"Two Different Bahrains"

Another visit by a senior U.S. State Department official to Bahrain, another broad statement of support for the Bahraini government. This is reportedly Feltman's fifth visit to Bahrain since February 14. According to a State Department spokesman, he "[r]eiterat[ed] U.S. support for Bahraini national reconciliation and dialogue, he concurred with the Bahraini leadership's own embrace of the principles of reform and the respect for rule of law and coexistence." He also is said to have met with representatives of "the opposition," presumably al-Wifaq, though I've yet to find details about this.

Now this strangely rosy description of Bahrain as having "embrace[d] ... the principles of reform and the respect for rule of law and coexistence" seemed to strike a lot of reporters at the press conference in Washington as odd, especially given the recent prison deaths, random arrests of citizens thought to form part of the opposition, persecution of journalists, and so on. As the very first reporter exclaimed,

I’m quite surprised by the tone of your statement because it seems like the push for demand for the respect of the rights of Bahrainis has been toned down quite a lot.

And then the next:

It sounds as if you’re talking about two different Bahrains because we’ve been talking at the podium about how horrible the situation is in Bahrain right now and U.S. concerns, whereas none of what you just said really reflected the seriousness of the situation there.

Let's everyone hope that the U.S. is saying things in private that it is not in public.

The full transcript of the press conference is pasted below, and I would suggest you take the time to read it. (Note again that this took place in Washington; I am not aware of remarks that Feltman made while in Bahrain.)

QUESTION: Can I start with Bahrain? So this time, Mr. Feltman was able to meet with leaders. How high were his meetings and how – I’m quite surprised by the tone of your statement because it seems like the push for demand for the respect of the rights of Bahrainis has been toned down quite a lot. You highlighted the concerns about Iran and your longstanding commitment to the people and the government who have been at loggerheads in recent weeks. Has this tone softened?

MR. TONER: Well, again, you’ve summarized some of what I said. But he also underscored the United States’ belief in universal values and conveyed that belief to the Bahraini authorities. And he also emphasized the fundamental need for respect for human rights. So I wouldn’t say there’s been any softening, but these talks took place in a very constructive atmosphere.

And we believe that this was done in a constructive manner and progress was made, and that going forward, we urge both that ongoing respect for human rights, but as well as the opposition and the Bahraini Government to engage in a political dialogue that leads to resolution.

QUESTION: Can you tell us some of the things that you expressed concerns about – the deaths in prisons, maybe?

MR. TONER: I think I – I mean, I think I’ve spoken to all of the incidents about which we have concern over the past week, including, as you noted, the death of a prominent human rights activist last week.

QUESTION: There are continued, I mean, deaths and human rights abuses taking place in Bahrain that have been documented by human rights groups over the last week and – I mean, the situation in Bahrain has been getting really bad. Last week, there were numerous criticisms of the United States and its approach to Bahrain, and, I mean, even if you’re couching your language at this podium, I hope that we can expect that – I mean, that Secretary Feltman took – can you say that he raised some of these serious issues?

And it sounds as if you’re talking about two different Bahrains because we’ve been talking at the podium about how horrible the situation is in Bahrain right now and U.S. concerns, whereas none of what you just said really reflected the seriousness of the situation there.

MR. TONER: Well, Elise, again, I disagree. Secretary Feltman went to Bahrain. He went there both to speak to the government as well as to the opposition, met with a wide range of actors, and did so in a constructive spirit. But we’ve been very, very clear about where we stand on this, that the Bahraini Government needs to respect human rights and needs to address the legitimate aspirations of its own people, and that was conveyed.

Yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION: Different subject. I’ll just wait. Can – sorry. Can you explain what the concerns were about Iran’s exploitation? Was that particular to Bahrain in this case? And what is Iran’s exploitation of the crisis?

MR. TONER: Well, again, I don’t want to get into – too deeply into details and specifics, but others have expressed that concern both with regard to Syria and with regard to Bahrain, the situation there, that Iran continues to play a less than constructive role in the region.

Now for some other interesting bits of news. First, on the same day that the State Department met with their Bahraini friends in Manama, the Bahraini prime minister met with his in Riyadh.

Then we hear from Sh. Khalid bin Ahmad that GCC troops "will leave [Bahrain] when they are done with any external threat" from Iran. "The external threat is a regional one," he continued. "The external threat is a complete misunderstanding between the GCC and Iran. This is a threat." A funny definition of what a threat is, but I suppose that means that we should not expect to see GCC forces leave anytime soon. I'm not sure anyone was.

Finally, the newest war of words between Iran and Saudi Arabia has made for some good quotes bordering on open threats. Here is one from Turki bin Sa'ud in response to a protest outside the Saudi embassy in Tehran:

We hope that these continuous violations will not lead us to take other positions. ... We hope not to resort to other measures, However if matters reached an unacceptable level then it is our right to protect our citizens.

And then the "Supreme Leader's Advisor for Military Affairs Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi":

The presence and attitude of Saudi Arabia [in Bahrain] sets an incorrect precedence for similar future events, and Saudi Arabia should consider this fact that one day the very same event may recur in Saudi Arabia itself and Saudi Arabi may come under invasion for the very same excuse.

Nice.

Update: Another interesting development in the last day or two is the spamming of anti-opposition/anti-Shi'a stories on Twitter, presumably by government supporters:


Who said the social revolution is useful only to regime opponents?

Stop Me If You've Heard This One

Here's one for you: what do a prominent defense attorney, a vascular surgeon, and a champion bodybuilder have in common? If you answered that they were all arrested by the Bahraini government in the past week, bringing the total to some 571 people in state custody without having been charged with a crime (according to the BCHR), you are right. Please proceed to the Interior Ministry in Salmaniyyah to claim your prize, a year's subscription to Al-Watan.

Around 11:00pm on Friday, police stormed the home of Mohammed al-Tajar, who is well-known for defending opposition figures and other highly political cases, most recently the 25 Shi'a activists who were on trial for "terrorism" and for attempting to overthrow the Bahraini government back when people still viewed that as the pinnacle of injustice and lawlessness in Bahrain. (Incidentally, though 23 of these 25 were pardoned in the early stages of protests some weeks ago, one cannot look back on this episode without thinking, "If 250,000 people in the streets couldn't overthrow the Bahraini government a month ago, these 25 activists must have been dangerous fellows indeed.")

Beyond the most high-profile case of al-Tajar, we find also that the vascular surgeon mentioned above, Sadiq Abdullah, "is one of nearly 20 Bahraini doctors who have been arrested or gone missing since the government crackdown began. Human Rights Watch claims that at least eight doctors have been arrested in the last week alone." And, last but not least, "Tareq al-Fursani, a gold medalist in several Asian championships," was the latest to be arrested from among Bahrain's Shi'a sports stars accused of having taken part in demonstrations.

Beyond arrests per se, the Guardian is reporting continued attempts by the Bahraini authorities to recall government-funded students from the U.K. for their participation in an anti-government rally in Manchester. Thankfully, the Foreign Office not being the U.S. State Department, they publicly rejected the maneuver, saying in a statement, "We have made clear to the Bahraini government that, unless these individuals commit a criminal offence in the UK, they will be free to carry out their activities in line with UK laws."

Next in the ongoing crackdown on professionals, the Bahrain News Agency on Sunday announced the firing of 111 Ministry of Education employees for participation in strikes and demonstrations (a.k.a. "flagrant violations" of the country's civil service law).

Then consider this ominous-sounding article in the pro-government Gulf Daily News describing a "day of reckoning" for businessmen who did not display sufficient loyalty during the past three months:

Yesterday was a day of reckoning for Bahrain businessmen who sat on the fence and kept silent while the country was confronting a coup attempt.

"We were astonished that no voice rose from the trade sector against the unrest, although it was the first to suffer damage," His Royal Highness Prime Minister Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa said.

He expressed his dismay as he received at Gudaibiya Palace traders and businessmen, who flocked to renew their allegiance to the leadership and voice support for the measures taken by the government to maintain security and stability.

So essentially the Prime Minister summoned leading businessmen to his palace simply in order to chastise them en masse. I have a feeling that the effective tax rate for these individuals just went up considerably.

Finally, since it doesn't look good to have a non-functioning parliament in a country that likens itself to a democracy, Bahrain will hold new elections to replace the 11 al-Wifaq MPs whose resignations were accepted. If I understand this correctly, the elections will take place only in those districts no longer represented (i.e., the districts of the resigned officials). I haven't looked to see which districts these are, but I wonder if this might help explain which MPs' resignations were accepted and which not. It may also relate to the aborted attempt to dissolve al-Wifaq, which presumably would have then been barred from official participation in the upcoming elections.

Finally again, Prof. Augustus Richard Norton has done everyone the favor of writing into the Boston Globe to respond to that ridiculous op-ed on Bahrain I dissected a while back. He writes,

JULIETTE KAYYEM (“Bahrain is the line in the sand,’’ Op-ed, April 9) informs Globe readers that Iran is seen as “a guiding force’’ in the Arab uprisings, especially in Bahrain. There is no credible evidence that Iran guided, planned, or inspired the peaceful demonstrations that began in mid-February, notwithstanding the sometime shrill claims of the Bahraini monarch and his entourage. It is striking that Kayyem, a former official in the Department of Homeland Security, has nothing to say about the economic despair and discrimination that afflict the majority of Bahrain’s population — factors that lent impetus to the protests but that have been minimized by the rulers.

Kayyem makes the odd claim that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened after an opportunity for reform had been missed. It is quite likely that the Saudi-led intervention was precisely intended to sabotage US-encouraged reforms. The Saudi monarchy has long been committed to quashing reform, both inside the kingdom and in the smaller states of the Gulf, not least in its Bahraini dependency.

The repression, censorship, and punitive policies now being pursued in Bahrain may open up opportunities for Iranian meddling, but this will stem from the avoidance of reform, not from people peacefully seeking better treatment from their government.

Update: I almost forgot. Today is the first day of the Zainab al-Khawajah-inspired mass hunger strike in Bahrain, claiming to be the world's largest. It seems that some U.S. academics are also taking part in solidarity.

Also, it turns out that, despite recent appearances, in fact it IS still illegal to kill people in Bahrain--but evidently only if they work for the government. The BNA is announcing that 7 anti-government protesters will stand in military court accused of "premeditated murder of a government employee."

Who Comes After the "Moderates"?: Political Affiliation among Bahraini Shi'a

Preliminary Note: I debated whether to attempt to get (a more general version of) this piece placed as an op-ed or an article, etc., since I think it tells us something important about what to expect moving forward in Bahrain. But given my poor luck in the past I've decided against it. So if there are any editors out there that agree with me, let me know. Otherwise, as always, imagine yourself browsing the Foreign Affairs website as you read this.

In light of all the commentary surrounding yesterday's move to dissolve al-Wifaq by Bahrain's Justice and Islamic Affairs Ministry, only to be followed by news today that this largest of Bahraini political societies has not been banned, or at least not until the end of the government's ongoing "investigation"--in light of all this, I thought it may be useful to examine the larger pattern of political affiliation among Bahraini Shi'a as suggested by the results of my 2009 mass survey of Bahrain. (If you don't know what this is, see here, for example.)

Apart from revealing the extent of the country's Shi'a population that would essentially be "driven underground" (as one commentator here recently noted) if al-Wifaq were indeed to be outlawed, these findings also help clarify the bases of political affiliation and orientation in Bahrain. More specifically, as we shall see shortly, the individual-level characteristics commonly thought to dictate whether one is a more "moderate" al-Wifaq supporter or more "hard-line" supporter of say, al-Haqq, in fact find little evidence in my Bahrain survey data. But more of this in a bit.

Bahrainis were asked the following open-ended question: "Which of the existing societies (associations) is closest to representing your political, social, and economic views?" In Arabic:

أي من جمعيات (منظمات) القائمة هي الأقرب لتمثيل طموحاتك السياسية، والاجتماعية، والاقتصادية؟

Of 249 Shi‘i respondents, representing some 58% of the total sample--a far cry, incidentally, from the standard population estimate of 65-70%, diluted over the previous decade in a program that opponents have termed "political naturalization"--a full 40% of respondents said that none of the existing societies represented their political views. Another 7% refused to answer outright. But what of the remainder?

Among Bahraini Shi‘a who identified with a political society, a little over half, 55%, named al-Wifaq. A further 10% of respondents aligned with socialist-leaning Wa‘ad, which attracts Sunnis together with Shi‘is and was originally invited to participate in the national dialogue initiative alongside al-Wifaq, only to be banned a week ago some time after the arrest of its Secretary General, Ebrahim Sharif, and later its Assistant Secretary General. Around 15% of Shi‘is, finally, mentioned various lesser-known societies, including local charities, human rights organizations, and liberal parties. These proportions we see in the graphic below.


The remainder—approximately 20%—identified al-Haqq. If this figure would thus seem to be encouraging for Bahrain's rulers, a deeper analysis proves to be less so. For one thing, at the time the survey was conducted, Sh. 'Abd al-Wahhab Hussain's Islamic Loyalty Movement was but a nascent organization known only as “the New Movement.” Now it is an important actor that competes for supporters with al-Haqq and al-Wifaq alike. Indeed, its Arabic name, al-Wafa’ al-Islami, is itself a riff on al-Wifaq. (If you hadn't guessed already, the heads of al-Wafa' have already been arrested and their homes ransacked.)

Moreover, contrary to the standard cliché that the most ardent political opponents in Bahrain are simply the poorest and least educated, with the most objective cause for complaint and least opportunity for social mobility, in fact there is no difference in household economy between survey respondents who support al-Haqq over against al-Wifaq. Neither is there any difference in education. As we gather from the graph below, only Wa'ad supporters are on average more highly educated (measured on an increasing 1-7 scale) and perhaps more economically-satisfied (on a decreasing 1-4 scale).

Together, these results cast real doubt on the idea that government opponents can simply be bought off with new jobs and housing projects paid for by Bahrain's rulers or, as attempted more recently, subsidized by suddenly-altruistic GCC countries. (Of course, with so many respondents refusing to answer this question, these conclusions should be treated only as preliminary.)


Yet perhaps most ominous for the prospect of political reconciliation in Bahrain is the picture that emerges when one looks at individuals’ actual responses to the question about their political leanings. “Al-Wifaq,” said one respondent, adding “but they don’t accomplish anything.” Many others expressed even more frustration: “al-Haqq, previously al-Wifaq.” And this in early 2009. Imagine the feelings in April 2011, even if the government ultimately decides not to dissolve al-Wifaq (an outcome that in any case is still far from certain).

Here, then, is the real danger: that supporters of al-Wifaq, whether for disagreement with its political positions per se or out of exasperation with the current lack of progress and indeed backward progress, turn (or have already turned) instead to more radical solutions. In which case the Coalition for a Republic of Bahrain may be the least of Bahrain's rulers' worries. Writing in Foreign Policy, Hussein Ibish asks outright whether the government's policy is setting the stage for a more violent sort of movement to arise--even, according to him, "a terrorist threat."

While one hopes and presumes we've not reached that stage yet (though I think Ibish vastly overestimates the tactical feasibility of guerrilla warfare in Bahrain), Bahrain's rulers do seem bent on encouraging a self-fulfilling prophecy to back up their claims that anti-regime protesters are not political opponents but Iranian-inspired, Shi'a terrorists. So far Bahrainis have not taken the bait. But this has been helped in no small part by the moderating role of religious-cum-political authorities such as Sh. 'Isa Qasim and Sh. 'Ali Salman, precisely the individuals the government will effectively serve to ostracize through its persecution of al-Wifaq. By cracking down on the only "moderates" left in Bahrain, whom do the Bahraini authorities expect will take their place?

And Then There Were None

What's better than arresting the leaders of all opposition groups except for al-Wifaq if you're the Bahraini government? Evidently, arresting the leaders of all opposition groups except for al-Wifaq and then BANNING al-Wifaq (along with the Islamic Action Society) so that no official opposition remains at all. And THEN, presumably, you can arrest the leaders and members of al-Wifaq as well (those of al-'Amal al-Islami have been under arrest for a while now) for involvement in an "illegal society." That's what we call a win-win.

The government statement, though short on details, says it all:

"The Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs announced it is raising legal action to dissolve the Islamic Action [Society] and al-Wifaq Society. ...This is because of major violations of the constitution and laws of the kingdom, undertaking activities that harmed social peace, national unity, and inciting disrespect for constitutional institutions."

Current (or former?) MP 'Abd al-Jalil Khalil confirmed the measure but did not say more.

The ironic thing, of course, and the thing that must be hard to swallow if you're an al-Wifaq supporter or member, is that the bloc existed explicitly for the purpose of "taking part in the political process," as we like to say. And for that they took no little heat from ordinary Shi'a and their own would-be constituents, leading ultimately to the al-Wifaq/al-Haqq split back in the run-up to the 2006 parliamentary elections. (And yet even with this intra-Shi'a schism al-Wifaq still managed well over half the popular vote in both the 2006 and 2010 elections.)

Ever since, those who chose to remain loyal to the original al-Wifaq principle (now represented by al-Haqq, al-Wafa' al-Islami, and others) of total disengagement from the regime have pointed to the group as a symbol of political co-optation. "What good has participation done us? The government will continue its same policies regardless of whether we participate," people would say mockingly. Doubtless those same people are reiterating this position today, perhaps with no little sense of vindication.

As for the other side, pro-government Bahrainis seem to be saying, "It's about damn time!" Such is the jist of this thread on the pro-regime Kingdom of Bahrain forum. One can infer the view of al-Wifaq from its detractors from this popular photoshop of Sh. 'Isa Qasim, who if not the official head of al-Wifaq is still assumed to be its spiritual leader:


One has ask about the timing, however. Today is Thursday, making tomorrow Friday, making tomorrow the day Arab governments everywhere have hoped to avoid for the past 3 months. Perhaps the logic is that, "If neither the opposition nor their supposed patron Iran will respond violently to our provocations, perhaps we should give them a real reason to be angry." (See Hussein Ibish's related argument in Foreign Policy.) Just as people aren't fired from work on Monday, it seems strange to announce this today.

Or, maybe the Bahraini authorities are just looking to pull an administrative coup on al-Wifaq such as they did on Al-Wasat. Maybe we will see Sh. 'Ali Salman replaced with, say, Sh. Jasim al-Sa'idi.

If any good should come of this newest escalation, perhaps it will serve as the final straw in pushing the U.S. toward a more critical stance in Bahrain. After all, it is easy for the Obama administration to defend an ally facing mass protests; less easy but still doable to defend an ally while it carries out sweeping crackdowns in the name of security; but it's hard to see how the U.S. can remain silent as Bahrain makes no effort at all to conceal its now-clear political intentions--which obviously do not include "dialogue," as there is now no one left to dialogue with--and to drive the region further toward a sectarian abyss.

Until now, the U.S. could always fall back on the position that, "Well, the protesters should be expressing their frustrations through the proper political channels, not through mass demonstrations and general strikes." No longer is this true. As one of my Bahrain survey respondents said when asked his opinion of the current political situation in Bahrain, "ما في سياسة في البحرين"--"There is no politics in Bahrain."

Update: Sure enough, the U.S. has been quick to condemn this, and the Bahrainis have responded with the most convoluted (or most poorly translated) statement possible, the jist of which is that the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs is waiting for the end of its "investigation" into al-Wifaq and al-'Amal before doing anything. Now if only Bahrain TV would run an exposé about plagiarized articles on al-Wifaq's website, the government would have an open-and-shut case.

Also see this piece in the Christian Science Monitor I helped inform titled "Why U.S. Silence on Bahrain's Crackdown Could Backfire."

Iran, the New U.S. Position on Bahrain, and the Dick Cheney Scale of Meddling

Wonder no more! The long-awaited U.S. evidence of Iranian "meddling" in Bahraini affairs has finally been revealed in an exposé in the Wall Street Journal. So what is this damning piece of evidence catching the Iranians red-handed? Did the U.S. intercept an arms shipment to Bahraini "rebels?" Record a telephone call from opposition sponsors in Iran revealing a plan for an impending invasion? Capture e-mails and text messages containing sensitive information about Bahrain's military installations for use by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard?

Actually, not quite. It turns out that the evidence that Iran is meddling in Bahrain is that... it is providing logistical support to the Syrian government, "providing gear to suppress crowds and assistance blocking and monitoring protesters' use of the Internet, cellphones and text-messaging." Now, I'm no logician, but there must be some sort of logical fallacy best expressed in Latin that describes this argument. Iran is interfering in A, ergo it is interfering in B. Never mind that A happens to be a government it's long-supported while B is a nebulous group of opposition demonstrators that happen to adhere to its state-sponsored religious beliefs.

To put this level of Iranian interference into perspective, refer to the Dick Cheney Scale of Meddling below (a nod to the Gary Busey Scale of Ugliness), where 0 represents no involvement and 10 represents Dick Cheney-esque levels of meddling. We see that Iran currently earns only about a 3.0 rating. Although I suppose this represents an upgrade from its previous level as indicated by Gates' comments last week in Riyadh that the U.S. has evidence that the Iranians "are TRYING to exploit the situation in Bahrain."


Except actually it isn't. The Wall Street Journal piece goes on to read more like an indictment of the Bahraini government than an exoneration, lending even further evidence to my inkling expressed in yesterday's article that we are beginning to see a subtle change in the U.S. position toward Bahrain, one driven by the realization that the political cesspool that is Bahrain is highly advantageous for Iranian foreign policy.

We read, for example, that "[s]ome U.S. officials have expressed surprise that Shiite-dominated Iran hasn't intervened more aggressively to support Mr. Assad and Shiites in Bahrain" (my emphasis), which is hardly an endorsement of the Saudi and larger GCC position.

Then we get to a very interesting paragraph:

The Obama administration repeatedly pressed Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia and Bahrain not to use force against largely Shiite protesters, according to U.S. officials, fearing that would provide Iran with an excuse to start meddling in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Middle East. ... "We told them not to use force because it would provide Iran with an excuse," a senior U.S. official said. "They didn't listen."

Again, not exactly a show of solidarity with the Bahrainis and Saudis. Then:

A U.S. defense official said Iranian policy makers are seriously debating how much aid, if any, to provide to Bahrain's opposition. Another U.S. official said some intelligence indicated that Iran has made small-scale transfers of money and light weapons—"a few dozen guns, maybe less, definitely not more"—into Bahrain. Much of the intelligence suggests Iran and Hezbollah were focused now on using propaganda to assert influence among restive Shiites.

Other Iranian officials appear content to let Bahrain's leaders become more repressive, which the defense official said is "probably more effective at getting people riled up against the king" than anything Tehran could do.

Therefore, despite the introductory claims of the article that "by voicing concerns about Iran's activities, the U.S. appears to be trying to close ranks, at least in part, with Saudi and Bahraini leaders whose warnings about Tehran's influence in their internal affairs have long been played down in Washington"--despite these claims, in fact it seems that the new U.S. disclosures reveal its skepticism of the GCC's argument.

As we wrote yesterday, it seems administration brass are realizing that the best way to make sure that Iranian influence DEFINITELY grows in the region is to allow a Mideast-wide Sunni-Shi'i split to fester as a result of political stagnation in Bahrain. Indeed, as quoted above, the Iranians are happy to allow Bahrain's rulers do their dirty work for them--"getting people riled up against the king" through their own doings rather than through any direct interference from abroad. All Iranian leaders have to do now is sit back and watch the violence and continued stalemate linger in Bahrain, with the knowledge that more and more ordinary Bahrainis are likely to view the country as their sole supporter amid a sea of GCC occupiers. (Update: this basic argument is now being taken up by Hussein Ibish in Foreign Affairs, who asks whether the Bahraini government is creating "a new terrorist threat.")

And finally, the U.S. cannot be pleased with the growing independence of the GCC as a regional bloc and of the Saudis in particular, who chose yesterday to announce a new deal with the Chinese to begin a "domestic nuclear program"--though strictly for energy purposes. Sound familiar?

Expect the U.S. to start increasing the pressure a few notches in Bahrain. The Guardian is already demanding it, and this State Department statement seems to be a tentative movement in that direction.

Update: Well, all of this has now come true, though mostly at the Bahraini government's own doing. The U.S. and others have spoken strongly against the decision to "investigate" al-Wifaq and the Islamic Action Society, and the U.S. Undersecretary for Near Eastern Affairs is headed to Bahrain next week for what will be, one imagines, some interesting meetings.

Winning the Battle, Losing the (Media) War: Hunger Strike Edition

It seems that the Western media and senior U.S. officials have finally realized that the problem in Bahrain did not miraculously solve itself--go figure. Helped no doubt by the lack of (or backward) progress in Libya, international attention has once again been re-focused upon Bahrain, and once again the Bahraini government is getting slammed in the press. And, relatively-speaking, by Hillary Clinton, who spoke specifically of Bahrain's need to accelerate political reforms in her speech at Tuesday's opening of the U.S.-Islamic Forum in Washington.

Not only this, but everyone knows that the traditional media are suckers for hunger strikes, and Zainab al-Khawajah's seems to be doing the trick, getting wide coverage at CNN (who since its journalists in Bahrain were arrested probably needs no excuse to run an anti-Bahrain story), the New York Times, and elsewhere. (Also, it doesn't hurt when her sister, Maryam, braves secret service to accost Hillary Clinton after her speech in Washington.)

Further, it's clear that almost a half-dozen people dying in your prison in less than 2 days is also something you should try to avoid if you're an authoritarian government. Especially if the people who are dying are facing ambiguous charges, haven't been given access to lawyers, appear as if they've been beaten and/or tortured, and if you're attempting to give the impression that they are the terrorists.

The two most recent casualties, for example, were a blogger, Zakariya al-Ashiri, and a businessman associated with al-Wifaq, Kareem Fakhrawi. The latter disappeared a week ago after failing to return home from a police station "where he had tried to complain about his house being demolished by police." What can you say about that?

Last but not least, the New York Times is running a page 1 article today on the embattled Salmaniyyah Hospital, which is described as "an apparatus of state terrorism":

At least a dozen doctors and nurses have been arrested and held prisoner during the last month, and more paramedics and ambulance drivers are missing. Ambulances have been blocked from aiding wounded patients, according to health care workers and human rights advocates.

(For those who write in to say I am biased: I am aware that this is a contested interpretation. The article linked here contains the government's side of the story as well, so find it there.)

Yet for all this renewed media coverage, I would wager that what really has begun to turn the tide in favor of a stronger U.S. position on Bahrain is the realization that, as I wrote some weeks ago, if the main driver of U.S. policy here (apart from the whole navy base thing) is its fear of Iranian influence growing in the region, the best way to make sure that Iranian influence DEFINITELY grows in the region is to allow a Mideast-wide Sunni-Shi'i split to fester as a result of political stagnation in Bahrain.

Not only this, but the lingering conflict has created new international divisions (GCC versus Lebanon, GCC versus Iraq) and altered power relations (a seemingly more unified and U.S.-independent GCC) that did not exist previously. Indeed, with oil at $130 a barrel, the GCC states may begin to feel that the West needs them as much as or more than they the West.

Thus we see today that GCC countries are demanding the cancellation of the upcoming Arab summit because it is to be held in Iraq, whose Shi'a politicians and population have been rallying in support of Bahraini Shi'a in recent weeks. Bahrain has already strained relations with Lebanon for pro-Shi'a statements by Hizballah leaders, cutting air routes to Beirut and deporting Lebanese nationals in Bahrain for "security" reasons, a move that has forced Sa'ad Hariri to go to Bahrain personally to attempt to mend relations.

More generally, as aptly captured in the title of this al-Arabiyyah piece--"War of words over Bahrain rattles region"--it is clear that the crackdown in Bahrain has only made the Arab Gulf and wider Middle East MORE rather than LESS vulnerable to Iranian "meddling," as we like to say. Bahrainis know it, we here at Religion and Politics in Bahrain know it, and it seems the Obamaman is coming to know it. Now if we could just convince the Pentagon...

All of this bodes rather poorly for the Bahraini (or Bahraini Arabian) government, or at least for its continued unchecked lock-down of the entire island. The problem is, once the government finally comes around (or is pushed back) to the negotiating table, who will be there to meet them from the opposition? And who from among the Bahraini population--from those who have been harassed at checkpoints, fired from work, whose family members have been arrested, injured, or killed--are likely to be satisfied with what the state is offering? And if they're not, what are they going to do about it? The current situation has the look of a vicious circle.

Update: see also the previous editions of this fan-favorite segment:

Winning the Battle, Losing the (Media) War (the original)

Winning the Battle, Losing the (Media) War: Al-Wasat Edition

Update 2: As noted by an intrepid commentator, my suspicion that we are beginning to see a subtle change in the U.S. position gets some evidence in this statement overnight (for me) from the State Department, which offers the diplomatic trifecta: "we are deeply concerned ..."; "we'd strongly urge the government of Bahrain to ..."; and "we call on the Bahraini government to ..."

Sunnis, Shi'is, and the Third Sect

Since things seem to have gone quiet in Bahrain apart from hunger strikes, continuing Iran-GCC recriminations, deportation of random Lebanese nationals, the trial of Mansur al-Jamri, and perhaps soon that of Nabil Rajab, I thought I would take a moment to address one issue that's been raised often, both in general commentary on Bahrain and by those who've written in to this site.

Particularly in reference to my Bahrain survey results, a standard retort is something like the following: "Your view of the Bahrain conflict in terms of Sunnis against Shi'is evidences both your misunderstanding of the situation and your having been duped by the Bahraini government, which uses the false Sunni-Shi'i dichotomy for its own political purposes--i.e., to ensure its own survival--when it fact no such thing exists. If you really looked hard, you would see that the basis of political conflict in Bahrain is [insert favorite topic] and not a difference between ordinary Sunnis and Shi'is."

And with this sort of sentiment I would tend to agree--to a point. I would agree and indeed it's indisputable that it is a useful thing for governments--not just Arab Gulf governments or the Bahraini government but all essentially non-democratic governments--to accentuate latent social divisions like ethnic/religious affiliation to foster competition for its patronage. In fact, Bahraini rulers make little secret about the fact that they attempt to play each group off the other. In the words of Justice Minister Khalid bin 'Ali in the run-up to the 2010 elections, the Al Khalifa position themselves a "buffer zone between Sunni and Shi'a." That is to say, the Al Khalifa ensure that neither group gains too big an advantage over the other that it begins to focus its energy on the government itself, just as the U.S. aided both sides of the Iran-Iraq War depending on who seemed to be winning at the time.

Yet at the same time, it makes little sense to deny that the latent social division exists in the first place, to say that Iran and Iraq were essentially not at odds with each other but only went to war as a result of some U.S. scheme to divide and conquer. A women can pit two potential suitors against each other and make them enemies, but that does not mean that they were not essentially in competition to begin with.

Thus it is, I would say, in Bahrain. The "third sect"--the Al Khalifa and their longstanding tribal allies (also known in parliament as "independents")--may be skilled in maximizing societal differences to their own ends, but we shouldn't therefore conclude that there is otherwise no independent source of these differences.

How then would we explain why some cars in Bahrain display the prominent sticker decal "اللهم صلّ على محمد وآل محمد", while others not? Why some houses fly black flags or those exclaiming, "يا حسين يا شهي", while others have the red and white flag of Bahrain? Why the 'Isa Town Mall has separate Sunni and Shi'i mosques at either end? Why each of Bahrain's three main political societies is based on religious affiliation? And so on. The point, again, is not that Bahraini Sunnis and Shi'is are locked in some epic war to decide good and evil, but that it's equally nonsensical to deny altogether any basis of societal division apart from political puppeteering.

Political scientists have long recognized that in patronage-based societies such as describe the Arab Gulf, the only real basis for political coordination is ethnicity or religion. "Consider," says Yates of a rentier society, "the following options for class-based politics: a declining rural-agricultural sector; a state-sponsored industrial sector; a booming service sector. Whence the revolution?" And Luciani, writing in 1989, predicted that in regimes such as Bahrain "parties will develop only to represent cultural or ideological orientations. In practice, Islamic fundamentalism appears to be the only rallying point around which something approaching a party can form in the Arab allocation states."

In the Bahrain of the 1960s and 1970s, socialism/Arab nationalism was (and for Wa'ad supporters perhaps still is) an alternative ideology around which political coordination could occur. That this function has since been overtaken by religious ideology is not unanticipated, and those who point it out are not automatically "sectarian" thinkers "reading from the script that [they] are regurgitating parrot fashion from the Shi'ites," to use the expression of one recent commentator here.

Finally, with specific regard to the results of my Bahrain survey: the Sunni-Shi'i differences that manifest themselves in the answers to survey questions, and that are often highlighted in my analysis, exist. Whether they exist because of machinations by the Bahraini government is another matter entirely. The point is that in Bahrain today ethnicity/religion has become a proxy for the extent to which one supports (tends to gain from) or opposes (tends not to gain from) the socio-political status quo. Most Shi'a oppose the regime on principle insofar as they are outsiders looking in; Sunnis support the government on principle, in order, as 'Adel al-Ma'awdah said in attempting to spur Sunnis to the polls in 2002, "to counter probable harm" that would come from not supporting it. This is the primary lesson of my Bahrain survey, and we continue to see the consequences of it today. So let's stop chalking it up to "sectarian thinking" or lack of familiarity with the "real" bases of politics of Bahrain.

(Also: in the spirit of survey research and not unrelated to this point anyway, don't forget to vote in the new poll I've opened: "Why do you hate this blog?" You have many fine options to choose from.)