahraini government just can't get enough of Religion and Politics in Bahrain!


Update 2: a story at Al-Jazeera contradicts the Bahrain Mirror report that al-Wifaq will announce its withdrawal from the National Dialogue tomorrow. I guess we shall see.

Update 3: since 'Ali Salman's keynote at the festival in Karranah (audio here) has now ended and I'm yet to hear anything about a complete al-Wifaq pull-out of the talks, it appears that the Bahrain Mirror rumor was indeed wrong after all.

In the end, though, I'm not sure what practical difference it really makes, since al-Wifaq has already clearly checked out intellectually from the talks, reiterating several times that the only reason it is there at all is to avoid "a scenario again where people say that the opposition is resisting in trying to find a political solution," as Khalil al-Marzuq said yesterday. I'd be surprised if they weren't busy browsing the Interweb or playing paper football during the sessions.

Likewise, in his Friday sermon today, Sh. 'Isa Qasim was equally dismissive of the talks: "This dialogue process is twisted and the way it is conducted indicates that there is no meaningful substance. ... The aim is to delay reforms and democracy." And, at least according to a poll at CNN Arabic (which asks, "Do you think that the National Dialogue will succeed in solving the current crisis in Bahrain?"), a healthy majority seems to agree:

Dialogue, Representation, and Statistics

On the eve of Bahrain's National Dialogue, whose first substantive sessions will begin tomorrow, Al-Jazeera is reporting a very peculiar story. It is based on a "leaked" report outlining the findings of an official study purportedly commissioned by the Bahraini government in the second half of 2010. What is this study, you ask? A study of the ethno-religious (Sunni-Shi'i) composition of Bahrain.

As one of the notable results of my 2009 mass survey of Bahrain was precisely this--a first direct estimate of the ratio of Sunni and Shi'i citizens in Bahrain since the country's very first census in 1941--naturally I was intrigued by this new government "study." And a bit surprised. For, according to the Al-Jazeera summary, the government study found that Bahraini Shi'a comprise a slight minority of the country's population, at 49%, a figure quite removed from my own estimate of around 57.6%.

In addition to this 49% Shi'a / 51% Sunni ratio, the Al-Jazeera summary also reports a few other "facts" revealed by this study, undertaken by Bahrain's Central Informatics Organization. Among these are that

the document emphasizes that the procedures for naturalization did not influence the sectarian division during any period by more than 1%, because it was limited and conducted in accordance with the conditions set for citizenship.

That is to say, this 51% Sunni majority was not achieved artificially by political naturalization, as contended by many in- and outside Bahrain, but by some natural demographic process. Indeed, the study says,

the document shows that the primary beneficiary since the [new] Bahraini citizenship law passed in 1963 are wealthy Persian Shi'is and not the followers of the Sunni sect.

And similarly:

The document adds that, after he took power in March 1999, King Hamad ordered the return of exiled citizens abroad, and the number of returnees with their families during the period from 2001 to 2003 [amounted] to about 10,607 citizens, mostly of the Shiite community.

The conclusion of the report is thus clear:

the lack of accurate and scientific data [has led] many international institutions, foreign governments, and the media to believe for 20 years that the demographic distribution in the Kingdom is divided into a Shiite majority (60% -70%) and a Sunni minority (30% -40%).

But they were wrong! And this leaked government report proves it.

Yet a few things make one suspicious of such results.

In the first place, the timing and content of the leak are simply very convenient. One day before a contentious national dialogue is to begin in which a Shi'a-dominated opposition is poised to demand substantive political reform in large part on the basis of their majority demographic status, we have a leaked report saying that "Oops, you aren't a majority after all! And by just one percentage point!"

Similarly, as highlighted in the quotations above, the related "conclusions" and emphasis of the report are equally convenient. These go something like this:

1. Sunnis have "historically" been, and still are, a majority in Bahrain. (The report notes that "historical estimates [average] about 56.2% [Sunni], compared with 43.8% of the Shiite community, a small difference making it difficult to divide the people to majority and minority [groups]." Never mind that the last Bahraini census to report ethno-religious affiliation (in 1941) put the ratio at 53% Shi'i / 47% Sunni.)
   
2. The government has never engaged in political naturalization.
3. Indeed, if anything, Bahrain's generous naturalization policy has done more to bring Shi'a to Bahrain, not Sunnis.
4. Thus, not only are Shi'a misguided to claim political disenfranchisement on majoritarian grounds and as a result of political naturalization, but the only reason they have reached even their current demographic status of 49% of the population is the government's liberal immigration policy.
5. ???
6. Profit!

The other suspicious thing about the findings of the study are its procedure, as reported by Al-Jazeera. The latter tells that the study was based on "analysis of historical documents and studies and field surveys"; records of the Sunni awqaf (religious endowments); family and marriage records; religious conversion records; and "data from the intelligence and security services."

Now, the agency said to have conducted the survey, the Central Informatics Organization, is Bahrain's main statistical agency. Formerly attached to the National Security Apparatus, it was once (and perhaps still is) the equivalent of Bahrain's CIA, and, as Al-Jazeera notes in its summary, it operates today under the direct supervision of the prime ministership. Given this background, and the fact that the CIO is the agency responsible for carrying out Bahrain's census, the notion that it would resort to "analysis of historical documents and studies," marriage records, and so on, is a bit difficult to understand.

In reality, all it need do is take a random sample of its own census data; determine (assuming it does not record it already, which is questionable) Sunni/Shi'i affiliation on the basis of family names and geographical location (which for 99% of cases should do the trick); and voilà. Or, at the very least, it could conduct its own field survey of 1,000 random households. In sum, why bother attempting to extrapolate from historical records and marriage certificates if it already possesses exactly the data it requires?

Furthermore, without divulging too many details, my own 500-household sample for my Bahrain mass survey came also from the census data of the Central Informatics Organization, if in a roundabout way. It is this therefore strange that just one year prior to this "study" undertaken by the CIO, and using its own census data, my Sunni-Shi'i estimate should differ by some 8 percentage points from that of the CIO's study.

Finally, while I do not claim to be a political science celebrity, my own article detailing the demographic findings of my 2009 survey has not gone unnoticed by the Bahraini government, nor more specifically by the CIO itself, as one gathers from the following visitor records to this website:

And:


And I'm sure I would find more if I cared to look back further through the logs. Suffice it to say that the Central Informatics Organization is keenly aware of the findings of my own Bahrain survey, and presumably were not happy to see its results made public. While this is not to say that its study (or the "results" of its study) were leaked specifically as a counterpoint to my own work, it is also not unthinkable in light of the government's current PR blitz.

Of course, there is also a more immediate benefit of leaking these new population figures. As the National Dialogue gets set to begin, government supporters have been quick to downplay the importance of al-Wifaq's participation, in particular by questioning the extent to which it actually represents a large proportion of the Bahraini population. Thus, for example:


The natural next step, then, is to question the extent of the Shi'i population more generally. For if al-Wifaq represents only a particular subset of Bahraini Shi'a, and Bahraini Shi'a themselves represent a minority of the population, then it makes the National Dialogue's soon-to-be lack of substantive political progress a bit easier to sell to international observers. If Al-Wifaq's political demands represent those of a relatively insignificant minority of the population, it is that much easier to dismiss them as one set of political preferences among many. Which, at the conclusion of the National Dialogue--and after the month-long break of Ramadan and 'Eid--King Hamad will surely do à la 2001.

To end, finally, on an unrelated note: everyone's favorite Al-Watan columnist Yusif Al Bin Khalil has given up on his ever-popular anti-U.S. series "Washington and the Sunna of Bahrain" to begin a new series with (if you can believe it) an even better title: "Ayatollah Obama and Bahrain."

Update: it seems our friends in the CIO (this time from the 'Isa Town branch) have found this article, and spent a good 45 minutes browsing the site:

And again from Manama!:


Need we continue?

Now from al-Hidd. Seriously, how many offices does the CIO have?

Update 2: an article in Al-Ayam now cites a CIO official as denying the Al-Jazeera story and indeed denying the organization's ever having undertaken a study of Bahrain's ethnic demography. (Al-Jazeera itself is also now reporting the denial.) "The source expressed surprise at the timing of such rumor-mongering, with the Kingdom of Bahrain preparing to enter into a dialogue of national consensus, which suggests an attempt to raise issues [at the dialogue] relating to [political] naturalization."

So it seems the government is somehow spinning this leaked "report" as a propaganda attempt on the part of the opposition rather than by it. Well played, sir!

Update 3: for English readers, the Gulf News now has a good summary of the report and the CIO's denial.

Bahrain to the Opposition: "Would You Like a Fact-Finding Commission to Go with That Dialogue?"

Spurred by months of international criticism and domestic political stagnation, the government in Bahrain is finally trying to piece things back together, or at least to give the appearance of doing so. This effort is aimed primarily at its observers abroad; though, as Laurence Louër points out in this excellent Arab Reform Bulletin piece, Bahrain's rulers are also attempting to make sure that they do not lose their relatively small but powerful constituency of long-time pro-government Shi'a families. (Hence, for example, King Hamad's June 21 personal visit to the majlis of the late Ibrahim Hamidan.)

The most obvious of these window-dressing measures is of course the July 2 faux National Dialogue, in which 300 mostly non-political delegates will talk over each other at the 'Isa Cultural Center and then submit their watered-down, least-common-denominator recommendations to King Hamad for a prompt filing in the circular receptacle, as my 5th-grade teacher used to say--that is, in the garbage can. For those further interested in this futile process, see the list of attendees recently published in Al-Wasat:


As noted before, of this five-column monstrosity, only the middle third column consists of participants from political societies. And, of these societies, only 2 of 15 currently have representation in parliament. So, all in all, the National Dialogue should prove an efficacious path to substantive political reform in Bahrain.

Yet the dialogue initiative is not alone. Indeed, over the past few days Bahrain has sought to address almost systematically each of the main criticisms levied against it for its handling of the post-February 14 period.

• Just three days after a June 25 report that FIFA will be investigating Bahrain's arrest of players on its national football/soccer team, authorities very quietly announced the release of an unspecified number of detained athletes, along with all but 14 of the doctors and nurses facing trial (the trial is still on, however).


• Five days after the widely-condemned sentences handed down by a military tribunal to Bahrain's 21 opposition leaders on June 22, authorities announced the transfer of some cases against anti-government activists (though not those of the doctors/nurses or the al-Wifaq MPs) to civilian court.


• Two weeks after the U.S. Department of Labor agreed to consider a complaint by the AFL-CIO contending that Bahrain's March and April firings of those suspected of demonstration participation violated the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, the Bahraini government dispatched its Ministers of Labour and Industry and Commerce to the U.S. for meetings with--you guessed it--senior AFL-CIO officials along with those from the State Department.


• News of the phased withdrawal of "most of" the Saudi military forces in Bahrain was conveniently leaked to Western media this week, while the Arabic press in Bahrain (e.g., Al-Ayam) continues to the deny the report, citing anonymous Saudi officials of its own.
  


• Several weeks after agreeing "in principle" to a UN-led inquiry into Bahrain's post-February crackdown, Bahrain announces instead its own, government-sponsored but still "independent" commission to investigate claims of human rights abuses "by both sides"--that is, by the government and by protesters.
  
  While no one can question the integrity of those who will comprise the committee--all of them being very respected internationally--one must assume that the government has its reasons to prefer its own commission to one headed by a third party like the UNHCHR. If nothing else, it will be much easier to say "thanks but no thanks" to the recommendations of a group of people working at your own behest than to the United Nations.
  
  Nonetheless, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has already given her blessing to the committee. But, then again, how could she not?, what with Bahrain being a sitting member of the UN Human Rights Council and all. Along with Saudi Arabia. And Libya. And Russia. And China for God's sake. A real Who's Who? of human rights defenders.
  

About these clearly very deliberate PR moves by the Bahraini government two things stand out.

The first is that, at the same time that the authorities take pains to announce publicly their intention to investigate the acts of violence, vengeance, and injustice undertaken during the previous months, these same acts continue unabated. As I write, today's protest in Jidhafs organized by the February 14 coalition is being teargassed by riot police. (And tomorrow's rally in al-Diraz led by al-Wifaq may get a similar treatment.) Furthermore, the appeal hearing for the 21 opposition leaders due to take place this week has been postponed to a much more politically-convenient date in September, which avoids the need to announce the verdicts in the days before the National Dialogue, especially as the government attempts to woo al-Wifaq and its supporters. Finally, several more high-profile (and controversial) trials have still yet to go forward or issue verdicts, including the military trials of the 48 doctors and nurses; and of former al-Wifaq MPs Matar Matar and Jawad Fayruz.

Hence, at the same time that it is saying, "You know, we should really form a commission to investigate all the bad things that have happened," the same bad things are still happening.

The second observation one may make is that all the measures announced so far, including the National Dialogue and the "fact-finding committee," represent an attempt to return to the status quo ante, to the state of affairs prior to February 14, as if this everything after this date were a mere aberration. Thus the trials of "those responsible," the "national dialogue" to reconcile society, and a backward-looking investigation into "what happened."

The problem is that the question is not "what happened" but "what is happening." That is to say, the protests, if sparked in the immediate sense by events outside Bahrain, were a culmination of a political conflict that has been brewing for decades, and that is no closer to resolution (and will not be any closer at the conclusion of the National Dialogue, even if al-Wifaq does participate) than when protests began on February 14.

The government is acting as though all that remains is to dialogue in the coming weeks, finish up trials in the next few months, elect a new parliament in late September, release the findings from the "independent commission" sometime in October, and then things should be back to normal by the new year. Voilà!

Yet, as Toby Jones has recently observed, "Events seem to have gone too far and too fast for some kind of quick fix through talks." Dialogues and commissions, while nice, are no substitute for actual political reform to address actual political grievances of actual political constituencies. Unfortunately, as Louër argues in her Carnegie piece, the ever-expanding Sunni-Shi'i (and inter-Al Khalifa) divide occasioned by the February 14 uprising will render such a process that much more difficult.

Update: so it turns out that those reports that al-Wifaq would not participate in the National Dialogue because it "missed the deadline" for agenda submission were indeed wrong after all. Talking on BBC Radio (at 2:53) with Jane Kinninmont of Chatham House, two-term MP Jasim Husain says he expects al-Wifaq to announce its participation at its festival today in al-Diraz, which makes some sense since its title as announced on Internet fliers is "Our National Demands." (There is an 'Ali Salman press conference scheduled tonight for 7:30pm.)

Moreover, Sh. 'Isa Qasim today in his Friday sermon (audio; English summary) welcomed the king's fact-finding mission and paved the way for al-Wifaq's participation in the dialogue, saying that although the dialogue is not genuine, the group is under pressure to take part and that involvement would not be "a betrayal of religion," as one forum-goer summarizes. This should make for an interesting event today in al-Diraz, since many are not happy with the decision, likening it to al-Wifaq's agreement to participate in the 2006 elections that led to its splintering.

Finally, the Gulf Daily News reports some new details today on the format of the dialogue itself, which will include 181 (!) different agendas, 16 moderators, and four different "halls" (political, social, economic, and human rights). And decisions will be sought "through consensus rather than by taking a formal vote." Consensus among 300 participants from 100 different societies? That should be no problem, right?

Update 2: it's official.

Bahrain's National Dialogue and the Ever-Deepening Sectarian Divide

I don't normally devote an entire post to a link, but in this case it deserves one.

Laurence Louër, a research fellow at Sciences Po who published an outstanding 2008 book on Shi'ism in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait called "Transnational Shia Politics" (Amazon link), has an equally outstanding piece today in the Arab Reform Bulletin at the Carnegie Endowment. It is called "Bahrain's National Dialogue and the Ever-Deepening Sectarian Divide."

If you haven't read her book, which is based on extensive fieldwork in all three countries (in Bahrain it seems she manages to meet with everyone save for the king and prime minister), I would suggest you do so.

In sum, it argues against the notion of a "transnational Shia crescent" of the sort warned of famously by Jordan's King 'Abdallah II and demonstrates that, in fact, in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, Shi'a politics is quite localized and based primarily on decades-old relationships between the aging generation of Shi'i scholars (in Bahrain, e.g., Sh. 'Isa Qasim and S. 'Abdallah al-Ghurayfi) who met in seminaries in Najaf or Karbala'. Thus she traces the inter-personal networks of these individuals to discover how far one can indeed speak of something like a "transnational" Shia program of political empowerment. Especially if you have some familiarity with these countries and leaders to begin with, this book is a fascinating read.

Her Carnegie piece begins,

Still holding on to its democratic façade, the Bahraini regime has called for a national dialogue to begin on July 2, while simultaneously orchestrating wide-ranging violations of basic human rights. King Hamad announced the formation of a “fact-finding committee” to investigate the cause of the uprisings in Bahrain in a June 29 speech, in an apparent gesture to encourage opposition participation in the dialogue. By-elections are scheduled for September 24 to replace the 18 opposition MPs who resigned in February in protest of the monarchy’s violent suppression of pro-democracy demonstrators who had been emboldened by the general climate of Arab uprising. All resigning MPs were from al-Wefaq (the Accord) National Islamic Party, Bahrain’s largest political opposition group, formed in 2001 from a grouping of different trends within Bahraini Shi’i political Islam.

Read the rest.

And, finally, as an appropriate addendum to Louër's article, Al-Wasat has published today the complete list of National Dialogue participants. In case you had not yet fully appreciated this monstrosity, behold:


Of the 15 groups listed in the "political societies" column (the middle column, to give you a sense of how outnumbered politicians will be), a grand total of 2 have won seats in parliament in the last two elections. Al-Wifaq, if you were wondering, is not listed.

Sh. 'Isa Qasim and S. 'Abdallah al-Ghurayfi are listed, however, in the "individuals" category. Ironically, their names appear just before that of Sh. 'Abd al-Latif Al Mahmud.

25 More Years of Crisis

Reacting to the sentences handed down to Bahrain's main opposition leaders last week, Sh. 'Ali Salman told the BBC that the judge who issued the verdicts also ensured that "Bahrain's crisis will continue for another 25 years as well"--i.e., for as long as the men were imprisoned. And, in the first move toward a self-fulfilling prophecy, al-Wifaq has decided by omission not to take part in the al-Dhaharani-sponsored National Dialogue to commence shortly.

As far as I can tell, never did al-Wifaq say "we will not participate," but, as implied above, its rejection was by omission--that is, by failing to submit an "agenda" by the government's deadline set for Sunday the 26th. The Gulf Daily News story linked here claims that the decision came "despite some members apparently wanting to take part," a fact pro-government folks are being quick to point out.

Assuming the group will indeed boycott, the reasons are obvious enough. In recent days 'Ali Salman has outlined a number of these, in particular (1) the lack of a royal family participant:

"This dialogue will be successful if there is a principal person from Royal Family like the Crown Prince present in the process. He understands the demand and the opposition sees him as a leader, who could solve this crisis."

And (2) the watering down of al-Wifaq's representation within the dialogue by the inclusion of hundreds of delegates from various groups and societies, most of which are unrelated to politics. He says:

"The opposition groups are clearly a minority on the negotiation table. ...

"Even if Al Wefaq participates along with other groups, the opposition will represent close to 100 people with the support of other individuals."

Close to 100, that is, out of 300. And this includes other, nominal "opposition" societies such as an Ibrahim Sharif-less Wa'ad, the Progressive Tribune of Hasan Madan, and some other groups that have won a grand total of 0 seats in parliament since 2002.


The government, of course, is stressing the rate of participation rather than the political reach of those participating. The statistic de jour, for example, is the dialogue's "94% participation rate." Interestingly, however, when we look at the government's more precise breakdown, we find that the lowest participation rate by type of participant is--go figure--political societies. But, when you think about it, as long as 100% of the invited (pro-government) journalists will be there, who cares how many political societies show up to this political dialogue?


As one would expect, this "94% participation rate" gives the army of pro-government propagandists a ready-made slogan to spread via social media. The logic goes something like this: "If 94% of Bahrain is represented at the dialogue, who cares whether al-Wifaq comes or not?!!!1 They can sit home and pick dates LOL !"


As if one really needed to point out the flaw in this argument, let's do the math. According to my 2009 mass survey of Bahrain, an estimated 57.6% of Bahraini citizens are Shi'a. Of the Shi'a interviewed in my survey, 55% of those who say their views are represented by a political society identified al-Wifaq. So, by these 2009 estimates al-Wifaq represents at least 57.6% x 55% = 31.7% of the citizen Bahraini population:


(And, if one assumes that a decent number of former al-Haqq and al-Wafa' supporters have been drawn into its sphere of influence since its mass resignation from parliament and its assumption of the role of main protest organizer, this is likely a low estimate.)

More simply, if one would take the proportion directly from the parliament, al-Wifaq would then represent 18/40 or 45% of the Bahraini population--unless, of course, the government is trying to say that the majlis al-nuwab is not a representative institution. Whatever the case, the National Dialogue can't represent 94% of the Bahraini population if al-Wifaq alone represents some one-third or one-half of it. Unless one is happy with 6% as an approximation of 32% or 45%.

If a new dialogue were setup involving 1,000 members of the Al Khalifa along with, say, 80 representatives of society, and these 80 people decided the initiative wasn't worth their time because they were hopelessly outnumbered, would this dialogue then represent 93% of Bahraini society because 1000/1080 = 93%? If the invitees are not proportional to their representation of the population to begin with, then we can make up whatever such statistics we want. Anyway, I assume I am preaching to the choir here, so I'll stop there.

In lieu of the National Dialogue, al-Wifaq will on July 1 hold the third installment of its parallel dialogue, the "Festival of Sermons/Speeches," in al-Diraz, not incidentally the home village of Sh. 'Isa Qasim. Al-Wifaq seems to be going for wide geographical variation, as the first was in Saar and the second in Sitra.


Another online poster beseeches people to "renew" their "legitimate and rightful national demands on Friday in al-Diraz."


In other news, the King will give a "very important" speech tomorrow (June 29) on "the latest developments in Bahrain" after presiding over a cabinet meeting. Speculation among opposition forum-goers ranges from a release of the sports figures and doctors/nurses on trial; to a pardon of the opposition leaders just recently sentenced; to an appointment of a new leader of the national dialogue. The news of the king's speech is also among the most active threads on the main pro-government forum, where many are dreading an announcement of pardons. Whatever King Hamad says, in all probability it will render irrelevant everything I've written here about the dialogue.

If it is not about the National Dialogue specifically, though, the speech could be about the impending withdrawal of "most of" the Saudi/GCC forces (NYT article here) from Bahrain, an event the government is obviously keen to advertise. (Of course, the official figure of 1,200 has been revealed already to be a considerable understatement of the Saudi force levels in Bahrain: a Wall Street Journal article from April notes that "The Saudis publicly announced that 1,000 troops had entered Bahrain, but privately they concede that the actual number is considerably higher." So the number that remains behind is likely also to be higher than the official figure.)

(Update: Al-Ayam is citing Saudi sources in denying that any withdrawal will take place and specifically denying this Reuters report.)

I guess we'll have to wait (though not too long) to find out.

Update: the BNA is reporting rather quietly the release last night of an unspecified number of detainees from among medical personnel and athletes who had been arrested for their "parts" in anti-government protests. Many are taking the release as a signal of further concessions to the opposition (if obviously not portrayed as such) to be announced by King Hamad later today.

Unrelatedly, the U.S. has appointed career FSO and former Ambassador to Yemen Thomas Krajeski as its new Ambassador to Bahrain. Most recently, he was in Iraq helping to negotiate the permanent boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan before returning to the U.S. to serve as Vice President of the National Defense University. So: an FSO with a strong military background and experience in two fractured societies. That sounds about right. I know that when I was in Yemen in 2006 he was very well liked among Yemenis; let's see if he can overcome the current anti-U.S. fever in Bahrain.

Update 2: So much for a "historic day" in Bahrain, as some speech prognosticators were calling it. Instead, King Hamad's announcement was that of an "independent truth commission" (details here) to investigate human rights violations linked to the uprising. In short, it will be government-appointed and headed by U.S.-based human rights lawyer Mahmud Basyuni.

The funny thing is, the Bahraini government had already at the beginning of June agreed "in principle" to a UN-based mission to do the exact same thing. So presumably a government-appointed "independent" *wink wink* commission is preferable to a UN-appointed ACTUALLY independent commission.

Thus, as the Associated Press notes,

Some [read: all] suspect the king's decree to investigate alleged abuses may just be window dressing to exonerate Bahrain's rulers and allow them to continue the crackdown on opposition supporters despite criticism from rights groups and Western allies.

The Arabic text of the address is here. (Update: And the video:)



It would seem that if the government really wanted to ensure that peoples' rights were respected, it could start by not postponing the appeals of the 21 opposition leaders, many of whom were just sentenced to life in prison, to a more politically-convenient time (September). And, of course, there is still the matter of inter-Al Khalifa politics. The King may want a truly independent commission. Others--not least among them the prime minister and the khawalid--may (and likely do) not.

Will this (along with last night's release of medical/athletic prisoners and the reported (though now denied) withdrawal of Saudi forces) be enough to coax al-Wifaq to the dialogue?

Update 3: a commenter points out that the February 14 people have (as always) their own agenda for tomorrow and Friday, part of their "Week of Popular Rage." Both events are set for Jidhafs near the suq, and come with a cool-looking advertisement:


And, in case you haven't received your instructions yet, please be advised:

An Illustrated Guide to the Bahrain Uprising

While we await the decision of al-Wifaq about whether it will participate in the upcoming National Dialogue--which, if yesterday's press conference and today's Friday sermon by 'Isa Qasim are any indication (see the videos below), seems to be "No"--I thought it would be nice to put the many hours of hard work by pro-government and opposition media groups to further use by creating an Illustrated Guide to the Bahrain Uprising using only images I've found on forums, Twitter, etc.

First, though, some preliminaries. The al-Wifaq press conference starring Khalil al-Marzuq, who calls the dialogue "not serious" but insists the society still has not made up its mind about participation:



Sh. 'Isa Qasim, on the other hand, seems to have a pretty good idea. Indeed, the title of the sermon itself is "A Dialogue that Announces Its Own Failure." In it, inter alia, he asks, "Is it required of us to enter dialogue when we are wronged, oppressed and insulted while you [the government] are laughing?" Touché.



Nonetheless, the government has now extended until Sunday the deadline for dialogue "submissions of topics," conveniently (and coincidentally, I'm sure) giving al-Wifaq a few more days to arrive at a final answer.

Finally, the following are some good links from the past days that are not simply about the sentences of the opposition leaders.

1. "Hard-line Sunni voice gains audience in Bahrain" - an AP article about the growing (and once-unlikely) influence of Sh. 'Abd al-Latif Al Mahmud.


2. "Becoming the Enemy" - U.S. Iran expert Gary Sick compares Bahrain's 2011 to Iran's 2009 post-election crackdown.


3. "Washington's Spies Are in Manama Prior to the Dialogue" - You guessed it: our friend Yusif Al Bin Khalil is back at it again, this time asking "Has Washington sent its spies to Manama before the dialogue? Or is there right now a secret American delegation moving among the cities and villages of Bahrain? I don't have a clear answer to this question, but ..." let's see if I can write an entire article speculating about it!
   


4. "Bahrain and the Option of Partition" - If you answered Al Bin Khalil again you are right. I really need to keep more up to date on this guy's articles. (And, if this Tweet by Susan al-Sha'ir is correct, it may soon be easier. She says that Al-Watan is preparing to launch its own English-language website. One can only hope!) Anyway, here Al Bin Khalil raises the issue of partitioning Bahrain, a country 2.5 times the size of Washington, D.C., into Sunni and Shi'i enclaves. Yet, if you take a look at my ethnic map of Bahrain, you'll see that someone clearly has beaten him to it:




And if you're like me and just can't get enough of Al Bin Khalil, some other of his recent offerings include: "After the Iranians.. Came Washington's Role"; "The Strategic Options for Sunnis Only!"; and "The Shi'a are the Democrats; the Sunna the Monarchists!"


5. "Bahrain Doesn't Want Stability" - A piece in Foreign Policy whose title does a good job of explaining itself.


6. Finally, there is news of an escalation in the Bahrain media war. Al-Ayam is reporting that Bahrain will soon appoint three media coordinators to the U.S., Britain, and Egypt, at a reported cost of 5 million dinars (a bit more than $13 million). This has been deemed by the government considerably less expensive than the alternative, which is to stop giving foreign media reasons to run negative stories about it in the first place.
   

And now on with the show!

---

An Illustrated Guide to Bahrain's February 14 Uprising


Once upon a time, the Kingdom of Bahrain lived in social and political harmony under the tender leadership of the Al Khalifa triumvirate,


who spent their days riding horses,


and hanging out with their friends,


and shooting things.


And the people were happy.


But the blood-spewing ghost of Ayatollah Sistani was not happy!


And that snake-charmer Ayatollah Khamenei was not happy!


And Devil Obama was not happy!


And when the ghost of Ayatollah Sistani, the snake-charming Ayatollah Khamenei, and Devil Obama are not happy, then no one shall be happy!

So they decided to send their minions down to wreak havoc in the harmonious Kingdom of Bahrain.

First, there was Hasan al-Musheimi'.


And then Sh. 'Abd al-Wahhab Hussein.


And then there was former al-Asalah MP 'Isa Abu al-Fath holding a photo of Saddam Hussein. Wait, what?


Then, finally, there was that Israeli-Iranian-American Sh. 'Isa Qasim, the worst and most contradictorily-affiliated of them all.


And, lo, did these minions wreak their havoc!, taking hostage the most prized of all Bahrain's 750 roundabouts and turning it into a place of filth and temporary marriage in their filthy Shi'i way!


Who could put an end to this madness and sexual ambiguity? Was it 'Isa Abu al-Fath and the reincarnated spirit of Saddam Hussein? NO! It was Bahrain's friends to the West.. and, I guess, South.. the Arabians from the land of Saudi.

Those shit-kicking bad-asses were always ready to kick some Shi'i butt, including their king, also ever ready to strike a pose.


But who else was prepared to stand up to the Iranian minions at the Pearl Roundabout? The 450,000-strong National Unity Gathering!


And so the Al Khalifa and the Arabians from the land of Saudi mustered the troops and inspected their steel horses


and ran the Iranians out of town!


And so too did the National Unity Gathering act as a wave stabilizing the ship of Bahrain, inundated by mischief perpetrated by "the deviant sect!"


But, alas, someone was still not happy. It was devil Obama, who dared question the tactics employed by Bahrain and the Arabians from the land of Saudi! He would even sneak into the country under their noses to commiserate with his fellow Shi'is at the wailing wall in Sitra,


and to use his skills as a community organizer to oversee 'Ashura' processions.


How should the Bahraini Arabians deal with such false friends (who, incidentally, had already pissed off the Arabians from the land of Saudi)? Why, with a swift slap to the face of course!


But how to deal with the trouble-makers who brought Bahrain thus to the brink? Should they be pardoned? NO!


Should they be sent back to Iran?


The Bahraini Arabians were stumped.

But then their friends from the land of Saudi Arabia reminded them that under Bahrain's 2006 counter-terrorism law anyone can be imprisoned so long as he is a member of a terrorist organization clearly delineated by a flow chart. The Ministry of Information got to work.


Yet still one small problem remained: how to earn back the favor of all those who suffered over the past weeks and months (Oh, I didn't mention that? Yea--it turns out that everyone was fired from work and/or arrested and/or knows someone who was arrested or fired.)

The Bahraini Arabians were stumped once again. But then someone remembered about the flow charts! And dialogue! "People love dialogue!" someone said. "Oh, right! I've heard that too!" said another.

And so they designed the bestest dialogue flow chart this side of the Mississip. Surely no one could stay mad if a flow chart told them not to be!


Could you?